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
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

PRESIDENT LINCOLN AND HIS SON "TAD."

ABRAHAM LINCOLN

A HISTORY

BY JOHN G. NICOLAY
AND JOHN HAY

VOLUME EIGHT

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ILLUSTRATIONS

Vol. VIII

President Lincoln and His Son "Tad" ..... *Frontispiece*
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PAGE

Judah P. Benjamin 16
From a photograph lent by James Blair.

George Bancroft 32
From a drawing by J. W. Alexander.

General Gordon Granger 48
From a photograph by Brady.

General D. H. Hill 64
From a photograph by Cook.

General Bushrod R. Johnson 80
From a photograph by Anderson-Cook.

General James A. Garfield 96
From an autotype by Edward Bierstadt.

General Alexander McD. McCook 112
From a photograph by Brady.

General William F. Smith 128
From a photograph.

General Braxton Bragg 144
From a photograph by Anderson-Cook.

General Simon B. Buckner 160
From a photograph by Anthony.

General James Longstreet 192
From a photograph.

Facsimile of Mr. Lincoln's Autographic Copy of His Gettysburg Address 200

EDWARD EVERETT 208
From a photograph by Brady.

LINCOLN'S EXECUTIVE OFFICE AND CABINET-ROOM IN THE WHITE HOUSE 224
From a drawing by Delancey Gill.

GENERAL ALEXANDER S. WEBB 240
From a photograph by Brady.

CAPTAIN JAMES D. BULLOCH 272
From a photograph by Kurtz.

GENERAL A. J. SMITH 288
From a photograph by Brady.

BENJAMIN WADE 304
From a daguerreotype.

GENERAL LEONIDAS POLK, BISHOP OF LOUISIANA 336
From a photograph by Morse.

GENERAL J. E. B. STUART 352
From a photograph by Anderson-Cook.

GENERAL JAMES S. WADSWORTH 368
From a photograph by Brady.

GENERAL JOHN SEDGWICK 384
From a photograph by Brady.

GENERAL RICHARD H. ANDERSON 400
From a photograph.

GENERAL FREDERICK STEELE 416
From a photograph lent by Colonel Thomas L. Snead.

ANDREW JOHNSON 448
From a photograph by Brady.

GENERAL LEW WALLACE 464
From a photograph by Brady.

GENERAL ALFRED PLEASONTON 480
From a photograph by Gardner.

MAPS

VOL. VIII

PAGE

THE TULLAHOMA CAMPAIGN 68
THE VICINITY OF CHATTANOOGA 69
BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA 86
BATTLE OF CHATTANOOGA 136

The Knoxville Campaign 168
Battle of Knoxville 176
The Vicinity of Fort Sanders, Knoxville 180
Northern Virginia 232
Positions of Opposing Forces at Mine Run, November, 1863 244
The Red River, Arkansas, and Missouri Campaigns of 1864 302
The Wilderness, May 4, 1864 356
The Wilderness, May 5, ,, ... 359
The Wilderness, May 6, ,, ... 365
Spotsylvania, May 8–21, ,, ... 373
North Anna 388
Drewry's Bluff, Bermuda Hundred, and Deep Bottom .. 394
Cold Harbor 402

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Vol. VIII

Chapter I. Conspiracies in the North

Secret Societies. Their Various Names. Their Numbers. Their Constitutions and Declarations of Principles. Their Methods of Operation. Communication with the Rebels. The Indiana Trials. Evidence of Participants. The Indiana Legislature and Governor Morton. Rosecrans's Discovery. Action of the President. The Case of the Chesapeake. Thompson's Mission in Canada. Trial and Execution of J. Y. Beall. The Camp Douglas Plot. Thompson's Incendiary Scheme. The St. Albans' Raid. Action of the Canadian Government 1

Chapter II. Habeas Corpus

Opinion of Attorney-General Bates. The Question Discussed. Opinion of Horace Binney. Action of the Senate. Orders of the President. Congress Passes an Act of Indemnity. Letter from George Bancroft. Habeas Corpus Suspended during the Draft. Case of George W. Jones. Sparing Use of the Power of Suspension. Arbitrary Action of the Confederate Authorities 28

Chapter III. The March to Chattanooga

Rosecrans's Long Delay at Murfreesboro'. His Reasons for it. His Complaints of a Lack of Cavalry. His Controversies with the Government. Occupation dur-

ing the Winter and Spring. Streight's Cavalry Expedition. Its Failure. Morgan's Raid in Indiana and Ohio. Thieving. Capture of Morgan and his Command. His Subsequent Career and Death. Rosecrans Proposes to March Southward. Discussion of Plans. The March to Tullahoma. Correspondence with the President. The March to Chattanooga. Its Difficulties. Brilliant Strategy of Rosecrans. Bragg Evacuates, Rosecrans Occupies Chattanooga 43

CHAPTER IV. CHICKAMAUGA

Rosecrans thinks Bragg is Retreating. Endeavors to Intercept him. Bragg Concentrates upon the Union Center in McLemore's Cove. His Plans Miscarry. Rosecrans Brings his Army Together. Bragg's Plan of Attack. The Battle of Chickamauga, September 19. The Attack on the Union Left Repulsed. The Battle of the 20th. Delays in Bragg's Movement. Thomas again Repulses the Confederates. The Union Right Wing Broken. Rout of McCook's Corps. Rosecrans Retreats to Chattanooga. Heroism of Wood and Brannan. Thomas Remains on the Field. Arrival of Garfield. Granger's Reënforcement. Thomas Retires by Night to Chattanooga. Comparative Losses. Reception of the News at Washington. Reënforcements Sent to Rosecrans. He is Besieged in Chattanooga. Reports of Charles A. Dana. Rosecrans Relieved; Thomas Appointed to Command the Army of the Cumberland 75

CHAPTER V. CHATTANOOGA

Grant's Arrival at Chattanooga. The Plan for Relief. Carried out by W. F. Smith. Seizure of Brown's Ferry and Lookout Valley. Bragg's Attempt to Recover the Ground. The Affair of Wauhatchie. Jefferson Davis's Visit to Bragg. Longstreet's Detachment. Grant's Orders to Thomas. Sherman's March from Vicksburg. Arrival at Chattanooga. Grant's Plan of Attack. November 24th. The Charge on the Rifle-pits. Sherman Crosses the River. Hooker on Lookout Mountain. The Battle Above the Clouds. November 25th. Sher-

man Attacks Again. The Assault of Missionary Ridge. Thomas Breaks Bragg's Center. Rout of the Confederates. Pursuit by Sheridan and by Hooker. Comparative Losses. Bragg's Report. The Spirit of the Union Army 121

CHAPTER VI. BURNSIDE IN TENNESSEE

Importance of East Tennessee; Political and Military. Sufferings of the Loyalists. The President's Sympathy. His Efforts to Relieve Them. Burnside's March to Tennessee. His Arrival at Knoxville. His Delay to Join Rosecrans. The President's Orders. Burnside's Desultory Activity. Longstreet's Detachment. Rosecrans Falls Back to Knoxville Before Him. Knoxville Partially Invested. Burnside "Not Dead Yet"! Longstreet Assaults, and is Repulsed. Sherman Raises the Siege. His Arrival at Knoxville. He Returns to Chattanooga. Longstreet Winters in Tennessee. The President's Letters to Tennessee. His Proclamation of Thanksgiving 158

CHAPTER VII. LINCOLN'S GETTYSBURG ADDRESS

The Dead and Wounded at Gettysburg. Plan for a National Cemetery. Governor Curtin Appoints David Wills Special Agent. Dedication Ceremonies, November 19, 1863. Edward Everett Chosen Orator. President Lincoln Invited. The Arrival at Gettysburg. Address by Mr. Seward. Procession to the Battlefield. Edward Everett's Oration. Lincoln's Gettysburg Address. Everett's Letter to Lincoln. Lincoln's Reply 189

CHAPTER VIII. MISSOURI RADICALS AND CONSERVATIVES

Party Names in Missouri. Schofield Supersedes Curtis. Lincoln's Instructions to Schofield. The Missouri Convention Called Together. Schofield's Inquiry of Lincoln. Lincoln's Letter About Missouri Emancipation. The Convention Ordinance of Emancipation. Movement of Radical Emancipationists at St. Louis. Radical Emancipation Convention at Jefferson City. Quan-

trell's Lawrence Massacre. Schofield's Action. Radical Resolutions. Committee of Missouri Radicals Visits Washington. Interview with Lincoln. The Committee's Written Addresses. Lincoln's Reply. Lincoln Declines to Remove Schofield. His Instructions to Schofield. Governor Gamble Demands Protection. Lincoln's Letter to Gamble 204

CHAPTER IX. THE LINE OF THE RAPIDAN

Meade's Failure to Intercept Lee at Front Royal. Lincoln's Letters to Meade. Two Corps Under Hooker Sent to Rosecrans. Lee moves Northward. His Plan. Meade Discovers it. A Race for Position. The Battle of Bristoe Station. Hill Defeated by Warren. Lee Retires to the Rappahannock. Meade's Advance. The Affair at Rappahannock Station. Russell's Victory. Lee Retires to the Rapidan. Meade's Advance on Mine Run. Lee's Measures of Defense. Warren and Meade Decline to Attack his Works. The Campaign Given up. Kilpatrick's Raid. Lost Opportunities 231

CHAPTER X. FOREIGN RELATIONS IN 1863

Correspondence Between the British and American Governments. Case of the *Alexandra*. The Iron-clad Rams. "This is War!" Purchase of the Rams by the British Government. English Disbelief in the Success of the Union. Anger of Jefferson Davis Against England. Withdraws his Commissioner from London. Mr. Mason Visits London. His Interview with Lord Palmerston. Relations with France. The Emperor's Public and Private Professions Contrasted. His Conversations with Mr. Slidell. Authorizes the Building of Confederate Ships. The Lindsay and Roebuck Interview at Fontainebleau. The Emperor's Contradiction. His Promises to Slidell Repudiated. The Ships Sold to Third Parties 254

CHAPTER XI. OLUSTEE AND THE RED RIVER

Gillmore's Expedition to Florida. His Plans and Purposes. The President's Share in Them. Major Hay Sent to Florida. Capture of Baldwin. General Sey-

mour Advances to Olustee. His Forces Defeated. He Retires to Jacksonville. The President Directs a Movement on Texas. Failure of the Expedition to Sabine Pass. Success of the Movement on Brownsville and Matagorda Bay. A Movement up the Red River Determined Upon. Unfavorable Conditions. Careless Order of March. Banks Defeated at Sabine Cross Roads. Checks the Confederates at Pleasant Hill. The Army Retires to Alexandria. Critical Condition of the Fleet. Bailey's Dam. The Fleet Saved. Subsequent Controversies. The Cotton Question. Lincoln's Dealing With It 281

CHAPTER XII. THE POMEROY CIRCULAR

Opposition to Mr. Lincoln. Mr. Chase the Rallying Point. His Letters Criticizing his Colleagues. His Candidacy for the Presidency. Mr. Lincoln's Toleration. Pomeroy and Lane. The Pomeroy Circular. Correspondence of Lincoln and Chase in Regard to it. Ohio Declares for Lincoln. Mr. Chase Relinquishes his Candidacy 309

CHAPTER XIII. GRANT GENERAL-IN-CHIEF

The Winter of 1863–64. Johnston Supersedes Bragg. Correspondence of Johnston with Richmond. Mr. Davis Urges an Advance. Grant's Plans. Sherman's March to Meridian. Thomas's March to Dalton and Return. The Bill to Revive the Grade of Lieutenant-General. Action of the Administration. Grant Nominated for the Place. His Correspondence with Sherman. His Arrival in Washington. Meeting with the President. Presentation of his Commission. He Visits the Army of the Potomac. Meade's Magnanimity. Grant Returns to the West for a Brief Visit 326

CHAPTER XIV. THE WILDERNESS

Change of Commands. Grant's Headquarters at Culpeper. His Visits to Washington. His Plan for Concerted Movement. The Route to Richmond. Lee's Army the Objective. The Position and Strength of the Two Armies. Letter of Lincoln to Grant. Grant's Re-

ply. The March Begun. Lee's Army Meets Grant's in the Wilderness. The Nature of the Country. The Battle of the Wilderness. Grant's Movement by the Left Flank. Lee's March to Spotsylvania. Sheridan's Raid. Defeat and Death of J. E. B. Stuart 346

CHAPTER XV. SPOTSYLVANIA AND COLD HARBOR

Lee and Grant Both Disappointed at Spotsylvania. Grant Determines to Attack Lee in Position. A Week of Battles. Death of Sedgwick. Battle of May 10. Upton's Assault. Grant's Dispatch of the 11th of May. "I Propose to Fight it Out on this Line if it Takes All Summer." Hancock's Assault of the McCool Salient. His Success. The Battle of the Bloody Angle. Other Events of the 12th. Grant Again Moves to the Left. Reënforcements. Bad News on the 18th. Lee's Stategy. The Meeting of the Armies at the North Anna. Grant Checkmated. His March by the Left to the Totopotomoy. Butler's Advance on Richmond. Battle of Drewry's Bluff. The Battle of Cold Harbor. Heavy Union Loss. Grant's Opinion of the Battle. His Change of Plan 372

CHAPTER XVI. ARKANSAS FREE

Movement of Loyalty and Emancipation. Reluctance of Arkansas to Secede. Curtis's Movement to Helena. Gantt Abandons Secession. Lincoln's Letter About Sebastian. Steele Marches to Little Rock. Lincoln's Letters to Steele About Arkansas Reconstruction. Arkansas State Convention. Address to Arkansas Voters. The Constitution of Arkansas Amended. Slavery Abolished Immediately and Unconditionally. Registration of Voters. Lincoln's Directions to Steele. Steele Orders an Election. The Vote for the Constitution. The Vote for Governor. A Legislature Elected and Organized. Members of Congress Elected. Lincoln's Letter 408

CHAPTER XVII. LOUISIANA FREE

The Free-State General Committee. Registration of Voters Begun. Lincoln's Reply to the Conservatives.

Lincoln's Letter to Banks about Louisiana Reconstruction. Cessation of Registration. Lincoln Urges a Resumption of Reconstruction. Conservative Movement Under the Old Constitution. Denounced by the Free-State Committee. Lincoln's Letter to Cottman Urging Reconstruction. Lincoln's Letter Making General Banks "Master" in Louisiana Reconstruction. Banks's Plan of Reconstruction. Lincoln Approves It. Banks Orders an Election for State Officers. Election and Inauguration of Governor Hahn. Lincoln Invests Hahn with Powers of Military Governor. Opposition of the Free-State Committee. A Convention Elected and Organized. A Constitution Adopted, Abolishing Slavery. A Popular Vote for the Constitution. Louisiana Legislature 419

CHAPTER XVIII. TENNESSEE FREE

Union Manifestations in Tennessee. Lincoln's Letters to Governor Johnson and General Grant. Governor Johnson Orders an Election. A Union Convention at Nashville. Hurlbut's Letter About Tennessee. Union Successes at Knoxville and Chattanooga. Lincoln's Letter to Governor Johnson, Urging Reconstruction. Governor Johnson's Speech. He Orders an Election for County Officers. His Plan. Lincoln's Letter to East. The Election of March 5, 1864. Political Movements in East Tennessee. Governor Johnson's Proclamation for Holding the Presidential Election. A Constitutional Convention Assembled. Slavery Abolished in Tennessee. Popular Vote on the Amended Constitution. Governor Johnson Proclaims the Amendments to the Constitution Adopted. The New State Government. The Thirteenth Amendment Ratified 438

CHAPTER XIX. MARYLAND FREE

The Question of Emancipation in Maryland. Lincoln and the Maryland Representatives. Compensated Abolishment in the District of Columbia. Legislative and Popular Resolutions on Emancipation. Action of Congress on Maryland Emancipation. The Union

League Convention. The State Central Committee Convention. The Rival Conventions Refuse to Cooperate. Lincoln's Order for Enlisting Negro Soldiers. General Schenck's Election Order. The Order Modified by Lincoln. Controversy Between Governor Bradford and General Schenck. Emancipation Victory at the Election. Lincoln's Letter Favoring Emancipation in Maryland. The Constitutional Convention. The Convention Abolishes Slavery. Lincoln's Letter in Favor of the Amended Constitution. Popular Vote. Governor Bradford Proclaims the New Constitution Adopted 450

CHAPTER XX. MISSOURI FREE

Meeting of the Legislature. Contest for Senator. Convention or no Convention. Schofield, Washburne, and Gratz Brown. Lincoln's Letter to Stanton. Schofield Nominated for Major-General. Rosecrans Supersedes Schofield in Missouri. Lincoln's Letter to Rosecrans. Missouri Military Affairs. Missouri Movements in Politics. Drake's Letter to Lincoln. Missouri Factions in the Presidential Election. Price's Annual Invasion. Election Order Issued by Rosecrans. Rival Nominees for Congressman. The Presidential Vote. The Constitutional Convention. Slavery Abolished in Missouri. Neighborhood Feuds. Lincoln's Letter to Governor Fletcher 469

ABRAHAM LINCOLN

CHAPTER I

CONSPIRACIES IN THE NORTH

OPPOSITION to the Government by constitutional means was not enough to gratify the vehement and resentful feelings of those Democrats in the North whose zeal for slavery seemed completely to have destroyed in their hearts every impulse of patriotism. They were ready to do the work of the Southern Confederacy in the North, and were alone prevented by their fear of the law. To evade the restraints of justice and the sharp measures of the military administration, they formed throughout the country secret associations for the purpose of resisting the laws, of embarrassing in every way the action of the Government, of communicating information to the rebels in arms, and in many cases of inflicting serious damage on the lives and property of the Unionists. They adopted various names in different parts of the country, but the designation chosen by the society having the largest number of lodges in the several States was the "Knights of the Golden

CHAP. I. Circle." As fast as one name was discovered and published it was cast aside and another adopted, and the same organization with the same membership appeared successively under the name we have mentioned and those of "The Order of American Knights," "The Order of the Star," and the "Sons of Liberty." These secret organizations possessed a singular charm to uneducated men, independent of their political sympathies; and this attraction, combined with the fact that they could not in plain daylight inflict any injury upon the Government, drove many thousands of the lower class of Democrats into these furtive lodges.

It is impossible to ascertain, with any degree of exactness, the numbers of those who became affiliated with the orders. The numbers claimed by the adepts vary widely. A million was not infrequently the membership of which they boasted. Mr. Vallandigham asserted, in a public speech, that the organized body numbered half a million. Judge Holt, in his official report, accepted this aggregate as being something near the truth. The heaviest force was in Illinois and in Indiana; in Ohio they were also very numerous, and in the border States of Kentucky and Missouri. Their organization was entirely military; the State lodges were commanded by major-generals, the Congressional districts by brigadiers, the counties by colonels, and the townships by captains. They drilled as much as was possible under the limitations of secrecy; they made large purchases of arms. General H. B. Carrington estimated that thirty thousand guns and revolvers were brought into Indiana alone, and the adherents of the order

Report of the Judge Advocate General.

1864.

in the State of Illinois were also fully armed. In the month of March, 1864, it was estimated that the entire armed force of the order, capable of being mobilized for active service, was 340,000 men. It is altogether probable that this estimate was greatly exaggerated; and even if so large a number had been initiated into the order, their lack of drill, discipline, and moral character rendered them incapable at any time of acting as an army.

The order was large enough at least to offer the fullest hospitality to detectives and to Union men who volunteered to join with the purpose of reporting what they could to the authorities; so that the Government was speedily put in possession of the entire scheme of organization, with the names of the prominent officers of the order and written copies of their constitutions, oaths, and books of ritual. The constitutions of secret societies are generally valuable only as illustrations of human stupidity, and these were no exception to the rule. Their declaration of principles begins with this lucid proposition: "All men are endowed by the Creator with certain rights; equal as far as there is equality in the capacity for the appreciation, enjoyment, and exercise of those rights." The institution of slavery receives the approval of this band of midnight traitors in the following muddled and brutal sentences: "In the divine economy no individual of the human race must be permitted to encumber the earth, to mar its aspects of transcendent beauty, nor to impede the progress of the physical or intellectual man, neither in himself nor in the race to which he belongs. Hence a people . . . whom neither the divinity within them nor

Report of the Judge Advocate General, Oct. 8, 1864.

CHAP. I.

the inspirations of divine and beautiful nature around them can impel to virtuous action and progress onward and upward, should be subjected to a just and humane servitude and tutelage to the superior race until they shall be able to appreciate the benefits and advantages of civilization."

Report of the Judge Advocate General, Oct. 8, 1864.

They also declare in favor of something they imagine to be the theory of State rights, and also the duty of the people to expel their rulers from the Government by force of arms when they see good reason. "This is not revolution," they say, "but solely the assertion of right." Had they been content to meet in their lodges at stated times, and bewilder themselves by such rhetoric as this, there would have been no harm done; but there is plenty of evidence that the measures they adopted to bring what they called their principles into action were of positive injury to the national welfare. One of their chief objects was the exciting of discontent in the army and the encouraging of desertion; members of the order enlisted with the express purpose of inciting soldiers to desert with them; money and citizens' clothing were furnished them for this purpose; lawyers were hired to advise soldiers on leave not to go back, and to promise them the requisite defense in the courts if they got into trouble by desertion. The adjutant-general of Indiana, in his report for 1863, says that the number of deserters and absentees returned to the army through the post of Indianapolis alone, during the last month of 1862, was about 2600. The squads of soldiers sent to arrest deserters were frequently attacked in rural districts by these organized bodies; the most violent resistance was

Ibid.

made to the enrollment and the draft. Several enrolling officers were shot in Indiana and in Illinois; about sixty persons were tried and convicted in Indiana for conspiracy to resist the draft.

Report of the Judge Advocate General.

A constant system of communication with the rebels in arms was kept up across the border; arms, ammunition, and, in some instances, recruits, were sent to aid the Confederates; secret murders and assassinations were not unknown; the plan of establishing a Northwestern Confederacy, in hostility to the East and in alliance with the Southern Confederacy, was the favorite dream of the malignant and narrow minds controlling the order. The Government wisely took little notice of the proceedings of these organizations. It was constantly informed of their general plans and purposes; the Grand Secretary of the order in Missouri made a full confession of his connection with it. In August a large number of copies of the ritual of the Order of American Knights was seized in an office which had been occupied by a prominent Democratic politician at Terre Haute. A private soldier in the Union army, named Stidger, had himself initiated into the order, and with infinite skill and success rose to a high position in it, becoming Grand Secretary for the State of Kentucky. Thus thoroughly informed of the composition and purposes of the society, the Government was constantly able to guard against any serious disturbances of the public peace; and whenever the arrest of any of the ringleaders was determined upon, the evidence for their conviction was always overwhelming.

Report of the Judge Advocate General.

The fullest light was thrown upon the organization and plans of these treasonable orders by the

CHAP. I.

trials of certain conspirators in Indiana in the autumn of 1864. We will make no reference to the testimony of Government detectives who joined the conspiracy with the purpose of revealing its secrets. It is sufficient to quote the unwilling and unquestionably truthful statements of members of the order, brought into court by subpœna. William Clayton, a farmer of Warren County, Illinois, testified that he was initiated a member of the Order of American Knights "at a congregation formed in the timber"; he took a long and bombastic oath, the only significant part of which was the pledge to take up arms, if required, in the cause of the oppressed against usurpers waging war against a people endeavoring to establish a government for themselves in accordance with the eternal principles of truth; this, he testified, bound him to assist the South in its struggle for independence. He said he understood the purpose of the order was primarily to beat the Republicans at the polls, and that force of arms was to be resorted to in case of necessity; that they contemplated a rebel invasion in support of these objects; that the understanding was that in case the rebels came into Illinois, they and the brethren of this organization were to shake hands and be friends; that they were to give aid and assistance to the invaders; that death was the penalty for divulging the secrets of the order. Other members testified that they took an oath providing that in case of treachery they were to be drawn and quartered, their mangled remains to be cast out at the four gates. When these dwellers in prairie villages were asked what they meant by "the four gates,"

Benn Pitman, "Treason Trials at Indianapolis," p. 39.

Ibid., p. 49.

they said they did not know. Clayton further said their objects were "to resist the conscription, or anything else that pushed them too hard." Another farmer said he joined "because he had been a Democrat all his life"; another, that he "went in out of curiosity"—and this was doubtless a motive with many. In communities where there is little to interest an idle mind these secret mummeries possess a singular attraction. The grips, the passwords, the emblems, formed a great part of whatever temptation the order offered to the rural conspirators. Their favorite cognizance was the oak; not on account of any civic association, but because the word was formed of the initials of the name "Order of American Knights." Their grand hailing cry of distress was "Oak-houn," the last syllable taken from the name of the South Carolina statesman whose principles they imagined they were putting in operation.

Benn Pitman, "Treason Trials at Indianapolis," p. 45.

By far the most important witness for the Government was Horace Heffren, a lawyer of Salem, Indiana, a man high in the councils of the order. He was indicted for treasonable practices, and concluded to make a clean breast of it. He gave an apparently truthful account: detailed the scheme for forming a Northwestern Confederacy, or, if that failed, for joining the Southern army; the State government of Indiana was to be seized; Governor Morton was to be held for a hostage or killed. He confirmed the story of the general uprising which was to have taken place on the 16th of August in conjunction with a rebel raid from Cumberland Gap, the great feature of which was the liberation of the Confederate prisoners in Illi-

Ibid., pp. 125, 127.

1864.

CHAP. I.

nois, Ohio, and Indiana. But when the time came the rebels did not, and the conspirators lacked heart for the fight. Vallandigham, the supreme head of the order, was too far away for intelligent and efficient direction. The whole conspiracy was shabby and puerile, although it included many editors and politicians of local standing. They were not all cravens; some of them stood up stoutly before the Military Commission and defended the cause of the South. "I assert," said one, "that the South has been fighting for their rights as defined in the Dred Scott decision." But there was very little display of heroism when the time of trial arrived. There was much that was ignoble and sordid: a scramble for the salaried places; a rush to handle the money provided for arms; one man intriguing for a place on the staff "because he had a sore leg"; a cloud of small politicians, who hardly knew whether they were members or not; "they had heard a ritual read, but paid little attention to it"; they were anxious to be members if the scheme succeeded, and to avoid the law if it failed.

Benn Pitman, "Treason Trials at Indianapolis," p. 174.

The President's attitude in regard to this organization was one of good-humored contempt rather than anything else. Most of the officers commanding departments, however, regarded the machinations of these dark-lantern knights as a matter of the deepest import. Governor Morton was greatly disquieted by their work in his State, and sent a telegram to the President in January, 1863, expressing his fear that the Legislature, when it met, would pass a joint resolution to acknowledge the Southern Confederacy, and urge the Northwest

Morton to Stanton, Jan. 3, 1863.

to dissolve all constitutional relation with the New England States. But when the Legislature came together, although it evinced a hearty good-will in giving the Governor all the worry and annoyance possible, it took no such overt step of treason as he feared. CHAP. I.

Their action was, indeed, sufficiently violent and contumacious. The House of Representatives insolently returned his message to him, and passed a resolution accepting in its stead that of the Democratic Governor of New York. Measures were introduced to take the military power of the State away from the Governor and to confer it upon the Democratic State officers. To defeat these unconstitutional proceedings the Republicans adopted the equally irregular course of abandoning the Legislature and leaving it without a quorum; in consequence of which no appropriation bills were passed, and the Governor had to appeal to the people of the State for the means to carry on the government. These were furnished in part by the voluntary offerings of banks, private corporations, and individuals; but, needing a quarter of a million dollars for an emergency, he came to Washington, and obtained it from the General Government, by virtue of a statute of July 31, 1861, which set aside two millions for the purchase of munitions of war to be used in States in rebellion or "in which rebellion is or may be threatened." In view of the revolutionary attitude of the Legislature, and the known treasonable organization and purposes of the Sons of Liberty, the Secretary of War decided that Indiana was so "threatened," and made Governor Morton a disbursing officer to the amount of

CHAP. I.

250,000 dollars. It is related that Morton remarked, as he took the warrant, if the cause failed, they would be called heavily to account for this; to which Stanton replied, "If the cause fails, I do not wish to live."

Henry Wilson, in "Atlantic Monthly," Feb., 1870, p. 242.

In the summer of 1864 General Rosecrans made a full discovery of the purposes and organization of these conspirators, and communicated it to Governor Yates of Illinois, who fully shared his solicitude. They joined in an earnest demand that the President should order Colonel J. P. Sanderson, of Rosecrans's staff, to Washington for a personal interview upon matters of overwhelming importance. Stanton objected to this, and the President was unwilling that either Rosecrans or his subordinate should come to Washington upon such an errand, under the temptation to magnify his office by alarming reports. He therefore concluded to send one of his own private secretaries to St. Louis to see precisely what were the facts which had thrown the general commanding into such a state of concern. Rosecrans then repeated the entire story of the organization of the Order of American Knights and the Golden Circle, facts which were already well known to the President and the Secretary of War; but the immediate cause of his excitement was the expected return of Vallandigham, which, he said, was in accordance with the resolution adopted by the order at the convocation held in Windsor, Canada. General Rosecrans thought that his return would be the signal for the rising of the Knights throughout the Northwest, and for serious public disorders.

The President, on receiving his secretary's report, declined to order Sanderson to Washington; and in

reference to Rosecrans's strict injunctions of secrecy, he said that a secret confided on the one side to half a million Democrats, and on the other to five Governors and their staffs, was hardly worth keeping. He said the Northern section of the conspiracy merited no special attention, being about an equal mixture of puerility and malice. CHAP. I.

General Rosecrans, after he was convinced that the President would not overrule the Secretary of War by ordering Colonel Sanderson to Washington, concluded at last to send his voluminous report in manuscript, accompanying it with the following letter, which we copy as giving in few words the results of his researches: 1864.

"Since Major Hay's departure, bearing my letter about the secret conspiracy we have been tracing out, we have added much information of its Southern connexions, operations, uses, and intentions.

"We have also found a new element in its workings under the name of McClellan minute men.

"The evident extent and anti-national purposes of this great conspiracy compel me to urge the consideration of what ought to be done to anticipate its workings and prevent the mischief it is capable of producing again upon your attention.

"Therefore, I have sent the report of Colonel Sanderson with the details of evidence, covering a thousand pages of foolscap, by himself, to be carried or forwarded to you by safe hands.

"That report and its accompanying papers show,

"1. That there exists an oath-bound secret society, under various names, but forming one brotherhood both in the rebel and loyal States, the objects of

CHAP. I.

which are the overthrow of the existing national Government and the dismemberment of this nation.

"2. That the secret oaths bind these conspirators to revolution and all its consequences of murder, arson, pillage, and an untold train of crimes, including assassination and perjury, under the penalty of death to the disobedient or recusant.

"3. That they intend to operate in conjunction with rebel movements this summer to revolutionize the loyal States, if they can.

"4. That Vallandigham is the Supreme Commander of the Northern wing of this society, and General Price, of the rebel army, the Supreme Commander of the Southern wing of the organization. And that Vallandigham's return was a part of the programme well understood both North and South, by which the revolution they propose was to be inaugurated.

"5. That this association is now, and has been, the principal agency by which spying and supplying rebels with means of war are carried on between the loyal and rebel States, and that even some of our officers are engaged in it.

"6. That they claim to have 25,000 members in Missouri, 140,000 in Illinois, 100,000 in Indiana, 80,000 in Ohio, 70,000 in Kentucky; and that they are extending through New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, and Maryland.

"Besides which prominent and general facts, the names of members, mode of operating, and other details appear fully, showing what a formidable power and what agencies for mischief we have to deal with.

"With this synopsis of the report it is respectfully submitted with the single remark — that whatever orders you may deem best to give, it must be obvious to your Excellency that leading conspirators like Chas. L. Hunt and Dr. Shore of St. Louis, arrested for being implicated in the association, cannot be released without serious hazard to the public welfare and safety."

Rosecrans to Lincoln, June 22, 1864. MS.

From first to last these organizations were singularly lacking in energy and initiative. The only substantial harm they did was in encouraging desertions and embarrassing and resisting the officers concerned in the enrollment and the draft. The toleration with which the President regarded them, and the immunity which he allowed them in their passive treason, arose from the fact that he never could be made to believe that there was as much crime as folly in their acts and purposes. Senator McDonald reports that the President once said to him, when he was asking the pardon of some of these conspirators condemned by military commission, "Nothing can make me believe that one hundred thousand Indiana Democrats are disloyal." They were sufficiently disloyal to take all manner of oaths against the Government; to declare in their secret councils they were ready to shed the last drop of their blood to abolish it; to express their ardent sympathy with its enemies, and their detestation of its officers and supporters. But this was the limit of their criminal courage. Shedding the last drop of one's blood is a comparatively easy sacrifice — it is shedding the first drop that costs; and these rural Catilines were

CHAP. I.

never quite ready to risk their skins for their so-called principles. Most of the attempts against the public peace in the free States and on the Northern border proceeded not from the resident conspirators, but from desperate Southern emissaries and their aiders and abettors in the British provinces; and even these rarely rose above the level of ordinary arson and highway robbery.

The case of the *Chesapeake* was one of the most noteworthy of these incidents. Two Canadians named J. C. Braine and H. A. Parr resolved, in the latter part of 1863, to start on a privateering enterprise on their own account. Parr, though born in Canada, had lived for several years in Tennessee; and Braine, who had been arrested and confined in Fort Warren, had been released from that prison on his claim, presented by the British Minister, that he was a British subject. Their sole pretension to Confederate nationality was the possession of commissions in the Confederate navy prepared *ad hoc*. They enlisted a dozen men, all British subjects, purchased in New York the arms and equipment they required for their enterprise, and took passage on board the United States merchant steamer *Chesapeake*, which left New York on the 5th of December, bound for Portland, Maine.

Benjamin to Holcombe, Feb. 15, 1864. MS. Confederate Archives.

On the morning of the 8th, they assaulted the officers and crew of the *Chesapeake*, capturing her after a struggle of only a few minutes' duration, killing one and wounding two of her officers. They took the *Chesapeake* into the Bay of Fundy, and there delivered her into the hands of a man calling himself Captain Parker of the Confederate navy, who afterwards turned out to be an Englishman

whose name was Vernon Locke, and who had come out in a pilot-boat to meet her. Feeling now secure in the possession of her new nationality, she went to Sambro Harbor, Nova Scotia, to receive the fuel and supplies necessary to enable her to prosecute her voyage to the Confederate States. While she lay there, the United States gunboat *Ella and Annie* entered the harbor; and, says Mr. Benjamin, whose righteous indignation was evidently aroused by the proceedings, "with that habitual contempt of the territorial sovereignty of Great Britain and of her neutral rights which characterizes our enemies," recaptured the prize, and left the British port with the purpose of taking the *Chesapeake* to the United States; but meeting on the way a superior officer of the United States navy, the captain of the *Ella and Annie* was ordered by him to return to Halifax to restore the *Chesapeake* to the jurisdiction of Great Britain. This was done, and the few pirates who had been captured in the *Chesapeake* were delivered up.

The case was taken at once into the courts, and was promptly and properly decided, so far as the vessel was concerned, by her delivery to her rightful owners; but before this decision was made known at Richmond, the Confederate Government, seeing in the case a possibility of profit to their cause, dispatched to Halifax Professor J. P. Holcombe, said to be the most accomplished international lawyer in the Confederacy, to take charge of the case. During the professor's transit, however, by way of Wilmington and Bermuda, the case had come to its natural close, and on arriving at Halifax he found his occupation gone. He was

CHAP. I.

Holcombe to Benjamin, April 1, 1864. MS. Confederate Archives.

compelled to report to the department that every man concerned in the capture of the *Chesapeake*, with the single exception of the Canadian-Tennesseean just mentioned, was a British subject. He also found that the captors had been guilty of stealing and peddling the cargo and pocketing the proceeds, and that the antecedents of the so-called Confederate officers involved were most disreputable. He seemed greatly disappointed to find that this gang of murderers and thieves were not high-minded and honorable gentlemen, and therefore concluded to make no demand upon the British authorities for the restitution of the stolen ship. He remained for some time in Halifax, enjoying the hospitality of the colonial sympathizers with the South, and then proceeded to join the other secession emissaries in Canada who were engaged in equally congenial enterprises.

The principal agent of the Confederates in Canada was Jacob Thompson, Secretary of the Interior in the late Administration of Buchanan, whose treasonable conduct of that important office has already been mentioned. He had sunk into appropriate insignificance, even among his own associates, after the war began; had been captured by General Grant on the Mississippi River in a ridiculous attempt at playing the spy under a flag of truce; and, after being released with contemptuous forbearance, had gone to Canada, under instructions from the rebel Government to do what damage he could in connection with the refugees and escaped prisoners who fringed the Northern frontier during the last two years of the war. He immediately placed himself in com-

Grant, "Personal Memoirs." Vol. I., p. 462.

JUDAH P. BENJAMIN.

munication with the disloyal Democrats of the Northern States, and through them and a band of refugees who at once gathered about him in Canada for employment, began a series of operations which, for their folly no less than their malignity, would be incredible if they were not recorded in the report which Thompson himself, with amazing moral obtuseness, wrote of his mission on the 3d of December, 1864. CHAP. I.

He states that immediately on his arrival in Canada he put himself in communication with the leading spirits of the Sons of Liberty. He was received among them with cordiality, and the greatest confidence was extended to him. They became convinced, during the summer of 1864, that their efforts to defeat the election of Mr. Lincoln were hopeless. "Lincoln had the power," he said, "and would certainly reëlect himself, and there was no hope but in force. The belief was entertained and freely expressed, that by a bold, vigorous, and concerted movement, the three great Northwestern States of Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio could be seized and held. This being done, the States of Kentucky and Missouri could easily be lifted from their prostrate condition and placed on their feet, and this, in sixty days, would end the war." It was resolved to hold a series of peace meetings in Illinois for the purpose of preparing the public mind for such a revolt. The first of these meetings was to be held at Peoria, and "to make it a success," says Thompson, "I agreed that so much money as was necessary would be furnished by me." It was held, and was decidedly successful. But he pretends that the

Thompson to Benjamin, Dec. 3, 1864. MS. Confederate Archives.

CHAP. I.

Niagara Falls conference and Lincoln's letter, "To whom it may concern," shocked the country to such an extent that the leading politicians conceived the idea that Lincoln might be beaten at the ballot-box on such an issue. "The nerves of the leaders," he says, "thereupon began to relax." The seizure of arms at Indianapolis, the arrest of leading supporters at Louisville, the unsympathetic attitude of Mr. McDonald, the Democratic candidate for governor of Indiana, all tended to discourage the ringleaders; and the day fixed for the revolt, which was to have been the 16th of August, passed by with no demonstration. "The necessity of pandering to the military feeling, which resulted in the nomination of McClellan, totally demoralized," says Thompson, "the Sons of Liberty."

Thompson to Benjamin, Dec. 3, 1864. MS. Confederate Archives.

Convinced that there was nothing to be expected from the coöperation of Northern Democrats, Thompson fell back once more upon his gang of escaped prisoners and other loose fish in Canada. The next scheme adopted by him was ingenious and audacious, and not without possibilities of success. He determined to capture the war steamer *Michigan*, plying on Lake Erie, and with her to liberate the rebel prisoners on Johnson's Island, in Sandusky Bay; the prisoners were then to march upon Cleveland, attacking that town by land and by water, and thence march through Ohio to gain Virginia. A man named Charles H. Cole, formerly one of Forrest's troopers, was sent round the lakes as a deck passenger to inform himself thoroughly of the approaches to the harbors, the depositories of coal, the stations and habits of the *Michigan*. He performed his task

with energy and efficiency and with great satisfaction and amusement to himself. He invented an oil corporation of which he was president and board of directors, opened an office in Buffalo, and used a good deal of Thompson's money in making the acquaintance of the officers of the *Michigan*. CHAP. I.

The 19th of September was the day fixed for the attempt upon the *Michigan*, Cole having contrived to have himself invited to dine with the officers of the vessel on that day. A Virginian named John Yates Beall was assigned the more difficult and dangerous part of the enterprise. He, with twenty-five Confederates, took passage from Sandwich, in Canada, on board the *Philo Parsons*, an unarmed merchant vessel plying between Detroit and Sandusky; they were all armed with revolvers, and had no trouble in taking possession of the steamer and robbing the clerk of what money he had. They soon afterwards fell in with another unarmed steamer, the *Island Queen*, scuttled her, and then steered for Sandusky Bay to join Cole and the boats he had prepared in an attack upon the *Michigan*. But the plan miscarried. The military, aware of Cole's intentions, had captured him; and Beall, missing the signals which had been agreed upon, did not dare to proceed in the enterprise alone. He therefore returned to Sandwich, and his crew scattered through Canada. 1864.

Beall was not content with the failure of this enterprise, and later in the season, in the middle of December, he was caught in the State of New York near the Suspension Bridge in an attempt to throw a passenger train from the West off the railroad track for the purpose of robbing the express company. General Orders No. 17, Feb. 21, 1865. Case of J. Y. Beall.

CHAP. I. This was the third attempt which he had made to accomplish this purpose. He was in citizen's dress, engaged in an act of simple murder and robbery, yet he imagined that the fact that he had a Confederate commission in his pocket would secure him against punishment in case of capture. He was tried by court martial and sentenced to death. Jefferson Davis took the same view of the talismanic character of the Confederate commission upon which Beall had relied, and issued a manifesto, assuming the responsibility of the act, and declaring that it was done by his authority. There was great clamor in regard to the case, and many people of all parties pleaded with Mr. Lincoln to commute the sentence of Beall. A petition in this sense was signed by most of the Democratic members of the House of Representatives and by many Republicans. But the Judge Advocate General reported that "Beall, convicted upon indubitable proof as a spy, guerrillero, outlaw, and would-be murderer of hundreds of innocent persons traveling in supposed security upon one of our great thoroughfares, fully deserved to die a felon's death, and the summary enforcement of that penalty was a duty which Government owed to society."

Loath as Mr. Lincoln was at all times to approve a capital sentence, he felt that in this case he could not permit himself to yield to the promptings of his kindly heart. He sent a private message to General Dix, saying he would be glad if he would allow Beall a respite of a few days to prepare himself for death, but positively declined to interfere with the sentence, and Beall was hung in the latter

part of February. The Virginia Senate made his cause their own, and recommended, by resolutions of the 3d of March, the adoption of such steps as might be necessary in retaliation for the offense committed by the authorities of the United States. CHAP. I. 1865.

Under Thompson's orders the large prison camps in the North had been thoroughly examined, with a view of effecting the release of the Confederate prisoners confined in them. But the attempts at different places were given up for one reason or another, and it was resolved to concentrate all the efforts of the conspirators upon Camp Douglas at Chicago. A large number of rebels and their sympathizers were gathered together in that city, and the plan for taking the prison camp with its ten thousand Confederate prisoners was matured, and was to have been put into execution on the night of election day, taking advantage of the excitement and the crowds of people in the streets to surprise the camp, release and arm the prisoners of war, cut the telegraph wires, burn the railway stations, and seize the banks and stores containing arms and ammunition. It was hoped that this would excite a simultaneous rising of the Sons of Liberty throughout the State, and result in the release of the Confederate prisoners in other camps. But the plot, as usual, was betrayed by repentant rebels who were in the most secret councils of the conspirators. Shortly after midnight on the 7th of November, Colonel Benjamin J. Sweet, commanding Camp Douglas, trapped in their various hiding-places and took prisoners all the leaders of the contemplated attack, among them John H. Morgan's adjutant-general, St. Leger Grenfell, Colonel 1864.

CHAP. I.

Marmaduke, a brother of the rebel general, the commanding officer of the Sons of Liberty in the State, and several other officers of the rebel army who were escaped prisoners. In one house they found two cartloads of revolvers, loaded and capped, two hundred stands of muskets, loaded, and a large amount of ammunition.

Colonel Sweet's report to General Cook, Nov. 7, 1864.

Mr. Thompson hesitated at nothing which he thought might injure the people of the United States. Any villain who approached him with a project of murder and arson was sure of a kindly reception. "Soon after I reached Canada," he says, "a Mr. Minor Major visited me and represented himself as an accredited agent from the Confederate States to destroy steamboats on the Mississippi River, and that his operations were suspended for want of means. I advanced to him $2000 in Federal currency, and soon afterwards several boats were burned at St. Louis, involving an immense loss of property to the enemy. . . Money has been advanced to Mr. Churchill of Cincinnati to organize a corps for the purpose of incendiarism in that city. I consider him a true man; and although as yet he has effected but little, I am in constant expectation of hearing of effective work in that quarter." Another miscreant of the same type, named Colonel Martin, who brought an unsigned letter from Jefferson Davis to Thompson, expressed a wish to organize a corps to burn New York City. "He was allowed to do so," says Mr. Thompson; "and a most daring attempt has been made to fire that city, but their reliance on the Greek fire has proved a misfortune. It cannot be depended on as an agent in such work. I have no faith whatever in it, and no

Thompson to Benjamin, Dec. 3, 1864. MS. Confederate Archives.

attempt shall hereafter be made under my general directions with any such materials."

A party of eight persons, mostly escaped prisoners, were sent to New York to destroy that city by fire. One of them, named Kennedy, was captured, tried, and hung. Before his execution he confessed that he had set fire to four places: Barnum's Museum, Lovejoy's Hotel, Tammany Hotel, and the New England House; "the others," he said, with a certain sense of wrong, "only started fires where each was lodging, and then ran off. Had they all done as I did, we would have had thirty-two fires and played a huge joke on the fire department." This stupid tool of baser men escaped to Canada; but relying, as Beall did, on his commission as a captain in the Confederate army, he started once more for the Confederacy by way of Detroit, and was arrested by detectives in the railway station. He had taken on a new name and a new character; and in his trial, among the evidence he brought forward which he thought would insure his immunity, was a pledge given to the transportation agent in Canada to return with all due diligence to the Confederacy. Even after his sentence he had no realization of the crime he had committed. He wrote to the President, arguing, as a matter of law, that death was too severe a penalty for arson, and suggesting that there was no need of punishing him as an example, since the execution of Beall had already served that purpose.

If Mr. Thompson is to be believed, it would appear that his adherents in Canada were not altogether under discipline, and that they sometimes took the opportunity to indulge in casual

CHAP. I. burglaries and murders on their own account. He said in his official report that he knew nothing of the St. Albans affair until after it was over. This was a crime of unusual atrocity, and bade fair, for the moment, to involve the most serious consequences. A party of Confederate thieves, some twenty or thirty strong, came over the border from Canada
1864. on the 19th of October, and entering the village of St. Albans in Vermont, they robbed the banks of some two hundred and fifty thousand dollars, accompanying this crime with entirely uncalled-for cruelty, firing upon the unarmed citizens, killing one man and wounding another; they also attempted to burn several houses. The raid was over in less than an hour, and the band, who had stolen horses enough in the vicinity to mount them all, immediately returned to Canada.

It seemed at first as if the Canadian authorities intended to arrest the criminals and hold them for punishment, and Mr. Seward, two days afterwards, expressed his gratification to the British Legation at Washington for this prompt and apparently satisfactory proceeding. As it turned out, however, he spoke too quickly, for Judge Coursol discharged the criminals from custody and restored to them the money they had stolen. As soon as this intelligence reached New York, General Dix, outraged beyond endurance by the iniquity of the act, without consultation with the Government issued an order, directing all military commanders on the frontier, in case of further acts of depredation and murder, to shoot down the murderers, or the persons acting under commissions from the rebel authorities at Richmond; and further instructing

them that if it should be necessary, with a view to their capture, to cross the border between the United States and Canada, to pursue them wherever they might take refuge, and on no account to surrender them to the local authorities, but to send them to the headquarters of the Department of the East for trial and punishment by martial law.

The President, who felt no less keenly than General Dix the wrong and outrage committed by these rebel murderers and the Canadian authorities who seemed to be protecting them, nevertheless declined to allow any subordinate to embroil the country with a foreign nation in this way;[1] and in spite of General Dix's vehement defense of what he called "the right of hot pursuit," the President required him to revoke the instructions quoted. The British Government directed Lord Monck, the Governor-General of Canada, to be guided by the decision of the proper legal authorities in the provinces, whether persons in custody ought or ought not to be delivered up under the treaty of extradition, saying that in case the decision were that they ought to be delivered, the Government would approve Lord Monck's acting on this decision; and in case of the contrary decision, the Government suggested that they should be put upon trial on the charge of misprision and violation of the royal prerogative by levying war from her Majesty's dominions against a friendly power. The criminals whom

[1] This order of General Dix gave great satisfaction at Richmond. An official of the Confederate War Department entered in his diary December 19: "General Dix orders his military subordinates to pursue any rebel raiders, even into Canada and bring them over. So light may come from that quarter. A war with England would be our peace." Jones, "A Rebel War Clerk's Diary," Vol. II., p. 359.

CHAP. I. Judge Coursol had released were again captured; the Canadian Parliament reproved the action of Coursol and suspended him from office. The prisoners having been once more arrested, the matter was heard before Mr. Justice Smith of Montreal, who again discharged them, on the ground that Young, the ringleader of the party, bore a commission in the Confederate army;[1] that Mr. Clement C. Clay, an associate of Thompson's as Confederate commissioner, was aware of Young's purpose and gave him a check for four hundred dollars for his expenses. "The attack on St. Albans," he said, "must therefore be regarded as a hostile expedition, undertaken and carried out under the authority of the so-called Confederate States by one of the officers of their army." He held that the prisoners had not acquired any domicile in Canada, nor lost their national character by their residence there. The Government of Canada was not satisfied with this pettifogging plea, and arrested the prisoners anew; but the war having now come to an end, the case was languidly prosecuted, and the criminals received no punishment. The Canadian authorities, however, desiring to maintain amicable relations with the United States and to do substantial justice in the case in spite of the courts, refunded fifty-eight thousand dollars of the money stolen by the raiders, being the gold value of some eighty-seven thousand which was in

[1] There is an entry in "A Rebel War Clerk's Diary," December 15, which would indicate that Young's commission was spurious or prepared after the fact: "A letter from G. N. Sanders . . . asks copies of orders, to be certified by Secretary of War, commanding the raid into Vermont, the burning, pillaging, etc., *to save Lieutenant Young's life.* I doubt if such written orders are in existence — but no matter." — Vol. II., p. 355.

their possession when they came into the custody of the Canadian courts, and an attempt was made in the provincial legislature to pass a law which should prevent the setting on foot of such unlawful expeditions from Canadian soil in the future. CHAP. I.

CHAPTER II

HABEAS CORPUS

CHAP. II.

1861.

THE decision of Chief-Justice Taney in the Merryman case led to a wide discussion of the constitutional principles involved in the suspension of the privilege of habeas corpus. Attorney-General Bates, the principal law officer of the Government, in an elaborate review of the matter, gave as his opinion that "in a time like the present, when the very existence of the nation is assailed by a great and dangerous insurrection, the President has the lawful and discretionary power to arrest and hold in custody persons known to have criminal intercourse with the insurgents, or persons against whom there is probable cause for suspicion of such criminal complicity"; and in summing up the case he said, "to my mind it is not very important whether we call a particular power exercised by the President a peace power or a war power, for undoubtedly he is armed with both. He is the chief civil magistrate of the nation, and being such, and because he is such, he is the Constitutional commander-in-chief of the army and navy; and thus, within the limits of the Constitution, he rules in peace and commands in war, and at this moment he is in the full exercise of all the

July 5, 1861.

functions belonging to both these characters."

In the general discussion which this question excited, a strict party line divided the advocates of the Union and the publicists who adhered to the Democratic party. Theophilus Parsons lent the great weight of his name and learning to the side of the Executive; Joel Parker wrote an elaborate treatise on the same side; and the venerable Horace Binney, in an exhaustive pamphlet, sustained to the fullest extent this power which the President had considered it his duty under the Constitution to exercise. In language whose simple vigor recalls the style of Mr. Lincoln himself, Mr. Binney said: "It is not a season for the judicial trial of all persons who are implicated in the Rebellion. It cannot be while the Rebellion lasts. To arrest and try even those who are openly guilty, and are taken with the red hand, would in many places be fruitless, and only aggravate the evil. The methods and devices of rebellion are infinite. They are open or covert, according to necessity or advantage. In arms, or as spies, emissaries, correspondents, commissaries, proveditors of secret supplies and aids, their name is sometimes legion; all treasonable, and many of them disguised or lying hid. A part of this disguise may sometimes be detected, and not often the whole. An intercepted letter, an overheard conversation, a known proclivity, an unusual activity in unusual transactions, in munitions or provisions or clothing — a suspicious fragment, and no more, without the present clue to detection may appear — not enough for the scales of justice, but abundantly sufficient for the precautions of the guardian upon his watch. Such are the universal accompaniments of rebellion, and

CHAP. II.

constitute a danger frequently worse than open arms. To confront it at once, in the ordinary course of justice, is to insure its escape, and to add to the danger. Yet the traitor in disguise may achieve his work of treason if he be permitted to go on, and if he is just passing from treason in purpose to treason in act, his arrest and imprisonment for a season may save both him and the country."

Binney's Pamphlet, "Writ of Habeas Corpus," p. 47.

We will add also the words in which Mr. Binney closes his admirable treatise, as probably nothing can be found which was written upon the subject sounder in law or clearer in expression: "The conclusion of the whole matter is this, that the Constitution itself is the law of the privilege, and of the exception to it; that the exception is expressed in the Constitution, and that the Constitution gives effect to the act of suspension when the conditions occur; that the conditions consist of two matters of fact, one a naked matter of fact, and the other a matter-of-fact conclusion from facts, that is to say, rebellion and the public danger, or the requirement of public safety. Whichever power of the constituted government can most properly decide these facts is master of the exception and competent to apply it. Whether it be Congress or the President, the power can only be derived by implication, as there is no express delegation of the power in the Constitution; and it must be derived to that Department whose functions are the most appropriate to it. Congress cannot executively suspend. All that a legislative body can do is to authorize suspension, by giving that effect to an Executive act;

and the Constitution having authorized that, there is no room for the exercise of legislative power. The Constitution intended that for the defense of the nation against rebellion and invasion the power should always be kept open in either of these events, to be used by that department which is the most competent in the same events to say what the public safety requires in this behalf. The President being the properest and the safest depositary of the power, and being the only power which can exercise it under real and effective responsibilities to the people, it is both constitutional and safe to argue that the Constitution has placed it with him."

Constant and elaborate efforts were made in Congress to define the limits of the Executive prerogative in this direction, and they were not entirely confined to the Democratic party; even so stanch a Republican as Lyman Trumbull offered a resolution on the 12th of December, 1861, instructing the Secretary of State to inform the Senate whether any persons had been arrested and imprisoned in the loyal States of the Union, and if so, under what law such action had been taken. This resolution was on the 16th referred to the Judiciary Committee, a proceeding equivalent to its rejection, by a vote of twenty-five to seventeen, six Republican Senators voting with the Democrats in the minority. But it was, of course, from the other side of the House that the most frequent and most vehement attacks upon this exercise of Executive power were directed. James A. Bayard, James A. McDougall, and others, seized every opportunity of bringing the question forward, with

"Globe," Dec. 12, and 16, 1861. pp. 67, 98.

CHAP. II. the uniform result of seeing their resolutions buried by a reference to the Committee of the Judi-
Feb. 14. ciary. Early in the year 1862, however, the President issued an order through the War Department, referring to the critical circumstances of the country through the past year, which, in his opinion, had justified the resort to extraordinary measures of repression; and then went on to say that a favorable change of public opinion had occurred; that the line between loyalty and disloyalty was now plainly defined; that apprehensions of public danger and facilities for treasonable practices had diminished with the passions which prompted heedless persons to adopt them; that the insurrection was believed to have culminated and to be declining. In view of these facts, and anxious to favor a return to the normal course of administration, so far as regard for the public welfare would allow, the President directed that all political prisoners or state prisoners then held in military custody be released on their subscribing to a parole engaging them to render no aid or comfort to the armies in hostility to the United States. The Secretary of War was authorized to except from the effect of this order any persons detained as spies in the service of the insurgents, or others whose release involved any danger to the public safety.

Raymond, "Life of Abraham Lincoln," pp. 379-381.

As the principal criticisms of Congress had been directed against the action of the Secretary of State, in making arbitrary arrests, the President, in this general order, announced that extraordinary arrests would hereafter be made under the direction of the military authorities alone; and on the 27th of February the President issued a further



GEORGE BANCROFT.

order appointing Major-General Dix and the Hon. Edwards Pierrepont of New York to examine the cases of state prisoners remaining in the military custody of the United States, and to determine whether, in view of the public safety and the existing rebellion, they should be discharged, or remain in military custody, or be remitted to the civil tribunals for trial. The tendency of all civil wars is to accumulate arbitrary power in the hands of the Government; the temptation to abuse of power is generally too great to be resisted by those who wield control of the constabulary and the army in times of civil tumult. We believe there is no instance in history, with the exception of the one we are now considering, where the Government, sustained by a large majority of the citizens, its physical force supplied by a devoted army, and its hands upheld by the enormous moral support of a loyal judiciary, has voluntarily relinquished the great powers freely confided to it, and has, from the beginning to the end of a great war, continually restricted the application of its powers, and diminished, instead of increasing, the frequency of its resort to arbitrary measures.

Feb. 27, 1863.

Morgan Dix, "Memoirs of John A. Dix," Vol. II., p. 43.

Once again in the autumn of 1862, on account of the necessity of enforcing the draft which had then been ordered in several States, and restraining the action of disloyal persons tending to hinder this measure, the President ordered that during the existing insurrection, and as a necessary measure for suppressing the same, all rebels and insurgents, their aiders and abettors within the United States, and all persons discouraging volunteer enlistments, resisting military

CHAP. II.

drafts, or guilty of any disloyal practice affording aid and comfort to the rebels against the authority of the United States, should be subject to martial law, and liable to trial and punishment by court martials or military commission; and that the writ of habeas corpus was suspended in respect to all persons arrested or imprisoned by the military or by the sentence of court martials. On the 22d of November, 1862, an order from the War Department directed that all persons then in military custody who had been arrested for discouraging volunteer enlistments, opposing the draft, or for otherwise giving aid and comfort to the enemy, in States where the draft had been made, or the quota of volunteers and militia had been furnished, should be discharged from further military restraint.

War Department, "General Orders," No. 193.

1862.

When Congress came together in December of the same year, there was a disposition among the Republican majority to put an end to the discussion of the question as to whether the President was authorized to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus by expressly granting him such authority. On the 8th of December, Thaddeus Stevens introduced a bill to indemnify the President, and other persons, for suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and acts done in pursuance thereof; and after its second reading moved that its consideration be made the special order for the next Thursday ensuing. This motion was objected to, upon which, in his energetic, not to say arbitrary, manner, he instantly moved the previous question, and this being sustained, the bill was read the third time and passed. It was a bill of great

and far-reaching importance. It not only provided for full indemnity for all arrests and imprisonments made under authority of the President, but it also provided that the President, during the existence of the Rebellion, might suspend at discretion the privilege of the writ. It passed the House by a vote of 90 to 45, exactly two to one, upon which 36 of the minority made a vehement and passionate protest, which, however, was not permitted to be entered upon the journal of the House.

"Globe," Dec. 8, 1862. pp. 20-22.

The bill went to the Senate, and there, after some inconsiderable amendments, it passed that body, by a vote of 33 to 7, on the 27th of January; and the House having refused to concur in the amendments, the Committee of Conference agreed upon a report which was accepted in both chambers — in the House by a majority of 99 to 45, and in the Senate without a record of yeas or nays. By this bill, which was signed in the closing hours of the session, on the 3d of March, 1863, it was provided that during the Rebellion the President of the United States, whenever, in his judgment, the public safety might require it, was authorized to suspend the writ of habeas corpus in any case throughout the United States, or any part thereof. Whenever the privilege should be suspended no military or other officer should be compelled, in answer to any writ of habeas corpus, to return the body of any one detained by him by authority of the President; upon such officer certifying, under oath, that the prisoner was detained by him under authority of the President, further proceedings under the writ should be suspended by the court which had issued it so long as the suspension by

Ibid., Jan. 27, 1862, p. 554.

CHAP. II.

the President should remain in force and the Rebellion continue. The second section provided for the furnishing to the courts of a list of all political prisoners, and the proceedings to be taken for their discharge. Another section provided that the order of the President should be a defense in all proceedings in prosecution of acts contained under this law, and also that such suits begun in State courts might be transferred to United States courts.[1]

[1] While this matter was under discussion in Congress the President received the following interesting letter from the illustrious George Bancroft:

"NEW YORK, February, 1863.

"MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: The case of the Earl of Chatham, of which you bade me send you a memorandum, happened in 1766. In the recess of Parliament his ministry laid an embargo. When Parliament met Lord Northington, the old Lord Chancellor, declared the embargo legal; so did Lord Camden, who was at the time the Lord Chancellor. After much debate, Chatham desired that an act of indemnity might be passed, and in terms as strong as possible. I find no full account of the discussion in any one place. I inclose a copy of Lord Camden's remarks, of which he spoiled the effect by the last line.

"For a tolerable account of the matter, see Adolphus, 'History of England,' edition of 1840, i., 286-291; and a letter from Henry Flood to Lord Charlemont in 'Original Letters, Principally from Charlemont, &c., to the Right Hon. Henry Flood.'

"The case differs from the present one; for we have a civil war. It might be said that Parliament is omnipotent, and may do what a government of limited powers cannot; but the power in question is one of those which are granted.

"Lord Chatham is good authority for consenting to accept a bill of indemnity; and I think it important, if possible, to obtain the deliberate judgment of Congress.

"If it be not out of place, I will venture one suggestion. Those who have discussed the subject have, I think, done wrong in stating the question too narrowly as of the power of the President. The public is sensitive as to all questions of power — the real primary question is of *the duties* of the President, and when the subject is taken up from this point of view, the President appears as the trustee of the people, with no power but to enable him to fulfill his duty, and as the faithful servant of us all, and with ample powers for that end.

"For one, though I think your position perfectly safe without it, I hope Congress will pass some bill, alike for your protection in the present case and for our security, should the nation ever suffer

CHAP. II.

During the summer following the passage of the statute authorizing the suspension of the privilege of the writ, the enrollment and draft of the national forces was going on. The work of the officers charged with this duty was greatly impeded by the constant resort to legal expedients by drafted men and their friends, and by those politicians who wished to embarrass the Government by making an issue of opposition upon every Executive act. General Fry says, "The action of the civil courts in the foregoing particulars threatened for a time, in several districts, to defeat, or at least to suspend, the business of raising troops and of arresting deserters, and either to throw the officers of this bureau into custody, or keep them so constantly before the courts as to prevent their attendance upon the duties for which they were appointed, and thus to defeat the raising of an army according to the law."

Report of Provost Marshal General, 1865–66, Part III., p. 34.

In this state of things, the President saw no course open to him except to avail himself of the powers conferred by the statute. He therefore, on the 15th of September, issued a general proclamation, reciting the provision of the Constitution that "the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not

1863.

itself to elect a ticket like that of Breckinridge and Lane.

"I remain, dear Mr. President,

"Very truly yours,

"(Signed) GEORGE BANCROFT."

"The necessity of a measure renders it not only excusable but legal, and consequently, a judge, when the necessity is proved, may, without hesitation, declare that act legal which would be clearly illegal where such necessity did not exist. The Crown is the sole Executive power, and is therefore intrusted by the Constitution to take upon itself whatever the safety of the state may require, during the recess of Parliament, which is, at most, but a forty days' tyranny."—Lord Camden's remarks. Adolphus, "History of England." Vol. I., p. 287.

CHAP. II. be suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety shall require it," and the fact that a rebellion was existing on the 3d of March, 1863, and that it still existed; reciting also the fact that, by the statute we have referred to, during the present insurrection, the President of the United States, whenever in his judgment the public safety may require, is authorized to suspend the privilege of the writ; and that in the judgment of the President the public safety then required that the privilege of the writ should be suspended throughout the United States in cases where persons are held under the command of the Government as prisoners of war, spies, or aiders or abettors of the enemy, or as soldiers or deserters, or for offenses against the military service; and after this preamble, which proclaimed and made known to all whom it might concern, that the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus was suspended throughout the United States in the several cases before mentioned, and that this suspension would continue throughout the duration of the Rebellion or until that proclamation should be revoked, he formally called on all civil and military officers of the United States to take distinct notice of this suspension and to give full effect to it, and on all citizens of the United States to conduct and govern themselves accordingly.

The controversy as to whether Congress or the President was the authority in whose discretion lay the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus was thus finally set at rest by the concurrent act of both. The President's authority was never after this seriously questioned, and it was used with such moderation and reserve that few

just occasions for complaint arose under the law. Military governors appointed by the President were invested with like authority. The letter of appointment gave them authority to exercise and perform within the limits of their State all the powers, duties, and functions pertaining to the office of military governor, including the power to establish all necessary offices and tribunals, and to suspend the writ of habeas corpus during the pleasure of the President, or until the loyal inhabitants of the State should organize a civil government in conformity with the Constitution of the United States.

The action of Congress and the President in this regard was justified by the civil courts. Perhaps the most important case under the act was that of George W. Jones, who had formerly been a United States Senator and Minister to Bogota. He had been arrested by the order of the Secretary of State and imprisoned at Fort Lafayette. After being released, he brought a suit for false imprisonment, claiming large damages. Under the provisions of the Act of March 3, Mr. Seward moved by his counsel to transfer the case to the United States Circuit Court. This motion was denied by the court of first instance, but a majority of the Supreme Court of New York affirmed the constitutionality of the act and dismissed the case.

1863.

The greatest care was taken by the President to restrain the officers acting under his authority from any abuse of this tremendous power. He watched over this with increasing vigilance as the war went on. The Senate having, on motion

CHAP. II. of Mr. Powell, adopted resolutions directing the Secretary of War to inform the Senate whether he had complied with the injunction of the act to lay lists of persons imprisoned under Executive authority before the United States courts, the Secretary promptly replied, transmitting the report of the Judge Advocate General, showing that all possible vigilance had been used in complying with the terms of the law. The rolls were necessarily incomplete; the offenses with which the prisoners were charged were frequently indefinitely stated; and instead of specifying the particular officers by whom arrests were made the President and Secretary of War assumed the responsibility in all cases, although the arrests were generally made by military commanders and provost-marshals without any intervention on the part of the President or Secretary. Those arrested for military offenses were tried with the greatest possible expedition, and generally with a strict regard to equity and law. Several commissions were actively engaged in investigating the cases of prisoners, and releasing them whenever it could be done without prejudice to the public safety. Frequent inspections of military prisons were made, and not only the errors incident to the use of such enormous authority in times of civil war were corrected as soon as discovered, but in hundreds of instances men guilty of positive offenses, who manifested some sense of awakened conscience, were dismissed without punishment. On the 20th of June, 1864, General C. C. Augur, commanding the Department of Washington, issued stringent orders against any arrests in that department, except in extreme cases

where there was no doubt of guilt, and notifying all his subordinates that they would be held responsible for any abuse of authority on the part of their employees.

These acts were the subject of the most energetic denunciation on the part of the Confederate leaders and their sympathizers all over the world, yet the most arbitrary acts of the Federal Government bore no comparison to those which marked the daily administration of affairs in the South. On the 1st of March, 1862, Jefferson Davis, by virtue of the power invested in him by law to declare the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus in States threatened with invasion, proclaimed martial law over Richmond and for ten miles around, following it with numerous arrests and imprisonments. On the 8th of April following he issued a proclamation extending martial law over East Tennessee and suspending all civil jurisdiction and the writ of habeas corpus. The next month he issued a like proclamation, extending it over six counties in Virginia. The year before this he had issued a general proclamation of banishment against all the adherents of the Union in the South, warning them to depart from the Confederate States within forty days of the date of that proclamation, under penalty of being treated as alien enemies if they should remain. Severe cruelties were practiced upon the loyal population of East Tennessee from the outbreak of the Rebellion until the last year of the war, and were stimulated by the orders of J. P. Benjamin, while he was acting as Secretary of War in the autumn of 1861.

1862.

See pp. 77-78, Vol. V. of this work.

The Confederate Congress followed the example

CHAP. II. of the Congress of the United States in passing a bill for the general suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. In February, 1864, at the request of Jefferson Davis, the privilege of the writ was formally suspended, "during the present invasion of the Confederate States," by both Houses of the Richmond Congress; but to guard against any abuse of the power thus given to Mr. Davis, a series of cases authorizing the suspension of the writ was enumerated in the act, of such variety and scope that any caprice or suspicion of power might easily be gratified under it.

CHAPTER III

THE MARCH TO CHATTANOOGA

THE Army of the Cumberland remained for six months on the field they had so gallantly defended at Murfreesboro. General Rosecrans and his friends have for twenty years vehemently defended this long inactivity, and General Thomas in his report to Congress gave the great authority of his name to the statement that the apparent lethargy of the Army of the Cumberland during its stay at Murfreesboro was due really to the severity of the winter, which rendered it almost impossible to move large bodies of men on the ordinary roads of the country, and to the difficulty of procuring animals to refit the transportation and equip the cavalry and artillery. But the winter was nearly half gone when the battle of Murfreesboro was fought, and this excuse does not explain the waste of several months of fine spring weather.

The Government expected great results from Rosecrans and his victorious army as soon as the weather became favorable and the roads fairly settled. No pains were spared in giving him every possible support in supplies and reënforcements. Early in February a fine additional force was sent

CHAP. III. him, comprising the Army of Kentucky under Major-General Gordon Granger and Brigadier-Generals Charles C. Gilbert, Absalom Baird, and George Crook. These forces, swelled by two regiments of infantry and four of cavalry, which joined them at Nashville, made a valuable reënforcement of some fourteen thousand men. The President and General-in-Chief with friendly urgency suggested an early movement, as required not only for the redemption of Tennessee from the control of an enemy which was cruelly persecuting and harassing the Union men of that State, but also to assist the campaigns of Grant at Vicksburg and of Hooker in Virginia, by withdrawing troops from their fronts, or, at least, by preventing reenforcements against them. But General Rosecrans did nothing from New Year's Day to
1863. midsummer except to build around Murfreesboro an enormous series of fortifications, to exercise and drill his troops, to project and carry out an extensive system of reconnaissances which led to nothing, and to write a large number of spirited letters to the authorities at Washington protesting against every order given him and deprecating every suggestion made to him.

In his evidence before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, he made this explanation of his action: "When spring arrived, and the roads had become settled, a movement which the country expected, and which would have given the officers and men of our command, including myself, pleasure and promised renown, was proposed. I felt it my duty to sacrifice all personal gratification and even to fall in the estimation, temporarily, of the

country and friends who had high hopes and expectations of the Army of the Cumberland, to secure General Grant in his operations before Vicksburg from the consequences of compelling Bragg to retire, when it would not be possible for us so to pursue as to prevent him from reënforcing Johnston, whose relative numbers to our troops under General Grant was deemed more formidable than I subsequently learned it to have been."[1]

Rosecrans, Testimony, Report Committee on Conduct of the War, 1864-65. Part III., p. 27.

It is hard to say whether this strange fancy that he could best support the campaign of Grant by doing nothing, and that by attacking Bragg he would drive him to reënforce Johnston, was really the cause of Rosecrans's long idleness at Murfreesboro, or was an afterthought to explain a delay otherwise inexplicable. A better explanation may probably be found in the idiosyncrasies of Rosecrans. He was, like McClellan, always demanding impossibilities from the Government in the way of troops and supplies; but the great difference between them was, that, while in McClellan's case delay was an instinct, in the case of Rosecrans delay seemed to spring from a certain controversial insubordination which appeared to render prompt obedience to the wishes of the Government impossible with him, unless every demand

[1] General Grant did not share this view of Rosecrans. When he started on his famous march in rear of Vicksburg, he suggested that Rosecrans should make a demonstration against Bragg to prevent reënforcements from coming from Bragg to Johnston. Badeau, in his "Military History of U. S. Grant," says, Vol. I., p. 431: "While Grant was operating behind Vicksburg, he had urged that Rosecrans should be directed to make some movement in his favor, to distract the enemy, and at least prevent the troops of Bragg, who was in front of Rosecrans, from being sent to reënforce Johnston. But although he was greatly superior to Bragg in numbers Rosecrans refused to budge."

CHAP. III.

of his own had been previously complied with. Whenever Rosecrans had a disagreement with his superiors, it became a fixed idea in his mind. His grievance assumed proportions that were almost ludicrous, and his statements became recklessly inaccurate. This was the case in regard to his constant clamor for cavalry during the year 1863.

He represented himself as destitute of horses when, as Halleck says, his stables were overcrowded with animals and the horses of his cavalry, artillery, and trains were dying in large numbers for want of forage. "Let it be clearly understood," said Rosecrans on the 20th of March, "that the enemy have five to our one and can, therefore, command the resources of the country and the services of the inhabitants." In answer to a letter from the quartermaster-general correcting his absurd understatement of the number of horses that had been sent him, he admits that he has on hand 8000 cavalry and mounted infantry, of which he claims that he is not able to turn out more than 5000 for actual duty; and that there were 3000 more in use as escorts and orderlies, and unserviceable in Nashville. According, therefore, to his own computation he had 11,000 mounted men, and the enemy 55,000, a number far exceeding the force of Bragg's entire army. He sent General L. H. Rousseau to Washington with a request that he be allowed to recruit a cavalry force among the Eastern troops recently discharged from service, a request which it was not possible to comply with on account of the exigencies of recruitment in the several States, but the fact that this authorization was not given him became in

Halleck, Report for 1863. W. R. Vol. XXX., Part I., p. 37.

1863. Rosecrans' Campaign, Report Committee on Conduct of the War, 1865. Vol. III., p. 39.

Rosecrans to Meigs, May 10, 1863. W. R. Vol. XXIII., Part II., p. 321.

Rosecrans, Testimony, Report Committee on Conduct of the War, 1865. Vol. III., p. 28.

his mind a new grievance and a new proof of the hostility of the Government towards him. CHAP. III.

During his six months at Murfreesboro, he assailed the Government daily by mail and telegraph with clamorous demands for supplies in horses, men, munitions, and details of officers which it was not practicable to grant; and he hardly ever received an order or a suggestion from the General-in-Chief to which he did not reply by an argument against its execution. It is altogether probable that if he had received no orders from Halleck he would have moved far earlier than he did. While he remained under the immediate command of Grant he was in constant controversy with him and on terms of the friendliest correspondence with Halleck; but the moment he became independent of Grant and subject to the orders of Halleck as general-in-chief, he transferred his animosity to the latter and sustained towards him an attitude of consistent hostility to the end of the war.

When he received his promotion to the grade of major-general he protested vehemently against the date of it, which was the 16th of September, 1862, and although this date was afterwards, at his importunity, changed to the 2d of March, 1862, he still regarded himself as deeply injured because even this earlier date left him junior to Grant. The President, writing to him on the 17th of March, 1863. said: "As to your request that your commission should date from December, 1861, of course you expected to gain something by this, but you should remember that precisely so much as you should gain by it others would lose by it. If the thing you sought had been exclusively ours, we would have

CHAP. III.

given it cheerfully; but, being the right of other men, we having a merely arbitrary power over it, the taking it from them and giving it to you became a more delicate matter, and more deserving of consideration. Truth to speak, I do not appreciate this matter of rank on paper as you officers do. The world will not forget that you fought the battle of Stone River, and it will never care a fig whether you rank General Grant on paper or he so ranks you. . . And now be assured," he concludes, "you wrong both yourself and us when you even suspect there is not the best disposition on the part of us all here to oblige you."

Lincoln to Rosecrans, March 17, 1863. MS.

There was at this time a vacancy in the rank of major-general in the regular army, and the friends of General Rosecrans, together with those of other meritorious officers, besieged the Government with the claims of their respective favorites. In this conjuncture General Halleck, it is not known whether by suggestion of the President or of the Secretary of War, wrote a letter to the different aspirants, saying in substance that this vacancy would be given to the general in the field who should first win an important and decisive victory. As a matter either of taste or of policy the propriety of such a suggestion to generals in the field may well be questioned, but no one except Rosecrans thought fit to make it a subject of controversy. He, however, with his unfailing pugnacity rose to the challenge and sent an angry and insulting reply to Halleck, saying, "As an officer and a citizen I feel degraded to see such auctioneering of honor. Have we a general who would fight for his own personal benefit, when he would not for honor and the country? He would

March 1, 1863.

W. R. Vol. XXIII., Part II., p. 95.



GENERAL GORDON GRANGER.

come by his commission basely in that case, and deserve to be despised by men of honor." It was in this tone that most of his correspondence with Washington continued. Upon General Halleck intimating to him, in a not unfriendly manner, on the 20th of April, 1863, that he was using the telegraph rather too freely in reports of insignificant occurrences, he answered that he regarded this as "a profound, grievous, cruel, and ungenerous official and personal wrong. If there is any one thing I despise and scorn," he says, "it is an officer's blowing his own trumpet or getting others to do it for him. I had flattered myself that no general officer in the service had a cleaner record on this point than I have. I shall here drop the subject, leaving to time and Providence the vindication of my conduct, and expect justice, kindness, and consideration only from those who are willing to accord them." It is needless to add that he did not drop the subject, and that his faith in time and Providence never prevented him from attending promptly to the vindication of his conduct, at all times and seasons.

March 6, 1863. W. R. Vol. XXIII., Part II., p. 111.

Ibid., March 20, 1863, p. 256.

Ibid., April 26, 1863, p. 279.

Of course it is not to be imagined that the army of Rosecrans on the north of Duck River, or the army of Bragg on the south, were entirely idle during this long interval. The late winter and spring were occupied not only by works of fortification and intrenchment, of discipline, and of supply, but also by a series of raids, more or less expensive and destructive on both sides, but leading in no case to any adequate result. The responsibility of these movements does not rest exclusively upon the generals in the field. They were suggested

CHAP. III.

in default of more important movements by the governments on both sides of the line. Mr. Lincoln himself wrote to Rosecrans on the 17th of February, referring to the trouble and injury inflicted upon us by the raids of rapidly moving small bodies of the enemy, harassing and discouraging the loyal residents, supplying themselves with provisions, clothing, and horses, and breaking our communications. He said: "Can these raids be successfully met by even larger forces of our own of the same kind acting merely on the defensive? I think," he continued, "we should organize proper forces and make counter-raids. We should not capture so much of supplies from them as they have done from us, but it would trouble them more to repair railroads and bridges than it does us. What think you of trying to get up such a corps in your army?" Bragg certainly made great use of his cavalry, but it is not at all clear that it was remunerative. Wheeler attacked Fort Donelson on the 3d of February, and was repulsed with heavy loss, though he succeeded in escaping with most of his command. Morgan was defeated by an inferior force under Colonel A. S. Hall on the 20th of March, near Milton, and was driven from his stronghold at Snow Hill by General Stanley on the 1st of April. On the other hand, Colonel John Coburn, commanding a general reconnaissance set on foot on the 4th of March, was surrounded by the force of Van Dorn and Wheeler and lost four regiments, and Forrest's cavalry captured some four hundred men at Brentwood on the 25th of March.

Lincoln to Rosecrans, Feb. 17, 1863. MS.

The most important of the cavalry movements set on foot by either army during the season came

to equally disastrous failure. General Rosecrans in the month of April organized a provisional brigade of 1700 men, under command of Colonel A. D. Streight, for an expedition into the States of Georgia and Alabama, to destroy property and interrupt the communications of the enemy as much as possible. He was ordered to move from Nashville to the Tennessee River; there to embark his command and proceed up the stream to form a junction with the force under General Dodge; then to menace Tuscumbia, and after having gone far enough with Dodge to create the impression that the two forces formed but one expedition, he was to push southward towards Western Georgia and to cut the railroads supplying the rebel army by way of Chattanooga. He was warned that this was the chief object of his expedition, and that he must not allow any collateral or incidental scheme to delay him so as to endanger his return. He was particularly required to restrain his command from pillaging and marauding; to destroy all manufactories of arms and depots of supplies of the rebel army, and to enlist all able-bodied men who desired to join the army of the Union.

These orders were, in the beginning, promptly and successfully carried out. A junction was formed with Dodge, and the National troops marched on Tuscumbia, defeating the Confederates there. Dodge turned southward, making a rapid raid through Northern Alabama, and returning to his headquarters at Corinth. Streight moved towards Northern Georgia, but was soon attacked in the rear by Forrest's cavalry. He turned and fought Forrest repeatedly, with energy and success, but,

CHAP. III. of course, lost at every stage of his march by fatigue and the casualties of battle. His ammunition was injured in fording a stream. He pushed onward, however, in hope of destroying at least the bridge at Rome, but was unable to accomplish even that much of his instructions, and surrendered the remainder of his command to Forrest on the 3d
1863. of May. They were taken to Richmond; his men were soon sent through the lines and exchanged, but he, and his officers, were retained and imprisoned on the ground that they had incurred the penalty fixed by the statutes of the State of Georgia for inciting slaves to rebellion. This caused a long controversy between the respective commissions of exchange, and led later to the imprisonment of General John H. Morgan and his officers in the Ohio penitentiary. By a singular coincidence both generals made their escape from prison and returned within their own lines.

Two months later the cavalry of General Bragg attempted a similar movement upon the Northern States with precisely the same calamitous result. It was part of a movement of a much wider scope, and was expected to yield far more important results to the Confederate army than any Rosecrans promised himself from the expedition of Streight. The force assigned to it was about double that of the Union raiders, consisting of three thousand of the best Confederate cavalry, which was expected to dash through the States of Kentucky, Indiana, and Ohio, and, supported by a strong infantry force, under General Buckner, to capture Louisville and perhaps Cincinnati. The Confederate Government, in spite of their disappointment

over the failure of Kirby Smith's expedition to establish a rebel State administration in Kentucky, still had a lingering hope that Kentucky at heart was attached to the South; and the demonstration of the Peace Democrats during the early summer of 1863, and the agitation apparent at the time of the arrest of Vallandigham, had convinced the authorities at Richmond that a large body of Northern Democrats were prepared to rise in insurrection against the Administration of Lincoln as soon as a Confederate force should appear on their soil to support such an enterprise. CHAP. III.

On account of the movement by General Rosecrans, to be narrated hereafter, General Buckner was unable to perform his part of the programme resolved upon, and the advance of Morgan was, therefore, a mere cavalry raid, more important, however, in regard to its numbers and its purpose than any which had hitherto been set on foot by either army. Morgan crossed the Cumberland River at Burkesville on the 2d of July, and moved on to Columbia, skirmishing all the way with inferior detachments of Union troops, who retired as he approached. He had a sharp skirmish on the 4th of July with Colonel O. H. Moore, who commanded a few hundred men at Green River Bridge, and, in honor of the day, handsomely repulsed the enemy. On the 5th Morgan captured the Twentieth Kentucky at Lebanon, after a fight of several hours, burning the greater part of the town. He rode rapidly through Springfield and Bardstown to Brandenburg, where he captured two small boats on the 9th of July, and crossed his force to the Indiana shore. General Basil Duke, 1863.

CHAP. III.

Basil W. Duke, "History of Morgan's Cavalry," p. 411.

the intimate friend and most trusted subordinate of Morgan, says that the crossing of the Ohio River was in direct disobedience of Bragg's orders; that Morgan told him Bragg had ordered him to operate in Kentucky; but that he had no intention, from the beginning, to obey his orders. He expected that success would condone his offense; that he could carry the war gloriously into the Northern States, keep a large force from reënforcing Rosecrans, sweep through Indiana and Ohio, recross the river at the upper fords, which he had examined for that purpose, or join General Lee in his anticipated career of conquest in Pennsylvania. Such dreams were common in that eventful summer, and even the utter failure of his campaign does not prevent General Morgan's biographer from claiming that the enterprise stamped him as a military genius of the first order.

1863.

The presence of so formidable a host upon the soil of a Northern State naturally produced great excitement. The people of Indiana and Ohio, who had hitherto known nothing of the war, except what they gained from their morning papers, were at this time to have their first and only practical experience of the presence of a hostile army before their eyes; and even now there was little actual fighting connected with the progress of Morgan and his rough riders through these States. It is no discredit to Morgan to say that the expedition was merely one of thieving and arson on a grand scale, for he would have been ready enough to fight, had there been any fighting to do. There was no organized force to meet him, and the troops which were hurrying after him in hot pursuit all

the way were for a long time unable to reach him, as he swept the country of fresh horses wherever he went, leaving his broken-down nags to be gathered up by his pursuers. He rode through Corydon; through Salem, where he found several hundred home guards, who made no resistance worth mentioning, and were taken and paroled. He burned here a railway station and ransomed the mills and factories of the place at a thousand dollars apiece. The Confederate historian here mentions the surprise with which Morgan's men, "just from thinned-out Dixie," observed the signs of thrift and plenty in the land of their enemies, especially "the dense population apparently untouched by the demands of the war." The sight of all this evident wealth excited among them a curious outbreak of cupidity, seemingly unregulated by any civilized perception of use or value.

General Basil W. Duke gives this singular account of the plundering done by his own soldiers, which would be scarcely credible if it were from an unfriendly hand: "The disposition for wholesale plunder exceeded anything that any of us had ever seen before. . . Calico was the staple article of appropriation — each man who could get one tied a bolt of it to his saddle, only to throw it away and get a fresh one at the first opportunity. They did not pillage with any sort of method or reason — it seemed to be a mania, senseless and purposeless. One man carried a bird-cage with three canaries in it for two days. Another rode with a chafing-dish, which looked like a small metallic coffin, on the pommel of his saddle, until an officer forced him to throw it away. Although the

Chap. III. weather was intensely warm, another still slung seven pairs of skates around his neck and chuckled over his acquisition. I saw very few articles of real value taken — they pillaged like boys robbing an orchard. I would not have believed that such a passion could have been developed so ludicrously among any body of civilized men. At Piketon, Ohio, one man broke through the guard posted at a store, rushed in, trembling with excitement and avarice, and filled his pockets with horn buttons."

Duke, "History of Morgan's Cavalry," p. 437.

Wherever Morgan went he burned bridges and public works, scouring the country for miles on either hand, for horses and supplies. A show of resistance was made at Vernon on the 11th of July, and Morgan, therefore, passed on without attacking that place. Moving eastward, tearing up railroad tracks, cutting telegraph wires, and destroying bridges, he passed out of Indiana into Ohio. On the 13th, he came near capturing a large number of Government horses and mules at Camp Monroe, not far from Cincinnati, but they had been removed to a place of safety a few hours before his arrival. His dangerous approach produced a great commotion in the city of Cincinnati; but not feeling strong enough to take the place he passed to the north, threw a train off the track, capturing a number of recruits and robbing the mails, and resumed his ride eastward.

1863.

By this time it was clear that the Confederates were to get no benefit from this raid, except the fun to be derived from it. Morgan had heard of the defeat of Lee at Gettysburg and of the fall of Vicksburg; the militia of the State of Ohio had been called out by Governor Tod, and though not espe-

cially efficient as against veteran troops, they were already gathering in such numbers about him as to delay and annoy his progress. The Confederates had now only one purpose, to strike the upper fords of the Ohio and effect their escape into the hill country of West Virginia. Thus far he had not been especially incommoded by the pursuit of the Union forces. The Indiana home guards had escorted him, at a respectful distance, to their State line, and then returned to their homes. Morgan regarded them with the same indifference with which a railway train views the pursuit of a rural dog, which barks at its passage until the limit of his farm is reached. General E. H. Hobson, who was in charge of the troops who had crossed the river from Kentucky in pursuit of Morgan, was never able to reach him, on account of the Confederate superiority in horses; but as Morgan approached the river the hunt became much more active and concentrated, and the waters of the Ohio being by this time thoroughly patrolled by improvised gunboats, the matter of crossing became every hour more difficult. CHAP. III.

Morgan's troopers were beginning to show signs of great exhaustion, and they were continually straggling and being captured by the pursuit. The rear-guard was constantly skirmishing, and, as the advance reached Buffington Island, near Pomeroy, where they hoped to cross the river, it was driven back by gunboats. The principal force of the raiders was captured on the 20th at this point. Morgan, with some five hundred of his command, escaped, and it was only after five days of wandering, of baffled attempts to cross the river July, 1863.

CHAP. III. at different points, and a desperate ride to the northward in search of some avenue of escape, that
July 26, 1863. he was taken by General Shackleford near Wellsville. Just one month had elapsed since he left Sparta, in Tennessee, with two brigades of the finest cavalry ever organized by the Confederate army in the West. In this ride of thirty days he had destroyed his whole detachment, had not interrupted for an hour the movements of the great armies of the Union, had done no damage that could not be repaired in a few days, had deprived General Bragg of his services at a time when he was in deadly need of them; and yet, so illogical is the popular sentiment where military fame is concerned, he made himself, by this boyish and fruitless exploit, by the mere fact of wasting his command on Northern soil, the most popular cavalry hero of the war on the Southern side. Being imprisoned at Columbus,
1863. he made his escape in the following November, and was received with great enthusiasm in the Confederacy. But the day of his brilliant activity was over; the criticisms of his fellow-officers clouded his peace of mind; he came to be ill-regarded at Richmond. He led one more important and well-equipped raid into Kentucky in June of the next year, but met with a decisive defeat at the hands of General S. G. Burbridge, and was driven back into
Duke, "History of Morgan's Cavalry," p. 528. Virginia, his command revenging itself, as General Duke says, by "great and inexcusable excesses." On the 4th of September, 1864, at the outset of another raid, he was surprised at the village of Greenville, Tennessee, and killed as he was trying to escape through a kitchen-garden.

While Morgan's expedition was preparing, Gen-

eral Rosecrans had at last resolved upon a forward movement, and was making it ready with that skill and judgment which never failed him in grand strategic operations, whenever he could be brought to obey the orders of the Government. It had been weary work to get him started. Before the middle of May it had become evident that his ostensible purpose, to hold Bragg's force away from Johnston, had failed. Reënforcements had been sent to Mississippi, though not in time or in sufficient force to check the victorious march of Grant across that State. The Government renewed its orders and its appeals to Rosecrans for a forward movement, now that Bragg was thus weakened, and it would seem as if nothing but Rosecrans's obstinacy prevented his taking advantage of the great opportunity thus afforded him. He made no secret of his views, and it was no less his singularly attractive personal influence than the weight of his authority as commander that brought all his generals to his own way of thinking. Annoyed by the orders of the Government to begin an aggressive campaign, he called together a council of war in the first week of June, and obtained from seventeen generals an opinion adverse to an advance.

Rosecrans to Halleck, June 11, 1863. W. R. Vol. XXIII., Part I., p. 8.

General Garfield, his chief-of-staff, alone dissented from this otherwise unanimous opinion, and on the 12th of June drew up a careful review of the opinions of the generals, showing that Rosecrans could throw 65,137 bayonets and sabers against Bragg's 41,680, allowing the most liberal estimate of his force; and it is not one of the least remarkable traits of the character of Rosecrans that, after furiously opposing the views of the Government and ex-

Ibid., Part II., pp. 422, 423.

CHAP. III.

torting from all his generals an opinion in harmony with his own, he suddenly adopted the plan of Garfield, and set about executing it with extraordinary ability and celerity. On the 11th of June he had telegraphed to Halleck the decision of his council of war, and added: "Not one thinks an advance advisable until Vicksburg's fate is determined. Admitting these officers to have a reasonable share of military sagacity, courage, and patriotism, you perceive that there are graver and stronger reasons than probably appear at Washington for the attitude of this army. I therefore counsel caution and patience at headquarters. Better wait a little to get all we can ready to insure the best results, if by so doing we, per force of Providence, observe a great military maxim, not to risk two great and decisive battles at the same time. We might have cause to be thankful for it; at all events you see that to expect success I must have such thorough grounds that when I say 'forward' my word will inspire conviction and confidence where both are now wanting."

Rosecrans to Halleck, June 11, 1863. W. R. Vol. XXIII., Part I., p. 8.

Halleck answered that the maxim quoted applied "to a single army, but not to two armies acting independently of each other. Johnston and Bragg are acting on interior lines between you and Grant, and it is for their interest, not ours, that they should fight at different times, so as to use the same force against both of you. It is for our interest to fight them, if possible, while divided. If you are not strong enough to fight Bragg with a part of his troops absent, you will not be able to fight him after the affair at Vicksburg is over, and his troops return to your front." He then

recalls to Rosecrans another military maxim that "councils of war never fight." He tells him the authorities will not make him fight against his will, but that "after five or six months of inactivity, with your force all the time diminishing, and no hope of any immediate increase, you must not be surprised that their patience is pretty well exhausted." When this letter reached him he answered on the 21st of June in the same spirit of controversy, with, however, a singular shifting of his ground. Apparently abandoning his idea that his duty was to keep Bragg away from Johnston, he now says that "for Bragg to materially aid Johnston he must abandon our front substantially, and then we can move to our ultimate work with more rapidity and less waste of material on natural obstacles. If Grant is defeated both forces will come here, and then we ought to be near our base." He deprecates the nation using all its force in the great West at the same time, so as to leave it without a single reserve to stem the current of possible disaster.

CHAP. III.

W. R. Vol. XXIII., Part I., p. 8.

Ibid., p. 9.

Having thus satisfied his controversial instinct by protesting against the plan of an advance, he began immediately to put it in action. He started on the 24th of June, ten days before the surrender of Vicksburg, at the very moment when, according to his own theory, he was bound by a policy of inaction to keep Bragg in his place in Tennessee; and he had no sooner started than the fine weather, which for several weeks had been tempting him to move, broke up in a series of the most tremendous storms which had ever been seen in Tennessee; but in spite of all these obstacles his march was pushed

CHAP. III. forward with extraordinary energy and success. The main force of the Confederates occupied a strong position north of Duck River, their front extending along a series of fortified camps from Shelbyville to Wartrace, their cavalry front out as far as McMinnville, on the right, and Spring Hill and Columbia, on the left. By a skillful and imposing feint upon Bragg's left wing, Rosecrans created the impression that his attack would be made on that side, and then moved the bulk of his force upon the Confederate right by way of Fairfield and Manchester, thus turning the right of Bragg's line on Duck River and compelling him to fall back to Tullahoma; while Rosecrans's right, under Granger, drove the rear-guard out of Shelbyville and gave to the Union force the whole of Bragg's first line. Without resting an instant, Rosecrans sent a cavalry force around Bragg's right and rear to interrupt his communications with the Tennessee, and to force a battle upon terms highly advantageous to the Union army; but Bragg, seeing that the campaign was lost, gave up his whole line, abandoned Tullahoma, and retreated rapidly through Winchester, across the Cumberland Mountains and the Tennessee River, to Chattanooga.

1863. "The work of expelling Bragg from Middle Tennessee," says General Garfield, "occupied nine days, and ended July 3, leaving his troops in a most disheartened and demoralized condition, while our army, with a loss of less than one thousand men, was, in a few days, fuller of potential fight than ever before." Had it not been for the storms, which delayed him thirty-six hours at Hoover's Gap and sixty hours at Winchester, Rosecrans says

Garfield to Chase, July 27, 1863.

he would have got possession of the enemy's communications and forced him to very disastrous battle; and this delay on account of the weather would have been avoided by an earlier movement, which was perfectly practicable, and which Rosecrans might have made at the time that he was arguing with Halleck against it. His loss was only 560 men killed, wounded, and missing; Bragg lost besides his killed and wounded, which have not been reported, some 1500 prisoners and a considerable number of guns, and material abandoned in his hasty retreat. But, beyond all this, he lost prestige which he never regained. The farmers of Tennessee and Kentucky, who had been inclined to favor the Confederate cause, and who had been repeatedly assured, by him, by Buckner, and by Kirby Smith, that the Yankees should not be suffered again to overrun their soil, turned towards the national side, when the national authority was once more established over them, with a feeling in which there was as much of resentment against the Confederates as of loyalty to the Union.

Rosecrans, Testimony, Report Committee on Conduct of the War, 1865. Vol. III., p. 28.

1863.

This brilliant success, which was an absolute negation of the theory upon which he had based his controversies with the Government for six months, did not encourage General Rosecrans to push forward in the way which was naturally indicated. He remained six weeks at Tullahoma, allowing Bragg to tighten his hold upon Chattanooga and to gather in reënforcements from all troops anywhere available throughout the Confederacy. Garfield, writing to the Secretary of the Treasury on the 27th of July, said that on the 18th the bridges were rebuilt, and the cars were in full com-

CHAP. III. munication from the Cumberland to the Tennessee. "I have, since then, urged, with all the earnestness I possess, a rapid advance while Bragg's army was shattered and under cover, and before Johnston and he can effect a junction. Thus far," he continued, "the general has been singularly disinclined to grasp the situation with a strong hand and make the advantage his own."

Rosecrans was not unaware of the President's solicitude and dissatisfaction at this resumption of the inactive attitude of the early part of the year.

1863. He wrote to Mr. Lincoln, on the 1st of August, a long letter, giving as his reasons for his previous delay, the difficulty of obtaining supplies; his weakness in cavalry; going over once again the long controversy with Halleck, insisting once more on the inexpediency of the movement against Bragg which would have caused him to reënforce Johnston, a plea which the events of the summer had completely confuted. He dwelt on the bad weather and the condition of the roads, insisting upon it that the roads in his department were worse than anywhere else in the world, and the difficulty of supply greater. He then enumerated the disadvantages of the campaign before him: sixty miles of barren mountain traversed by a few poor roads; bridge material brought from a great distance; wide, unfordable rivers for a length of five hundred miles; and the difficulty of securing a crossing in the face of a strong opposition force on the other side; and added to the immense difficulty of taking a position in Tennessee, the still greater difficulty of holding it.

Rosecrans to Lincoln, Aug. 1, 1863. MS.

The President answered this letter as soon as it was received in his usual tone of kindness and can-



GENERAL D. H. HILL.

dor. "I think," he said, "you must have inferred more than General Halleck has intended, as to any dissatisfaction of mine with you. I am sure you, as a reasonable man, would not have been wounded could you have heard all my words and seen all my thoughts in regard to you. . . After Grant invested Vicksburg I was very anxious lest Johnston should overwhelm him from the outside, and when it appeared certain that part of Bragg's force had gone and was going to Johnston, it did seem to me it was the exactly proper time for you to attack Bragg with what force he had left. In all kindness let me say it so seems to me yet. Finding from your dispatches to General Halleck that your judgment was different, and being very anxious for Grant, I, on one occasion, told General Halleck I thought he should direct you to decide at once to immediately attack Bragg or to stand on the defensive and send part of your force to Grant. He replied he had already so directed in substance. Soon after, dispatches from Grant abated my anxiety for him, and in proportion abated my anxiety about any movement of yours. When afterwards, however, I saw a dispatch of yours arguing that the right time for you to attack Bragg was not before, but would be after, the fall of Vicksburg, it impressed me very strangely, and I think I so stated to the Secretary of War and General Halleck. It seemed no other than the proposition that you could better fight Bragg when Johnston should be at liberty to return and assist him than you could before he could so return to his assistance. Since Grant has been entirely relieved by the fall of Vicksburg, by which Johnston is also relieved,

CHAP. III.

it has seemed to me that your chance for a stroke has been considerably diminished, and I have not been pressing you directly or indirectly. True, I am very anxious for East Tennessee to be occupied by us; but I see and appreciate the difficulties you mention. The question occurs, Can the thing be done at all? Does preparation advance at all? Do you not consume supplies as fast as you get them forward? Have you more animals to-day than you had at the battle of Stone's River? And yet have not more been furnished you since then than your entire present stock? I ask the same questions as to your mounted force. Do not misunderstand: I am not casting blame upon you; I rather think by great exertion you can get to East Tennessee, but a very important question is, 'Can you stay there?' I make no order in the case — that I leave to General Halleck and yourself. And now be assured once more that I think of you in all kindness and confidence, and that I am not watching you with an evil eye."

Lincoln to Rosecrans, Aug. 10, 1863. MS.

When this letter was received Rosecrans was already in motion, yet he could not let it pass without controversy. He wrote, defending his action, in the line of argument already familiar, contrasting the work required of him, and the resources he had to accomplish it, with that required of Grant and his resources, enlarging upon the difficulties of his position, and saying that few armies have been called upon to attempt a more arduous campaign. The President said in reply that it was not his intention to engage in an argument on military questions. "You had informed me," he said, "you were impressed through General Halleck that I

was dissatisfied with you; and I could not bluntly deny that I was, without unjustly implicating him. I therefore concluded to tell you the plain truth, being satisfied the matter would thus appear much smaller than it would if seen by mere glimpses. I repeat that my appreciation of you has not abated. I can never forget whilst I remember anything that about the end of last year and beginning of this, you gave us a hard-earned victory, which, had there been a defeat instead, the nation could scarcely have lived over." CHAP. III. Lincoln to Rosecrans, Aug. 31, 1863. MS.

Political as well as strategic considerations of the most imperative character demanded that the Union armies should advance upon East Tennessee, and the President, therefore, exhibited some impatience at Rosecrans's delay after his advance at Tullahoma. Orders more and more pressing were given him to advance. On the 4th of August he asked in his usual querulous tone, "As I have been determined to cross the river as soon as practicable, and have been making all preparations and getting such information as may enable me to do so without being driven back like Hooker, I wish to know if your order is intended to take away my discretion as to the time and manner of moving my troops?" To which the General-in-Chief replied on the next day, "The orders for the advance of your army and that its movements be reported daily are peremptory." To save his own self-respect and assert his independence, Rosecrans waited ten days longer, and then started. To cover and protect his left flank in this movement, and to rescue the loyal inhabitants of East Tennessee from the tyranny under which they had been suffering for 1863. W. R. Vol. XXIII., Part II., p. 592. Ibid.



MAP OF THE TULLAHOMA CAMPAIGN.

Valley Head, mentioned in the text, but outside the map, is the same distance (twenty-five miles) southwest of Lafayette that the latter is south of Chattanooga. Alpine is about twelve miles southeast of Valley Head.

CHAP. III. two years, Burnside was at the same time ordered to move upon Knoxville. The Government had equal difficulty in overcoming his inertia. Hal-
1863. leck telegraphed to Rosecrans on the 14th of July, "Burnside has been frequently urged to move forward and cover your left by entering East Tennessee." He adds in a tone which has more of pathos
W. R. Vol. XXIII., Part II., p. 531. than dignity in it, "I do not know what he is doing. He seems tied fast to Cincinnati." Burnside moved forward, however, at length; and by slow marches, which were almost unopposed, his advance entered Knoxville the first of September.

Rosecrans had now before him the most difficult and important operation of his entire military career. Between him and the army of Bragg at Chattanooga there lay on his left flank the Cumberland Mountains, and beyond them the rugged chain of Walden's Ridge, which, half way from Bridgeport to Chattanooga, abuts upon the Tennessee River, closing access to the rocky fastness of the Confederates by an almost impassable barrier. If he chose to advance upon the right and strike his enemy's communications with the South he must first pass the Cumberland Mountains, then the Tennessee River, and after the passage of this wide and unfordable stream had been accomplished, there still lay before him the wide plateau of Sand Mountain and the formidable heights of the Lookout range. Rosecrans chose to grapple with the almost insuperable difficulties of the latter route; but he resolved to conceal his purpose from the enemy and to create the impression on the mind of Bragg that the assault on Chattanooga was to be made from the north of the river; and he carried

out this plan with a skill and success which entitles this campaign to the foremost place among the great strategic movements of the war.

He sent two divisions of Crittenden's corps, under John M. Palmer and Thomas J. Wood, by parallel roads over the mountains into the Sequatchie Valley, pushing John T. Wilder's brigade of Joseph J. Reynolds's division as far east as Pike Valley, and R. H. Q. Minty's cavalry to the northeast as far as Sparta. Every pass of the mountains to the north of Chattanooga was pervaded by this cloud of blue uniforms, until Bragg was convinced that an attack was to come from that side, and was only in doubt whether Buckner at Knoxville, or himself at Chattanooga, was the immediate object of assault. Four brigades, under command of General W. B. Hazen, took position from Williams Island to Kingston along the north shore of the Tennessee, massing their heaviest force across the river from Chattanooga and the mouth of Chickamauga Creek. This powerful feint, brilliantly planned and admirably conducted, completely deluded the Confederate general and caused him to neglect Rosecrans's principal movement lower down the river. Under cover of this demonstration, the army moved across the mountains and began their passage of the river on the 29th of August, crossing at Bridgeport, Caperton Ferry, Shell Mound, and the mouth of Battle Creek, with such expedition and good fortune that by the 4th of September all were over, except Hazen's troops, who were observing Chattanooga, and a few brigades in the rear. The next obstacle was Sand Mountain, which was speedily crossed, the cavalry scouring the passes in

Van Horn, "Army of the Cumberland." Vol. I., p. 314.

1863.

CHAP. III. advance of the troops, who hurriedly prepared practicable roads for the artillery. So steep was the ascent in many places that the trains had to be doubled; the soldiers assisted by hauling the
1863. guns by hand. But by the 6th of September the army lay stretched along the western slope of Lookout Mountain from Valley Head, a point some forty miles from Chattanooga, to Wauhatchie, only six miles away.

Rosecrans had now to choose between two movements — either to cross the point of Lookout Mountain, near Chattanooga, or to move over the range farther south and threaten the enemy's line of communications. He decided upon the latter course, and issued orders to his troops to cross Lookout Range by various passes, the center starting from Trenton and the right from Valley Head, while the left continued to threaten Chattanooga. Directly on the east of Lookout Mountain there lies a wide, open valley called McLemore's Cove, shut in upon the east by Pigeon Mountain, watered by a small stream called Chickamauga Creek. Into this peaceful valley, destined to be the scene of one of the most sanguinary contests of modern times, General J. S. Negley, the advance of Thomas's corps, marched his division, after cross-
1863. ing Lookout Mountain on the 7th of September, through Cooper's and Stevens's Gaps. The day after crossing, news had come to General Rosecrans that Burnside was in Knoxville; that Buckner, evacuating that place, had retreated to Loudon; and that large reënforcements were coming from Mississippi to join General Bragg; and while the army lay at the foot of Lookout Mountain, indica-

tions came from various sources that Bragg was in retreat. CHAP. III.

A bold reconnaissance was made on the 7th, across the front of Lookout Mountain, which found the enemy in force. This, however, did not disprove the fact of Bragg's retrograde movement, as a force would naturally be left in that position to cover the retreat. Rosecrans's sanguine temper always led him to believe that the enemy would act in accordance with his own plan; and now, believing that Bragg was retreating, he pushed his army in every direction upon his communications. He ordered McCook to cross the mountain from Valley Head into the Broomtown Valley, starting the cavalry, who were sent forward to scour the country, towards Lafayette and Rome. On the 9th, the rumors continually thickening that Bragg was in flight, Rosecrans sent a reconnaissance to Summertown, on Lookout Mountain, overlooking Chattanooga, and ordered forward his cavalry on the right, to strike the railroad between Dalton and the Resaca Bridge. But the troops on the north of the river had already discovered that their enemy had disappeared, and on the morning of the 9th of September, 1863, the extreme left of the Army of the Cumberland marched, without firing a shot, drums beating and colors flying, into the mountain fastness of Chattanooga, the most important strategic point in the Southern Confederacy. In spite of any inferences that may be drawn from General Rosecrans's career after this day, it must be said in his favor that this bloodless victory was second in importance to few military achievements during the war. The popular mind Sept., 1863.

CHAP. III. sets highest value upon laurels colored by blood and by fire, but nevertheless every careful student of military history must agree that there were few days of carnage in the history of this long war so valuable and so important as this apparently holiday march of the armies of the Union from Murfreesboro to the rear of Chattanooga.

1863.

CHAPTER IV

CHICKAMAUGA

GREAT as was General Rosecrans's success in the strategic march that brought him to the western base of Lookout Mountain, in his natural elation he regarded it as greater still. He apparently thought he had nothing more to do than move upon the flying enemy and destroy him by a flank attack, or, at worst, if Bragg had really escaped, to harass the rear of his retreating army. Sending a brigade to occupy the deserted fastness of Chattanooga, he called over all the troops from the north bank of the river, put Crittenden's corps in motion towards Ringgold, ordered Thomas over the gaps of Lookout upon Lafayette, and directed McCook to advance rapidly upon Alpine to harass the enemy's supposed flight to Rome. He telegraphed to Halleck in his exultation: "Chattanooga is ours without a struggle, and East Tennessee is free. Our move on the enemy's flank and rear progresses, while the tail of his retreating column will not escape unmolested. Our troops from this side entered Chattanooga about noon; those north of the river are crossing. Messengers go to Burnside to-night urging him to push his cavalry down." It took but one day's marching to disconcert these

1863.

Rosecrans to Halleck, Sept. 9. W. R. Vol. XXX., Part III., p. 479.

CHAP. IV. confident expectations. Crittenden's force made but a short march; their front being greatly annoyed by the enemy's cavalry, which showed no disposition to escape unmolested. McCook, on reaching Alpine, saw no signs of the disorderly retreat he had been led to expect, but, on the contrary, found himself entirely isolated from the rest of the army, and prudently disobeying his orders to advance to Summerville sent back couriers for further instructions. Negley, who led the advance of Thomas's corps in the center, pushed through the passes into McLemore's Cove, and found himself not only warmly welcomed in front but perceived unmistakable signs of trouble on both his flanks.

The danger was even more serious than it appeared. Bragg had been taken somewhat by surprise by the passage of the Tennessee so far below him,[1] and, fastened as his mind had been upon the threatened demonstration from the north, it was, at first, hard for him to believe that his enemy had executed this difficult and brilliant feat on his left and rear. But when he became aware of the state of things, he acted with great promptness and energy. He did not suffer himself, as Pemberton had done, to be shut up in his fortress at Chattanooga. He called Buckner down from the Hiawassee, and with the reënforcements of two divisions sent by Johnston from Mississippi, which, he says, gave him altogether an army of over 35,000, exclusive of

[1] In the "Life of Leonidas Polk," by his son, the author speaks of "the surprise of Chattanooga," and says that the story of Rosecrans's passage of the river was regarded at army headquarters as "incredible," and was only believed after it was confirmed by reports of the occupation of Trenton by the enemy's cavalry.—"Southern Historical Society Papers.' Vol. X., p. 3.

cavalry, he gathered himself compactly together, ready to strike a blow at his enemy at the first opportunity. Nothing was further from his mind than the purpose of flight with which Rosecrans credited him from the 7th to the 10th of September.

1863.

His vigilant cavalry soon reported to him the general movement of Rosecrans towards his left and rear in the direction of Dalton and Rome. He concluded that a movement upon Rosecrans's rear with his own inferior force — as he considered it — would be extremely hazardous. He therefore determined to meet him in front whenever he should emerge from the mountain gorges. He could not do this and hold Chattanooga at the same time. He therefore drew in his troops on the 7th and 8th of September, on a line running from Lee and Gordon's Mill to Lafayette, fronting the east slope of Lookout Mountain. The first point at which the Federal troops presented themselves for attack was when Negley, supported by Baird, came out into McLemore's Cove. Bragg had a perfect comprehension of the situation. He says in his report: "Thrown off his guard by our rapid movement, apparently in retreat, when in reality we had concentrated opposite his center, and deceived by the information from deserters and others sent into his lines, the enemy pressed on his columns to intercept us, and thus exposed himself in detail."

Bragg, Report. W. R. Vol. XXX., Part II., p. 27.

Ibid.

The three corps of Rosecrans's army were at this time separated by intervals of a hard day's march, and were each more accessible to Bragg's compact forces than they were to each other. The Confederate general had an opportunity, rarely afforded in war, of taking his enemy in his fault and destroying his

CHAP. IV. three corps one at a time. His wisest course would perhaps have been to strike first Crittenden's corps, which was absolutely in the air on his right, and then, returning to McLemore's Cove, to try conclusions with Thomas; but he naturally enough concluded that Thomas's advance was the nearer and surer prey, and might be destroyed with the least expense, leaving Crittenden and McCook, on either flank, to be dealt with later. He gave orders
Sept., 1863. to T. C. Hindman on the night of the 9th to move his division forward to Davis's cross-roads, and from that point to attack the enemy near Stevens's Gap; and he directed General D. H. Hill to send or take P. R. Cleburne's division to unite with Hindman in this attack. Hill replied during the night that the movement required of him was impracticable, as Cleburne was sick and the gaps through Pigeon Mountain were so obstructed by fallen timbers as to be, for the moment, impassable.[1] Bragg, therefore, ordered Buckner to move with two divisions and execute the orders issued to Hill.

But the plan encountered inexplicable delays. Hindman consumed invaluable time by arguments in favor of a change of plan, which Bragg refused to entertain. Cleburne, who, in the prospect of a fight, had recovered his health, removed the obstructions from Dug Gap, and was

[1] General Bragg, in a letter written to Major E. T. Sykes, Feb. 8, 1873, now in possession of the Southern Historical Society at Richmond, severely blames the "querulous and insubordinate spirit" shown by General Hill on this occasion, distinctly stating that Cleburne was surprised that Hill should have reported him sick. He gives the following as the forces he had ready to throw upon Negley and Baird, which, by Hill's fault, was not done: Hindman's and Buckner's divisions, 10,922 men, and 500 cavalry, under William T. Martin, with a coöperating force of at least 8000 under Cleburne and W. H. T. Walker.

ready at daylight for the march. Bragg joined him at his camp, and they waited in intense anxiety for the opening of Hindman's guns to move on the enemy's flank and rear. They waited most of the day, dispatching couriers and staff officers one after the other with vehement appeals for Hindman to begin. It was the middle of the afternoon before the first gun was heard; and the advance of Cleburne's division then discovered that the Union troops had become aware of their danger, and had retreated to the mountain passes. Baird had reached Negley early in the morning and formed in position on his left, but every moment showed them signs of an overwhelming force on all sides, and they therefore sent their trains back to the mountains, Negley following for their protection, leaving Baird to hold the enemy in check. When Negley had placed himself in an advantageous position near the pass, Baird also gradually withdrew, skirmishing heavily, and finally formed a new line behind Negley, protected by the artillery. Rosecrans did not at first appreciate the merit of this movement. He censured Thomas on the 10th for not having moved farther in the direction of Lafayette; and on the 12th, at noon, he wrote him, that, after maturely weighing the matter, he thought Negley withdrew more through prudence than compulsion.

Sept. 10, 1863.

Bragg, seeing this great opportunity lost, still hoped for compensation in the destruction of Crittenden's column. He moved Polk and W. H. T. Walker's corps in the direction of Lee and Gordon's Mill, and on the afternoon of the 12th he ordered Lieutenant-General Polk to attack Crit-

CHAP. IV. tenden's corps, which John Pegram's cavalry had reported as on the road from Lafayette to Graysville, and near Pea Vine Church. Late at night he received, to his great vexation, a dispatch from Polk stating he had taken a strong position for defense, and requesting reënforcements. He assured him in return that he had a heavy superiority of force, and still urged him to attack at daybreak. He hurried to the front to join
Sept., 1863. Polk on the morning of the 13th, but found no enemy before him. He afterwards severely blamed General Polk for this miscarriage of his plan—unjustly, for Crittenden, becoming aware of the isolation of his force, had withdrawn from his advanced position the day before, and on the night of the 12th was encamped at Gordon's Mill, having passed during the afternoon the right flank of Bragg's army in close proximity, each being unconscious of the presence of the other.

While the left and center had thus, as much by good fortune as by good management, escaped a grave danger, McCook was still far to the right, entirely out of position. He scoured the country in his front with his cavalry, and finding that coöperation with Thomas from the Broomtown Valley was out of his power, he retired his trains to the summit of the mountain behind him, and waited with natural anxiety for his orders. It was midnight of the 12th before McCook received directions to join General Thomas. The fact of Bragg's concentration of his army in the neighborhood of Lee and Gordon's Mill had now become apparent to General Rosecrans, and the matter of McCook's return to the main body was one of vital importance. Con-

GENERAL BUSHROD R. JOHNSON.

cluding that it was impracticable to move along the eastern base of Lookout, and having no trustworthy guides to direct him by any shorter route, McCook determined to go the roundabout way by Valley Head. He ascended the mountain on the night of the 13th, moving by way of Henderson's Gap, and it cost four days of laborious and devious marching before he was able to effect his junction with General Thomas by Winston's Gap, which he claims Thomas advised him was the only practicable road. His advance went into camp on the 17th of September at Pond Spring, seven miles from the slope of Missionary Ridge, where Rosecrans had his headquarters, and fifteen miles from Chattanooga. CHAP. IV. Sept., 1863.

Hardly had Rosecrans announced the retreat of Bragg when he received a dispatch from Halleck, dated the 6th, urging the importance of an immediate junction between him and Burnside, so that Bragg and Buckner, if they did unite, could not attack them separately. This message had the usual effect of Halleck's dispatches upon Rosecrans, and he answered with his habitual contumacious petulance: "Your apprehensions are just, and the legitimate consequence of your orders. The best that can now be done is for Burnside to close his cavalry down on our left, supporting it with his infantry, and refusing his left, threaten the enemy without getting into his grasp, while we get him in our grip and strangle him or perish in the attempt." W. R. Vol. XXX., Part III., p. 381. Ibid., p. 407.

The mistake of General Rosecrans in scattering his army to harass the imaginary retreat of the enemy had thus been compensated by Bragg's delay or inability to take advantage of the flagrant

CHAP. IV. Sept., 1863.

error of his opponent; and to Rosecrans's intense relief his army found itself virtually concentrated on the night of the 17th. It was ten days since he had sent his exulting announcement of the enemy's flight. He had since recovered from the delusion, but the authorities at Washington were still laboring under the misapprehension[1] into which his confident announcement had led them, and he now received General Halleck's dispatches with an exasperation which all men feel at having others accept their mistakes and act upon them. While he was straining every nerve to pull his troops together on the Lafayette and Chattanooga road, he received a dispatch from Halleck, dated the 11th of September, warning him not to go farther than Dalton, and repeating the rumor that a part of Bragg's army was reënforcing Lee. The false reports of deserters, sent for that purpose within the Union lines in Virginia, together with the slight resistance made by the enemy in East Tennessee, and the news of the evacuation of Chattanooga, had, for the moment, entirely misled General Halleck. It was not until the 14th that General Meade telegraphed him his judgment that Longstreet had left Lee's army, and even then he did not feel sure of his destination.

Halleck's Report for 1863. W. R. Vol. XXX., Part I., p. 34.

But before this Rosecrans's dispatches had lost their sanguine tinge, and although he said he was sufficiently strong for the enemy in his front, there

[1] Charles A. Dana telegraphed from before Stevens's Gap on the 14th of September: "This army has now gained a position from which it can effectually advance upon Rome and Atlanta, and deliver there the finishing blow of the war"; and on the 16th he telegraphed from Crawfish Springs that Rosecrans's intention was to hold the gaps of Lookout Mountain in his rear, and marching by night around the northern extremity of Pigeon Mountain, "to surprise the enemy at Lafayette."

W. R. Vol. XXX., Part I., pp. 186–188.

were indications that they intended to turn his flanks and cut his communications. Halleck then bestirred himself with the utmost energy to do everything possible for the reënforcement of Rosecrans. He ordered Burnside to move his infantry as rapidly as possible towards Chattanooga. He informed Rosecrans of these orders, and told him in case the enemy attempted to turn his right flank to give up Chattanooga to Burnside and move his army to prevent Bragg from reëntering Middle Tennessee. Hurlbut was ordered to send troops to Rosecrans's right with all possible dispatch. Grant and Sherman were both informed of the situation, and directed to send their available forces to Memphis, and thence to Corinth and Tuscumbia, and Burnside was directed to reënforce Rosecrans with all possible dispatch. "It is believed," Halleck says, "that the enemy will concentrate to give him battle, and you must be there to help him"; but still, with a lingering doubt as to Longstreet's destination, he warned Foster at Fort Monroe to look out for him at Norfolk and North Carolina.

W. R. Vol. XXX., Part I., p. 36.

All these measures, judicious as they were, were too late to accomplish anything for the matter in hand. The two great armies were massed in face of each other along Chickamauga Creek, and nothing which could be done in Washington or Richmond could now materially alter the conditions of the terrible fight that was impending. Bragg's plan of attack was the Murfreesboro scheme reversed. He determined to move this time by the right flank instead of the left, to take position on the road from Lafayette to Chatta-

CHAP. IV. nooga, attacking the Union left, driving it down against the eastern slope of Lookout Mountain, and destroying it. It is altogether probable that the destruction of Rosecrans's army would have been complete if the left wing could have been totally destroyed. By Bragg's original orders, B. R. Johnson was to cross the Chickamauga at Reed's Bridge, then turning to the left, sweep up the stream towards Lee and Gordon's Mill, Walker crossing at Alexander's Bridge to unite in the movement; Buckner at Thetford's Ford to join in pressing the enemy up the creek in front of Polk; Polk attacking at Lee and Gordon's Mill, while Hill was to cover the Confederate left flank from an advance of the Union troops from McLemore's Cove, and in case of a movement on their part to the left to attack in flank.

Sept., 1863. This movement, which was to have taken place at daybreak of the 18th, was delayed all that day by the resistance of the Union cavalry and difficulties arising from the bad and narrow country roads. The extreme Confederate right did not cross the stream until late in the afternoon. By this time General Hood of Longstreet's corps had arrived, and assumed command in place of Johnson. Through this delay the purpose of Bragg became evident to Rosecrans. He improved every moment of the time by shifting the position of his army to the left. This was a critical and delicate movement, especially dangerous to Crittenden's corps, which was in the immediate presence of the enemy. It was therefore resolved to move Thomas's corps with the greatest caution and silence in rear of Crittenden's, and to

place him in position on the extreme left to guard the Lafayette road, McCook being brought up at the same time from the right to take the place of Thomas on Crittenden's right. These movements were accomplished successfully by hard and skillful marching, although the battle had begun and was raging on the left, before McCook was fairly in line on the right. CHAP. IV.

On the morning of the 19th Bragg prepared to carry into execution his orders of the day before; but not being aware of the extension of the Union lines to the left, he immediately met with unexpected difficulties in the execution of his plan. In fact, he was not permitted to begin the battle in his own way. General Thomas had been informed early in the morning by Colonel Daniel McCook that an isolated brigade of the enemy had crossed the Chickamauga at Reed's Bridge the day before, and he believed it could be cut off. Thomas immediately ordered General J. M. Brannan to take out two brigades and, if possible, capture this wandering brigade of Confederates. This force soon became engaged, but the resistance it met with showed that it was not a brigade, but a formidable force which had crossed the Chickamauga. Brannan reporting this, Baird's division was sent to his assistance, and the two drove the enemy for some distance, taking a good many prisoners, from whom it was learned that a heavy force of Confederates lay in front and to the right. Baird halted, and before the hasty preparations which he made for an attack upon his right were completed the onset came, and the battle of Chickamauga began. Sept., 1863.


FORREST'S CAVALRY
RED HOUSE OR RINGGOLD BRIDGE
CHICKAMAUGA CREEK
WHITTAKER OF STEEDMAN
STEEDMAN OF GRANGER'S CORPS
COL. McCOOK
STEEDMAN
GRANGER
McAffee's Church
COL. McCOOK
COL. McCOOK
STATE ROAD
TO LAFAYETTE
TO RINGGOLD
TO CHATTANOOGA
UNION FIELD HOSPITAL
Cloud
Mullis
Shoddrass House
MINTY
CRITTENDEN
STEEDMAN
COL. McCOOK
Rossville
McCOOK
McFARLAND'S GAP
Cooper
James
DRY VALLEY ROAD
Hillsboro
Cleburne
Walker
Cheatham
Brannan
Baird
Johnson
Palmer
Reynolds
Stewart
Van Cleve
Negley
Wood
Hindman
Breckinridge
Polk
INDICATES POSITIONS OF UNION TROOPS AFTER THE BATTLE


BATTLE-FIELD OF CHICKAMAUGA.
Union.
Confederate.
Positions, Evening of Sept. 18th, 1863.
Direction of lines of battle, Sept. 19th.
First lines of battle, Sept. 20th.
Last lines of battle, Sept. 20th.
Cavalry.
LAMBERTS FORD
CHICKAMAUGA CREEK
ALEXANDER'S BRIDGE
WILDER'S POSITION
TEDFORD'S FORD
STEWART
BUCKNER
DALTON FORD
PRESTON
CHEATHAM
LONGSTREET
HOOD
B. JOHNSON
PRESTON
Hall
HALL'S FORD
Lee & Gordon's Mill
BRECKINRIDGE
HINDMAN
CLEBURNE
D. H. HILL
WHEELER'S CAVALRY
HINDMAN
B. JOHNSON
WOOD
SHERIDAN
Vineyard
WILDER 2nd POSITION
DAVIS
WILDER
Widow Glenn's House
ROSECRANS
SHERIDAN
WILDER
WOOD
CRITTENDEN
ATKINSON
PALMER
CHICKAMAUGA CREEK
BRECKINRIDGE
BAIRD
THOMAS
BRANNAN
NEGLEY
OF THOMAS
Crawfish Springs
CROOK'S CAVALRY
REYNOLDS
OF THOMAS
JOHNSON
OF McCOOK
E
NORTH
S
W
SCALE
500 1000 2000 4000 YARDS
½ 1 2 MILES
J. WELLS

CHAP. IV.

Walker commanded on the extreme Confederate right, Hood held the center, and Buckner commanded the left, his flank resting on the Chickamauga about a mile below Lee and Gordon's Mill. Cheatham's division was held in reserve. The battle raged furiously for several hours against the Union left; so hotly was it contested that the generals on both sides constantly reported an overwhelming force of the enemy opposed to them. Cheatham's division was ordered to the support of Walker, but before it could reach him, says General Bragg, "he had been pressed back to his first position by the extended lines of the enemy assailing him on both flanks." R.W. Johnson's division of McCook's corps had by this time arrived to the support of Brannan and Baird, and Reynolds's division had also been placed in position by Thomas. The enemy, taken in front and flank, was driven in great confusion for a mile and a half. General Thomas was, however, too intelligent a soldier to imagine his success was decisive. He ordered Brannan and Baird to reorganize their troops and take position on commanding ground on the road to Reed's Bridge, and to hold it to the last extremity, as he felt sure that the next effort of the enemy would be made on his left flank and rear. After a respite of an hour another furious attack was made on the right of Reynolds. Thomas sent Brannan to his support, J. T. Croxton's brigade reaching Reynolds just in time to defeat an energetic Confederate assault at that place.

Bragg, Report. W. R. Vol. XXX., Part II., p. 32.

At this point General W. B. Hazen greatly distinguished himself. When H. P. Van Cleve had been forced across the road, and the enemy was spring-

ing forward to take possession of it, General Hazen gathered together four field batteries, and, by an enfilading fire, broke the line of the advancing Confederates and saved the road. Towards five o'clock Thomas, finding his line somewhat disordered by the ardor with which his troops had been pushing the enemy, determined to concentrate them on better ground, feeling sure that the battle would be renewed with greater fury in the morning. The hostile forces were so near together that the movement was observed by the enemy, and the retiring troops of Johnson and Baird were forced to turn and repulse the Confederates before taking up the positions assigned them; and after midnight Thomas, having been informed by General Baird that his line did not extend far enough to the left, asked that Negley's division be sent to him to take position on Baird's left and rear. This was promised him; but Negley was not able, in consequence of a dense fog — he reports — to take the place assigned him during the night; and in the morning, while withdrawing his division, he says he was ordered by General Rosecrans to hold his position, and only one brigade obeyed the former order.

CHAP. IV.

Sept. 19, 1863.

As the attack from Bragg's left wing was made contingent upon the advance of his right, and as the right was not able to make any serious impression upon Thomas's line until late in the evening, the greater part of the day passed by in comparative quiet on Rosecrans's right. Jeff. C. Davis, of McCook's corps, made an advance to feel the enemy's left flank, and a smart contest ensued there in the afternoon, known as the battle of Vineyard's Farm. It involved, before it ended, considerable forces

CHAP. IV. drawn in successively from each side; but though both sides met with severe loss, no decided consequences resulted to the general field.

Sept., 1863. The battle of the 19th, though terribly destructive to both sides, left each army in high hopes and spirits. The fact that Thomas retired in the evening to better his position inspired the Confederates with the idea that they had won a decided victory. Bragg, in his report, says of the final attack of Cleburne on the right: "This veteran command, under its gallant chief, moved to its work after sunset, taking the enemy completely by surprise, driving him in great disorder for nearly a mile." Thomas, on the contrary, describes this movement as an orderly change of position in obedience to his own command, executed handsomely, and repulsing the enemy. Rosecrans telegraphed at eight o'clock: "We have just concluded a terrific day's fighting, and have another in prospect for to-morrow. The enemy attempted to turn our left, but his design was anticipated, and a sufficient force placed there to render his attempt abortive." He says, precisely as Bragg says, "The enemy was greatly our superior in numbers." "The army is in excellent condition and spirits, and by the blessing of Providence the defeat of the enemy will be total to-morrow."

W. R. Vol. XXX., Part II., p. 32.

Ibid., Part I., p. 250.

Ibid., p. 136.

The battle of the 20th did not begin at daybreak as Bragg had intended and ordered. He had divided his entire army into two commands, assigning to the right wing Lieutenant-General Polk, and to the left Lieutenant-General Longstreet, who had arrived in the night from Virginia, and whose presence alone was to any army a valuable reënforcement. Polk was to assault at the earliest dawn of

day, and the attack was to be taken up in rapid succession to the left of the Confederate line. Before the first light appeared in the East, Bragg was in the saddle waiting for the opening guns of Polk.[1] Dawn came, and the day broadened over hill and valley, and still the only sign that came to the ears of the impatient Confederate general was that of the axes, and of the falling trees, which showed that Thomas was preparing to repeat the inhospitable welcome of the day before. In accordance with Bragg's verbal directions to him Polk had issued his orders to Hill, Cheatham, and Walker immediately after the midnight council, directing Hill to attack at daylight and Cheatham to make a simultaneous attack on Hill's left, Walker's corps being held in reserve. But Hill's orders did not reach him until sunrise. The thickly-wooded country cut up by innumerable roads, the moving trains of fifty thousand men, and the darkness and fog are the reasons assigned by General Polk for this failure in promptness.[2] It was half-past nine before Hill reported his corps ready, and after the order to advance was given, further delay ensued from the fact that Longstreet had, during the night, pushed A. P. Stewart's division in front of Cheat-

Sept. 20, 1863.

[1] Bragg spoke in after years with great acrimony of Polk's delay to attack. "It was nine o'clock," he said, "before the attack was made," which had been ordered at the earliest dawn. "Five hours, in which our independence might have been won." Letter of Bragg to Sykes, *ut supra*. He loads Breckinridge, Cheatham, and Longstreet with equally bitter reproaches.

[2] Captain W. M. Polk's "Life of General Polk." Captain Polk also mentions as an illustration of the loose manner in which Bragg's preparations were made that Polk's orders were verbal, while Lieutenant-General Hill, commanding an army corps, and with headquarters quite near those of Bragg, never received a word or a line from him to indicate that he was to report to Polk for orders.—"Southern Historical Society Papers." Vol. X., p. 19.

CHAP. IV. ham, making it impossible for the latter to move forward.

These errors were at last repaired, and Breckinridge's division, which was nearly fresh, was thrown with great impetuosity against the extreme Union left. The reënforcements of which Thomas had foreseen the necessity, and which had been promised him, had not arrived. Only one small brigade, under John Beatty, was there to receive this furious onslaught; it gave way, and Breckinridge poured in upon Baird's crumbling flank and, for a moment, gained his rear; but his progress was promptly checked by the reserve from Palmer's division, and with the assistance of the other reserves from Brannan and Negley he was driven, in turn, with great slaughter, and the left flank was again firmly established. In this fight the Confederate general B. H. Helm, a brother-in-law of Mrs. Lincoln, was killed. A part of Cleburne's division at the same time struck the front of the Union position, and was repulsed. All the morning a sanguinary contest raged in front of Thomas, which he sustained with his magnificent coolness and imperturbable presence of mind, using every man under his command with infallible judgment and skill. His lines were furiously assaulted at every point in turn: Baird, Johnson, Palmer, and Reynolds met in succession the impetuous onslaught of Breckinridge, Cleburne, and Cheatham, and although their lines were fearfully shaken they were never once broken, and, as Thomas says, "The enemy having exhausted his utmost energies to dislodge us, apparently fell back entirely from our front." Bragg says in his report that his troops

W. R. Vol. XXX., Part I., p. 252.

"were moved to the assault in detail and by detachments, unsupported, until nearly all parts of the right wing were, in turn, repulsed with heavy loss." CHAP. IV. W. R. Vol. XXX., Part II., p. 33.

Longstreet, meanwhile, on the Confederate left, appeared at first to have an easier task before him. He had waited since early morning for orders to advance, and finally convinced by the roar of battle on his right that no special advantage was being gained by Polk, he sent for permission to advance his own forces; but, before his messenger returned, he found his own division commanders moving forward under direct orders from Bragg, which had not been communicated to him. He at once swung his left wing, under Hindman, vigorously forward; Stewart, who commanded on his right, being kept at first stationary by the ill success of the right wing, and Hood in the center driving forward with his usual impetuosity and with more than his usual success. It had not been Longstreet's fortune, hitherto, to win easy victories, but on this occasion, for once in his life, he had only to enter an open door. Sept. 20, 1863.

All the day before, and thus far on the 20th, Rosecrans had done little but move reënforcements from his right wing to the left, where Thomas was sustaining the Confederate onslaught; but he had unfortunately delayed the promised movement of Negley's division to the left of Baird, and his attempts at concentration after the battle had actually begun were now even too anxious and hurried. He became convinced early in the morning that the enemy was moving in force upon his left, and a little after ten o'clock he sent an order to McCook, Sept., 1863. 6:35 A. M. W. R. Vol. XXX., Part I., p. 70.

CHAP. IV.

commanding him to make immediate dispositions to withdraw the right so as to spare as much force as possible to reënforce Thomas. "The left," he said, "must be held at all hazards, even if the right is drawn wholly back to the present left," and a few minutes later he wrote to him again to send two brigades of Sheridan's division to Thomas with all possible dispatch, and the third brigade as soon as the lines could be sufficiently drawn up; to march them as rapidly as possible without exhausting the men. A little before eleven o'clock he received by an aide-de-camp a message from Thomas that he was heavily pressed, and the messenger added on his own responsibility the information that Brannan was not in line with Reynolds, and that Reynolds's right flank was in danger.

W. R. Vol. XXX., Part I., p. 70.

Sept. 20, 1863.

This information was incorrect; Brannan was in his proper position, his division having been echeloned a little in rear of Reynolds's line on account of an advantage of topography. But Rosecrans had another reason for believing that there was a gap in the line between Reynolds and Wood. He had ordered Brannan's division to reënforce Baird, and Ferdinand Van Derveer's brigade had been sent to the left in partial compliance with the order. Brannan had exercised his discretion in retaining two brigades in the line where he saw their presence was essential, and had sent to inform Rosecrans of his action; but Rosecrans, not knowing this, dispatched a peremptory order to General Wood, who commanded the division next on Brannan's right, to "close up on Reynolds as fast as possible and support him." A courier was dispatched with the message and

10:45 A. M. W. R. Vol. XXX., Part I., p. 635.

bidden to carry it to Wood, at the utmost speed of his horse. CHAP. IV.

General Thomas J. Wood, a veteran of the regular army, received this order with great concern. He had been holding his line with vigilance all the morning, momentarily expecting an attack in his front. He did not think the order judicious; he thought Brannan was in position; it did not appear to him that Reynolds was hard pressed, but with instinctive subordination, feeling that the General-in-Chief must know more of the field than he did, he turned to General McCook, who happened to be standing beside him, saying he would at once obey it, and suggested that McCook should close up rapidly and prevent a gap in the line. General Davis was ordered to do this, but he had only one brigade to fill up the wide interval left by the withdrawal of Wood's division, and it was at this fatal moment, when Sheridan, Davis, and Wood were all out of position and marching by the left flank, that Longstreet hurled his heavy battalions against the moving mass of the National right wing. Hood's quadruple formation poured into the gap, pushing away Davis's thin line like a cobweb, driving Wood's rear some distance in confusion, taking Brannan in flank and crumbling up two brigades of Van Cleve in the wildest confusion. Hindman at the same time struck Sheridan who, left absolutely unprotected on either flank — after a gallant defense which cost the life of General W. H. Lytle, an agreeable poet, a brave soldier, and an estimable citizen — gave way in some disorder. Sept. 20, 1863, 11 A.M.

General Rosecrans was standing at this moment

CHAP. IV. Sept. 20, 1863.

in the rear of Davis's right, waiting to see McCook's corps close to the left. He went quickly to the extreme right to bring Sheridan forward, but it was too late; the beaten troops rolled back upon him and overwhelmed him. He rode rapidly down the Dry Valley road, accompanied by a part of his staff and a small escort. In the midst of the confusion, which increased every instant, the suddenness of the catastrophe for the moment quite appalled him; his spirit, usually so indomitable in battle, under the stress of the week's enormous labor and anxiety, his physical fatigue, his lack of sleep, and the tremendous impression of a terrible calamity suddenly occurring under his eyes, without an instant's warning, for the moment gave way, and amid the horrible wreck and confusion of his beaten army, in the tumult and disorder, and entanglement of trains of artillery, of mingled foot and of cavalry, he lost heart and hope. McCook had been swept away; Crittenden, unable to check the retreat, had followed it; Negley, who had been put in charge of a great quantity of artillery, had started for Rossville, taking his guns with him; even Sheridan, the very genius of fighting, unable to hold his division together, was moving to the rear. It was impossible for Rosecrans to imagine that the rest of the army could hold firm in such disaster. He rode back to Rossville, and not being able to persuade himself that even there the rout could be stayed he pushed on to Chattanooga, as he says, "to give orders for the security of the pontoon bridges at Battle Creek and Bridgeport, and to make preliminary dispositions either to forward ammunition and supplies, should we hold

W. R. Vol. XXX., Part I., p. 60.



GENERAL JAMES A. GARFIELD.

our ground, or to withdraw the troops into good position."

One of those crises had now arrived, rare in the history of any country, where the personal character and power of an individual become of incalculable value to the general welfare. Only the highest qualities in the second in command, thus instantly left in charge of the abandoned field, saved the Army of the Cumberland from irremediable ruin. General Thomas having about noon beaten the enemy in his front into silence and inaction, yet expectant of further attack, became anxious as to the arrival of Sheridan's division which, he had been informed, was on the way to him. While waiting for its arrival, about two o'clock, hearing heavy firing on his right and rear through the thickly wooded hills, he rode in the direction of the noise, and soon met the aide-de-camp whom he had dispatched in quest of Sheridan, who informed him that a large force of the enemy was stealthily advancing in the rear of Reynolds's position. This astounding news seemed at first incredible to Thomas; to find on the road where he confidently expected a heavy reënforcement a hostile force in rear of the Union center would have paralyzed the faculties of most generals; but stupefying as the situation was, Thomas instantly set about to make the best of it, and by one of the fortunate accidents of this extraordinary battle the means were ready to his hand.

Two generals, following their own soldierly instincts, had without orders held together some fragments of their commands and placed them already in eligible positions. When Hood made his

CHAP. IV.

Brannan, Report. W. R. Vol. XXX., Part I., p. 402.

wild rush through the gap in the center, Brannan's division, struck in flank and rear, had been driven back on the right, but with wonderful steadiness, under the circumstances, had virtually retained its formation. Brannan held his command firmly together, and bringing to it stragglers from other shattered organizations, he swung back his right flank and, moving about half a mile to the rear, took up a good position on a commanding point of Missionary Ridge, where, for a while, unsupported on either flank, he held the enemy in check. General Wood, whose withdrawal from the line had caused the break, had reported with one brigade to Thomas, and on being informed by him that Reynolds did not need support, sent it under orders to General Baird. Riding back for his other two brigades, intending to take them also to the left, he found the south end of the valley suddenly alive with rebel troops, and one of his brigades, in part, and both his batteries swept from the field. With his remaining brigade under Charles G. Harker, and part of George P. Buell's, he immediately formed a line across the valley, facing southward, and without any help of artillery, with the musket alone, used sparingly, for the ammunition was already running low, he, also unsupported on either flank, was doing his best to hold the field when Thomas appeared. Under the latter's orders, Wood's right was brought into communication with the left of Brannan; Brannan's right occupying a commanding ridge, and Harker's brigade extending to the left, along a spur which jutted out through the valley almost perpendicular to the general direction of the range; the Union lines

Sept. 20, 1863.

thus facing the enemy in the shape of an irregular crescent. There was still a gap between Reynolds and Wood, which later in the day caused Thomas great anxiety for fear the enemy should discover it and rush through. He filled it as soon as possible with Hazen's brigade which, fortunately, by the provident care of this intelligent and cool-headed commander, was better supplied with ammunition than the rest of the field.

All the afternoon, upon this line, the battle raged with unceasing fury and terrific slaughter. The right wing had disappeared, the center had been for a moment shattered and crumbled, the left had fought a desperate and sanguinary battle all day. But such was the indomitable spirit which the presence of Thomas infused among those who were left, that the slender line we have described resisted through the long autumnal afternoon the most desperate and repeated assaults of an overwhelming force of veteran Confederate infantry, and were at the same time rained upon by formidable batteries, to which, except for a few guns of Brannan, they could only reply with their muskets. The supply of ammunition meanwhile ran so low that several assaults were met and repulsed with cold steel. This fact is not derived from any boasting reports of Federal soldiers. General Hindman himself says, "Our troops attacked again and again, with a courage worthy of their past achievements; the enemy fought with determined obstinacy and repeatedly repulsed us, but only to be again assailed. As showing the fierceness of the fight, the fact is mentioned that on our extreme left the bayonet was

CHAP. IV.

used, and men also killed and wounded with clubbed muskets."

W. R. Vol. XXX., Part II., p. 305.

If the scattered divisions streaming over the ridge and down the Dry Valley road to Rossville could have been brought to halt and return; if General Rosecrans could have displayed in this emergency one tithe of the courage and the contagious fire that his presence inspired among the cedar brakes of Murfreesboro, the battle might still have been his; for Sheridan, one of the heroes of Stone's River, was there and had already regained such control of his troops that he was able to march them in good order to Rossville, and out on the road again towards the battlefield, striving to gain the left instead of the right where his presence would have been decisive. Had Rosecrans been with him and turned him even at this late hour upon Longstreet's flank, the battle must certainly have had a different issue; for so late as three o'clock in the afternoon Longstreet, finding all his efforts unavailing against the stubborn resistance of Brannan and Wood, sent to Bragg for reënforcements from the right wing, but was informed by him that they had been beaten back so badly that they could be of no service to him. "I had but one division," he says, "that had not been engaged, and hesitated to venture to put it in, as our distress upon our right seemed to be almost as great as that of the enemy upon his right." Hindman was continually appealing to Longstreet for reënforcements and desperately apprehensive of an attack on his left and rear; but it was late in the afternoon before Longstreet dared to risk his last reserve, Preston's division. Hindman says: "I have

Sept. 20, 1863.

Longstreet, Report. W. R. Vol. XXX., Part II., p. 289.

never known Federal troops to fight so well. It is just to say, also, that I never saw Confederate soldiers fight better."

Longstreet, Report. W. R. Vol. XXX., Part II. p. 305.

Brannan's position, though strong and admirably chosen and defended, could yet be easily turned; a practicable valley lay on his right flank through which access was easy to his rear, and Hindman with his superior force was able to send a strong detachment by this route, which about four o'clock seriously menaced the integrity of the Union line. It was the critical instant of the day. Thomas's whole force had been engaged for hours, and he had no reserves. But assistance came at the moment when it was most needed. Gordon Granger, commanding the reserve corps, had heard during the morning far to the left the roar of battle, and without other orders than the promptings of his own heart, had marched with J. B. Steedman's division to the music of that martial sound. His approach, earlier in the day, had seriously alarmed Polk for his right wing, and had checked for a moment the movement of Cleburne and Cheatham, but instead of attacking the Confederate right, he had wisely moved to the west and down the rear of Thomas's line, to arrive at the point where his presence was most urgently required. As Hindman's advance planted its banners on Brannan's right, Thomas indicated to Steedman the work he was to do. "Steedman, moving his division into position," says Thomas, "with almost as much precision as if on drill, and fighting his way to the crest of the hill on Brannan's right, moved forward his artillery and drove the enemy down the southern slope, inflicting on him a most

Captain W. M. Polk, in "Southern Historical Society Papers." Vol. X., p. 22.

CHAP. IV. terrible loss in killed and wounded." Longstreet hesitated no longer to throw in his last reserve. He sent Preston with three fresh brigades to Hindman, and even with this large reënforcement, Hindman says, he "found the gain both slow and costly." Steedman reports three separate assaults, made with the greatest fury, and repulsed after heavy fighting, before nightfall.

W. R. Vol. XXX., Part I., p. 253.

Ibid., p. 860.

It is one of the insoluble problems of the war whether Thomas might permanently have held his position which he so heroically defended on the hills of Chickamauga. But he was not left free to choose his course of action. About four o'clock General James A. Garfield, chief-of-staff, arrived on the field. He, with the rest of the staff, had accompanied Rosecrans in the flood of ruin which swept the right wing from the field. Although they were at first overwhelmed by the news of the misfortune as they rode towards Rossville, the personal characteristics of the two men soon began to assert themselves. As Rosecrans sunk every moment deeper in the forlorn conviction that the army was utterly beaten, Garfield, on the contrary, took encouragement from every sound of battle that reached him from the east, and at last he stopped short and asked permission to report to Thomas on the field. This was at first refused, but on Garfield's importunity was finally granted;[1] Rosecrans, taking an

Sept. 20, 1863.

[1] The writers had this statement from General Garfield himself; and Mr. Whitelaw Reid, who enjoyed the intimate friendship of both Garfield and Rosecrans, says, in "Ohio in the War," Vol. I., p. 757: "It should not be forgotten in Garfield's praise that it was on his own earnest representation that he was sent — that, in fact, he rather procured permission to go to Thomas, and so back into the battle, than received orders to do so. He refused to believe that Thomas was routed or the battle lost," etc., etc.

affectionate leave of his chief-of-staff, as of one whom he never expected to see again in life, continued his melancholy ride to Chattanooga, and Garfield threaded the mountain bridle-paths in high hope and patriotic ardor, to give to Thomas the full information of which he was so greatly in need, and to share in the toil and success of the final struggle. It was by no means a promenade of pleasure; the way was beset with danger, several of his escort were killed, but as Wood says in his report, his arrival on the field showed "that the road was open to all who might choose to follow it to where duty called." He had commanded the very brigade of Wood's division which was now holding its place on the right with such obstinate valor, and it was a pleasure which paid him tenfold for his hazardous journey to see how they acquitted themselves under his sympathetic eye.

CHAP. IV.

Sept. 20, 1863.

W. R. Vol. XXX., Part I., p. 638.

It was a little after the arrival of Garfield that orders came from Rosecrans to Thomas, directing him to assume command of all the forces — something he had been doing unquestioned all the afternoon — and with Crittenden and McCook to take a strong position and assume a threatening attitude at Rossville, and to send the unorganized forces to Chattanooga for reorganization. Rosecrans added that he would examine the ground at Chattanooga and then join Thomas, and that he would send out rations and ammunition to meet him at Rossville. Knowing that retreat with the enemy pressing so close would entail enormous loss, Thomas resolved to hold his present lines, if possible, until his movement could receive the partial cover of darkness. He distributed the new supplies of ammunition

Thomas, Report. Ibid., p. 253.

CHAP. IV. Sept. 20, 1863.

which had arrived, and then sent orders to his division commanders to make ready to retire to Rossville as soon as night should close in. Reynolds being first ready to move, Thomas went to meet him and point out the position he intended him to take, when he met with another of the most singular incidents of this abnormal day.

Passing through an open bit of woods to reach Reynolds he came upon a body of rebel infantry, who had made their way, unperceived, around the extreme left and in rear of Baird. At this moment the head of Reynolds's column appeared, and Thomas threw J. B. Turchin's brigade upon the advancing Confederates, who were driven by a most spirited charge more than a mile over the way they had come, clear beyond Baird's left and out of sight, losing several hundred prisoners. Turchin, M. S. Robinson, and August Willich were then posted so as to guard the roads by which the army was to withdraw, and orders were sent to the division commanders to bring off their troops. Late as the hour was, the enemy was everywhere so near that the movement could not wholly escape observation, and Baird, Johnson, and Palmer were successively attacked in yielding their lines, and though resisting energetically suffered some losses in prisoners. Baird, in his report, expresses his confidence that he could have continued to hold his position; "to fall back was more difficult than to remain." Brannan, Wood, and Steedman left the scene of their heroic defense without trouble or molestation; "the final victorious charge of the Confederate left wing," under Longstreet — which was, in fact, a cautious

W. R. Vol. XXX., Part I., p. 279.

advance of his skirmish line over the deserted field — found nothing to oppose it. Early in the night Thomas was firmly established at Rossville, the braves who had come back with him finding at Rossville or on the road, coming to meet him, the reorganized divisions of Sheridan and Negley as good as ever.

Sept. 20, 1863.

The Confederates were not aware until the next day that Thomas had gone from their front. In the Confederate reports written several days or weeks after the fact, there are the usual conventional phrases describing their final victory on the evening of the 20th; but, in truth, night came down on the stubborn fight leaving the issue by no means decided. The only proof of this that need be offered is Bragg's official dispatch to the Government at Richmond: "After two days' hard fighting we have driven the enemy, after a desperate resistance, from several positions, and now hold the field; but he still confronts us. The losses are heavy on both sides, especially so in our officers. We have taken over twenty pieces of artillery and some 2500 prisoners." He had done much better than that, but this understatement of his success, by a man not accustomed to diminish his own glory, shows how terrible the conflict had been and how doubtful he still was of the final issue.

W. R. Vol. XXX., Part II., p. 23.

The assertions of the commanders on both sides, that they everywhere met superior forces of the enemy, prove only that there was but slight disparity of numbers; and that the fighting was at all points, except for the break on the Union right, unusually obstinate and determined. There are no authentic reports of the Confederate army

CHAP. IV.

for the days of battle;[1] but Major E. C. Dawes has made the following careful estimate:

"An examination of the original returns in the War Department, which I have personally made, shows the following result: General Bragg's return, 31st of August, 1863, shows under the heading 'present for duty,' officers and men, 48,998. This return does not include the divisions of General Breckinridge or General Preston, the brigades of Generals Gregg and McNair, or the reënforcement brought by General Longstreet. The strength of each is accurately given in Confederate official returns. The total Confederate force available for battle at Chickamauga was as follows: General Bragg's army, 31st of August, 1863, for duty, 48,998; Longstreet's command (Hood's and McLaws's divisions), by the return of the Army of Northern Virginia, 31st of August, 1863, for duty, 11,716; Breckinridge's division, by his official report in 'Confederate Reports of Battles,' for duty, 3769; Preston's division, by his official report in 'Confederate Reports of Battles,' for duty, 4509; Brigades of Gregg and McNair, by General Bushrod Johnson's official report ("Southern Historical Society Papers," Vol. XIII.), for duty, 2559,— total, 71,551."

"Battles and Leaders." Vol. III., p. 676.

Rosecrans's effective strength, partly taken from official reports and partly estimated, was: Fourteenth Army Corps (estimated), 20,000; Twentieth

[1] General Lee wrote to Jefferson Davis (September 14, 1863), "If the report sent to me by General Cooper, since my return from Richmond, is correct, General Bragg had, on the 20th August last, 51,101 effective men; General Buckner, 20th August last, 16,118 effective men. He was to receive from General Johnston 9000 effective men. His total force will, therefore, be 76,219, as large a number as, I presume, he can operate with."— "Southern Historical Society Papers." Vol. XII., p. 324.

Army Corps (estimated), 11,000; Twenty-first Army Corps (report), 12,052; Reserve Corps (report), 3913; Cavalry Corps (estimated), 10,000,— total, 56,965. And he had 208 guns; showing that General Bragg had ready to bring into action a few thousand more troops than the total effectives of Rosecrans.

"Battles and Leaders." Vol. III., p. 673.

The divisions which Bragg did not employ on the 19th were those which, thrown fresh into the fight on the 20th, formed the most efficient part of his force. Thomas fought his final battle against Bragg's whole army with not more than twenty thousand men.

Sept., 1863.

Van Horne, "Army of the Cumberland." Vol. I., p. 361.

The losses on both sides were frightful. Bragg admits, in his official report, that he lost forty per cent. of his army, which would bring his killed and wounded to over twenty thousand. Longstreet says the strength of the left wing on going into action on the 20th was 22,872; of these he lost (not counting one brigade which had not reported to him its casualties), 7595 in killed and wounded alone. The loss on the Confederate right was, of course, far heavier than this in proportion. Several brigades were almost annihilated; Helm's lost, besides their general, all but 432 out of 1763.[1] The loss of the army of Rosecrans was 1656 killed, 9749 wounded, 4774 captured or missing,— total, 16,179. The mortality among the Union troops was the less as they fought most of the time in position, and sheltered, when it was possible, by improvised works.

The first news which the Government received in regard to the battle was conveyed in a disheartened, almost despairing, telegram which Rosecrans, at

[1] The revised estimates of the Confederate loss give 2389 killed, 13,412 wounded, 2003 captured or missing,—total, 17,804.

CHAP. IV. Chattanooga, wrote at five o'clock: "We have met with a serious disaster; extent not yet ascertained. Enemy overwhelmed us, drove our right, pierced our center, and scattered our troops there. Thomas, who had seven divisions, remained intact, at last news. Granger, with two brigades, had gone to support Thomas on the left. Every available reserve was used when the men stampeded. Burnside will be notified of the state of things at once, and you will be informed; troops from Charleston, Florida, Virginia, and all along the sea-board are found among the prisoners. It seems that every available man was thrown against us." Such was the discouraging news which reached the President on the morning of the 21st of September. His first exclamation to his secretary after reading the dispatch was: "Rosecrans has been whipped, as I feared. I have feared it for several days. I believe I feel trouble in the air before it comes." "Burnside," he continued, "instead of obeying the orders which were given him on the 14th, and going to Rosecrans, has gone on a foolish affair to Jonesboro to capture a party of guerrillas who were there." As the day wore on the news brightened; the details of the magnificent defense of his position by Thomas became known, the orderly retreat to Rossville was reported, and on the next day the safe establishment of the army around Chattanooga.

Rosecrans to Halleck, Sept. 20, 1863. W. R.

J. H., Diary.

It is the habit of most military writers, when they narrate a reverse to our arms, to describe the Administration at Washington as thrown into consternation by it. Even General Grant, referring to this event, commits this error in speaking of a matter of which he could not possibly be informed. He

says: "The Administration, as well as the General-in-Chief, was nearly frantic at the situation of affairs." There was certainly deep disappointment and concern at the untoward issue of Rosecrans's campaign, which had been so splendidly begun; but to show how little of frenzy there was in the feeling and action of the President, we give this letter to General Halleck, written immediately after the receipt of Rosecrans's melancholy dispatch: "I think it very important for General Rosecrans to hold his position at or about Chattanooga, because, if held, from that place to Cleveland, both inclusive, it keeps all Tennessee clear of the enemy, and also breaks one of his most important railroad lines. To prevent these consequences is so vital to his cause that he cannot give up the effort to dislodge us from the position, thus bringing him to us, and saving us the labor, expense, and hazard of going farther to find him, and also giving us the advantage of choosing our own ground, and preparing it to fight him upon. The details must, of course, be left to General Rosecrans, while we must furnish him the means to the utmost of our ability. If you concur, I think he would better be informed that we are not pushing him beyond this position; and that, in fact, our judgment is rather against his going beyond it. If he can only maintain this position, without more, this rebellion can only eke out a short and feeble existence, as an animal sometimes may with a thorn in its vitals." And after giving these directions, the wisest possible under the circumstances, as shown by subsequent history, he sent to General Rosecrans this comforting and encouraging dispatch: "Be of good cheer. We

Grant, "Personal Memoirs." Vol. I., p. 583.

Lincoln to Halleck, Sept. 21, 1863. W. R. Vol. XXX., Part I., p. 148. Also MS.

CHAP. IV.

have unabated confidence in you, and in your soldiers and officers. In the main you must be the judge as to what is to be done. If I were to suggest, I would say, save your army by taking strong positions until Burnside joins you, when, I hope, you can turn the tide. I think you had better send a courier to Burnside to hurry him up. We cannot reach him by telegraph. We suppose some force is going to you from Corinth, but for want of communication we do not know how they are getting along. We shall do our utmost to assist you. Send us your present positions." At the same time he sent a peremptory dispatch to Burnside, in which there is a certain tone of reproof: "If you are to do any good to Rosecrans it will not do to waste time with Jonesboro. It is already too late to do the most good that might have been done, but I hope it will still do some good. Please do not lose a moment," and by another route he repeats this peremptory injunction in briefer words.

Lincoln to Rosecrans, Sept. 21, 1863. Ibid., p. 146.

Lincoln to Burnside, Sept. 21, 1863. W. R. Vol. XXX., Part I., p. 149.

Even on the 21st Rosecrans had not altogether recovered the tone of his spirits. He telegraphed: "After two days of the severest fighting I ever witnessed, our right and center were beaten. The left held its position until sunset. Our loss is heavy and our troops worn down." After speaking of the overpowering force of the enemy, he continues: "We have no certainty of holding our position here. If Burnside could come immediately it would be well, otherwise he may not be able to join us unless he comes on west side of river."

Rosecrans to Lincoln, Sept. 21, 1863. Ibid.

This dispatch contained no news not already known; and the President again besought Rose-

Sept. 22. Ibid., p. 161.

crans to relieve his anxiety as to the position and condition of his army. Strangely enough the first encouraging word that the President received from the battlefield was contained in a Richmond paper, which published Bragg's official report already quoted. He at once telegraphed it to Rosecrans to show him he was not so badly beaten as he thought, and on the same day Rosecrans, having got back his habitual composure by virtue of sleep and rest and immunity from attack, either at Rossville or Chattanooga, reported from the latter place, "We hold this point, and I cannot be dislodged unless by very superior numbers and after a great battle." He asked for large and prompt reënforcements, a demand which the Government took into immediate consideration.

CHAP. IV.

Sept. 23, 1863. W. R. Vol. XXX. Part III., p. 791.

W. R. Vol. XXX., Part I., p. 168.

Stanton, upon whom the testy and petulant dispatches of Rosecrans during the preceding year had had their natural effect in alienating his goodwill and impairing to some extent his confidence, had for some weeks made no secret of his waning trust in Rosecrans. Even while Rosecrans was crossing the river on the last day of August, Secretary Chase having represented to Mr. Stanton the great importance of prompt and vigorous military action, saying that the following day the amount of suspended requisitions, including pay of the army for July and August would approach thirty-five millions, to meet which there were only five millions, and adding that, unless the war could be pushed more vigorously and with greater certainty of early and successful termination there was cause for serious apprehension of financial embarrassment, Stanton replied that the delay of Rosecrans was

1863.

CHAP. IV.

Warden, "Life of Salmon P. Chase," pp. 535, 536.

the principal cause of the difficulty; that he commanded fully one-third of the effective force of the country and did nothing, comparatively, with it. Therefore when the news of the disaster at Chickamauga arrived, Stanton, at least, had no hesitation in assigning the responsibility for it. Yet amid all this disapprobation of Rosecrans his demand for reënforcements received instant attention. Troops from Grant and Hurlbut were already on the way, but these were not enough. Immediately on receipt of Rosecrans's dispatch, Mr. Stanton sent one of the President's secretaries who was standing by to the Soldiers' Home, where the President was sleeping. A little startled by the unwonted summons,— for this was "the first time" he said, "Stanton had ever sent for him,"— the President mounted his horse and rode in through the moonlight to the War Department to preside over an improvised council to consider the subject of reënforcing Rosecrans.

J. H., Diary.

Sept. 23, 1863.

There were present General Halleck, Stanton, Seward and Chase of the Cabinet; P. H. Watson and James A. Hardie of the War Department, and General D. C. McCallum, superintendent of military transportation. After a brief debate, it was resolved to detach the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps from the Army of the Potomac, General Hooker to be placed in command of both. The President's only fear was that so large a body of troops could not be transported such a distance without consuming a great deal of time; but to his pleasure and astonishment the two corps, numbering some twenty thousand men, were brought from the Rapidan to Washington, there embarked, and carried

GENERAL ALEXANDER McD. McCOOK.

by railway through Wheeling, Cincinnati, Louisville, and Nashville to the Tennessee, and there deposited, with their guns, their munitions of war, and all their impedimenta, ready for fighting, in the almost incredible time of eight days. The credit of this extraordinary feat belongs to Generals Meigs and McCallum and Prescott Smith of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. CHAP. IV.

General Rosecrans in retiring to Chattanooga did not consider it practicable or expedient to retain control of the point of Lookout Mountain commanding the Tennessee River below Chattanooga. This point was at once seized by Bragg, who extended his lines from Lookout Mountain to the Tennessee River above the town, thus holding the place in a sort of demi-blockade, depriving it of all communication south of the Tennessee River and restricting it to a long and difficult line over the mountains, continually threatened by the enemy's cavalry, which, in the end, brought it almost to the point of starvation. General Bragg adopted this plan of reducing the post by siege against the opinion of Longstreet, who advised him on the morning of the 21st to cross the river above Chattanooga, thinking he could force Rosecrans to evacuate that place by a demonstration upon his rear, and indeed could force him back upon Nashville; and in case the Confederate transportation was found inadequate for a continuance of that movement, to follow up the railroad to Knoxville, to destroy Burnside, and thence to threaten the rear of Nashville. Sept., 1863.

Longstreet intimates that this proposition was favorably received by Bragg; but that general in his

CHAP. IV.

W. R. Vol. XXX., Part II., p. 37.

report insists, with some indignation, that he never for an instant entertained it, his lack of transportation rendering it utterly impossible. He stamps it as entirely lacking in military propriety; it would abandon to Rosecrans his entire line of communication, and leave open to him the Confederate depots of supplies, placing Bragg, with a greatly inferior force, beyond a difficult and, at times, an impassable river, in a country affording no subsistence to men or animals. As another reason for rejecting Longstreet's scheme, Bragg adds that it would have left open to the enemy, only ten miles away, the battlefield with the thousands of wounded and its valuable trophies.

For nearly a month the siege of Chattanooga continued, Bragg sealing the front and both flanks of the place against any communication. The cavalry of both sides were busy, one in threatening and the other in defending the slender and inadequate means of communication left open to the rear. Rosecrans's dispatches to the Government, though copious and energetic, were never devoid of a certain anxiety, and were continually full of requests for reënforcements and supplies. The President answered him with unfailing courtesy and encouragement receiving kindly even his political suggestions. Rosecrans telegraphed on the 3d of October: "If we can maintain this position in such strength that the enemy are obliged to abandon their position and the elections in the great States go favorably, would it not be well to offer a general amnesty to all officers and soldiers in the Rebellion? It would give us moral strength, and weaken them very much."

Rosecrans to Lincoln, Oct. 3, 1863. MS.

Mr. Lincoln replied: "If we can hold Chattanooga and East Tennessee, I think the Rebellion must dwindle and die. I think you and Burnside can do this, and hence doing so is your main object. Of course to greatly damage or destroy the enemy in your front would be a greater object, because it would include the former and more, but it is not so certainly within your power. I understand the main body of the enemy is very near you, so near that you could 'board at home,' so to speak, and menace or attack him any day. Would not the doing of this be your best mode of counteracting his raid on your communications? But this is not an order. I intend doing something like what you suggest whenever the case shall appear ripe enough to have it accepted in the true understanding rather than as a confession of weakness and fear." CHAP. IV. Oct. 4, 1863. Lincoln to Rosecrans, Oct. 4, 1863. MS.

The operations of the rebel cavalry, though they were carried on at great expense and loss to them, and were compensated by equally successful and energetic movements on the part of the Union cavalry, kept Rosecrans continually harassed and ill at ease. The failure of Burnside to connect upon his right distressed him; and although Hooker was on his left securing the most vital points of the railroads, the non-arrival of the troops from Vicksburg drove him to ask in his petulant style, "No news from Sherman. Are his or any other troops really coming to this army?" He telegraphed to Lincoln, on the 12th, his fear of starvation, the "enemy's side of valley full of corn. Every exertion will be made to hold what we have and gain more. After which we must put our trust in God, who never fails those Rosecrans to Halleck, October 4. Ibid., October 11. Rosecrans to Lincoln, Oct. 12, 1863. MS.

CHAP. IV.

who truly trust." The same day Lincoln telegraphed him one of those singular dispatches which seem full of intuitive military knowledge, telling him that Burnside, being menaced from the east, could not go to him without surrendering East Tennessee. "I now think," Mr. Lincoln said, "the enemy will not attack Chattanooga, and I think you will have to look out for his making a concentrated drive at Burnside. You and Burnside now have him by the throat, and he must break your hold or perish. . . Sherman is coming to you," he went on to say, "though gaps in the telegraph prevent our knowing how far he is advanced. He and Hooker will so support you on the west and northwest, as to enable you to look east and northeast."

Lincoln to Rosecrans, Oct. 12, 1863. MS.

But no encouragement was sufficient to give back to General Rosecrans his old buoyancy and hopefulness. His dispatches continued full of premonitions of trouble. Jefferson Davis had appeared in the other camp and made encouraging speeches. Rosecrans feared the rebel cavalry on his right; if his mounted force were not swelled the Confederate cavalry would paralyze his army and compel it to retire. Sherman was still too far off to be of any real help. The rebel cavalry would soon overpower and wear out his; and finally a dispatch of the 16th of October is filled with apprehension of an attempt to be made by the enemy to destroy the Army of the Cumberland by separating it from Burnside. "We cannot feed Hooker's troops on our left, nor can we spare them from our right depots and communications. . . Had we . . . the whole of Sherman's and Hooker's troops

brought up, we should not probably outnumber the enemy. This army, with its back to barren mountains, roads narrow and difficult, while the enemy has the railroad and the corn in his rear, is at much disadvantage." "Our future is not bright." By this time the Government had become convinced that the supreme charge of the armies in Tennessee could no longer be safely left in the hands of a general so querulous and so despondent as Rosecrans had become.

Report, Committee on Conduct of the War. Part III., p. 49.

They did not gain this impression exclusively from his dispatches. Charles A. Dana, who accompanied the army as the representative of the War Department, had for several weeks been giving the gloomiest views of Rosecrans's temper and capacity. Late in September he wrote that there was serious fermentation in the corps of Crittenden and McCook; that subordinate officers were unwilling to risk their troops in the hands of those generals; but that Rosecrans hated to take active measures against them, as he felt he was as much to blame as they were for running away; that this impression was shared by his subordinates, especially by Granger and Garfield, who blamed him severely for his conduct and his orders on the battlefield of Chickamauga, and for his abandonment of the Lookout passes; "but," Mr. Dana continues, "Rosecrans, who is sometimes as obstinate and inaccessible to reason as at others he is irresolute and vacillating, pettishly rejected all arguments." He describes the threatening famine in the camp, and adds, "the commanding general devotes part of the time which is not employed in pleasant gossip to the composition of a long

Mr. Dana's dispatches, Sept. 27, 30, 1863, *et seq.* W. R. Vol. XXX., Part I., pp. 201, 204.

Oct. 12, 1863.

CHAP. IV. report to prove that the Government is to blame for his failure. . . I have never seen a public man possessing talent with less administrative power, less clearness and steadiness in difficulty, and greater practical incapacity. . . He has invention, fertility, and knowledge, but he has no strength of will and no concentration of purpose. His mind scatters; there is no system in the use of his busy days and restless nights, no courage against individuals in his composition, and, with great love of command, he is a feeble commander. He is conscientious and honest, just as he is imperious and disputatious; always with a stray vein of caprice and an overweening passion for the approbation of his personal friends and the public outside. Under the present circumstances I consider this army to be very unsafe in his hands."

W. R. Vol. XXX., Part I., p. 215.

On the 16th of October he wrote: "Nothing can prevent the retreat of the army from this place within a fortnight, and with a vast loss of public property and possibly of life, except the opening of the river. . . Rosecrans seems insensible to the impending danger, and dawdles with trifles in a manner which can scarcely be imagined. . . With plenty of zealous and energetic officers ready to do whatever can be done, all this precious time is lost because our dazed and mazy commander cannot perceive the catastrophe that is close upon us, nor fix his mind upon the means of preventing it." Later in the same day, he reported a conversation which he had just had with Rosecrans, in which the general said the holding of the river to Williams Island was indispensable, but that he could not accomplish this until Hooker arrived. He expected

Ibid., p. 218.

the enemy to cross the river on his left; he must then fight or retreat to Cumberland Mountains; he thought the enemy's force was rapidly increasing, and that even when Hooker came he would still be outnumbered; he thought not less than one hundred or one hundred and twenty-five thousand men was the least force with which he could go forward. Every day Mr. Dana's reports assumed darker colors. On the 18th he described the situation as desperate, with no outlet but starvation or disorderly retreat; the soldiers were becoming mutinous; "the incapacity of the commander is astonishing, and it often seems difficult to believe him of sound mind."

W. R. Vol. XXX., Part I., p. 221.

General Grant on October 17 received a dispatch, at Cairo, directing him to repair to Louisville for orders. It was the intention of the Government to place him in chief command, and to leave it to his discretion whether General Rosecrans should remain at the head of the Army of the Cumberland or should be replaced by General Thomas. Mr. Stanton went west in person, and meeting General Grant at Indianapolis, he proceeded to Louisville with him, handing him on the train two orders which were identical in all but one particular. Both created the military division of the Mississippi, giving Grant the command, composed of the Departments of the Ohio, the Cumberland, and the Tennessee, and in fact all the territory from the Alleghanies to the Mississippi River north of the limits of Banks's command. One of these orders left the department commanders as they were, while the other relieved Rosecrans and assigned Thomas to his place. Grant, without hesitation, accepted the latter.

Grant, "Personal Memoirs." Vol. II., p. 17.

Ibid., p. 19.

CHAP. IV.

While they were at Louisville the Secretary of War received a dispatch from Mr. Charles A. Dana, in Chattanooga, informing him that unless prevented Rosecrans would retreat, and advising peremptory orders against his doing so. Upon receipt of this startling intelligence the Secretary directed Grant to proceed immediately to the front. Grant wrote an order, assuming command of the military division of the Mississippi, and immediately telegraphed it to Rosecrans, informing him also of Thomas's assignment to command of the Army of the Cumberland, and sent a telegram to Thomas urging him to hold Chattanooga at all hazards. Thomas promptly answered: "We will hold the town till we starve." Rosecrans, on receiving these orders, gave over the command to Thomas, and left Chattanooga on the morning of the 20th, shortly after daylight, before the change became known. He said afterwards, "Convinced that this would excite profound sorrow and discontent in the Army of the Cumberland, which my continued presence, after it became known, would increase, and that this would be detrimental to the public service in the presence, as it were, of the enemy, I determined to forego the gratification of receiving the parting adieus of those with whom I had shared so many toils and dangers." This was probably an unnecessary precaution. General Thomas had served with that army quite as long as General Rosecrans; and his qualities, exhibited in camp, on march, and on the field of battle, were not such as to inspire any emotion of sorrow or discontent at his promotion.

Grant, "Personal Memoirs." Vol. II., p. 19.

Ibid., p. 26.

Rosecrans, Testimony. Report Committee on Conduct of the War, 1865, Part III., pp. 33, 34.

CHAPTER V

CHATTANOOGA

THE inference of Mr. Dana that Rosecrans was meditating a retreat from Chattanooga was modified by a later dispatch which arrived too late to counteract the impression already made on Grant's mind;[1] it has always been vehemently denied by Rosecrans himself. He claims that so early as the 4th of October he had laid before General Thomas and General Garfield his plan of seizing Lookout Valley and fortifying it, covering the road from there to Bridgeport, and giving himself the practical use and possession of both the road and the river and Lookout Valley; that he was hastening forward the completion of his boats and barges to run from Bridgeport to Chattanooga; that Hooker had been directed to concentrate his troops for a move from Stevenson; and that

1863.

[1] General Grant says in his "Personal Memoirs," Vol. II., p. 29: "During the evening most of the general officers called in to pay their respects, and to talk about the condition of affairs. They pointed out on the map the line, marked with a red or blue pencil, which Rosecrans had contemplated falling back upon. If any of them had approved the move, they did not say so to me." And Stanton telegraphed to the War Department, October 21, from Louisville: "Generals Garfield and Steedman are here on their way home. Their representation of the incidents of the battle at Chickamauga more than confirm the worst that has reached us from other sources as to the bad conduct of the commanding general and the great credit that is due General Thomas."

1863.

CHAP. V. on the day of his removal he personally reconnoitered the river bank, and selected a point for the crossing at Brown's Ferry to connect Hooker with the force at Chattanooga.

General Thomas substantially confirms this claim of General Rosecrans, though he gives especial credit to General W. F. Smith, chief engineer of the department, for planning and preparing the movement. In fact, General Grant himself virtually substantiates this story. On his way to Chattanooga he met General Rosecrans at Stevenson on the night of the 21st, and in the interview which there took place, he says Rosecrans "made some excellent suggestions as to what should be done. My only wonder was that he had not carried them out"; and when he had arrived at Chattanooga he said that Smith's explanation of the situation and the topography of the country was so plain that he "could see it without an inspection." Still the fact remained that the talk at headquarters was so desponding that, taken in connection with Rosecrans's own dispatches to Washington, the Government felt that it could not safely leave the command in such reluctant hands. At all events, Grant found, on reaching Chattanooga, the plan for the relief of the straitened garrison all ready, and there was nothing left for him to do but to give the word, "Forward," and this was speedily given.

Grant, "Personal Memoirs." Vol. II., p. 28.

Oct. 23, 1863.

Chattanooga, as we have before said, was strictly blockaded on the south; the lines of the enemy stretched from the Tennessee River, on the east of Chattanooga, along Missionary Ridge, across the Chattanooga Valley to Lookout Mountain, whose beetling precipices almost touched the river on the

west of the town. At this point the river doubles upon itself in a sudden loop, which forms a narrow promontory, called Moccasin Point, which was in possession of the Union troops; but the left side of the river from Lookout to Bridgeport was occupied by the Confederate pickets. This was the natural line of supply for Rosecrans's army, and in relinquishing Lookout Mountain he had given up the advantage of this short line, the loss of which had reduced his army almost to starvation. The plan which General Smith, or Rosecrans, had devised was to seize Brown's Ferry, on the Tennessee, at the northern base of Moccasin Point, while Hooker, crossing at Bridgeport, should take possession of Lookout Valley. This would relieve the whole extent of road, and give to the Union army the advantage of river transportation from Bridgeport to Kelley's Ferry, from which point there was a good wagon road to Brown's Ferry and thence to Chattanooga. Thomas had already ordered the concentration of Hooker at Bridgeport, and Smith had prepared the pontoons necessary for bridging the river at Brown's Ferry. Grant, by a reconnaissance made immediately on his arrival, satisfied himself of the feasibility of the undertaking, and immediately gave orders for carrying it out. He says in his "Memoirs": "General W. F. Smith had been so instrumental in preparing for the move which I was now about to make, and so clear in his judgment about the manner of making it, that I deemed it but just to him that he should have command of the troops detailed to execute the design, although he was then acting as a staff officer, and was not in command of troops."

Oct. 24, 1863.

"Memoirs," Vol. II., p. 35.

CHAP. V. 1863.

At three o'clock on the morning of the 27th of October General Hazen embarked a force of 1800 picked men in sixty pontoons. Committing themselves to the swift current of the Tennessee, which obviated the necessity of using oars, they silently glided down the rapid river under the works of the Confederates, almost within touching distance of the muskets of the pickets on the banks, and arrived in the early dawn at Brown's Ferry, surprising the picket guard, and capturing most of it. Smith had marched in advance, and was on the right side of the river when Hazen landed on the left. Smith's force was rapidly ferried over, the pontoon bridge was quickly and skillfully laid, and the heights on the left bank were speedily fortified, so as to defend the bridge against any force the enemy would be likely to bring against it. The distance was so short across Moccasin Point from Chattanooga that the whole Union army could reënforce Smith's detachment before the Confederates could arrive there.

Hooker's part[1] of the enterprise was executed with equal skill and celerity, which was the more remarkable as every step of his progress across the river and along Lookout Valley could be seen from the

[1] This enterprise, in which General Hooker showed such zeal and ability and won such merited fame, was entered upon in his usual spirit of grumbling and criticism. Mr. Dana reports on the 27th: "He [Hooker] is in an unfortunate state of mind for one who has to coöperate — faultfinding, criticizing, dissatisfied. . . . He is quite as truculent toward the plan he is now to execute as toward the impotence and confusion of the old *régime*." Slocum's behavior was equally indecorous. His hatred of Hooker amounted to a mania. He wrote a letter declining to serve under him, on the ground that he regarded him neither with confidence as an officer nor respect as a man. Grant was so disgusted with their mutual ill-feeling that he wanted both of them sent away and Howard put in command of both corps.

W. R. Vol. XXXI., Part I., p. 72.

Dana to Stanton, Oct. 29. Ibid., p. 73.

enemy's watch-towers on the craggy heights of the mountain. He crossed the Tennessee by the pontoon bridge at Bridgeport on the morning of the 26th with the Eleventh Corps under General Howard, and a part of the Twelfth under General Geary, and with two companies of Tennessee and Alabama cavalry. He left small detachments as he advanced, to guard the route over which he had passed. His march was somewhat protected from the enemy on Lookout Mountain by a range of hills that divided the valley in its center, and although under fire the greater part of the way, he suffered small damage and little annoyance. At the same time General Palmer, with a division of the Fourteenth Corps, was ordered to cross the river opposite Whiteside's and take up a position in support of Hooker's line of march; he met with some delay, but finally got over. Howard's advance had a slight skirmish with the enemy as they drew near the river, but the Confederates were easily driven across Lookout Creek. About five o'clock at night the column halted a mile or more up the valley from Brown's Ferry, and although no continuous line had as yet been established, the troops at Brown's Ferry, Howard's corps and Geary's division, were cheered by the news which spread from one camp to the other that Lookout Valley was once more in their possession, and the line at Bridgeport opened for the relief of their comrades.

This position, of such vast importance that it involved nothing less than the life and death of the army, was not to be held without a struggle. The progress of Hooker's column and the landing of Smith's expedition had struck the Confederate

CHAP. V.

commander with something like consternation. The day before he had imagined he held his enemy firmly in his grasp. General Bragg had taken, as he thought, dispositions which "insured the enemy's speedy evacuation of Chattanooga for want of food and forage. Possessed of the shortest route to his depot, and the one by which reënforcements must reach him, we held him at our mercy, and his destruction was only a question of time." Now in the most unexpected and surprising manner he saw his prey wrenched instantly from his grasp, and his own continuance in his present camp depending upon the issue of a desperate battle, unless he could at once reëstablish his hold on Lookout Valley.

Bragg, Report of Chickamauga. W. R. Vol. XXX., Part II., pp. 36, 37.

He attempted by a night attack to seize the ground which had been occupied in open day before his eyes. Longstreet's corps,—his most trustworthy troops, under the lead of his best general,—was sent against Hooker's force. It had been seen before nightfall that a considerable interval had been left between Geary's division and Howard's corps, and it was thought that, relying upon the superior knowledge of the country possessed by the Confederates, the Union troops might be thrown into confusion by a surprise in the darkness. Geary's pickets were driven in, but made such resistance that he was in line of battle to receive the direct attack when it was made. He defended himself with obstinacy, and Howard was directed to double-quick Schurz's division to his relief. Steinwehr's division followed, but both of them on their way to Geary were themselves attacked on the left flank, and a spirited battle occurred, lasting several hours, in which the opposing forces could only mark each

Oct. 29, 1863.

other's positions by the flash of their muskets. The Confederate attack was repulsed from one end to the other of the Union line.[1] Hooker's loss was between 400 and 500; Longstreet's was something more than this, as Geary reports having buried 153 in front of his lines, and 100 Confederate prisoners were taken. The enemy made no further attempt to dispute the possession of Lookout Valley. Communication was established from Brown's Ferry to Wauhatchie; the rebel pickets from Lookout to Kelley's Ferry dispersed or surrendered; supply trains began running regularly over the shortened line, and the garrison, finding itself once more in communication with the source of supplies and of reënforcements, took fresh heart and courage, and was ready to move against the enemy.

1863.

W. R. Vol. XXXI., Part I., p. 95.

General Bragg, under fatal advice, now made the greatest error in all his career. About the middle of October Mr. Davis had visited him in his camp, before Chattanooga. They had gone together over the battlefield of Chickamauga, the Confederate President had made a series of complimentary and boastful speeches to the soldiers and officers of the army, praising them for what they had done and promising them still greater triumphs in the near future. It is conjectured that his visit had for its principal object the arranging of some difference of opinion which had arisen between Longstreet

1863.

[1] Pollard, in "The Lost Cause," p. 455, says: "A night attack on the 29th October was planned upon it [Hooker's force] by Longstreet, who hoped, by a surprise, to frustrate the entire movement, and to capture the whole of Hooker's wagon train. The attack failed from insufficient force; it was made with only six Confederate regiments, and was withdrawn after three hours' fighting with considerable loss."

CHAP. V.

Grant, "Personal Memoirs." Vol. II., p. 85.

and Bragg, and that for the purpose of removing an element of discord from the army he had suggested the detachment of Longstreet's corps to capture or destroy the army of Burnside at Knoxville.[1] Mr. Davis had always great confidence in his own military ability, and viewed his own plans with a complacency which was not disturbed by their continual failure. He was so elated on leaving the camp at Chattanooga that, discounting the success of the campaign he had planned, he bubbled over with satisfaction in the speeches he made on his route. At Selma, Alabama, on the 18th of October, urging the citizens to gather their guns and go to war, he intimated that such blows would soon be dealt the enemy as he would find it difficult to recover from. He spoke of the aid this would give "to the gallant men and officers who are carrying out the plans of the noble Longstreet, under the supervision of the heroic Bragg." He was confident that "Rosecrans could be crushed to dust," and "his defeat would practically end the war." He "firmly believed that next spring would see the invader driven from our borders."

1863.

Longstreet, however, did not start immediately after the visit of Mr. Davis. It was only after the de-

[1] "This extraordinary military movement was the work of President Davis, who seems, indeed, to have had a singular fondness for erratic campaigns. His visits to every battlefield of the Confederacy were ominous. He disturbed the plans of his generals; his military conceit led him into the wildest schemes; and so much did he fear that the public would not ascribe to him the hoped-for results of the visionary project, that his vanity invariably divulged it, and successes were foretold in public speeches with such boastful plainness as to put the enemy on his guard, and inform him of the general nature of the enterprise.

"On the 12th of October President Davis visited the field of Chickamauga. He planned the expedition against Knoxville." — Pollard, "The Lost Cause," p. 456.



GENERAL WILLIAM F. SMITH.

feat of Longstreet, in the night battle at Wauhatchie, that Bragg, being convinced that his grip on the army at Chattanooga was loosening, determined to seek compensation in an expedition against Burnside. On the 3d of November Longstreet received his orders to march, and the next day he took his departure from Tyner's Station. His orders were to "drive Burnside out of East Tennessee, or, better, to capture or destroy him." He took with him Hood's and McLaws's divisions and Wheeler's cavalry, not less than twenty thousand men. He remained for several days at Sweetwater, asking for another division, and it was the 15th of November before he really took the road. Grant was promptly informed of the movement, and on the 7th of November issued peremptory orders to Thomas to make a powerful demonstration on the enemy's right wing on the northern extremity of Missionary Ridge for the purpose of recalling Longstreet. He, as well as the General-in-Chief and President, was in great anxiety about Burnside, and he preferred to have the most formidable corps of the rebel army in his front rather than see the army at Knoxville exposed to such serious danger.

CHAP. V.

1863.

The orders of the 7th of November took Thomas by surprise. The plan devised by General W. F. Smith to advance the pickets on the left to Citico Creek, about a mile in front of the position they had been occupying, and to threaten the seizure of the northwest extremity of Missionary Ridge, had been under consideration for several days. Smith's plan was intended partly to occupy the space which would be necessary, on Sherman's arrival, for the proper encampments and probable developments for a battle, and the menace to Mis-

Dana to Stanton, Nov. 5. W. R. Vol. XXXI., Part II., p. 57.

CHAP. V.

sionary Ridge was intended merely as a feint which might possibly induce the recall of Longstreet. But Grant's intense desire to relieve Burnside, and to effect some practical result against the enemy in front of him, led him to change these orders into a peremptory direction to Thomas to attack the north end of Missionary Ridge, and from there to threaten and even attack, if possible, the enemy's line of communication between Dalton and Cleveland. The moment Thomas received the order he said to Smith that, if he attempted to carry it out, his army would be terribly beaten, and he asked Smith to get the order revoked. But before any representations were made to Grant, Smith, Thomas, and Brannan, chief of artillery, made a careful reconnaissance of the field from a hill opposite the mouth of Chickamauga Creek, and being convinced that with their starved and skeleton animals they could do nothing with their field artillery, and that there were not muskets enough in Thomas's command to execute the task proposed, they reported that the movement could not be made until the arrival of Sherman's column, and Grant countermanded the order. In his official report he simply says that "after a thorough reconnaissance of the ground, however, it was deemed utterly impracticable to make the move until Sherman could get up, because of the inadequacy of our forces and the condition of the animals then at Chattanooga"; but he never thoroughly forgave General Thomas for this difference of opinion, and in Badeau's "Life" and his own "Personal Memoirs" General Grant's disapproval of the conduct of his great subordinate is indicated.

Nov. 7, 1863.

W. F. Smith, in "Battles and Leaders." Vol. III., p. 716.

W. R. Vol. XXXI., Part II., p. 29.

The general judgment of military men, however, is that in this respect Thomas was right and Grant was wrong. General Smith says, "When it is remembered that eighteen days after this Sherman with six perfectly appointed divisions failed to carry this same point of Missionary Ridge at a time when Thomas with four divisions stood threatening Bragg's center, and Hooker with nearly three divisions was driving in Bragg's left flank (Bragg having no more strength than on the 7th), it will not be a matter of surprise that the order staggered Thomas." It will be remembered that General Rosecrans also expressed his dissatisfaction at Thomas's slowness, at the very moment when his caution was saving Negley and Baird from destruction at the hands of Bragg. At this still more important juncture the cool and imperturbable judgment of this great soldier again rendered invaluable service to the country. He firmly confronted the weighty censure of his powerful commander, and again, like Fabius Cunctator, rendered the state the best possible service by delaying until Sherman came and made victory certain.

Nov., 1863.

"Battles and Leaders." Vol. III., p. 715.

The week that elapsed was one of intense anxiety and suspense. Sherman was making every possible effort to hasten the advance of his column, but it is a far cry from Vicksburg to Chattanooga and every day's march was thickly sown with obstacles. Low water in the Mississippi River and the scarcity of wood and coal made his progress up the river slow and tedious. From time to time they landed to gather fence rails by the riverside or to push out into the interior with wagons for wood. On the 2d of October Sherman reached

1863.

CHAP. V. Memphis and started his troops across country to the rescue of Rosecrans. He had 400 miles of marching through a region almost denuded of supplies and infested by large bodies of hostile
1863. cavalry. At Colliersville (October 11) he took part in person in the defense of a railroad station, against Chalmers and a large force of horse and artillery. Blair, who commanded the advance, skirmished with the enemy all the way to Tuscumbia, which he occupied on the 27th of October.

Sherman, having now received command of the Army of the Tennessee, assigned Blair to the command of the Fifteenth Army Corps and set General Dodge, with 8000 men, to work repairing the railroads. On the 27th Sherman received at Iuka a message from Grant, borne by a scout who had floated down the Tennessee, ordering him to drop all work on the railroads east of Bear Creek and to put his command in motion towards Bridgeport until he met orders. Sherman hastened to the front, leaving Blair to bring up the rear, and with infinite trouble from bad roads and swollen rivers he arrived at Bridgeport on the night of the 13th
1863. of November, and rode into Chattanooga on the night of the 15th. The next day he reconnoitered the field of the coming battle, from the same hill where Thomas had stood on the 7th, and surveyed with a kindling heart the work laid out for him and his army to perform. The week before would have been one of intolerable suspense to Grant and his army if the time had not been fully occupied by the preparation for the impending struggle. "All things," Sherman says, "had been prearranged with a foresight that elicited my

admiration. From the hills we looked down on the amphitheater of Chattanooga as on a map, and nothing remained but for me to put my troops in the desired position." CHAP. V. Sherman, Report. W. R. Vol. XXXI., Part II., p. 571.

Grant's original plan had been to throw Sherman's force across the river at a point near the mouth of Chickamauga Creek, from which he should attack and carry the extremity of Missionary Ridge. Thomas was so to dispose his troops as to coöperate in this movement, and after the ridge was carried the united forces were to rush to the railroad between Cleveland and Dalton. Hooker was to attack and carry Lookout Mountain, if possible, while a demonstration was to be made on Trenton, to induce Bragg to believe that the movement of Rosecrans in September was to be repeated. He changed his mind, however, a few days later, having resolved to throw a very large force into the attack on the northwest end of Missionary Ridge. He determined to detach Howard's corps from Hooker, and to hold it in readiness to move to the support of Sherman or Thomas; but even Grant, the most masterful of all our generals, could not absolutely control the course of events, and on the very eve of battle he reverted to the former plan. Grant, Report. W. R. Vol. XXXI., Part II., p. 32.

He had intended that the attack should be made on the 21st, but a furious rainstorm, which began on the 20th and continued for two days, made the movement impossible. Though Sherman pushed his troops forward with his habitual fiery zeal, they could not get into position on the day fixed. The time, however, was not lost. While Sherman, in spite of flooded roads, and Nov., 1863.

CHAP. V.

bridges repeatedly broken as fast as repaired, was bringing his troops into a sheltered position behind the hills north of Chattanooga, where they were entirely concealed from the view of the enemy, Thomas brought Howard's corps in full view of Bragg's observatory on Missionary Ridge, across the river, through the town of Chattanooga, out into the open fields in front of the Union works. This move was made to induce the enemy to believe that the troops from Brown's Ferry had been brought to reënforce the Union center. While this dramatic display of a splendidly appointed corps from the Army of the Potomac passed under the watching eyes of the enemy, the serious attack upon his right wing was preparing north of the river, screened behind the hills of Chattanooga; and Hugh Ewing, having made his demonstration at Trenton, had been hurried forward to the extreme left of the National army.

Grant, Report. W. R. Vol. XXXI., Part II., p. 32.

Nov., 1863.

Even on the 23d, the disposition of the troops was not yet completed, but Grant resolved to postpone his movement no longer. He had received a letter from Bragg, on the 20th, notifying him that prudence would dictate the early withdrawal of non-combatants from Chattanooga. This ruse was altogether too gross to be taken seriously. Grant suspected at once that Bragg was intending to retire, and this suspicion was strengthened on the night of the 22d by the report of a deserter that Confederate troops were already moving to the rear. This report, although untrue, Grant afterwards thought was made in good faith, and was founded on the fact that Bragg had sent reënforcements to Longstreet, and, with in-

credible fatuity, was preparing to send others. Believing that Bragg was about to retire, and not willing to allow him the privilege of withdrawing his army intact, Grant ordered Thomas to make such a demonstration in front of his line on the 23d as to determine whether the enemy was still there in force or not. This duty was assigned to General Gordon Granger, commanding the new Fourth Corps, made up principally of the remains of McCook's and Crittenden's former commands. At the most prominent salient of the Union lines stood a redoubt called Fort Wood, where twenty-two heavy guns had been placed in position. On either side of this fort two divisions of Granger's command were formed; on the left General Wood, and on the right General P. H. Sheridan, who was this day to fight for the first time under the eyes of Grant, and to enter on the career of unbroken success which was to bring him to the head of the army. CHAP. V.

During the early part of the day the valley was filled with fog, which concealed it from the view of the enemy on the surrounding heights; but in the afternoon the veil lifted, and the Confederates on the ridge saw below them a sight full of scenic beauty. Two splendid divisions moved out in front of the Union line, drums beating and colors flying; behind them the Eleventh Corps was drawn up in mass; and on Granger's right Baird and Johnson, of Palmer's Fourteenth Corps, were held under arms in the intrenchments. So measured and precise were the movements of the troops that the Confederates imagined it was a dress parade going on in the plain, and they assisted at the show with Nov. 24, 1863.

Lookout Mountain
Tennessee River
Sherman's Corps
Sherman's Concealed Lamp
William's Island
Moccasin Point
Raccoon Mountain
Moccasin Bend
Tennessee River
Chattanooga
Hooker
Wauhatchie
Nashville & Chattanooga R.R.
Trenton R.R.
Lookout Mountain
Summertown
Lookout Mountain
Chattanooga Valley



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CHAP. V. no interest, except that of pleased spectators; but suddenly, after the troops had rested some half an hour in line, the order to advance was given.

Nov.24,1863. Sheridan's and Wood's divisions rushed forward upon the rebel pickets, driving them rapidly through the low-lying ground and the thin woods, reaching the grand guards almost as soon as the pickets themselves, capturing Bragg's first line of rifle-pits and several hundred men, and securing themselves in their new position before reënforcements could arrive from the main Confederate line.

The Union line was thus pushed forward in the arc of a circle about a mile in front of the position it had held the day before. An eminence called Orchard Knob was seized and hastily fortified, and although this success led immediately to no substantial result (and, indeed, it has been criticized as a needless and premature warning to the enemy), its moral effect seems to have been an ample compensation. It was a brilliant and easy success, important in the ground gained for future work, and valuable in the cheer and encouragement it gave to the troops who had been beaten at Chickamauga and so long shut up in the intrenchments at Chattanooga. They had met the enemy they had been confronting, and had gained the first round of a fight which all felt sure was to be decisive. Evening closed in with the roar of artillery from every point of the opposing lines, which seemed to the excited soldiers to express the exultation of the National troops and the defiance of the Confederates.

Nov., 1863. It was night on the 23d before Sherman's forces had been brought together opposite the mouth of the Chickamauga, and even then his rear division

under Osterhaus had been cut off by the broken bridge at Brown's Ferry; but Grant determined to wait no longer. He detached Osterhaus's division to Hooker, and ordered Sherman to make his attack with the other three, assisted by J. C. Davis, who had been detached from Thomas to support him. Before midnight his pontoons were loaded; they dropped silently down to the point above the mouth of the creek; then, moving cautiously along the river, his troops captured, successively, all the Confederate pickets except one. By daylight of the 24th, eight thousand men were on the south bank of the Tennessee, safely established in their rifle trenches. As soon as it was light a pontoon bridge was built over the Tennessee and another over the creek. "I have never," says Sherman, "beheld any work done so quietly, so well, and I doubt if the history of war can show a bridge of that extent, 1350 feet, laid so noiselessly and well in so short a time. I attribute it to the genius and intelligence of General W. F. Smith."

CHAP. V.

Nov., 1863.

W. R. Vol. XXXI., Part II., p. 573.

Sherman had carefully explained to each of his division commanders the work required of him, and shortly after noon he marched from the river in three columns, the left commanded by General M. L. Smith on Chickamauga Creek, the center under General J. E. Smith, and the right under General Ewing. A light rain fell, and the valley was shrouded in mist and fog. Reaching the foot-hills, the skirmishers of Sherman kept up the face of the hill, followed by their supports; a brigade of each division went rapidly to the top of the hill; and, though energetically opposed by the enemy, the point which Sherman had selected as the first

CHAP. V. position to be gained was reached. Here a grave disappointment awaited him. All the maps he had seen were imperfect, and represented Missionary Ridge as one continuous hill. From his observatory north of the river the vast wrinkles of the ridge were not seen, and now, on gaining the top of
NOV. 24, 1863. the hill for which he had so gallantly fought, he found that a considerable valley lay between him and the strong position of the enemy over the railroad tunnel, which had been his chief objective point. He fortified himself strongly, however, during the night, and the blaze of his camp-fires gave to Grant the assurance of a success greater than had really been gained.

While Sherman was attacking on the extreme left of the Union line, Hooker, thirteen miles away at Wauhatchie, was executing, with no less gallantry than good fortune, the task allotted to him. In the changes of troops which the exigencies at the eve of battle required, Howard had been taken from him, and Osterhaus's division from the Fifteenth Corps, and Cruft's from the Fourth, had been added to Geary's of the Twelfth — the only division which remained to him of the army he had brought from Virginia. Those three divisions, entirely strange to each other, were to participate in an attack upon the formidable position, equally unknown to them all, of Lookout Mountain, which was held by a strong force of the enemy. General Bragg, in his report, says that General Stevenson had six brigades at his disposal, and, upon his urgent appeal,
W. R. Vol. XXXI., Part II., p. 664. another brigade was dispatched in the afternoon to his support. Hooker had a force not much superior in numbers, and utterly inadequate to the attack of

such a position as the enemy occupied, if it had been properly defended. The enemy's pickets formed a continuous line round the right bank of Lookout Creek, with strong reserves in the coves of the hills, while his main force was encamped in a hollow half way up the slope of the mountain. The only means of access to the summit was by narrow trails, which were defended by strong pickets of the enemy; but if Hooker could succeed in rounding the northern slope of the mountain he was sure of compelling the evacuation of the place, as the only road by which the enemy could connect with their main body was one which zigzagged up the eastern slope. "Viewed from whatever point," says Hooker, "Lookout Mountain, with its high, palisaded crest and its steep, rugged, rocky, and deeply furrowed slopes, presented an imposing barrier to our advance; and when to these were added almost interminable well-planned, well-constructed defenses, held by Americans, the assault became an enterprise worthy the ambition and renown of the troops to whom it was intrusted."

Hooker, Report. W. R. Vol. XXXI., Part II., p. 315.

Hooker, Report. Supplemental Report Committee on Conduct of the War. Vol. I., p. 166.

Geary with his own and a part of Charles Cruft's division crossed the creek near Wauhatchie early in the morning and moved down the valley, his right resting on the rocky palisades, capturing the rebel pickets as he moved. William Grose's brigade advanced resolutely to the bridge and began under a brisk fire to repair it. The Confederates were at once seen swarming down the mountain from their camps, filling their rifle-pits and breastworks; but they were so much occupied with the men at the bridge that they paid little attention to Geary, who was moving down in a slight mist that obscured the

Nov. 24, 1863.

CHAP. V.

valley, and they also neglected the passage of C. R. Woods's brigade between Geary and the bridge. At eleven o'clock both these brigades sprang across the river, connecting with Geary's left, which was in position to enfilade the Confederate works at the north end of Lookout, and the whole command rushed solidly up the mountain-side driving the Confederates rapidly before them. "The right passed directly under the muzzles of the enemy's guns on the summit, climbing over ledges and boulders up hill and down, furiously driving the enemy from his camp and from position after position."[1]

Nov. 25, 1863.

Hooker, Report. W. R. Vol. XXXI., Part II., p. 316.

At noon Geary's advance rounded the northern point of the mountain. They had gained such an impetus that although this was the strongest point of the enemy's position, and although it had not been Hooker's intention to attack the Confederate works at that point without a pause for preparation, fired by success the troops pressed impetuously forward with uninterrupted and irresistible progress. By two o'clock the clouds, which since morning had been hanging over the mountain, settled so thickly about the troops that their operations were arrested by the darkness; they halted and began strengthening their position, while their comrades in the field gazed with intense excitement upon the dense mass of vapor that hid this extraordinary battle from their view. Occasional flashes of musketry and glimpses of moving lines and of advancing banners were caught through the drifting

[1] Brig.-Gen. E. W. Pettus, in his report of the battle of Lookout Mountain, feels called upon to apologize for the scanty list of casualties in his brigade — only 56 in killed, wounded and missing. "It is small," he says. "The day was dark, and the men well-sheltered in the rocks."— W. R. Vol. XXXI., Part II., p. 733.

clouds, and proved that all was going well with Hooker. At four o'clock he sent to Grant the welcome intelligence that he had established himself on the northern slope of Lookout in a position which he considered impregnable. Direct communication having been opened with Chattanooga, W. P. Carlin's brigade arrived late in the afternoon, after sharp fighting, and went to Hooker's right, relieving Geary's exhausted division. Nov. 24, 1863.

By this brilliant and picturesque victory the Union line was greatly shortened and strengthened, and brought into connection, so that on the morning of the 25th, the enemy having evacuated the mountain in the night, the National troops were drawn up in perfect communication from the point where Sherman's left rested on Chickamauga Creek to the lofty summit of Lookout Mountain where the Eighth Kentucky had planted the Union flag to catch the first rays of the morning sun. It was not only the material advantages gained on this epic march which made the "battle above the clouds" memorable: moral benefits of the highest character also came from it. When Hooker first started west, Mr. Lincoln wrote to Rosecrans that the relations between Hooker and Slocum were not such as to promise good in their relative positions. He therefore earnestly requested Rosecrans to make a transposition by which Slocum and his corps might pass from under the command of Hooker, and Hooker in return receive some other equal force. Rosecrans answered that "any attempt to mingle them [the troops of his army] with Potomac troops by placing them under Potomac generals would kindle a flame of jealousy and dislike";

Lincoln to Rosecrans, Sept. 28, 1863. MS.

Rosecrans to Lincoln, Oct. 13, 1863. MS.

CHAP. V. but here, without a moment's warning, troops from the veteran Army of the Tennessee had been mingled with troops transferred from the soil of Virginia, and these, joined to soldiers of the Army of the Cumberland, had been put unexpectedly under the command of a Potomac general, and all had marched like brothers, under extraordinary circumstances, to battle and to victory, showing how incapable were the rank and file of that patriot army of the petty meanness imputed to them by their general. It was a happy augury of final success that this lofty watchtower, the possession of which had been so ardently desired for two weary years by the President, should at last be permanently occupied by the National power, through the fraternal and unselfish valor of soldiers coming from every Army and almost every State of the Union.

Sherman had been ordered to renew his attack on
NOV., 1863. the left at daybreak on the 25th. He obeyed his orders with the utmost gallantry and no lack of skill, but not with the success for which Grant had hoped and planned. It had been his expectation that Hooker's demonstration on the left, and the threatening attitude of Thomas in the center, would have occupied enough of Bragg's army to enable Sherman to gain Missionary Ridge with comparative ease, and to push the National left between Longstreet and Bragg; but the Confederate general, perceiving at once in what direction his real danger lay, threw the bulk of his force against Sherman, and having obstinately barred his passage on the 24th, was prepared on the 25th also to make his principal battle against him.



GENERAL BRAXTON BRAGG.

Though deeply chagrined by the failure of Stevenson to hold Lookout Mountain, Bragg comprehended the situation on the night of the 24th, and ordered the withdrawal of his forces from Lookout, concentrating them all on Missionary Ridge. He relied to a great extent on the strength of his works to defend his left flank and his center, which was under the command of Breckinridge, with Stewart's, Buckner's, and Hindman's divisions, and threw to the right his heavy columns under Cleburne, Cheatham, Walker, and Stevenson, the whole under command of Hardee. CHAP. V. NOV., 1863.

The morning broke clear and cold; the fog and mist of the previous day had passed away, and as Sherman, who had mounted his horse in the twilight before dawn, and had ridden from one end to the other of his line, began to marshal his forces for the attack, he could see from his commanding position on the left the whole field of battle, the most grandiose and picturesque of the war. The plain of Chattanooga, broken by low ridges and small watercourses, interspersed with clumps of sparsely growing trees, and cut throughout its length by the parallel intrenchments of the hostile armies; to the north, the tortuous stream of the Tennessee winding among wooded hills and lofty rocks, and still further to the north the bare and rugged heights of Walden's Ridge and the Cumberland Mountains. On the extreme right the sheer precipices of Lookout Mountain closed the view, and in front the steep slope of Missionary Ridge, crowded with the Confederate batteries and fringed by the waving battle flags of the rebellion, barred the passage of the Union arms to Atlanta

CHAP. V. and the heart of the South. But the first sight that greeted the eyes of Sherman was that the hill
Nov. 25, 1863. in front of him was held by the enemy with breastworks of logs and fresh earth, and that the high hills beyond swarmed with heavy masses of Confederates supporting formidable batteries. A great gorge lay between, where, although Sherman could not see them, his quick intelligence surmised the
Sherman, Report. W. R. Vol. XXXI., Part II., p. 574. presence of the Confederate reserves. The sun had risen before his preparations were completed and the bugles sounded forward. General J. M. Corse led the center along the ridge; M. L. Smith commanded the left, as he had done the day before, and J. M. Loomis the right, supported by two reserve brigades of J. E. Smith. General Howard had reported to Sherman early in the day with the Eleventh Corps, and had been posted on the left. Baird also, who had been feeling Chattanooga Creek early in the morning, was ordered to report to Sherman, and hurried to the left, only to be told that he was not needed, and returned to take his place between the point where Sherman's battle was going on and the left of T. J. Wood's division, which was standing under orders in front of Missionary Ridge.

There is but little to be said of the morning's work, except that both armies fought with the greatest possible gallantry and determination, without seriously damaging either side. From early noon until three o'clock, Sherman was expecting a coöperative movement on the part of Thomas, and as often as the imperative demands of the work before him gave him an instant of leisure, he looked
Ibid., p. 575. anxiously to his right for the opening of the battle

in that direction; but "an occasional shot," he says, "from Fort Wood and Orchard Knob, and some musketry-fire and artillery over about Lookout, was all that I could detect on our side; but about 3 P. M. I noticed the white line of musketry-fire in front of Orchard Knob, extending farther and farther right and left and on. We could only hear a faint echo of sound, but enough was seen to satisfy me that General Thomas was at last moving on the center." But night had fallen on his gallant but unavailing struggle before he heard of the exploit of the Army of the Cumberland, which will remain forever immortal in our annals. CHAP. V.

The short afternoon was rapidly waning. Grant and his principal generals were waiting upon Orchard Knob for news of such decisive success from Sherman as to justify the coöperating movement on the part of Thomas which had been ordered, and also for tidings that Hooker had descended from the slope of Lookout, and had made his expected attack on the left flank of the enemy at Rossville. But Sherman, as we have seen, had met with unexpected obstacles; and though the greater part of the Union army was under his orders, they had not been able to make head against the heavy masses of Confederate infantry, and the formidable works which he found springing up, as if by magic, in his path; while Hooker had also been detained several hours in the passage of Chattanooga Creek. But he had at length got his forces across that stream, and was even now, by a rapid and skillful movement on each side of the gap, driving the enemy from their works (the same, by the way, which Rose- Nov. 25, 1863.

CHAP. V. NOV., 1863.

crans had thrown up to defend his retreat from Chickamauga), and was striking the heavy blows which were soon to force the Confederate left in upon the center.

This, however, was not yet known to Grant, and the absence of tidings gave him some anxiety. At last, concluding that Hooker must from the nature of the case have already made his way to Rossville, he gave orders for Thomas's advance. Baird had by this time got into position on the left of Wood, and the Union line stretched in martial array from left to right in this order: Baird, Wood, and Sheridan, each with three brigades, and Johnson far on the right, his two brigades slightly refused.[1] They had stood there all day, like well-bred hounds straining at the leash, excited and restless at their apparent inaction, while the sound of furious battle, coming from the left, showed how their comrades were striving. At a distance varying from four to nine hundred yards in their front was the first line of the enemy's intrenchments; from there the slope of Missionary Ridge ran up nine hundred yards to the crest, bristling with batteries and protected by rifle-pits, while half way up this steep ascent was another imperfect line of works. Their orders were to take the first line of rifle-pits, there to halt and re-form. As firmly and steadily as if upon holiday drill this magnificent line of veterans passed through the intervening wood, and arriving at the open ground beyond broke into double-quick, and rushed at full speed

[1] The order of the brigades from left to right was as follows: Under Baird: Phelps, Vanderveer, Turchin; under Wood: Beatty, Wilich, Hazen; under Sheridan: Wagner, Harker, and Sherman; under Johnson: Stoughton and Carlin.

upon the Confederate intrenchments. Sheridan, who was in advance of his division, looked back at this serried line of waving and glittering steel behind him, and felt from that moment that nothing could withstand a rush of arms so terrible and imposing. CHAP. V.

The Confederates threw themselves flat in their trenches, and the Union troops rushed over and beyond them. A thousand prisoners were sent to the rear, crouching before the rain of metal their own batteries were flinging upon both armies from the crest. Here, according to orders, the whole force should have halted; but a spirit had been raised in that long line of brave men that no order could hold in check. The position was, in fact, untenable; the rifle-pits they had taken were commanded in every nook and corner by the blazing batteries above; to stay there was useless slaughter, to give way in the spirit that then animated the troops was impossible. One by one, without orders, the color-bearers rushed to the front and the men followed. Sheridan and others sent back for orders to take the crest; they came in such contradictory shape that a moment's confusion resulted. Wagner's brigade, with superb obedience, marched back to the rifle-pits and held their places for a little while with terrible loss; but the delay lasted only a few minutes. In the heat of valorous expectation, and a certain prescience of victory that spread over the whole line, the orders of the morning passed out of view; and the officers, from the commanders of corps to the last corporal, gave, by common consent, the word to go forward. Captain Avery came to Sheridan from Nov., 1863.

CHAP. V. Granger with permission to go to the crest, if he could do so. Sheridan asked the aide-de-camp for his flask, and raising it towards the crest of the ridge, where Bragg's headquarters were visible, he bowed and drank to his adversary with the frontier salutation, "How," and dashed forward with his men up the precipitous slope of the mountain.

This continent has never beheld a scene of such grandeur as that which followed. The whole army was swept forward by an irresistible impulse. In each brigade and regiment little attention was paid to lines of formation. The color-bearers sprang forward first, a few of the strongest men gathered immediately about them, and groups of soldiers, which a spectator describes as looking from a distance like inverted "V's," began climbing the mountain at every point. And yet so homogeneous was the spirit of daring and patriotism in every division that, taken as a whole, the entire mass went up the hill together. Several times, out of breath with the furious rush, they dropped panting upon the mountain-side for a moment's rest, and the enemy at the top of the hill thought they were repulsed; but still the blue line went up, gaining ground every moment, under the frightful fire of grape and canister from the batteries, and the incessant hail of musketry from the rifle-pits.

Bragg, Report.

The commanders on Orchard Knob watched the movement with intense concern. When the troops broke away from the enemy's first line of rifle-pits, Grant turned to Thomas and said: "By whose orders is this?" Thomas, who knew his

soldiers,[1] said, with his imperturbable smile: "By their own, I fancy"; but still, as the soldiers drew nearer and nearer to the summit, the anxiety increased every instant, and when at last the blue line reached the last range of rifle-pits near the crest, General W. F. Smith says that he turned away his face in the intolerable suspense, until the cheer that filled the whole valley with its echoes showed that the victory was won. The troops poured over the top of the ridge like the crest of a breaking wave, without firing a shot. They captured a large number of the rebels in the rifle-pits, driving the rest in panic across the narrow plateau, seizing the guns and turning their enfilading fire against their late owners. So sudden and so overwhelming was the rush, so ineffectual against the spirit of the Union soldiers had been the rain of fire and lead as they swept up the mountain-side, that no impulse of fight seemed to be left in the Confederates when they reached the summit. The labor of that strenuous climb up a slope of nearly one thousand yards must have exhausted the attacking force, so as to render them an easy prey to the fresh troops on the summit if they had shown any enterprise; but all accounts agree that, once up, they met with no resistance.[2]

[1] Baird says he was told by a staff officer of General Thomas, who brought him verbal orders to assault the mountain, that he would be following Thomas's wishes if he pushed on to the summit. We are also informed by General H. V. Boynton that he and other field officers were advised at the same time to leave their horses behind them, as the ground near the top of the ridge, in Baird's front, was impracticable to horsemen. Baird, Report. W. R. Vol. XXXI., Part II., p. 508.

[2] Colonel Wm. W. Berry, of the Fifth Kentucky, makes this remarkable statement: "The guns captured were immediately turned upon the enemy in General Sheridan's front. The rebel cannoneers good-naturedly assisted in this artillery practice." W. R. Vol. XXXI., Part II., p. 286.

CHAP. V.

General Bragg himself who, by some strange hallucination the moment before, had imagined the enemy repulsed, and who was riding along the crest swinging his hat in triumph and congratulating his troops, suddenly heard that Wood's men had broken the line behind him and were crowning the ridge. Thinking this but a local misfortune, he sent General Bate to repair it, and at the same moment he heard that his left had given way at the point where Sheridan, mounting his short person upon a captured cannon, to make himself seen, in the confusion, was ordering a hot pursuit of the flying enemy. Hardee, on the extreme Confederate right, still, and for some time afterwards, held his own with energy, as well against Sheridan as with the division of Baird, which, after gaining the crest, had wheeled to the north and attacked the rebel right; but, says General Bragg himself, "all to the left . . . was entirely routed and in rapid flight, nearly all the artillery having been shamefully abandoned by its infantry support. Every effort which could be made by myself and staff and by many other mounted officers availed but little. A panic which I had never before witnessed seemed to have seized upon officers and men, and each seemed to be struggling for his personal safety regardless of his duty or his character."

Whitelaw Reid, "Ohio in the War."

W. R. Vol. XXXI., Part II., p. 665.

Meanwhile General Hooker was advancing on the left. Osterhaus took the road to the east of the ridge, Geary that to the left, while Cruft pushed along the crest. After the first break at the gap little effective resistance was made. The three divisions pushed rapidly along, driving the

huddled Confederates before them till, reaching the scene of the greater battle, they rushed into the arms of R. W. Johnson's division of the Fourteenth Corps, and large numbers were captured. CHAP. V.

Seeing the victory won, General Grant spurred his horse from Orchard Knob and soon gained the crest intent upon pursuit; but even before his arrival the keen eye of Sheridan had marked in the valley below a crowd of fugitives with trains and artillery which excited his martial cupidity. He ordered Wagner and Harker to press the rear-guard and capture the trains if possible. They marched rapidly forward, gathering in many guns and wagons. A mile beyond the battlefield the road ran over a high and formidable ridge, upon which the enemy made a determined stand with a heavy force of infantry and several batteries. Sheridan, with Harker, Wagner, and Colonel Wood, in spite of the fatigue of his soldiers, here made another spirited attack, the men climbing and clinging to the face of the hill as they had done in the afternoon on Missionary Ridge. Holding the enemy in front, Sheridan sent a part of Harker's brigade to the right — and he pauses in his report at this point to draw an exquisite picture of a rare and beautiful scene — a nocturne in blue and silver. "But a few moments elapsed ere the Twenty-sixth Ohio and Fifteenth Indiana carried the crest. When the head of the column reached the summit of the hill the moon rose from behind, and a medallion view of the column was disclosed as it crossed the moon's disk and attacked the enemy, who, outflanked on the left and right, fled, leaving two pieces of artillery and many wagons." Nov. 25, 1863.

W. R. Vol. XXXI., Part II., p. 191.

CHAP. V. The enemy abandoned his position near the railroad tunnel in front of Sherman about mid-
Nov., 1863. night, and on the morning of the 26th Sherman advanced by way of Chickamauga Station, and Thomas's force under Hooker and Palmer moved out in pursuit on the Rossville road in the direction of Ringgold. At that point they found the enemy's rear-guard, under Cleburne, in a strong position, well defended by artillery, in a narrow gorge, and on the slopes of the hill on either side of it. A spirited action here took place, in which Hooker's column fought at a great disadvantage on account of his entire lack of artillery. When his guns came up, however, Hooker succeeded in dislodging Cleburne and continued the pursuit as far as Tunnel Hill, some twenty miles from Chattanooga, where Grant ordered it to cease. Howard's corps was sent forward to Red Clay to break up the railroad between Dalton and Cleveland, thus cutting off Bragg's communication with Longstreet. General Grant says it was only the imperative necessity of relieving Burnside which prevented him from pursuing the retreating enemy as long as he could find supplies in the country; but his last advice having been that Burnside
1863. could probably hold out no longer than the 3d of December, he called back his victorious columns from pursuit and ordered Sherman to take Gran-
W. R. Vol. XXXI., Part II., p. 35. ger's corps, and with that and his own to proceed immediately to the rescue of Knoxville.

So great a success was not to be obtained without serious loss. Only fifty-five minutes elapsed from the time the National soldiers left their positions until they poured over the crest of the ridge,

but every step of the way cost valuable lives. In this charge and in the smaller engagements Sheridan lost 1346, of whom 121 were officers; Wood 1035, of whom 72 bore commissions; Johnson on the right had the easiest task, though he lost 304; and Baird, who was favored by the ground in front of him, lost 566, including 39 officers, among whom was the gallant Colonel Edward H. Phelps, commanding the brigade on the extreme left of the line, who fell in the moment of victory after the heights were gained. The Union loss in the battle of Chattanooga aggregated 753 killed, 4722 wounded, and 349 captured or missing: a total of 5824. The enemy's loss in killed and wounded was far less, as he fought almost entirely behind intrenchments; General Bragg in his official report is prevented by his grief and disgust from entering into details. He admits a large loss of prisoners and stragglers, and of forty guns. Grant reported the capture of 6142 prisoners, 239 of whom were commissioned officers. Bragg's losses at Chattanooga were 361 killed, 2180 wounded, 4146 captured or missing: in all 6687. The disparity in numbers engaged was not so great as Bragg claims, and such as it was he had only himself, or Mr. Davis, to thank for it. Grant had about 60,000 men, and Bragg some 20,000 less; if the latter had had on Missionary Ridge the force which Longstreet took off on his wild-goose chase to Knoxville, he would have had superior numbers as well as his vast advantage of position. Grant always thought that the sudden disappearance of Sherman's army, behind the hills north of Chattanooga, deluded Bragg into the be-

CHAP. V.

Nov., 1863.

W. R. Vol. XXXI., Part II., pp. 80, 88.

Ibid., p. 36.

CHAP. V.

lief that Sherman had gone on to the help of Burnside and that his feeble and irresolute tactics had their rise in that impression.

Bragg, when he made his official report, five days after the battle, was still suffering an agony of rage and shame. He spoke frankly of "the panic," and "the shameful conduct" of his troops. "The position," he says, "was one which ought to have been held by a line of skirmishers against any assaulting column, and wherever resistance was made the enemy fled in disorder after suffering heavy loss. Those who reached the ridge did so in a condition of exhaustion, from the great physical exertion in climbing, which rendered them powerless, and the slightest effort would have destroyed them. . . Had all parts of the line been maintained with equal gallantry and persistence, no enemy could ever have dislodged us." He had but one explanation[1] to give for a "disaster and disgrace" otherwise inexplicable, and that is wholly insufficient. He says his troops "had for two days confronted the enemy, marshaling his immense forces in plain view, and exhibiting to their sight such a superiority in numbers as may have intimidated weak minds and untried soldiers; but our veterans had so often encountered similar hosts, when the strength of position was against us, and with perfect success, that not a doubt crossed my mind."

W. R. Vol. XXXI., Part II., p. 666.

Ibid.

There is nothing so potent or so inexplicable as that mysterious essence called the morale of

[1] In later years his accusations took on darker tones. In the letter to Sykes, previously quoted, he attributes his defeat to treason and drunkenness among his leading officers.

an army. The spirit which informed the Army of the Cumberland on the afternoon of the 25th of November, and which rendered it impossible for its generals to hold it back, made it irresistible. Officers and men were swept up the rugged face of the mountain as if by some divine fury of purpose. They faced the fiery rain of death as if it had been a summer shower, though the Fourth Corps was twice decimated before it reached the summit.[1] General Bragg was too severe on his soldiers. They did all they could be asked to do; they shot one in five of their assailants in that few minutes' breathless rush. They were beaten, and they felt it instinctively; they were barely holding their own on their right against Sherman's heavy battalions; Hooker, they knew, had defeated them on the left and was even now thundering upon their flank; and when they saw Thomas's splendid army swarming upon them from the plain, and apparently caring no more for their deadliest volleys than if they were snow-flakes, it is no wonder that their hearts failed, and that they gave up the fight, when the Army of the Cumberland poured over their trenches.

1 "My command lost 20.21 per cent. of the force engaged in killed and wounded."—Granger, Report. W.R. Vol. XXXI., Pt. II., p. 134.

CHAPTER VI

BURNSIDE IN TENNESSEE

CHAP. VI. WE have mentioned in other chapters the intense and incessant anxiety with which Mr. Lincoln had endeavored, ever since the war began, to extend relief to the loyal and suffering population of East Tennessee. He had lavished orders, persuasions, and entreaties upon every succeeding general who commanded in that region, to take possession of its important strategic points. He had repeatedly urged upon Congress the construction of roads to render it accessible to our armies. Every consideration, military and political, united in urging the immediate and permanent occupation of East Tennessee. The strategic position was of the utmost importance; the great food-producing regions of Kentucky and Tennessee were the source of a great part of the Confederate supplies. The expeditions of Bragg, of Buckner, and of Kirby Smith into Kentucky showed the vast importance the Confederates attached to the retention or even the intermittent possession of those rich fields from which they drew their principal supplies of horses, of cattle, and of grain. In the flanks of these mountains also lay the great niter-beds upon which the Confederates relied in their manufacture of gun-

powder. Their most rapid and useful line of communication between Virginia and the West was by the railway which ran through the valley between the Great Smoky and the Cumberland Mountains. With the Union armies once safely in possession of Knoxville, the Rebellion must inevitably perish sooner or later, to use Mr. Lincoln's vivid phrase, "like an animal with a thorn in its vitals."

W. R., Vol. XXX., Part I., p. 148.

But even more strongly than these material advantages did the moral claims of the East Tennesseeans weigh with the President. No section of the country had deserved more at the hands of the republic than those harried and persecuted loyalists throughout the great mountain regions of West Virginia, Western North Carolina, and East Tennessee. Slavery had from the beginning gained there but a slight foothold and a feeble influence, so that the spirit of freedom and patriotism, which is so frequently characteristic of mountaineers, flourished unimpeded by the noxious influence of a society based upon human bondage. From the opening of the war this brave and stalwart people had been true to the Union. As long as they were allowed the privilege of voting they gave overwhelming majorities against secession;[1] and after the State had been fraudulently declared out of the Union, and all its principal towns occupied by rebel troops, the loyalists yet stoutly stood by the old

[1] For separation and representation at Richmond, East Tennessee gave 14,700 votes, and half of that number were rebel troops, having no authority under the constitution to vote at any election. Against separation and representation, the straight-out Union vote of East Tennessee gave 33,000, 18,300 majority with at least 5000 quiet citizens deterred from coming out by threats of violence and by the presence of troops at the polls to insult them. — "Parson Brownlow's Book," p. 222.

1861.

CHAP. VI.

flag, resisting the exactions of rebel officers to the utmost of their ability; and when at last, through want of arms and organization, their attitude of passive resistance became impossible at home, they fled by night in groups of twos and threes, at the risk of their lives, over the rugged heights and through the laurel thickets of the Cumberland Mountains, running the risk of death by exposure to the shots of rebel pickets, to enlist at the first camp of Union soldiers which they could find in Kentucky. Many of those who remained at home met with a more dreadful fate than any which soldiers confronted on the field of battle. Their attitude of silent protest against rebel usurpation was treated as treason; they were cast by hundreds into overcrowded and fetid prisons; and on the mere suspicion of bridge-burning large numbers of them were summarily put to death; and according to the brutal order of Mr. Benjamin, the rebel Secretary of War, the bodies of those patriots were "left hanging in the vicinity of the burnt bridges."

Benjamin to Wood, Nov. 25, 1861. See page 78, Vol. V. of this work.

The tale of these sufferings came constantly to Mr. Lincoln, and there was nothing in the war which caused him sharper pain or excited in him a more ardent desire for redress. The loyalists of Tennessee were ably represented in Washington, at first by Andrew Johnson in the Senate, and afterwards by Horace Maynard and others in the House of Representatives. They considered it their duty to give the Government no peace in reference to the sufferings of their fellow-citizens; and the President, striving with all his energies to relieve them, found for two years his efforts so unavailing that the sight of an East Tennesseean at last came to



GENERAL SIMON B. BUCKNER.

give him the keenest distress. When, finally, he had been enabled to overcome the inertia of Rosecrans, and had got his army as far as Tullahoma on the march to Chattanooga, and was even then urging Burnside in the most peremptory terms to march the Army of the Ohio into East Tennessee to support the movement of Rosecrans, his impatience and anxiety were such that he declined to meet a delegation of East Tennesseeans who had come to urge upon the Government some action in their favor; but he wrote them this letter, which shows the painful strain he was enduring: CHAP. VI. Aug., 1863.

"The petition of which you were the bearers, has just been handed me. Your cards and notes had come to me on two or three successive days before; and I knew then as well as I do now, after reading the petition, what your mission was. I knew it was the same true and painful story which Governor Johnson, Mr. Maynard, Dr. Clements, and others have been telling me for more than two years. I also knew that meeting you could do no good, because I have all the while done, and shall continue to do, the best for you I could and can. I do as much for East Tennessee as I would or could if my own home and family were in Knoxville. The difficulties of getting a Union army into that region, and of keeping it there, are so apparent — so obvious — that none can fail to see them, unless it may be those who are driven mad and blind by their sufferings. Start by whatever route they may, their lines of supply are broken before they get half way. A small force sufficient to beat the enemy now there would be of no value, because the enemy would reënforce to meet them, until we

CHAP. VI.

should have to give back, or accumulate so large a force as to be very difficult to supply, and as to ruin us entirely if a great disaster should befall it. I know you are too much distressed to be argued with, and therefore I do not attempt it at length. You know I am not indifferent to your troubles, else I should not, more than a year and a half ago, have made the effort I did to have a railroad built on purpose to relieve you. The Secretary of War, General Halleck, General Burnside, and General Rosecrans are all engaged now in an effort to relieve your section. But, remember, you will probably thwart them if you make this public."

Lincoln to Fleming and Morrow, Aug. 9, 1863. MS.

Relief and redress were this time really on the way. The dispatch by Burnside of the Ninth Corps to the assistance of Grant at Vicksburg had for a long time delayed his march to the South, but at last, without waiting for General Parke's return, Burnside started from Camp Nelson in Kentucky on the 16th of August. Buckner, with a large force, awaited him, expecting that he would come by the easiest and most direct way, through Cumberland Gap; but Burnside chose, instead, to move by the right directly over the mountains. His progress was entirely unopposed. He concentrated his forces at Crab Orchard, and on the 21st of August began his march, with General S. P. Carter in the advance. He marched through Mount Vernon, Loudon, and Williamsburg, where he was detained for a day by torrents of rain. On the 26th he passed the State line into Tennessee, where he was joined by General G. L. Hartsuff's command; after two days' rest they pushed forward again, and in two rapid marches reached Montgomery in Morgan County,

1863.

Tennessee. On the 1st of September, Burnside, with his escort, entered Kingston, on the Tennessee River, and about the same time his advance took possession of Knoxville without resistance, the strategic march of Rosecrans upon Bragg's left flank having by this time caused the recall of Buckner to take part in the battle which was preparing on the banks of Chickamauga Creek.

Burnside's force, advancing from Kingston to Loudon, arrived just in time to witness the withdrawal of the rear guard of the enemy and the destruction of the great bridge of the East Tennessee and Georgia Railroad over the Holston River. Following his cavalry advance which arrived on the 2d, he entered Knoxville on the 4th of September, amid the joyous acclamations of the people who had waited, with the sickness of hope deferred, for more than two years for the great deliverance. He could hardly make his way through the streets for the crowds of delighted citizens of all colors and ages who thronged about him shouting their welcome and cheering the flag. General Carter, who was a native of East Tennessee, was everywhere stopped and forced to address the people. Burnside, who had no inclination for public speaking, was at last compelled to say a few words. He acquitted himself of the task with dignity and earnestness, saying it had been his fervent wish from the moment he took command of the Army of Ohio to lead them into Tennessee to the deliverance of the loyal people there, and he assured them that he had come with means sufficient, with their assistance, to hold the country permanently and securely. When the flag was unfurled from the balcony of the house

CHAP. VI. where he had made his headquarters, the crowd rushed forward, covering it with kisses; and the citizens, seizing upon the soldiers and officers without distinction of rank, carried them off to their houses to enjoy a warm welcome with what entertainment the disasters of war had still left them. It was not at army headquarters alone that the red white and blue standard was seen and honored. The flags which had been kept in concealment for so many months were now everywhere thrown to the breeze, and the town became radiant with the national colors.

The immediate duty of Burnside was, of course, to place himself instantly in connection with Rosecrans. He should have done this even had he had no orders, but in reality his orders were of the most stringent character. Halleck had ordered him to connect with Rosecrans on the 11th of
1863. September, and as soon as he had become aware of Rosecrans's peril in McLemore's Cove, he directed him on the 13th to "move down his infantry as
W. R. Vol. XXX., Part III., p. 617. rapidly as possible towards Chattanooga to connect with Rosecrans," and the next day said: "There are reasons why you should reënforce General Rosecrans with all possible dispatch. It is believed that the enemy will concentrate to give him
Ibid., 638. battle. You must be there to help him." Burnside, however, seemed unaware of the necessities of the case.[1] He had felt on the 10th of September as if the war were virtually over and his work

Dana to Stanton, Nov. 21. W. R. Vol. XXXI., Part I., p. 261.

[1] He had been at first misled by a dispatch which Crittenden, by Rosecrans's direction, had sent him when Chattanooga was evacuated; it indicated the flight of the enemy and a hot pursuit by Rosecrans, and made Burnside, who was naturally sanguine, believe that Rosecrans needed no assistance from him.

done; and he tendered his resignation by telegraph on that day, feeling that he could now conscientiously ask to be allowed to resign. "I look upon East Tennessee," he said, "as one of the most loyal sections of the United States." The President responded with a thousand thanks; but said, "We cannot allow you to resign until things shall be a little more settled in East Tennessee." He was then at Cumberland Gap, where he had the day before received the surrender of General J. W. Frazer, who with some two thousand troops had lingered too long in that gateway of the mountains, and had been taken by an attack of J. M. Shackleford in the rear. During the next ten days, while Bragg was preparing to crush Rosecrans's army, and the latter was straining every nerve to concentrate his own scattered forces, now exposed to such peril, Burnside, nothwithstanding all the orders that could be sent to him from Washington, seemed to feel no obligation resting upon him to make any especial haste for the relief of Rosecrans. From his own point of view, indeed, he was losing no time. He filled East Tennessee with desultory activity, and answered every injunction from Washington with cheerful acquiescence, saying that he would proceed at once to the assistance of Rosecrans; but he took his own time about it; his cavalry was scouring the country in every direction, skirmishing as far as Blountsville in the extreme northeastern corner of the State. So late as the 23d, the third day after Chickamauga, he telegraphed the President from Carter's Station, giving a cheerful view of the situation, saying he should go to Knoxville very soon, and though the news from Rosecrans was

CHAP. VI.

W. R. Vol. XXX., Part III., p. 523.

Lincoln to Burnside, Sept. 11, 1863. Ibid., p. 55.

Sept., 1863.

CHAP. VI.

rather discouraging, he sincerely hoped and believed he would be able to hold his position. He gave particulars of bridges over the Holston, and intimated that if it had not been for the President's orders he might have accomplished some very important work within forty-eight hours.

On receipt of this, the President sat down in the War Department, his patience giving way, and wrote a stinging dispatch acknowledging receipt of Burnside's, and saying: "It makes me doubt whether I am awake or dreaming. I have been struggling for ten days, first through General Halleck, and then directly, to get you to go to assist General Rosecrans in an extremity, and you have repeatedly declared you would do it, and yet you steadily moved the contrary way." He enumerates Burnside's dispatches, acknowledging receipt of orders and promising to hurry troops to Rosecrans, adding, "and now your dispatch of the 23d comes in from Carter's Station, still farther away from Rosecrans, still saying you will assist him, but giving no account of any progress made towards assisting him." The President's chiding continued for some time in this vein; but, as he wrote, his habitual gentleness and moderation of spirit came back to him, as frequently happened in such cases; and, having finished his dispatch he folded and indorsed it, "Not sent." But later he sent him a telegram directing him to hold his present position and send Rosecrans what he could spare in the quickest and safest way. "In the mean time," he said, "hold the remainder as nearly in readiness to go to him as you can, consistent with the duty it is to perform while it remains. East Tennessee can be no more

Lincoln to Burnside, Sept. 25. MS.

than temporarily lost so long as Chattanooga is firmly held."

Lincoln to Burnside, Sept. 27, 1863. W. R. Vol. XXX., Part III., p. 905.

Meanwhile the mere thought that Burnside's troops were to be sent to Rosecrans drove the loyal Tennesseeans wild. Mr. Maynard wrote from Nashville: "Can it be possible that after taking so easy and so complete possession of that country as we have done, it is to be abandoned for the sake of a few thousand soldiers more or less numerous than we have ourselves furnished and put into the field? Remember that Chattanooga, though politically in Tennessee, is geographically in Georgia, and while it is vitally important to hold it, it is also vitally important not to abandon East Tennessee. In behalf of East Tennessee we promised you: first, that your army should go in without serious opposition; second, that the people would receive the troops with welcome; third, that the country would furnish supplies in abundance for the army. All this has been fulfilled, and I beg we may no longer be made to suffer by the incredulity of generals-in-chief."

Sept. 28.

In the end, Burnside did not go to Chattanooga. His favorite Ninth Corps joined him on the 1st of October, and he established himself firmly in Knoxville. His position there greatly troubled the Confederate authorities, and when Jefferson Davis visited the Confederate armies in the West it was resolved to send a formidable expedition to dislodge or destroy Burnside.

1863.

It is a singular fact that on the very day of Mr. Davis's visit to Bragg, when the detachment of Longstreet was probably resolved upon, the Government ceased urging Burnside to hurry to Chat-



MAP OF THE KNOXVILLE CAMPAIGN.

tanooga, and President Lincoln himself sent a telegram to Rosecrans, referred to in another place, explaining how Burnside could not go to him without surrendering East Tennessee, and making the remarkable prophecy of Longstreet's detachment. The East Tennesseeans were, however, greatly concerned, under the apprehension that Burnside would be sent away from Knoxville; and two prominent Union men of that place sent on the 13th of October this passionate appeal to the President: "In the name of Christianity and humanity; in the name of God and liberty; for the sake of their wives and children and everything they hold sacred and dear on earth, the loyal people of Tennessee appeal to you and implore you not to abandon them again to the merciless dominion of the rebels by the withdrawal of the Union forces from East Tennessee." The President answered them on the 17th of October, saying, "You do not estimate the holding of East Tennessee more highly than I do. There is no absolute purpose of withdrawing our forces from it, and only a contingent one to withdraw them temporarily for the purpose of not losing the position permanently. I am in great hope of not finding it necessary to withdraw them at all, particularly if you raise new troops rapidly for us there."

Lincoln to Rosecrans, Oct. 12, 1863. See also Chapter on Chickamauga.

1863.

Lincoln to John Williams and N. G. Taylor. MS.

This work of raising new troops was going on with great rapidity and success, considering how many of the more adventurous Union men had already crossed the Cumberland Mountains to join the National army. Burnside reported to the President that he had already 3000 in the three years service, and half armed about 2500

CHAP. VI. Home Guards. Many more recruits could have been had for the three years service but for the want of clothing and camp equipage. The difficulty of transportation was in fact the main trouble Burnside had to contend with. Congress had not authorized the building of the road which President Lincoln had so earnestly urged upon it, and the hauling of supplies from Kentucky by the mountain roads was a most difficult and toilsome proceeding. Burnside's command was from the beginning placed upon half rations of everything but fresh beef, and the half ration was afterwards cut in two. There were almost no small stores except sugar and coffee; but the command was reported by Burnside as "remarkably happy and willing, and ready for any ordinary emergency." Throughout
1863. the month of October the country supplied an abundance of forage, although there was some suffering for the want of food and clothing and horse-shoes. Burnside went cheerily ahead, surveying the railroad from Kingston to the mouth of the Big South Fork of the Cumberland, the head of navigation of that river. A road was at the same time building from Kentucky down to that place to supply the army in winter. So much at ease did Burnside feel in regard to the position of the army that on the 22d of October he again tendered his resignation. But a situation of the gravest peril was at that moment being prepared for him.

1863. On the 3d of November, Longstreet, being summoned to headquarters, received the orders detaching him from Bragg's army to lead an expedition against Burnside. He took with him Mc-

Laws's and Hood's divisions, two artillery battalions, and Wheeler's cavalry. He was directed to move as fast as possible, and warned that the success of his plan depended upon rapid movements and sudden blows. Driving Burnside out of East Tennessee was the least of the objects proposed to him; it was hoped that he might do better than this, capture or destroy him. Major-General Samuel Jones was at the same time urged to press Burnside from East Tennessee. Longstreet got away promptly next day, but in ten days moved no farther than Sweetwater. With a doubt and indecision singular in his firm and resolute character, he repeatedly begged for further reënforcements. With a command already double that of his enemy, not counting the force which General Jones commanded in the Northeast, he still insisted on another division being sent him. He went so far as to say to Bragg that he thought he greatly over-estimated the enemy's force at and around Chattanooga. "I have seen the force," he says, "every day for the time it has been here, and I cannot think it exceeds your force without Stevenson's division," which he, therefore, urgently asked for; but this demand was very properly refused by Bragg, and Longstreet started with the force he had. Late in the campaign, Bragg foolishly yielded, and sent him two additional brigades from Buckner's force.

Bragg to Longstreet, Nov. 4, 1863. Badeau, "Military History of U. S. Grant." Vol. I., p. 678.

Ibid., p. 461.

While Longstreet was thus making his leisurely march from the Southeast, Jones, on the opposite side of Knoxville, made a spirited dash upon one of Burnside's outposts at Rogersville, capturing the force stationed there. Burnside, on the 12th of November, explaining this mishap, said it was

CHAP. VI. impossible to be sufficiently watchful to prevent trouble while so many points were assailable. He was then trying to occupy the line from Washington on the Tennessee River to the Watauga, and he was holding as far east as Bull's Gap, scouting to Greenville and picketing the Tennessee River from Washington to Kingston, his main force being stationed along the line from Kingston to Knoxville. His command, he said, was still in good health and spirits, though short of everything. By running the flour-mills in his possession he could keep five days' supply of flour on hand, and he had always plenty of beef cattle and salt; and though "threatened," as he said, "by a considerable force of the enemy on each flank, . . . had no serious apprehension of immediate trouble." With courage and purpose, undisturbed by the undeniable dangers surrounding him, he said this was certainly not the proper time to evacuate the country; and although he heard the report of Longstreet's force between Sweetwater and Loudon, he said, with almost boyish confidence, "General Grant will take care of this." One of the most remarkable incidents of all these campaigns was that while the Administration in Washington and General Grant in Chattanooga were filled with the keenest anxiety and alarm with regard to Burnside — fearing, on the one hand, that he might be captured or destroyed by a sudden dash of the enemy, or that he might lack heart for the defense of the place and retreat to Cumberland Gap — he himself felt no apprehensions as to his fate, and had no purpose to desert the post confided to his care. Whatever may have been his faults and deficiencies as a

Badeau, "Military History of U. S. Grant." Vol. I., p. 473.

1863.

general, a lack of resolution or a distaste for fighting could never be reckoned among them. CHAP. VI.

As soon as Longstreet's advance arrived at Loudon on the Tennessee, Burnside sent a dispatch to Grant proposing, by gradually retiring from that point, to draw Longstreet further and further away from Chattanooga, wisely thinking that in this way he could best assist the plans of Grant against Bragg. Grant was greatly relieved by this suggestion, not only from the practical assistance it would give himself, but also because it was an indication of Burnside's confidence in his own power to resist the formidable onslaught of Longstreet. Grant telegraphed him on the 14th, urging him to hold Longstreet in check, then to skirmish and fall back, avoiding serious loss to himself; and that in that case Grant would be able to place a force between Longstreet and Bragg that would inevitably drive the former to the mountain passes; and the next day he telegraphed him again a dispatch which is a model of earnest and energetic instruction, directing him to hold on to Knoxville and that portion of the valley immediately depending upon it. He said: "Should Longstreet move his whole force across the Little Tennessee River, an effort should be made to cut his pontoons on the stream, even if it sacrificed half the cavalry of the Ohio Army. . . I can hardly conceive the necessity of retreating from East Tennessee. If I did so at all, it would be after losing most of the army. I will not attempt to lay out a line of retreat. I would harass and embarrass progress in every way possible, reflecting on the fact that the Army of the Ohio is not the

Badeau, "Military History of U. S. Grant." Vol. I., p. 473.

Nov., 1863.

Ibid., p. 474.

Ibid., p. 475.

CHAP. VI. only army to resist the onward progress of the enemy." In this strain he continued for several days his stringent and encouraging dispatches.

Burnside carried out these orders, which, to do him justice, he had himself suggested, with great energy and spirit. He withdrew from Loudon on
NOV., 1863. the morning of the 15th, and fell back, marching in the direction of Knoxville. Longstreet after crossing pushed forward with great energy, and tried to reach Campbell's Station before Burnside to cut off the national force from Knoxville. Burnside was, however, warned in time, and by a rapid march reached the Station first. He had only about five thousand troops, and with these he carried on a spirited fight of several hours against double that number of Confederates; and having checked the enemy long enough to save his trains, he renewed his movement on Knoxville, where he arrived by a night march, Longstreet following the next day. Burnside was so little impressed by the strength of Longstreet's attack that he telegraphed to the President that he thought there was a chance that Longstreet might be simply covering a movement into Kentucky; but this fancy was rapidly dispelled. Longstreet at once began to invest Knoxville, though the investment was never made complete. The town had been thoroughly fortified, a line of defense extending from the Holston River on the left, a double line of works fronting west, a strong work called Fort Sanders at the northwest salient, and a line which continued from there across the railroad and again to the right as far as the river. The south side of the Holston was defended also by de-

tached works connected with the town by a pontoon bridge. CHAP. VI.

Burnside had about twelve thousand effective men, which number was swelled by a partially organized force of loyal Tennesseeans. Longstreet sat down before the place with over 15,000 veteran troops, exclusive of his cavalry, a number which was afterwards increased to some 23,000. His superiority in force was, however, never sufficient to enable him to invest the place completely. Burnside still continued to hold partial communication with the country outside, and although before the end of the siege the ration was greatly reduced, and forage became so scarce that superfluous animals were killed and thrown into the river to get rid of them, the garrison was never really driven to extremities. Loyal farmers floated down all sorts of needed supplies in rafts on the river, which were caught by booms at the town, and the same device was used to stop the progress of the heavy rafts sent down by the Confederates in the hope of breaking the pontoon bridges.

There was a considerable time during which no news came from Burnside. At his request General Foster had been sent to relieve him; but, having only a small force with him, Foster was unable to get farther than Cumberland Gap; and thence he sent from day to day such news as came to him of the progress of the siege, which amounted to very little, except that his scouts coming in reported heavy firing in the direction of Knoxville. On the receipt of one of these messages, on the night of November 23d, President 1863.


MAP OF THE
APPROACHES AND DEFENSES
OF
KNOXVILLE, TENN.
Showing the Positions occupied by the
UNITED STATES & CONFEDERATE FORCES
DURING THE SIEGE
Surveyed by direction of
Capt. O. M. POE, Chief Engr. Dept. of the Ohio.
during Dec., Jan.ª & Feb.
1863-4.
By
Cleveland Rockwell, &
R. H. Talcott, U.S. Coast Survey.
To Clinton
EAST TENNESSEE & GEORGIA
Third Creek
To Loudon
Kingston
Confederate Ferry
Gaudens
BATT. HELLMAN
SANDERS
FORT
BYINGTON
BRAT. NOBLE
HOLSTON
HIGHTS

To Rutledge
EAST
KNOXVILLE
Ponton Bridge
RIVER
FORT HILL
To Sevierville
Union Positions
Confederate Positions
Union Picket Lines captured by the Confederates
Statute Mile
Scale of Yards

CHAP. VI. Lincoln, who had waited all day with some anxiety for news from Knoxville, expressed his satisfaction. When asked by his secretary what cause of congratulation he could find in a bit of news of so little significance, he replied with one of his characteristic apologues: "A neighbor of mine in Menard County, named Sally Ward, had a large family of children that she took very little care of. Whenever she heard one of them yelling in some out-of-the-way place she would say, 'Thank the Lord! there 's one of my young ones not dead yet.'" So long as there was "firing in the direction of Knoxville," Burnside was not captured.

J. H., Diary.

At last Grant made his move upon the enemy; Hooker fought his way through the clouds on Lookout Mountain; Sherman held Bragg's right arm as in a vise at the tunnel; and Thomas's soldiers broke like a thunderbolt through the Confederate center at Missionary Ridge. Grant, riding in pursuit of the broken enemy, spent but one day in this occupation, and instantly ordered Sherman, with his own and Howard's corps, to march to the rescue of Burnside. They made all possible haste on the way; but, swiftly as they marched, the news of the Confederate disaster on Missionary Ridge reached Longstreet before them. He at once determined to wait no longer, but to attempt, at least, to carry Knoxville by assault. This resolution was taken against the protest of his generals, who advised returning to Virginia; but Longstreet argued, "It is a great mistake in supposing there is any safety for us in going to Virginia if General Bragg has been defeated, for we leave him at the mercy of his victors; and with his army destroyed, our own had

better be also, for we must not only be destroyed but disgraced."

Badeau, "Military History of U. S. Grant." Vol. I., p. 539.

He therefore advanced his line of sharp-shooters on the night of the 28th to within rifle range of the national defenses, and made ready a heavy column to assault Fort Sanders on the northwest side of Burnside's line, which was the strongest point of the National works, but, if taken, rendered the capture of the city an easy task. The defenders of the place became aware of his purpose by the capture of pickets, and made their preparations to resist. At dawn on the 29th Long- Nov., 1863. street began a furious artillery fire, to which no reply was made from the fort; and after about half an hour the Confederate column, which had been concentrated during the night, charged on the bastion. The space in front of the fort had been carefully prepared with abatis and entanglements of wire; many of the Confederates fell over these obstacles and produced a momentary confusion; but the heavy mass behind them pushed resolutely forward, and soon gained the ditch and the parapet. It was a repetition, with exchanged flags, of the slaughter of Fort Wagner. The National guns, which had remained inexplicably silent up to this moment, opened upon the rebels with triple charges of canister; the infantry suddenly appeared, shooting down the defenseless Confederates on the glacis and in the ditch, bayoneting or clubbing back with their muskets every head that appeared above the parapet. Only one of the assailants got over the parapet alive; the ditch was filled with the dead and wounded, and the glacis was thickly sprinkled with them.



CHAP. VI. Longstreet lost in this assault a thousand men; the casualties on the Union side were insignificant; Burnside reports only thirteen killed and wounded. There were only 220 men and 11 guns actually engaged in this brilliant defense, against four brigades of Longstreet. Lieutenant Samuel N. Benjamin, commanding a light battery of the Second United States Artillery, inspired and directed the defense of the fort. Immediately after the repulse, while his broken columns were coming shattered and bleeding back to his lines, Longstreet received a dispatch from Jefferson Davis announcing the disaster of Chattanooga, and directing him to put himself in immediate communication with Bragg; but learning soon after, by means of a dispatch which Grant had contrived should fall into his

Badeau, "Military History of U. S. Grant." Vol. I., p. 542.

hands, that heavy reënforcements were on the way to Burnside, he saw that it was impossible to form a junction with Bragg. He therefore recalled his trains, which were already in motion for Loudon; and, resolving on the 2d of December to abandon the siege, he put his trains in motion on the 3d; and on the night of the 4th he passed around the north side of Knoxville and took up his line of march to the Holston.

1863.

When Sherman was turned back by Grant from the pursuit of Bragg he imagined that he was only required to protect the right flank of Granger during the first stage of his march to Knoxville; but on arriving at Charleston he was surprised to find a dispatch from Grant, directing him to take command of Granger's corps, and with whatever force he deemed necessary from his own command to push forward with the utmost haste to Burnside's relief. "Seven days before," he says, "we had left our camps on the other side of the Tennessee with two days' rations, without a change of clothing, stripped for the fight, with but a single blanket or coat per man, from myself to the private included." He had no provisions except such as could be gathered by the road, and was, in all respects, ill-supplied for such a march; but without protest or complaint he pushed his column forward with such celerity as to cause the various detachments of the enemy who were guarding the road to fall back in haste without, in any case, effecting the complete destruction of their stores; so that Sherman's advancing army lived, in great part, on the provisions deserted by these Confederate detachments. At Loudon he divided his force into three armies,

Sherman, Report. Moore, "Rebellion Record." Vol. VIII., p. 203.

CHAP. VI.

Howard, Report. Committee on Conduct of the War, 1865-66. Supplement, Vol I., p. 154.

Frank P. Blair, Jr., commanding the right wing, Granger the center, and Howard the left. The different commanders were to act independently and on the defensive, marching to the support of each other at the sound of the guns.

The bridge at Loudon over the Holston River having been destroyed, the army was compelled to move east on the south side of the river, and the principal obstacle in their way was the Little Tennessee, which flows into the Holston between Loudon and Knoxville. Sherman had hoped to ford this river at Morgantown, but it was found too deep, and the water was freezing. With the assistance of General J. H. Wilson a bridge was hastily improvised of cut wood and square trestles made from the houses of Morgantown, and the Fifteenth Corps crossed at that point. Howard, who had captured a large number of wagons from the Confederates at Loudon, brought them along with him, and made a bridge of them at Davis's Ford, on which he passed his force. A new and welcome experience of this march was that the army everywhere received willing assistance from the population. General Howard says, "Along the entire route . . . we were cheered by the most lively demonstrations of loyalty on the part of the inhabitants. . . A man who had been a major in the rebel service and resigned came to me, and without laying any claim to loyalty, stated that he had drifted with the current, but since our recent victory was satisfied that Tennessee would resume her place in the Union. He gave me information so accurate that I was able to sketch the works at Knoxville and the enemy's position."

Ibid.

He records in another place a touching instance of the loyalty of the Tennesseeans. Many of his troops had worn out their shoes in their long march, and were tramping barefoot over the frozen ground. He saw citizens, meeting them, sit down on the ground, take off their own shoes and give them to the soldiers.

"National Tribune." Oct. 9, 1884.

Straining every nerve to reach and rescue their comrades at Knoxville, whom they considered in such extremity, firing their artillery with wasteful liberality whenever a Confederate uniform came in sight, for the purpose of advertising their advance to Burnside — all the heads of columns communicated at Marysville on the night of the 5th, where General Sherman met an officer of Burnside's staff, who announced that Longstreet had raised the siege and retreated in the direction of Virginia. Sherman at once wrote to Burnside announcing his arrival, and saying he could bring 25,000 men into Knoxville, but, "Longstreet having retreated," he adds, "I feel disposed to stop, for a stern chase is a long one."

Dec., 1863. Sherman, Report. Moore, "Rebellion Record." Vol. VIII., p. 204.

Badeau, "Military History of U. S. Grant." Vol. I., pp. 543, 544.

Leaving his own troops, and accompanied only by Granger's corps, he rode into Knoxville, and was greeted by Burnside with the warmest and most courteous welcome, but with a serenity which somewhat surprised Sherman, who had expected to find the garrison at the point of starvation. His astonishment was increased on viewing the pens of fat cattle by the river side and reached its height when he sat down at the hospitable table of Burnside — a born Amphitryon, who, if he were cast ashore on a coral reef, would have asked his shipwrecked comrades to dine with him the next day

CHAP. VI. on whatever the atoll afforded — and partook of the best dinner he had had for a year. The two generals visited together the lines about Knoxville, passing in review the works which Burnside had so gallantly defended and the vastly more extensive and formidable fortifications with which Longstreet had attempted to invest the town. The officers at Knoxville, who had expected a much less massive reënforcement, looked with some wonder at the three armies which Sherman had brought them, which they regarded as entirely disproportionate to the service required; as one said, "it was like using the foot of an elephant to crush a gnat." Burnside at once assured Sherman that he required but a small portion of the forces to drive Longstreet out of Tennessee, and with that unselfish generosity which formed the most distinguished trait of his character, and which won for him the continual devotion of his friends and the love and appreciation of his fellow-citizens in spite of all errors and mistakes throughout his conspicuous public career, he gave Sherman a letter, thanking him in the heartiest terms for the great assistance his army had rendered, to which he unreservedly attributed the raising of the siege, and advised him to return at once, with all the troops except those commanded by Granger, to within supporting distance of the force in front of Bragg's army.

There is no reason to doubt that General Sherman coincided with this view of Burnside; it is certain that Granger deeply injured himself in the estimation both of Sherman and Grant by bitterly protesting against it. There is nothing to show that at the moment General Grant

did not himself agree in the wisdom of the course suggested by Burnside and pursued by Sherman; yet later, when it was shown to have been a mistake, Grant, in a letter to Halleck, made haste to exonerate Sherman from any share in it.[1] It soon became evident that this action was unwise. It was either unnecessary to send so great a force to Knoxville, or, having it there, it was an error to bring it back without a more energetic pursuit of Longstreet than was made. Grant's orders were imperative that Longstreet should be well followed up; and in pursuance of them the Ninth Corps, under General Parke, started in pursuit of the retreating Confederates on the 7th of December. Burnside, feeling that his work was done, now eagerly awaited the arrival of his successor, General Foster, who came on the 10th, and on the 11th assumed command of the Department. The force under General Parke was quite insufficient for the work required of him; they could neither outmarch nor outfight Longstreet's veterans, and the result was that, without serious

CHAP. VI.

1863.

[1] Grant announced on the 7th of December, "It may now safely be assumed that the enemy are driven from the front, or at least that they no longer threaten it in formidable numbers"; but on the 20th of January he wrote to Halleck: "It was a great oversight in the first place to have ever permitted Longstreet to come to a stop within the State of Tennessee after the siege was raised. My instructions were full and complete on this subject. Sherman was sent with forces sufficient alone to defeat Longstreet; and notwithstanding the long distance the troops had marched, proposed to go on and carry out my instructions in full. General Burnside was sanguine that no stop would be made by the enemy in the valley. Sherman then proposed to leave any amount of force Burnside thought might be necessary to make his position perfectly secure. He deemed two divisions ample. . . . I write this now particularly to show that the latter named officer" (Sherman) "is in no wise to blame for the existing state of affairs in East Tennessee." Badeau, "Military History of U. S. Grant." Vol. I., p. 549.

CHAP. VI. molestation, Longstreet moved to the south side of the Holston, where, in the midst of a rich grain-growing region, he passed the winter — a sore annoyance to the Union people of East Tennessee and a constant menace to the Union force at Knoxville.

Sherman returned with his army to Chattanooga, and the grand campaign was ended, one of the most interesting in its incidents and important in its results that took place during the War of the Rebellion. It had been, since the war began, the project nearest and dearest to the heart of the President, to establish the National flag in the hill country of Tennessee, among that loyal and suffering population, and to take possession at Chattanooga of those rocky fastnesses which, once firmly held by the Union army, formed a salient bastion thrust into the enemy's most vital line of communication, completely severing the Eastern from the Western portion of the Confederacy, stopping the flow of supplies from the rich food-producing regions of the border to the Southern armies, and affording a safe and impregnable sally-port from which the armies of the Union should march in their own good time on their final mission of liberating con-

1863. quest. On the 11th of September, when Rosecrans's strategic march opened the gates of Chattanooga, the President's first thought was of the political regeneration of East Tennessee. He wrote to Andrew Johnson, the military governor of that State, urging him to seize the moment to inaugurate a loyal State government, which should be in the hands of the friends of the Union.[1] A week later

[1] This letter is printed in chapter "Tennessee Free."

he wrote again, saying, "Let me urge that you do your utmost to get every man you can, black and white, under arms at the very earliest moment, to guard roads, bridges, and trains, allowing all the better trained soldiers to go forward to Rosecrans. Of course, I mean for you to act in coöperation with, and not independently of, the military authorities." CHAP. VI. Lincoln to Johnson, Sept. 18, 1863. MS.

But after this letter was written there were still almost three months of battle, of march, and of siege before this important national conquest was fixed and affirmed, and the flag of the Union floated in security from Cumberland Gap to Chattanooga, and over the loyal hills of Knoxville. On the 7th of December, the President gave utterance to the feeling of reverent gratitude with which the nation hailed this inestimable success, in a proclamation in which he said: "Reliable information being received that the insurgent force is retreating from East Tennessee, under circumstances rendering it probable that the Union forces cannot hereafter be dislodged from that important position, and esteeming this to be of high national consequence, I recommend that all loyal people do, on receipt of this information, assemble at their places of worship and render special homage and gratitude to Almighty God for this great advancement of the National cause." And the next day, not being of the number of those rulers who reserve all their gratitude for the Almighty to the neglect of human instrumentalities, he sent a dispatch to Grant, saying: "Understanding that your lodgment at Chattanooga and Knoxville is now secure, I wish to tender you, and all under your command, 1863.

CHAP. VI. my more than thanks, my profoundest gratitude for the skill, courage, and perseverance with which you and they, over so great difficulties, have effected that important object. God bless you all!"

CHAPTER VII

LINCOLN'S GETTYSBURG ADDRESS

BY the retreat of Lee from Gettysburg and the immediate pursuit by Meade, the burial of the dead and care of the wounded on that great battle-field were left largely to the military and local authorities of the State of Pennsylvania. Governor Andrew G. Curtin gave the humane and patriotic duty his thoughtful attention; and during its execution the appropriate design of changing a portion of the field into a permanent cemetery, where the remains of the fallen heroes might be brought together, and their last resting-place suitably protected and embellished, was conceived and begun. The citizen soldiery from seventeen of the loyal States had taken part in the conflict on the Union side, and the several Governors of these States heartily coöperated in the project, which thus acquired a National character. This circumstance made it natural that the dedication ceremonies should be of more than usual interest and impressiveness. Accordingly, at the beginning of November, 1863, when the work was approaching its completion, Mr. David Wills, the special agent of Governor Curtin, and also acting for the several States, who had not only originated, but mainly

CHAP. VII. superintended, the enterprise, wrote the following letter of invitation to President Lincoln:

"The several States having soldiers in the Army
1863. of the Potomac, who were killed at the battle of Gettysburg, or have since died at the various hospitals which were established in the vicinity, have procured grounds on a prominent part of the battlefield for a cemetery, and are having the dead removed to them and properly buried. These grounds will be consecrated and set apart to this sacred purpose, by appropriate ceremonies, on Thursday, the 19th instant. Hon. Edward Everett will deliver the oration. I am authorized by the Governors of the different States to invite you to be present and participate in these ceremonies, which will doubtless be very imposing and solemnly impressive. It is the desire that after the oration, you, as Chief Executive of the nation, formally set apart these grounds to their sacred use by a few appropriate remarks. It will be a source of great gratification to the many widows and orphans that have been made almost friendless by the great battle here, to have you here personally; and it will kindle anew in the breasts of the comrades of these brave dead, who are now in the tented field or nobly meeting the foe in the front, a confidence that they who sleep in death on the battlefield are not forgotten by those highest in authority; and they will feel that, should their fate be the same, their remains will not be uncared-for. We hope
Wills to Lincoln, Nov. 2, 1863. MS. you will be able to be present to perform this last solemn act to the soldier dead on this battlefield."

President Lincoln expressed his willingness to perform the duty requested of him. On the day

preceding the ceremonies he went by special train to Gettysburg, accompanied by the Secretary of State and other prominent persons. The village was full of visitors when they arrived. That evening in response to a serenade Mr. Seward made a short address, in the course of which he said: CHAP. VII.

> I thank my God that I believe this strife is going to end in the removal of that evil which ought to have been removed by deliberate councils and peaceful means. . . And I thank him for the hope that when that cause is removed, simply by the operation of abolishing it, as the origin and agent of the treason that is without justification and without parallel, we shall thenceforth be united, be only one country, having only one hope, one ambition, and one destiny.
>
> . . . When we part to-morrow night, let us remember that we owe it to our country and to mankind that this war shall have for its conclusion the establishing of the principle of democratic government;— the simple principle that whatever party, whatever portion of the community, prevails by constitutional suffrage in an election, that party is to be respected and maintained in power, until it shall give place, on another trial and another verdict, to a different portion of the people. If you do not do this, you are drifting at once and irresistibly to the very verge of universal, cheerless, and hopeless anarchy. But with that principle this government of ours — the purest, the best, the wisest, and the happiest in the world — must be, and, so far as we are concerned, practically will be, immortal.

Seward, Speech at Gettysburg, Nov. 18, 1863.

At the appointed hour on the 19th a vast procession, with military music, moved to the cemetery grounds where, in the midst of a distinguished auditory, the orator of the day, Edward Everett, made an address worthy alike of his own fame and the extraordinary occasion. His discourse

CHAP. VII. occupied itself with three principal and natural divisions of his subject: the great battle, the origin and character of the war, and the object and consequences of victory. It is not too much to say that for the space of two hours he held his listeners spell-bound by the rare power of his art. The durable interest of history in his utterance lies most in the witness he bore concerning the character and responsibility of those who began the great conflict of which this battle was one of the principal events.

If there was an American who was qualified by moral training, by literary culture, by political study, by official experience, by party affiliation, by long practice in historical criticism, and ripe experience in public utterance, to sit in calm judicial inquiry on the causes, theories, and possible results of the civil war, that man was Edward Everett. Furnished under the most favorable auspices, during his student years, with the full panoply of scholastic acquirements that teachers and text-books can provide; beginning his career as a minister of the gospel, under the rigid self-restraints and tempering charity which that calling imposes, he passed successively to the duties of a college professor, where out of the critical study of the value of words grew the rare perfection of his literary style. Then by a ten years' participation in National legislation as a member of the lower House of Congress, he became familiar with the quality of laws and the ends of government. Following this, his functions as Governor of Massachusetts gave him practical insight into the principles and needs of local administration; the



GENERAL JAMES LONGSTREET.

authority of the Executive, as the guardian of the liberties of the citizen. Sent abroad thereafter to fill the highest diplomatic office of the American Government as minister to England, he was called upon, under broad principles of the law of nations, to discuss and adjust several difficult and far-reaching questions, which touched not merely the present, but also the future welfare and greatness of his country. Later, he was appointed to the wider and more responsible duties of Secretary of State during the close of Fillmore's Administration, when the whole diplomatic service of the American Government was intrusted to his care and direction. Crowning his official career, he was elected to the United States Senate, where the opening phases of the great slavery agitation engaged his earnest solicitude and temperate comment. His impaired health withdrew him from politics and enabled him to stand aloof from party heats and factional storms. This circumstance placed him in that neutral attitude in virtue of which he became the nominee for Vice-President of the Constitutional Union party in 1860, which professed to ignore the slavery issue and to stand as a peace-compelling umpire between the extremists of the North and the South. CHAP. VII.

Where, then, could be found an observer, critic, or commentator of nicer skill, of finer judgment, of more impartial temper? In the clamor and conflict of assertion and denial, of crimination and recrimination, the words of such a man, uttered on such an occasion as this dedication of the Gettysburg cemetery, in the presence of these august living witnesses, standing amidst the half-closed

CHAP. VII. graves of the greatest battlefield of the war, become a testimony and a guide to the historian and to posterity, before which flimsy excuse and selfish appeal, choleric invective and maudlin sympathy, alike fade into insignificance. It must be remembered that his were not the hasty expressions of excitement or passion that marked the culmination of controversy and the outbreak of
NOV. 19, 1863. hostilities. This was near the close of the third year of the war, when every claim had been heard, every protest weighed, every profession tested by the criterion of practical experiment. Neither was it the mere fervid outburst of an orator's heat. His indictment embodies the calm reflection of the thinker in his study, pronounced with the grave authority of the statesman on his tribune. Only a few of its salient paragraphs can here be quoted.

Beginning his oration with a recital of the mortuary honors which the Greeks paid the warriors who died in battle for the cause of their country, and passing from that theme to "our obligations to the martyrs and surviving heroes of the Army of the Potomac," the speaker went on with a master's skill to draw a picture of the great campaign and battle. Coming then to a new branch of his subject, he continued: "And now, friends, fellow-citizens, as we stand among these honored graves, the momentous question presents itself, Which of the two parties to the war is responsible for all this suffering, for this dreadful sacrifice of life; the lawful and constitutional Government of the United States, or the ambitious men who have rebelled against it? . . I call the war which the Confederates are waging against the Union a 're-

bellion,' because it is one, and in grave matters it is best to call things by their right names. I speak of it as a crime, because the Constitution of the United States so regards it, and puts 'rebellion' on a par with 'invasion.' The constitution and law not only of England but of every civilized country, regard them in the same light; or rather they consider the rebel in arms as far worse than the alien enemy. To levy war against the United States is the constitutional definition of treason, and that crime is by every civilized government regarded as the highest which citizen or subject can commit. Not content with the sanctions of human justice, of all the crimes against the law of the land it is singled out for the denunciations of religion. The litanies of every church in Christendom whose ritual embraces that office, as far as I am aware, from the metropolitan cathedrals of Europe to the humblest missionary chapel in the islands of the sea, concur with the Church of England in imploring the Sovereign of the universe, by the most awful adjurations which the heart of man can conceive, or his tongue utter, to deliver us from 'sedition, privy conspiracy, and rebellion.' And reason good; for while a rebellion against tyranny, — a rebellion designed, after prostrating arbitrary power, to establish free government on the basis of justice and truth, — is an enterprise on which good men and angels may look with complacency, an unprovoked rebellion of ambitious men against a beneficent government, for the purpose — the avowed purpose — of establishing, extending, and perpetuating any form of injustice and wrong, is an imitation on earth of that first foul revolt of

CHAP. VII.

'the Infernal Serpent,' against which the Supreme Majesty of Heaven sent forth the armed myriads of his angels, and clothed the right arm of his Son with the three-bolted thunders of Omnipotence.

"Lord Bacon, in 'the true marshaling of the sovereign degrees of honor,' assigns the first place to 'the *Conditores Imperiorum*, founders of States and Commonwealths;' . . . and far more than to any of those to whom Bacon assigns this highest place of honor, whose names can hardly be repeated without a wondering smile,— Romulus, Cyrus, Cæsar, Ottoman, Ismael,— is it due to our Washington as the founder of the American Union. But if to achieve or help to achieve this greatest work of man's wisdom and virtue gives title to a place among the chief benefactors, rightful heirs of the benedictions of mankind, by equal reason shall the bold, bad men who seek to undo the noble work, *Eversores Imperiorum*, destroyers of States, who for base and selfish ends rebel against beneficent governments, seek to overturn wise constitutions, to lay powerful republican unions at the foot of foreign thrones, to bring on civil and foreign war, anarchy at home, dictation abroad, desolation, ruin,— by equal reason, I say, yes, a thousand-fold stronger, shall they inherit the execrations of the ages.

"But to hide the deformity of the crime under the cloak of that sophistry which strives to make the worse appear the better reason, we are told by the leaders of the Rebellion that in our complex system of government the separate States are 'sovereigns,' and that the central power is only an 'agency.' . . . Certainly I do not deny that the separate States are clothed with sovereign powers for the

administration of local affairs. It is one of the most beautiful features of our mixed system of government; but it is equally true that, in adopting the Federal Constitution, the States abdicated, by express renunciation, all the most important functions of National sovereignty, and by one comprehensive, self-denying clause gave up all right to contravene the Constitution of the United States. Specifically, and by enumeration, they renounced all the most important prerogatives of independent States for peace and for war,— the right to keep troops or ships of war in time of peace, or to engage in war unless actually invaded; to enter into compact with another State or a foreign power; to lay any duty on tonnage, or any impost on exports or imports, without the consent of Congress; to enter into any treaty, alliance, or confederation; to grant letters of marque and reprisal, and to emit bills of credit,— while all these powers and many others, are expressly vested in the General Government. To ascribe to political communities thus limited in their jurisdiction,— who cannot even establish a post-office on their own soil,— the character of independent sovereignty, and to reduce a National organization, clothed with all the transcendent powers of government, to the name and condition of an 'agency' of the States, proves nothing but that the logic of secession is on a par with its loyalty and patriotism. CHAP. VII.

"Oh, but 'the reserved rights'! And what of the reserved rights? The tenth amendment of the Constitution, supposed to provide for 'reserved rights,' is constantly misquoted. By that amendment 'the *powers* not delegated to the United

CHAP. VII. States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States, respectively, or to the people.' The '*powers*' reserved must, of course, be such as could have been, but were not delegated to the United States — could have been, but were not prohibited to the States; but to speak of the *right* of an *individual* State to secede, as a *power* that could have been, though it was not delegated to the *United States*, is simple nonsense.

"But waiving this obvious absurdity, can it need a serious argument to prove that there can be no State right to enter into a new confederation reserved under a constitution which expressly prohibits a State to 'enter into any treaty, alliance, or confederation,' or any 'agreement or compact with another State or a foreign power'? To say that the State may, by enacting the preliminary farce of secession, acquire the right to do the prohibited things — to say, for instance, that though the States, in forming the Constitution, delegated to the United States and prohibited to themselves the power of declaring war, there was by implication reserved to each State the right of seceding and then declaring war; that, though they expressly prohibited to the States and delegated to the United States the entire treaty-making power, they reserved by implication (for an express reservation is not pretended) to the individual States — to Florida, for instance — the right to secede, and then to make a treaty with Spain retroceding that Spanish colony, and thus surrendering to a foreign power the key to the Gulf of Mexico — to maintain propositions like these, with whatever affected seriousness it is done, appears to me egregious trifling. Pardon

me, my friends, for dwelling on these wretched sophistries. But it is these which conducted the armed hosts of rebellion to your doors on the terrible and glorious days of July, and which have brought upon the whole land the scourge of an aggressive and wicked war."

Everett, Gettysburg Address, Nov. 19, 1863.

Room cannot be given in these pages to the speaker's consoling prediction, fortified by numerous historical precedents, that at last reunion must come, and that reconciliation would surely follow — a prediction which the same generation that fought the war has seen happily fulfilled. After the lapse of a quarter of a century, the American reader can without misgiving repeat the prophecy of the orator, that "These bonds of Union are of perennial force and energy, while the causes of alienation are imaginary, factitious, and transient. The heart of the people, North and South, is for the Union."

Mr. Everett ended in a brilliant peroration, the echoes of which were lost in the long and hearty plaudits of the great multitude, and then President Lincoln arose to fill the part assigned him in the programme. It was a trying ordeal to fittingly crown with a few brief sentences the ceremonies of such a day, and such an achievement in oratory; finished, erudite, apparently exhaustive of the theme, replete with all the strength of scholastic method and the highest graces of literary culture. If there arose in the mind of any discriminating listener on the platform a passing doubt whether Mr. Lincoln would or could properly honor the unique occasion, that doubt vanished with his opening sentence; for then and there the President

FACSIMILE OF MR. LINCOLN'S AUTOGRAPHIC COPY OF THE GETTYSBURG ADDRESS, MADE BY HIM FOR THE SOLDIERS' AND SAILORS' FAIR AT BALTIMORE, IN 1864.

Address delivered at the dedication of the
Cemetery at Gettysburg.

Four score and seven years ago our fathers
brought forth on this Continent, a new na-
tion, conceived in Liberty, and dedicated
to the proposition that all men are cre-
ated equal.

Now we are engaged in a great civil war,
testing whether that nation, or any nation
so conceived and so dedicated, can long
endure. We are met on a great battle-field
of that war. We have come to dedicate a
portion of that field, as a final resting
place for those who here gave their lives
that that nation might live. It is alto-
gether fitting and proper that we should
do this.

But, in a larger sense, we can not dedi-

cate— we can not consecrate— we can not hallow— this ground. The brave men, living and dead, who struggled here have consecrated it, far above our poor power to add or detract. The world will little note, nor long remember what we say here, but it can never forget what they did here. It is for us the living, rather, to be dedicated here to the unfinished work which they who fought here have thus far so nobly advanced. It is rather for us to be here dedicated to the great task remaining before us— that from these honored dead we take increased devotion to that cause for which they gave the last full measure of devotion— that we here highly resolve that these dead shall not have died in vain— that this nation, under God, shall have a new birth of freedom— and that government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth.

Abraham Lincoln.

November 19, 1863.

CHAP. VII.

pronounced an address of dedication so pertinent, so brief yet so comprehensive, so terse yet so eloquent, linking the deeds of the present to the thoughts of the future, with simple words, in such living, original, yet exquisitely molded, maxim-like phrases that the best critics have awarded it an unquestioned rank as one of the world's masterpieces in rhetorical art. He said:

Lincoln, Gettysburg Address, Nov. 19, 1863. Autograph MS.

> Fourscore and seven years ago our fathers brought forth on this continent a new nation, conceived in liberty, and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal. Now we are engaged in a great civil war, testing whether that nation, or any nation so conceived and so dedicated, can long endure. We are met on a great battlefield of that war. We have come to dedicate a portion of that field, as a final resting-place for those who here gave their lives that that nation might live. It is altogether fitting and proper that we should do this. But, in a larger sense, we can not dedicate — we can not consecrate — we can not hallow — this ground. The brave men, living and dead, who struggled here, have consecrated it, far above our poor power to add or detract. The world will little note, nor long remember, what we say here, but it can never forget what they did here. It is for us the living, rather, to be dedicated here to the unfinished work which they who fought here have thus far so nobly advanced. It is rather for us to be here dedicated to the great task remaining before us — that from these honored dead we take increased devotion to that cause for which they gave the last full measure of devotion — that we here highly resolve that these dead shall not have died in vain — that this nation, under God, shall have a new birth of freedom — and that government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth.

After the conclusion of the ceremonies the President and his party, accompanied by the orator and his friends, returned to Washington that same

evening by special train. On the next day Mr. Everett sent the President the following note: "My dear Sir: Not wishing to intrude upon your privacy, when you must be much engaged, I beg leave in this way to thank you very sincerely for your great thoughtfulness for my daughter's accommodation on the platform yesterday, and much kindness otherwise to me and mine at Gettysburg. Permit me also to express my great admiration of the thoughts expressed by you, with such eloquent simplicity and appropriateness, at the consecration of the cemetery. I should be glad if I could flatter myself that I came as near to the central idea of the occasion in two hours as you did in two minutes. My son who parted from me at Baltimore, and my daughter, concur in this sentiment."

Edward Everett to Lincoln, Nov. 20, 1863. MS.

To this courteous compliment Mr. Lincoln replied on the same day: "Your kind note of to-day is received. In our respective parts yesterday you could not have been excused to make a short address, nor I a long one. I am pleased to know that, in your judgment, the little I did say was not entirely a failure. Of course, I knew Mr. Everett would not fail; and yet, while the whole discourse was eminently satisfactory, and will be of great value, there were passages in it which transcended my expectations. The point made against the theory of the General Government being only an agency, whose principals are the States, was new to me, and, as I think, is one of the best arguments for the National supremacy. The tribute to our noble women for their angel-ministering to the suffering soldiers surpasses in its way, as do the subjects of it, whatever has gone before."

Lincoln to Everett, Nov. 20, 1863. MS.

CHAPTER VIII

MISSOURI RADICALS AND CONSERVATIVES

LINCOLN'S determination to "keep out of the quarrel" in Missouri soon became practically impossible to carry out. Such a thorough change of political sentiment was being wrought by the local civil war in that State, that every incident, whether of success or failure, served for the moment only to aggravate strife and bitterness. Out of the underlying suspicion and hostility between Secessionists and Unionists there grew the scarcely less strained and uncomfortable suspicion and rivalry between the new parties into which the people divided themselves. For nearly two years these rival parties, first called Claybanks and Charcoals and afterwards Conservatives and Radicals, gave President Lincoln little rest. They showered him with letters and besieged him with committees and delegations. Their complaints and protests touched every detail of civil and military administration in the State. They could neither agree upon a policy to be pursued nor upon persons to execute it.

Forced at length to intervene, Lincoln wrote on May 11, 1863, to the Secretary of War: "I have again concluded to relieve General Curtis. I see

no other way to avoid the worst consequences there. I think of General Schofield as his successor, but I do not wish to take the matter of a successor out of the hands of yourself and General Halleck." This reference shows with what constant prudence he kept himself in harmony with his immediate subordinates, who also, as a rule, recognized and confirmed the wisdom of his actions. "You owe your present appointment entirely to the choice of the President himself," wrote Halleck to Schofield. "I have not, directly or indirectly, interfered in the matter, but I fully concur in the choice." The formal order of assignment was made on the 13th. When the rumor of the change reached the Radical leaders at St. Louis they hastened to ask the suspension of Schofield's appointment; but Lincoln replied in the following emphatic telegram: "Your dispatch of to-day is just received. It is very painful to me that you in Missouri cannot or will not settle your factional quarrel among yourselves. I have been tormented with it beyond endurance for months by both sides. Neither side pays the least respect to my appeals to your reason. I am now compelled to take hold of the case." While he rarely used other than gentle words and kind phraseology, the telegram shows us that he could also speak with strong decision, and this tone he afterwards maintained substantially throughout the Missouri quarrel.

Lincoln to Stanton, May 11, 1863. W. R. Vol. XXII., Part II., p. 277.

Halleck to Schofield, May 22, 1863. W. R. Vol. XXII., Part II., p. 292.

Ibid., p. 277.

Lincoln to Blow, Drake, *et al.*, May 15, 1863. W. R. Vol. XXII., Part II., p. 281.

His instructions to General Schofield, on May 27, are characteristic of the underlying energy of will with which he met his more important difficulties. "Having relieved General Curtis and assigned you to the command of the Department of

1863.

CHAP. VIII. 1863. the Missouri, I think it may be of some advantage for me to state to you why I did it. I did not relieve General Curtis because of any full conviction that he had done wrong by commission or omission. I did it because of a conviction in my mind that the Union men of Missouri, constituting, when united, a vast majority of the whole people, have entered into a pestilent factional quarrel among themselves; General Curtis, perhaps not of choice, being the head of one faction, and Governor Gamble that of the other. After months of labor to reconcile the difficulty, it seemed to grow worse and worse, until I felt it my duty to break it up somehow, and, as I could not remove Governor Gamble, I had to remove General Curtis. Now that you are in the position, I wish you to undo nothing merely because General Curtis or Governor Gamble did it, but to exercise your own judgment, and do right for the public interest. Let your military measures be strong enough to repel the invader and keep the peace, and not so strong as to unnecessarily harass and persecute the people. It is a difficult rôle, and so much greater will be the honor if you perform it well. If both factions, or neither, shall abuse you, you will probably be about right. Beware of being assailed by one and praised by the other."

Lincoln to Schofield, May 27, 1863. W. R. Vol. XXII., Part II., p. 293.

In accepting this appointment to his second command in Missouri, General Schofield promised to act in the spirit of the President's letter, and as far as possible to reconcile Missouri differences, and this promise he appears to have earnestly endeavored to fulfill. One of his first tasks related to the delicate question of Missouri emancipation.

Prior events had so far advanced this issue that both parties recognized the main question as being already decided. The secondary and only remaining question was to find some mode of tempering the impending social and political change. In the late session of the Legislature, this feeling had already found expression; the Conservatives promoting a measure to reconvene the existing Missouri Convention to initiate emancipation, while the Radicals labored for a bill to secure the election of an entirely new Convention. Both measures failed, however, and this left to Governor Gamble, as leader of the Conservatives, the opportunity to initiate the contest for 1863, which he did by his proclamation of April 15, calling the old Convention to meet on the 15th of June. His personal course was very prudent. While his message distinctly indorsed emancipation as "necessary for the public good," he refrained from recommending any given scheme, and advised concession and harmony in details; and, assuming that the revolutionary urgency upon which the Convention had appointed him provisional governor had now happily passed, he announced his resignation as such to take effect on the last day of the session. But the Convention refused to accept his resignation, and by a test vote of forty-seven to thirty-four requested him to "continue to exercise the powers and discharge the duties of the office of Governor of this State until the first Monday in November, 1864, and until his successor is elected and qualified."

CHAP. VIII.

1863.

"Convention Journal," June 23, 1863, pp. 25, 26.

Meanwhile President Lincoln had received from General Schofield the following inquiry: "The action of the Missouri State Convention upon the

CHAP. VIII.

question of emancipation will depend very much upon whether they can be assured that their action will be sustained by the General Government, and the people protected in their slave property during the short time that slavery is permitted to exist. Am I authorized in any manner, directly or indirectly, to pledge such support and protection?" To this President Lincoln replied on June 22d:

Schofield to Lincoln, June 20, 1863. W. R. Vol. XXII., Part II., p. 330.

MY DEAR SIR: Your dispatch, asking in substance whether, in case Missouri shall adopt gradual emancipation, the General Government will protect slave-owners in that species of property during the short time it shall be permitted by the State to exist within it, has been received. Desirous as I am that emancipation shall be adopted by Missouri, and believing as I do that gradual can be made better than immediate for both black and white, except when military necessity changes the case, my impulse is to say that such protection would be given. I cannot know exactly what shape an act of emancipation may take. If the period from the initiation to the final end should be comparatively short, and the act should prevent persons being sold during that period into more lasting slavery, the whole would be easier. I do not wish to pledge the General Government to the affirmative support of even temporary slavery beyond what can be fairly claimed under the Constitution. I suppose, however, this is not desired, but that it is desired for the military force of the United States, while in Missouri, to not be used in subverting the temporarily reserved legal rights in slaves during the progress of emancipation. This I would desire also. I have very earnestly urged the slave States to adopt emancipation; and it ought to be, and is, an object with me not to overthrow or thwart what any of them may, in good faith, do to that end. You are, therefore, authorized to act in the spirit of this letter, in conjunction with what may appear to be the military necessities of your department. Although this letter will become public at some time, it is not intended to be made so now.

Lincoln to Schofield, June 22, 1863. W. R. Vol. XXII., Part II., pp. 331, 332.

EDWARD EVERETT.

With this decided advantage of the President's known sympathy, the Conservative members of the Convention frittered away their opportunity to perform a transcendent act of benefit to their State and of honor to themselves. They indeed devised and adopted a scheme of emancipation, but it was one which, in the new condition of public opinion, seemed vitiated with a spirit of selfishness and an afterthought of evasion. The ordinance adopted provided in substance that slavery should cease in Missouri in the year 1870, and prohibited sales to non-residents after that date, provided, that all slaves so emancipated should remain in servitude; those over forty years of age during their lives; those under twelve, until they became twenty-three; and all others until July 4, 1876. Thus the institution of slavery in Missouri would have remained untouched for the period of seven years, with of course the contingent possibility of a change of public sentiment and a repeal of the ordinance before any right to freedom could accrue. Neither of the two desirable points mentioned by Mr. Lincoln in his letter to Schofield were embodied in it. The period of postponement was long, and no provision was made to prevent slaves being sold out of the State in the interim. Another objectionable provision was that slave property was exempted from all further taxation. It was not to be expected that such a dilatory and half-hearted measure as this would receive popular acceptance.

This ordinance of emancipation was passed on the 1st of July, 1863, by a vote of fifty-one ayes to thirty noes. It was the last day of the session,

"Convention Journal," 1863, p. 47.

CHAP. VIII. and the Convention took no further action except to receive from Governor Gamble a withdrawal of his previously tendered resignation which it had declined to accept, after which it adjourned *sine die*. Except in the failure to which we have adverted, few State conventions have had so remarkable and so honorable a history. Its election took place under the revolutionary design that it should declare Missouri out of the Union; on the contrary, it remained firmly loyal; and after five sessions, during three of which it exercised the duties of ordinary legislation, it terminated its labors by prospectively destroying slavery. Passing from insurrection to emancipation, it signally reversed the ordinary rule that revolutions never go backwards.

July 1, 1863

No sooner had the Constitutional Convention adjourned (July 1, 1863) than a popular movement of protest and opposition was begun by the Radical Emancipationists of St. Louis, which was pushed with such vigor and success that two months later (September 1) delegates from four-fifths of the counties of Missouri met at Jefferson City in a Radical Emancipation Convention.[1] The political action which brought this Convention together was greatly accelerated by one of those

[1] Readers not skilled in American politics need to be reminded that the word convention, used in this chapter, has two meanings; being applied on one hand to a parliamentary body of delegates, chosen under State laws, with authority to change or amend the State Constitution, usually subject to ratification by a vote of the people. The more proper name for this is constitutional convention. On the other hand, when delegates of a political party, selected without any legal authority under merely self-imposed party rules, meet to nominate candidates or to pass resolutions, the assemblage is called a convention, though it would be more strictly accurate to call it a party convention.

atrocities which spring from the unrestrained passions of guerrilla war. Since the fall of Vicksburg many rebel soldiers had returned from Arkansas to their homes in Western Missouri, and under the secret orders so frequently sent from commanders in the South into that State, the guerrilla bands along the Kansas border suddenly grew in numbers and audacity. CHAP. VIII.

Though the whole region was patrolled almost day and night by Union detachments and scouts, a daring leader named Quantrell, who had been for some weeks threatening various Kansas towns, assembled a band of three hundred picked and well-mounted followers at a place of rendezvous near the line, about sunset of August 20. His object being divined, half a dozen Union detachments from different points started in chase of him; but skillfully eluding them all by an eccentric march, Quantrell crossed the State line, and, reaching the open prairie country, where roads were unnecessary, pushed directly for Lawrence, Kansas. Every accident favored the invaders. When they were yet twenty-five or thirty miles away a friendly messenger, riding at full speed in advance, sought to gain the town and give warning, but the horse fell and was killed, and his rider died next day from the injury he received. This town was forty miles in the interior, and had no reason to apprehend an attack, and though it could have assembled several hundred men under arms in half an hour, its inhabitants had no dream of danger when the marauders entered the place at sunrise of August 21. Quantrell stationed detachments to prevent any assembling or concentration of the citizens, and then 1863.

W. R. Vol. XXII., Part I., p. 583.

Ibid.

Ibid., 1863.

CHAP. VIII. began a scene of pillage, arson, and massacre too horrible to relate. Stores and banks were robbed, 185 buildings burned, and from 150 to 200 inhabitants murdered with a cold-blooded fiendishness which seems impossible to believe of Americans. The direful work occupied but three or four hours, when the perpetrators re-mounted their horses and departed. Though they managed their retreat with such skill as to avoid a general encounter, the pursuit was so hot that in several skirmishes, and by cutting off stragglers and laggards, a hundred or more of the band were killed.

The sudden calamity raised excitement on the Kansas border to almost a frenzy; a public meeting was held at Leavenworth, and the 8th of September was suggested for a general rising to enter Missouri to recover stolen property—a phrase easy to be translated into summary retaliation. Against this lawless proposal, however, General Schofield immediately took decided ground. "You cannot expect me to permit anything of this sort," he wrote to the Governor of Kansas. "My present duty requires me to prevent it at all hazards and by all the means in my power." At the same time he assured the Governor that he would make every effort to punish the perpetrators of the Lawrence massacre and to afford all possible security for the future, and a satisfactory coöperation for this purpose was agreed upon by them and carried out.

Schofield, Report, Sept. 14, 1863. W. R. Vol. XXII., Part I., p. 573.

Schofield to Lincoln, Aug. 28, 1863. Ibid., Part II., pp. 483, 484.

Schofield to Carney, Aug. 29, 1863. Ibid., Part II., pp. 491, 492.

It was amid the excitement over this event that the Radical Union Emancipation Convention met at Jefferson City. This body took not only an extreme, but even a threatening, attitude. Its resolutions broadly supported the President's gen-

Sept. 1, 1863.

eral policy of suppressing the rebellion and his proclamation of military emancipation; but they complained of the local military administration of General Schofield, and asked the President to remove him and appoint "General Butler or some other suitable man" in his place. They complained more especially of the policy and action of Governor Gamble and the provisional government of the State, which they charged with aiding the pro-slavery faction and paralyzing the Federal power in suppressing the rebellion. They not only demanded the resignations of Governor Gamble and Lieutenant-Governor Hall, but, seizing upon the occurrence of Quantrell's massacre in Kansas as a justification, adopted the following bold resolution: CHAP. VIII.

> Resolved, That in view of the serious complications that are arising out of hostilities on the part of the Provisional State Government to the National authority and the National policies, and the absence of protection from inroads from guerrilla bands, we hereby instruct the President of this Convention to appoint a general committee of Public Safety, composed of one from each Congressional district, whose duty it shall be to confer with the loyal men of this State to organize and arm them for the protection of their homes, and in the event of no relief being obtained from our present troubles, to call upon the people of this State to act in their sovereign capacity, and take such measures of redress as shall be found necessary for their welfare.

The language was artfully framed; literally construed, it merely called for protection against guerrillas and bushwhackers; but it required no great stretch of interpretation for an excited partisan to imagine that the provisional government was the real culprit to which its meaning pointed. Their resolutions also asked that General Schofield should

CHAP. VIII. authorize the recruitment of the negroes of disloyal owners for military service; that the Legislature should provide for the election of a new State Convention to act on the subject of emancipation; and finally provided that a committee of one from each county should be appointed to visit President Lincoln and lay their grievances before him. By way of anticipation the visit of this committee to the President may be at once described.

"Annual Cyclopædia," 1863, pp. 655, 656.

New York "Tribune," Sept. 28, 1863.

They came to Washington to the number of seventy on September 27, and spent two days in preparing a formal address and arranging the necessary preliminaries to make their interview as impressive as possible. A number of delegates from the State of Kansas also appeared in Washington at the same time with similar views and objects, and joined in the interview and address. Their independent attitude and language were reported to the President by apprehensive friends. They gave out that the Missouri Conservatives were only waiting a favorable opportunity to pronounce against him; that the Radicals would certainly carry the State in the next election; and that, to use their own expression, it was for the President to decide "whether he would ride in their wagon or not." All this, however, had no effect upon Mr. Lincoln, who understood perfectly that the object of the delegation and Radical leaders was to procure the removal of General Schofield. "If," said he, "they can show that Schofield has done anything wrong and has interfered to their disadvantage with State politics, or has so acted as to damage the cause of the Union and good order, their case is made." But he be-

1863.

J. H., Diary. MS.

lieved that the general had incurred their ill-will simply by refusing to take sides with them. "I think," said he, "I understand this matter perfectly, and I cannot do anything contrary to my convictions to please these men, earnest and powerful as they may be." CHAP. VIII.

On the 30th of September Senator Lane of Kansas brought "his little army," as he styled it, to the Executive Mansion, and ranged it along three sides of the East Room—an assemblage of representative men from two frontier States; remarkable, however, more for sincere earnestness, and a bearing evincing stubborn determination to get what they considered their rights, than for either high average intelligence or adroitness. It was a compact phalanx of devoted political soldiers, officered by a few leaders of great ability. Mr. Lincoln never appeared to better advantage than in this interview, which lasted something over two hours, partly spent in speech-making and partly in desultory talk. Though the President well knew how great the danger was to his political hopes from the unreasoning anger of the committee, he never cringed to them for an instant. The chairman, Hon. C. D. Drake of St. Louis, impressively read their long, studied address, and though no reporters were present, one of the President's secretaries took full notes of his reply, from which we have room to quote only a small portion. Said he: "It would not be consistent, either with a proper respect for you or a fair consideration of the subject involved, to give you a hasty answer. I will take your address, carefully consider it, and respond at my earliest convenience. I shall consider it without partiality 1863.

CHAP. VIII. 1863. for, or prejudice against, any man or party. No painful memories of the past and no hopes for the future, personal to myself, shall hamper my judgment."

The President then took up their points of complaint in detail. He told them that while they did not appear to relish his having characterized their troubles in Missouri as a "pestilent factional quarrel," Governor Gamble liked it a great deal less; that Gamble had been chosen governor by their own State Convention, seemingly with the universal consent of the Union people of the State; that he, the President, had uniformly refused to give the Governor exclusive control of the Missouri State Militia; that, on the other hand, the Enrolled Militia existed solely under State laws with which he had no right to interfere, either in Missouri or elsewhere; and if that organization were inconsistent with their State laws, he, as President, had no power over it. He was sorry they had not been more specific in their complaints about Schofield; they had only accused him vaguely of sympathy with their enemies. "I cannot," continued he, "act on vague impressions. Show me that he has disobeyed orders; show me that he has done something wrong, and I will take your request for his removal into serious consideration. He has never protested against an order — never neglected a duty with which he has been intrusted, so far as I know. When General Grant was struggling in Mississippi and needed reënforcements, no man was so active and efficient in sending him troops as General Schofield. I know nothing to his disadvantage. I am not personally acquainted with him.

I have with him no personal relations. If you will allege a definite wrong-doing, and, having clearly made your point, prove it, I shall remove him. You object to his order on my recent proclamation suspending the privilege of the writ of *habeas corpus*. I am at a loss to see why an order executing my official decree should be made a ground of accusation to me against the officer issuing it. You object to its being used in Missouri. In other words, that which is right when employed against opponents is wrong when employed against yourselves. Still, I will consider that. You object to his muzzling the press; as to that, I think when an officer in any department finds that a newspaper is pursuing a course calculated to embarrass his operations and stir up sedition and tumult, he has the right to lay hands upon it and suppress it, but in no other case. I approved the order in question after the 'Missouri Democrat' had also approved it."

Here an unwary delegate replied: "We thought then it was to be used against the other side."

Lincoln: "Certainly you did. Your ideas of justice seem to depend on the application of it.

"You have spoken of the consideration which you think I should pay to my friends as contra-distinguished from my enemies. I suppose, of course, that you mean by that those who agree or disagree with me in my views of public policy. I recognize no such thing as a political friendship personal to myself. You will remember that your State was excluded from the operations of that decree by its express terms. The proclamation therefore can have no direct bearing upon your

CHAP. VIII. State politics. Yet you seem to insist that it shall be made as vital a question as if it had. You seem to be determined to have it executed there."

Delegate: "No, sir; but we think it is a national test question."

Lincoln: "You are then determined to make an issue with men who may not agree with you upon the abstract question of the propriety of that act of mine. Now let me say that I, who issued the proclamation, after more thought on the subject than probably any one of you has been able to give it, believe it to be right and expedient. I am better satisfied with those who believe with me in this than with those who hold differently. But I am free to say that many good men, some earnest Republicans, and some from very far North, were opposed to the issuing of that proclamation, holding it unwise and of doubtful legality. Now, when you see a man loyally in favor of the Union — willing to vote men and money — spending his time and money and throwing his influence into the recruitment of our armies, I think it ungenerous, unjust, and impolitic to make his views on abstract political questions a test of his loyalty. I will not be a party to this application of a pocket inquisition."

J. H., Diary.

In the desultory talk which followed the speech-making Mr. Lincoln was as fair and as firm on all collateral points and issues, meeting every statement of grievance with a quick counter-statement so brief and so clinching that the several volunteer spokesmen who came forward to support the main address retired, one by one, disconcerted and overwhelmed. The interview finally closed with a little

rejoinder from him, intended more especially for the marplots in the delegation. After stating that he appreciated perfectly the difference between the ultimate value of Conservatives and Radicals in the long controversy, he continued: "My Radical friends will therefore see that I understand and appreciate their position. Still you appear to come before me as my friends, if I agree with you, and not otherwise. I do not here speak of mere personal friendship. When I speak of my friends I mean those who are friendly to my measures, to the policy of the Government. I am well aware that by many, by some even among this delegation — I shall not name them — I have been in public speeches and in printed documents charged with 'tyranny and willfulness,' with a disposition to make my own personal will supreme. I do not intend to be a tyrant. At all events I shall take care that in my own eyes I do not become one. I have no right to act the tyrant to mere political opponents. If a man votes for supplies of men and money, encourages enlistments, discourages desertions, does all in his power to carry the war on to a successful issue, I have no right to question him for his abstract political opinions. I must make a dividing line somewhere between those who are the opponents of the Government, and those who only approve peculiar features of my Administration while they sustain the Government." CHAP. VIII. J. H., Diary.

These sentences from the President's talk to the delegation sufficiently show us his inflexibly fair dealing in the face of strong temptation. He knew that a certain unreasoning radicalism which per-

CHAP. VIII. vaded the whole North might, and probably would, range itself behind this unreasonable radicalism of these Missourians, and that the whole acting together might prevent his renomination or reëlection. Besides this, while deploring the error of their present policy, he had a sincere respect for, and faith in, their undying political convictions. "I believe after all," he said some weeks later, "those Missouri Radicals will carry their State, and I do not object to it. They are nearer to me than the other side in thought and sentiment, though bitterly hostile personally. They are the unhandiest fellows in the world to deal with; but after all their faces are set Zionward." The real termination of the incident came with the formal reply which Mr. Lincoln addressed to Hon. Charles D. Drake and others, committee, under date of October 5, 1863, and in which the President draws a picture of the confusion and terror of civil war which we believe no pen has surpassed.

J. H., Diary.

1863. Your original address presented on the 30th ultimo, and the four supplementary ones, presented on the 3d instant, have been carefully considered. I hope you will regard the other duties claiming my attention, together with the great length and importance of these documents, as constituting a sufficient apology for my not having responded sooner. These papers, framed for a common object, consist of the things demanded and the reasons for demanding them. The things demanded are:

First: That General Schofield shall be relieved, and General Butler be appointed, as commander of the Military Department of Missouri.

Second: That the system of Enrolled Militia in Missouri may be broken up, and National forces be substituted for it; and

Third: That at elections persons may not be allowed to vote who are not entitled by law to do so.

Among the reasons given, enough of suffering and wrong to Union men is certainly, and I suppose truly, stated. Yet the whole case, as presented, fails to convince me that General Schofield, or the Enrolled Militia, is responsible for that suffering and wrong. The whole can be explained on a more charitable and, as I think, a more rational hypothesis. We are in civil war. In such cases there always is a main question; but in this case that question is a perplexing compound — Union and Slavery. It thus becomes a question not of two sides merely, but of at least four sides, even among those who are for the Union, saying nothing of those who are against it. Thus, those who are for the Union *with*, but not *without*, slavery — those for it *without*, but not *with* — those for it *with* or *without*, but prefer it *with* — and those for it *with* or *without*, but prefer it *without*. Among these again is a subdivision of those who are for *gradual* but not for *immediate*, and those who are for *immediate*, but not for *gradual* extinction of slavery. It is easy to conceive that all these shades of opinion, and even more, may be sincerely entertained by honest and truthful men. Yet, all being for the Union, by reason of these differences each will prefer a different way of sustaining the Union. At once sincerity is questioned, and motives are assailed. Actual war coming, blood grows hot, and blood is spilled. Thought is forced from old channels into confusion. Deception breeds and thrives. Confidence dies and universal suspicion reigns. Each man feels an impulse to kill his neighbor, lest he be first killed by him. Revenge and retaliation follow. And all this, as before said, may be among honest men only. But this is not all. Every foul bird comes abroad and every dirty reptile rises up. These add crime to confusion. Strong measures deemed indispensable, but harsh at best, such men make worse by maladministration. Murders for old grudges, and murders for pelf, proceed under any cloak that will best cover for the occasion. These causes amply account for what has occurred in Missouri, without ascribing it to the weakness or wickedness of any general. The newspaper files, those chroniclers of current events, will show that the evils now complained of were quite as prevalent under Frémont, Hunter, Halleck and Curtis, as under

CHAP. VIII. Schofield. If the former had greater force opposed to them, they also had greater force with which to meet it. When the organized rebel army left the State, the main Federal force had to go also, leaving the department commander at home relatively no stronger than before. Without disparaging any, I affirm with confidence that no commander of that Department has, in proportion to his means, done better than General Schofield.

Proceeding then to examine with minuteness, and answer with great patience, such specific points of complaint as could be gleaned from the papers presented by the committee, the President's letter continued:

With my present views, I must decline to remove General Schofield. In this I decide nothing against General Butler. I sincerely wish it were convenient to assign him a suitable command. In order to meet some existing evils I have addressed a letter of instructions to General Schofield, a copy of which I inclose to you.

As to the "Enrolled Militia," I shall endeavor to ascertain, better than I now know, what is its exact value. Let me say now, however, that your proposal to substitute National forces for the "Enrolled Militia" implies that in your judgment the latter is doing something which needs to be done; and if so, the proposition to throw that force away, and to supply its place by bringing other forces from the field where they are urgently needed, seems to me very extraordinary. Whence shall they come? Shall they be withdrawn from Banks, or Grant, or Steele, or Rosecrans? Few things have been so grateful to my anxious feeling as when, in June last, the local force in Missouri aided General Schofield to so promptly send a large general force to the relief of General Grant, then investing Vicksburg, and menaced from without by General Johnston. Was this all wrong? Should the "Enrolled Militia" then have been broken up, and General Herron kept from Grant to police Missouri? So far from finding cause to object, I confess to a sympathy for whatever relieves our general force in Missouri, and allows

it to serve elsewhere. I therefore, as at present advised, cannot attempt the destruction of the "Enrolled Militia" of Missouri. I may add that the force being under the National military control, it is also within the proclamation in regard to the *Habeas Corpus*.

I concur in the propriety of your request in regard to elections, and have, as you see, directed General Schofield accordingly. I do not feel justified to enter upon the broad field you present in regard to the political differences between Radicals and Conservatives. From time to time I have done and said what appeared to me proper to do and say. The public knows it all. It obliges nobody to follow me, and I trust it obliges me to follow nobody. The Radicals and Conservatives each agree with me in some things and disagree in others. I could wish both to agree with me in all things; for then they would agree with each other, and would be too strong for any foe from any quarter. They, however, choose to do otherwise, and I do not question their right. I too shall do what seems to be my duty. I hold whoever commands in Missouri, or elsewhere, responsible to me, and not to either Radicals or Conservatives. It is my duty to hear all; but at last I must, within my sphere, judge what to do and what to forbear.

Lincoln to Chas. D. Drake and others, Oct. 5, 1863. Corrected from Autograph MS.

The very radical announcements authoritatively made by so large and so representative a gathering as the Convention which appointed the delegation whose visit to the President we have described, on the whole rather tended to produce a reaction in local opinion. The Conservatives had all along been accusing the Radical leaders of harboring unlawful and revolutionary designs. Reckless speakers, and particularly reckless newspapers of that party, had indeed, during the whole year, been calling for the overthrow or displacement of the Missouri Provisional Government, with all its machinery of civil administration, and especially its State and Enrolled Militia, by a sweeping assumption of Federal

CHAP. VIII. military power. Now, when this extensive and influential political gathering vaguely proposed some such action through a committee of public safety, and an organizing and arming of those who chose to call themselves "loyal men," the menace began to look serious under whatever pretext it might be put forth.

It served at least to bring the various questions in controversy to a sharper issue. Under date of
1863. September 20, General Schofield transmitted to Washington a collection of inflammatory newspaper articles, with a report that: "The revolutionary faction which has so long been striving to gain the ascendancy in Missouri, particularly in St. Louis, to overthrow the present State government and change the policy of the National Administration, has at length succeeded, so far as to produce open mutiny of one of the militia regiments and serious difficulties in others." He also inclosed an order
1863. published by him on September 17, announcing that martial law would be enforced against persons encouraging mutiny, exciting insurrection by uttering or publishing falsehoods or misrepresentations, and that newspapers violating the order would be suppressed. "I am thoroughly convinced," he added, "of the necessity for prompt and decided measures to put down this revolutionary scheme, and my sense of duty will not permit me to delay it longer."

Schofield to Halleck, Sept. 20, 1863. W. R. Vol. XXII., Part II., pp. 546, 547.

Called upon to act in what seemed a critical emergency, President Lincoln, notwithstanding a great outcry from the Radical press, under date of
1863. September 26 sent the general his written approval of the order, and on the 1st of October wrote him a



LINCOLN'S EXECUTIVE OFFICE AND CABINET-ROOM IN THE WHITE HOUSE.

letter, adding a number of prudential suggestions as to the spirit and manner in which he wished the order to be carried out. It is written in such a tone of judicious firmness, and contains at the same time so much valuable admonition in regard to the details of the general's duty, that we cannot refrain from quoting the greater part of it: CHAP. VIII. Oct. 1, 1863.

There is no organized military force in avowed opposition to the General Government now in Missouri, and if any such shall reappear, your duty in regard to it will be too plain to require any special instruction. Still the condition of things, both there and elsewhere, is such as to render it indispensable to maintain for a time the United States military establishment in that State, as well as to rely upon it for a fair contribution of support to that establishment generally. Your immediate duty in regard to Missouri now is to advance the efficiency of that establishment, and to so use it as far as practicable, to compel the excited people there to leave one another alone. Under your recent order, which I have approved, you will only arrest individuals, and suppress assemblies, or newspapers, when they may be working palpable injury to the military in your charge; and in no other case will you interfere with the expression of opinion in any form, or allow it to be interfered with violently by others. In this you have a discretion to exercise with great caution, calmness, and forbearance. With the matters of removing the inhabitants of certain counties *en masse*, and of removing certain individuals from time to time who are supposed to be mischievous, I am not now interfering, but am leaving to your own discretion. Nor am I interfering with what may still seem to you to be necessary restrictions upon trade and intercourse. I think proper, however, to enjoin upon you the following: Allow no part of the military under your command to be engaged in either returning fugitive slaves or in forcing or enticing slaves from their homes, and, so far as practicable, enforce the same forbearance upon the people. . . At elections, see that those, and only those, are allowed to vote who are

CHAP. VIII.

entitled to do so by the laws of Missouri, including as of those laws the restriction laid by the Missouri Convention upon those who may have participated in the rebellion. So far as practicable, you will, by means of your military force, expel guerrillas, marauders, and murderers, and all who are known to harbor, aid, or abet them. But, in like manner, you will repress assumptions of unauthorized individuals to perform the same service; because, under pretense of doing this, they become marauders and murderers themselves.

Lincoln to Schofield, Oct. 1, 1863. W. R. Vol. XXII., Part II., pp. 585, 586, also Autograph MS.

But the President did not have General Schofield alone to advise and direct. Governor Gamble also had taken alarm at the attitude of menace which the Radical leaders had allowed their followers to assume. On this same 1st of October he wrote a letter to the President, in which he recalled that as provisional governor of Missouri he had "exhausted the resources of the State in maintaining the supremacy of the Federal Government," and he now demanded in turn that the President should "order the general commanding this department to maintain by all the force under his control the integrity of the State government." Following this official demand for protection, Governor Gamble also on the 12th of October issued a long proclamation to the people of his State, in which he embodied a strong and convincing reply to the accusations of disloyalty which had been leveled against him, reciting his many and continuous official services and his fidelity to the Union cause and Federal Government, and his willingness and efforts as a member of the State Convention to secure and complete emancipation at as early a date as 1867. He called attention to the fact that he had voluntarily tendered his resignation of his

1863.

Gamble to Lincoln, Oct. 1, 1863. MS.

office of provisional governor; and while still declaring "that no objection is here intended to be suggested to any change in their government which the people may think proper to make by peaceful means, in accordance with the Constitution and laws," he nevertheless warned all persons "against any attempt to effect a change by means of violence," and announced his intention to employ "all the force I can command to sustain the laws, preserve the peace of the State, and punish those who disturb it." It was a document so clear in its statements and so quiet and firm in its tone as to appeal to the good sense and moderation of all except those intent upon mischief. About a week later, October 19, President Lincoln sent his reply to the Governor's official demand for protection to the provisional government, and as his letter was written with such skill and discrimination in the perplexing complications which called it forth, it requires to be read in full:

Gamble, Proclamation, Oct. 12, 1863. St. Louis "Republican," Oct. 13, 1863.

Yours of the 1st instant was duly received; and I have delayed so long to answer it because of other pressing duties; because it did not appear to me that the domestic violence you apprehend was very imminent; and because, if it were so imminent, my direction to General Schofield embraces very nearly the extent of my power to repress it. Being instructed to repress all violence, of course he will, so far as in his power, repress any which may be offered to the State government. At the beginning of our present troubles, the regularly installed State officers of Missouri, taking sides with the Rebellion, were forced to give way to the provisional State government, at the head of which you stand, and which was placed in authority, as I understood, by the unanimous action and acquiescence of the Union people of the State. I have seen no occasion to make a distinc-

CHAP. VIII. tion against the provisional government because of its not having been chosen and inaugurated in the usual way. Nor have I seen any cause to suspect it of unfaithfulness to the Union. So far as I have yet considered, I am as ready, on a proper case made, to give the State the Constitutional protection against invasion and domestic violence, under the provisional government, as I would be if it were under a government installed in the ordinary manner. I have not thought of making a distinction.

Oct., 1863. In your proclamation of the 12th instant you state the proposition substantially, that no objection can be made to any change in the State government, which the people may desire to make, so far as the end can be effected by means conforming to the Constitution and laws through the expression of the popular will; but that such change should not be effected by violence. I concur in this, and I may add that it makes precisely the distinction I wish to keep in view. In the absence of such violence, or imminent danger thereof, it is not proper for the National Executive to interfere; and I am unwilling, by any formal action, to show an appearance of belief that there is such imminent danger before I really believe there is. I might thereby, to some extent, bear false witness. You tell me "a party has sprung up in Missouri which openly and loudly proclaims the purpose to overturn the provisional government by violence." Does the party so proclaim, or is it only that some members of the party so proclaim? If I mistake not, the party alluded to recently held a State Convention, and adopted resolutions. Did they therein declare violence against the provisional State government? No party can be justly held responsible for what individual members of it may say or do. Nothing in this letter is written with reference to any State which may have maintained within it no State government professedly loyal to the United States.

Lincoln to Gamble, Oct. 19, 1863. MS.

The serious lengths to which the Missouri controversy had run, Schofield's order against sedition, the Governor's proclamation against treason to the State, and President Lincoln's approval of both

with qualifying advice, served at last to check and moderate factional excitement and exasperation. Following the President's suggestions, General Schofield exercised great forbearance in enforcing his order and in general administration. He submitted to the President a plan and recommendation gradually to dispense with the Enrolled Militia, which he characterized as "some being very good and others very bad," though by reason of their local knowledge they had rendered efficient service. He partly satisfied antislavery clamor by permitting negroes to be recruited under careful restrictions. He issued an order impartially regulating and enforcing the laws and ordinances of the State Convention applicable to the coming election of November 3, 1863. He was so fortunate also as to frustrate and repel a raid of the rebels under Shelley into the State, and to chase Quantrell and others out with them. On October 25 he wrote to the President: "My Radical friends now exhibit some disposition to stop their war upon me, and I shall not certainly give them any good reason for continuing it. . . I have enforced my order in only one case, and that so clear that the offender freely confessed and asked pardon on any terms. It will not probably be necessary for me to exercise any control over their press hereafter. Your accurate appreciation of the real difficulty here, and the strong and generous manner in which you have sustained me, will do more good in Missouri than to have doubled the troops under my command." And a little later he was further able to report: "The late election in all parts of the State passed off in perfect quiet and good order. I have heard

1863.

Schofield to Lincoln, Oct. 25, 1863. W. R. Vol. XXII., Part II., p. 677.

Schofield to Lincoln, Nov. 9, 1863. Ibid., 698.

CHAP. VIII. Nov. 3, 1863.

of no disturbance of any kind anywhere." At the election the Radicals gained a slight apparent victory, the soldiers' vote especially supporting their ticket with a near approach to unanimity, and this result tended still farther to prevent for the time being active and adverse criticism of General Schofield's administration.

CHAPTER IX

THE LINE OF THE RAPIDAN

GENERAL MEADE crossed the Potomac with very little delay; the 18th of July found his whole army on the Virginia side. His plan for the pursuit of Lee was not unlike that of McClellan a year before, but although he displayed much greater expedition and energy in the execution of it than were shown by his predecessor, the results through no fault of his own were unimportant. General French, who had taken no part in the battle of Gettysburg, had been placed in command of the Third Corps; he was an old officer of the regular army, excellent in drill, in routine, and all the every-day details of the service, but entirely unfit for an enterprise requiring great audacity and celerity. He was assigned upon this expedition to the duty of throwing his corps through Manassas Gap and attacking the flank of the enemy as he moved southward by Front Royal. Meade succeeded in getting French into the Gap in time to have broken the rebel army in two; but when he attacked, it was in so inefficient a manner, and with so small a portion of his force, that the day was wasted and the enemy made their way down the valley to the lower Gaps. This failure was a source of deep mortifi-

Warren, Testimony, Report Committee on Conduct of the War, 1864-65. Part I., p. 381.

MAP OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA.

cation to General Meade, and it is difficult to understand why General French was retained in command of his corps; it was a great error, and resulted in still more serious damage later in the campaign. CHAP. IX.

The pursuit of the enemy was not continued further, and on the 29th of July the President wrote a letter to General Halleck stating that he had inferred from one of General Meade's dispatches that he thought the Government was pressing him to an engagement with Lee; that this impression was erroneous; that he was opposed to it unless such a course was in harmony with Halleck's and Meade's views; that if it were imprudent to attack at Williamsport it was certainly more so now that Meade had no more than two-thirds of the force he had then; that he was in favor at Williamsport of Meade's crossing and harassing the enemy; this had been done, and now he was rather in favor of delay than immediate attack, and he desired General Halleck to make this known to Meade, unless he saw good reasons to the contrary. The months of August and September were a period of repose for the Army of the Potomac. It was in fact in no condition to undertake active operations; a considerable body of troops had been taken from Meade for service in South Carolina, and a strong detachment had been sent to the city of New York for the purpose of enforcing the draft there. 1863. Lincoln to Halleck, July 29, 1863. MS.

General Lee had retired behind the Rapidan for several weeks of rest; neither army was ready at that time to attack the other. After his victory at Chancellorsville and his damaging defeat at Gettysburg General Lee, as well as his army, needed a 1863.

CHAP. IX.

certain period of quiet and recruitment. He even thought proper, on the 8th of August, to offer his resignation to the President of the Southern Confederacy; this offer was, of course, refused with the utmost promptness and kindness, and he was left, as before, perfectly untrammeled in the conduct of his army. Not apprehending any immediate attack from General Meade, he embraced the occasion to grant a large number of leaves of absence; they were given as rewards for good conduct to about a fourth of the army in active service. To assist and to render certain the great enterprise of Braxton Bragg against Rosecrans in Tennessee, Longstreet's corps, early in September, was sent to the West.

W. R. Vol. XXIX., Part II., p. 639.

This seemed to President Lincoln a favorable time to strike the enemy. On the 15th of September he wrote to General Halleck that, in his opinion, Meade "should move upon Lee at once in manner of general attack, leaving to developments whether he will make it a real attack. I think," the President added, "this would develop Lee's real condition and purposes better than the cavalry alone can do." This opinion having been communicated to Meade he answered, three days later, in a dispatch of some length, giving a statement of Lee's position, and concluding: "I can get a battle out of Lee under very disadvantageous circumstances, which may render his inferior force my superior, and which is not likely to result in any very decided advantage, even in case I should be victorious. In this view I am reluctant to run the risks involved without the positive sanction of the Government." Mr. Stanton sent this dispatch to the President "for reflection overnight." It evidently gave rise to

Lincoln to Halleck, Sept. 15, 1863. Ibid., p. 187.

Meade to Stanton, Sept. 18, 1863. W. R. Vol. XXIX., Part II., p. 202.

CHAP. IX.

Sept. 19, 1863.

grave reflections, for the next morning Mr. Lincoln wrote to Halleck, declining to order an attack where the general in the field "thinks the risk is so great and the promise of advantage so small," and then going on to set forth some of the serious considerations to which the situation gave rise. "These two armies," he says, "confront each other across a small river, substantially midway between the two capitals, each defending its own capital, and menacing the other. General Meade estimates the enemy's infantry in front of him at not less than 40,000. Suppose we add fifty per cent. to this for cavalry, artillery, and extra-duty men stretching as far as Richmond, making the whole force of the enemy 60,000. General Meade, as shown by the returns, has with him, and between him and Washington, of the same classes of well men, over 90,000. Neither can bring the whole of his men into a battle; but each can bring as large a percentage in as the other. For a battle, then, General Meade has three men to General Lee's two. Yet, it having been determined that choosing ground and standing on the defensive gives so great advantage that the three cannot safely attack the two, the three are left simply standing on the defensive also. If the enemy's 60,000 are sufficient to keep our 90,000 away from Richmond, why, by the same rule, may not 40,000 of ours keep their 60,000 away from Washington, leaving us 50,000 to put to some other use? Having practically come to the mere defensive, it seems to be no economy at all to employ twice as many men for that object as are needed. With no object, certainly, to mislead myself, I can perceive no fault in this statement,

CHAP. IX. unless we admit we are not the equal of the enemy, man for man. I hope you will consider it.

"To avoid misunderstanding, let me say that to attempt to fight the enemy slowly back into his intrenchments at Richmond, and then to capture him, is an idea I have been trying to repudiate for quite a year. My judgment is so clear against it, that I would scarcely allow the attempt to be made if the general in command should desire to make it. My last attempt upon Richmond was to get McClellan, when he was nearer there than the enemy was, to run in ahead of him. Since then I have constantly desired the Army of the Potomac to make Lee's army, and not Richmond, its objective point. If our army cannot fall upon the enemy and hurt him where he is, it is plain to me it can gain nothing by attempting to follow him over a succession of intrenched lines into a fortified city."

Lincoln to Halleck, Sept. 19, 1863. MS. Also W. R. Vol. XXIX., Part II., pp. 207, 208.

While this discussion was going on Longstreet was hastening westward to the help of Bragg; and the combined Confederate armies struck Rosecrans at Chickamauga, as we have seen, on the 19th of September. The battle raged among those hills all that day and the next. Rosecrans retreated to Chattanooga, representing the position of his army as so critical that strong reënforcements were absolutely necessary to enable him to hold that position. Secretary Chase, in his diary, has preserved a record of a conference in relation to this matter, held at the War Department, on the 24th, between the President, the General-in-Chief, and the Secretaries of War, State, and the Treasury. Mr. Stanton asked General Halleck what reënforcements Burnside could add to Rosecrans and in what time.

1863.

Sept., 1863.

Halleck replied twenty thousand men in ten days, if uninterrupted. The President then said: "Before ten days Burnside will put in enough to hold the place. . . After Burnside begins to arrive the pinch will be over." Halleck thought that in about ten days Sherman's advance would reach Rosecrans; there were a few available troops in Kentucky. Stanton proposed to send at once thirty thousand from the Army of the Potomac; he was growing impatient at General Meade's inactivity, and thought the army was doing no good where it was. The President was unwilling to weaken Meade so much as that, and had doubts about its being possible to convey so large a force to Rosecrans in time; the Secretaries of State and of the Treasury sided with Stanton, however, and it was at length agreed that Halleck should telegraph to Meade in the morning; and if an immediate advance was not certain the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps, about thirteen thousand men, should be sent westward at once, under Hooker, with Butterfield as his chief-of-staff.

CHAP. IX. 1863.

Warden, "Life of Salmon P. Chase," pp. 550, 551.

But, even with this reduction of his command, after the return of the troops detached to the North, Meade found himself with an army of about 68,000 men; and, knowing this force to be somewhat superior to that of the enemy, he resolved to cross the Rapidan and attack him; but again, as so often happened in the history of the contending armies in Virginia, Lee had formed the project of a similar enterprise, and began its execution a day or two in advance. He had learned of the departure of two corps for the West, and on the 5th of October the Second Corps, of which General Warren had been

1863.

CHAP. IX. put in command, and which had been stationed for some time at Miller's, a point nearest the enemy, was marched back to Culpeper; this mere shifting of a camp probably gave General Lee the idea that another corps had been detached from the Army of the Potomac; for, four days afterwards, he began a flanking movement to the right of the Union line.

Lee, Report, Oct. 23, 1863. W. R. Vol. XXIX., Part I., p. 410.

General Lee's report leaves no doubt of his purpose in this march. He says it was made "with the design of bringing on an engagement with the Federal army" in a position, of course, favorable to himself. He was again possessed of the project, which he had already three times essayed with more or less incomplete success, of coming upon the rear of the National forces, destroying them in battle, and conquering a peace under the shadow of the Capitol. Now, as before, he was willing to risk the loss of Richmond in the hope of gaining the more splendid prize, and in this it cannot be said that his calculations were anything but wise. General Longstreet reports him as using, about this time, the expression which has been quoted before in regard to "swapping queens." He advanced by way of Madison Court House, and by "circuitous and concealed roads in order to avoid the observation of the enemy," and arrived at Culpeper Court House on the 11th, where he was surprised to find that General Meade, discovering his march and guessing its intentions, had already retired behind the Rappahannock. General Meade, who had been preparing himself to move upon the left flank of his adversary, became aware of the movement of Lee upon the 10th; but he was ill served by his

Swinton, "Army of the Potomac," p. 377.

1863.

Humphreys, Testimony, Report Committee on Conduct of the War, 1864–65. Part I., p. 399

cavalry. During the first days of this campaign the mounted service of the Army of the Potomac was decidedly below its usual average of efficiency and intelligence, while Stuart seemed to have recovered all his former powers on the soil of his native State; his zeal was even excessive; General Lee gently rebuked him on one occasion for having sent him eight messages in one day.

Cooke, "Life of General Lee," p. 346.

After a part of Meade's army had crossed the Rappahannock he detached three corps to the south of the river under the mistaken impression, derived from the reports of his cavalry, that the main body of the enemy was still on that side; but he speedily discovered his error and recalled his troops without misadventure. The halt which Lee was compelled to make at Culpeper to provision his troops gave Meade the opportunity to bring his army well together north of the Rappahannock and to inform himself thoroughly of the attitude of his enemy. General Lee distinctly states his purpose of marching upon the Orange and Alexandria Railroad north of the river and intercepting the retrograde movement of Meade. It was therefore a race for position between the two generals. Lee, relying upon the celerity of his troops and his own absolute knowledge of every path and by-way of the country, hoped to reach a point upon General Meade's communications where he could establish his army in a favorable position and force Meade to fight for his life. Meade, on the other hand, misled by all the indications he could gather into the belief that the point which Lee especially desired to reach was Centreville, determined to anticipate him in the occupation of that place, and

Warren, Testimony, Committee Report on Conduct of the War, 1864–65. Part I., p. 383.

CHAP. IX. moved his army with all possible speed in that direction.

The Army of the Potomac never showed more remarkable qualities than in this singular campaign. General Lee had ordered his whole force to move in two columns upon Bristoe Station, but before they arrived General Meade's entire army had passed there on their way to Centreville, with the exception of the Second Corps which formed his rear-guard. The advance of A. P. Hill's corps reached that point just as Warren arrived, and as the rear of the Fifth Corps was marching away to the north of Broad Run, Hill prepared to make short work of the Federal rear-guard. A brief but stubborn engagement ensued, resulting in a complete and brilliant victory for Warren and his gallant subordinate, General A. S. Webb. They repulsed Hill's attack, wounding three of his generals, killing and wounding some five hundred men, and capturing as many more, with numerous guns and flags. Having thus thoroughly beaten back the enemy, Warren, in pursuance of his orders, crossed the stream unmolested and joined General Meade at Centreville. General Lee, coming on the field after the engagement ended, surveyed with deep disappointment and melancholy the conclusion of the campaign from which he had expected so different a result. Hill, depressed and mortified at his mishap, endeavored to explain to him the causes of his failure. "Lee," says a Southern biographer, "listened in silence as they rode among the bodies of his dead soldiers and replied, 'Well, well, bury these poor men, and let us say no more about it.'"

John R. Cooke, W. W. Kirkland, and C. Posey.

John Esten Cooke, "Life of General Lee," p. 355.



GENERAL ALEXANDER S. WEBB.

General Lee made no pretense of any further pursuit. He had failed in securing a battle upon ground chosen by himself and he was not willing to repeat the experience of Gettysburg in attacking the Army of the Potomac in position. After doing what damage was in his power to the railroad he turned back on the 18th towards the line of the Rappahannock, leaving the cavalry to skirmish for a few days longer with that of the Army of the Potomac. It was a movement in which, with the exception of Warren's fight at Bristoe, no great credit was won by either side. General Lee, whose easy victories over McClellan, Burnside, and Hooker had bred in the minds of his fellow-citizens of the South an idea of his invincibility, was severely criticized for returning from the frontier without a battle, and General Meade, whose successful manœuvre had thwarted the scheme of Lee's campaign, was bitterly and most unjustly attacked in the North for what appeared to many a causeless retreat. But it seems to be the better opinion of military critics, that his action, if perhaps lacking in enterprise and daring, was in a high degree prudent and discreet. He believed that Lee was advancing with the purpose of fighting, and in this belief he was correct, as this purpose is avowed in Lee's report. He therefore manœuvred to select a position where he would have the advantage, and he selected one with such judgment that Lee declined to attack it. He might indeed have concentrated his entire army at Bristoe Station and obtained on a grander scale a victory as brilliant as that which Warren gained there, but he thought Lee was moving upon Cen-

CHAP. IX. Oct., 1863.

CHAP. IX.

treville, and it is probable that the associations of the Bull Run battlefield made that neighborhood appear to him of evil omen for a decisive contest.

A. A. Humphreys, "Gettysburg to the Rapidan," p. 20. Oct. 16, 1863.

While he waited in vain for Lee's attack in his lines at Centreville, the President wrote the following letter to General Halleck: "I do not believe Lee can have over sixty thousand effective men. Longstreet's corps would not be sent away to bring an equal force back upon the same road, and there is no other direction for them to have come from. Doubtless in making the present movement Lee gathered in all available scraps and added them to Hill's and Ewell's corps; but that is all. And he made the movement in the belief that four corps had left General Meade; and General Meade's apparently avoiding a collision with him has confirmed him in that belief. If General Meade can now attack him on a field no worse than equal for us, and will do so with all the skill and courage, which he, his officers, and men possess, the honor will be his if he succeeds, and the blame may be mine if he fails." Fortified by this order, Meade moved forward as Lee retired; the broken railroads were rapidly repaired, and early in the first days of the following month Meade was again prepared for an active campaign. Everything being made ready, on the 7th of November the movement was begun with such efficiency, celerity, and success that its subsequent failure was the occasion of deep disappointment.

Lincoln to Halleck, Oct. 16, 1863. MS.

1863.

The right wing of Lee's army was stationed upon the Rappahannock, stretching from the bridge at Rappahannock Station to Kelly's Ford. The Federal army moved in two columns; General French

commanding the left wing, and Sedgwick the right. The left crossed the river at Kelly's Ford, capturing the enemy's rifle-pits and a large number of prisoners on the other side, and advanced, almost unresisted, until ordered to halt to await the movement of the right wing, which had met with far more serious resistance at Rappahannock Station. The enemy at that place occupied the northern bank of the river with a strong line of fortifications. They held General Sedgwick's force in check there during the entire afternoon, but towards night General D. A. Russell, in command of his own brigade and Colonel Emory Upton's, proposed to storm the works in the gathering darkness, and receiving permission, attacked with such vigor and skill as to create in the minds of the enemy the impression of a vastly superior force. Under cover of the twilight he led his brave troops inside the Confederate works, and in a hand-to-hand scuffle, which lasted about half an hour, he completely overpowered, almost without bloodshed, a force fully equal to his own. CHAP. IX.

General Lee, who had been standing with General Early on the southern bank as night came on, watching the progress of the fight, thought from the cessation of the firing that the Federal attack had been repulsed until the fugitives, rushing over the bridge or coming up dripping from the icy river, where they had been swimming, announced to him the story of the disaster. The Confederate brigades of General H. T. Hays's division which were thus summarily overpowered were commanded by Colonel D. B. Penn and Colonel A. C. Godwin. Hays himself surrendered, but after-



MAP OF THE FIELD OF OPERATIONS OF NOVEMBER, 1863.

wards made his escape under cover of the darkness and tumult, in company with some hundreds of his troops, who had also surrendered. The extent of the panic and confusion which accompanied this extraordinary feat of arms may be imagined from a single detail of General Hays's report; he magnified Russell's and Upton's enterprising little column of 3000 men into "20,000 or 25,000." His loss in killed was two men. General Early's loss, including that of the artillery, was six killed, thirty-nine wounded, and 1629 missing. General Lee reports the loss of General Rodes at Kelly's Ford as five killed, fifty-nine wounded, and 295 missing The campaign began and ended with this brilliant day's work. The next day, being thick and misty, was wasted in ineffective reconnaissances, and General Lee, retiring, concentrated his army behind the Rapidan, where it was not considered advisable to follow him.[1] CHAP. IX.

A fortnight passed away, during which time there was little expectation of an attack from either side. The season was growing late, and it was reasonable to expect that both armies would go into winter quarters and postpone any movements on a large scale until spring. General Lee had scattered his army, for greater convenience of subsistence, over a large extent of country. His left wing, heavily intrenched, rested upon Mine Run, a NOV., 1863.

[1] The following is from a trustworthy Confederate authority. John Esten Cooke, in his life of General Lee, p. 359, says: "General Lee retired before him [Meade] with a heavy heart and a deep melancholy, which, in spite of his great control over himself, was visible in his countenance. The infantry fighting of the campaign had begun and ended in disaster for him; in the thirty days he had lost at least 2000, and was back again in his old camp, having achieved absolutely nothing."

CHAP. IX. little tributary of the Rapidan; the rest of Ewell's corps was stationed from that point to Orange Court House, while Hill's right wing lay several miles further along, and his left extended almost to Charlottesville.

NOV., 1863. During this fortnight General Meade's mind was busily occupied with an enterprising and daring plan for an aggressive campaign. He proposed to throw his army across the Rapidan by the lower fords, which were entirely unguarded, to turn the enemy's right, and, attacking his works in reverse, to fight Ewell's corps before Hill should be able to concentrate on it. He intended to cut loose entirely from his base, to provision his army with ten days' rations in their knapsacks, to take with him the least possible amount of artillery and baggage, and to travel, in short, in the lightest marching order. The plan, bold as it was, was not impracticable, and deserved a better issue than it met. He had, according to his own account, between 60,000 and 70,000 men equipped and armed ready to bring into battle; he estimated the force of General Lee at some 8000 to 10,000 fewer, which was not far from the fact. The marching qualities of his army had been sufficiently tested during the autumn; he thought he could calculate accurately upon the distance they could march in a given time, and he knew that, man for man, they were as good soldiers as any in the world. It was reasonable, therefore, for him to expect success in a plan which he had carefully elaborated down to the smallest detail. He knew how far up Mine Run the enemy's fortifications extended; he believed that he could march around them in a day, and

compel a portion of Lee's army to meet him in an open field, or in as near an approach to one as that wilderness country could furnish. CHAP. IX.

He had fixed upon the 23d of November as the day to start, but was prevented by a storm, which caused him to postpone the movement until the 26th. His first disappointment occurred at the very beginning. Major-General French was again tardy; he arrived at the Rapidan later than the time assigned him, which delayed the entire movement three hours. The banks of the river proved more precipitous than was expected, and the river itself was a little broader than the engineers had reported; the banks had to be graded, and the pontoon bridges patched with trestle-work; these various causes of delay wasted half a day, and the bewildered movement of General French's corps the next day, after the army had crossed the Rapidan and the other corps had taken the positions assigned them, was again the cause of the loss of several hours. By the time the whole army was brought into position in front of Mine Run, on the 28th, the results of this delay and of the use which the enemy had made of it were clearly apparent. 1863.

Humphreys, "Gettysburg to the Rapidan," p. 63.

From the moment when Meade's approach to the Rapidan was signaled to General Lee he began the most energetic measures to meet it. He issued an address to his army, which, in its acrid tone, shows how much his own spirit, naturally generous and amiable, had been embittered by his recent lack of success. "The cruel enemy," he says, "seeks to reduce our fathers and our mothers, our wives and our children, to abject slavery; to strip them of their property, and drive them from their

CHAP. IX. homes. Upon you these helpless ones rely to avert these terrible calamities, and to secure to them the blessings of liberty and safety." But his reliance was, of course, not in these angry manifestoes. He brought up his scattered troops with the greatest possible expedition; his left wing was already well intrenched, and he began upon his center and his right a series of those improvised fortifications which afterwards proved so deadly to the army of Grant. He doubled his functions of general-in-chief with those of a lieutenant of engineers; riding along his lines, he indicated with his own hand the positions to be occupied; he even directed the working parties, who, with incredible celerity, were felling trees and constructing abatis. A. P. Hill's seasoned veterans built all along the line of Mine Run double walls of logs, which they rapidly filled with earth, constructing in this way, in the space of a few hours, miles of cannon-proof bulwarks shoulder high.

NOV., 1863. When, therefore, on the morning of the 29th, Meade and Warren, themselves the most accomplished engineers in the Federal army, surveyed the scene before them and the work they had to do, they recognized at once the new difficulties born of the delay of the last twenty-four hours. But Warren, after a careful reconnaissance of the extreme left, was convinced that it was still possible, by a rapid movement in that direction, to overlap the enemy's right, and to make an attack there with a reasonable prospect of success. He was sent, therefore, with his corps, increased by a division of the Sixth, to move upon the enemy's right flank, and, if possible, to outflank

and turn him. As the short autumn day drew to a close, Meade received from the right and the left the most encouraging reports as to the feasibility of the attack to be made in the morning from both those directions. General Sedgwick thought there was a weak point on the extreme right, and Warren, on the left, was still stronger and more emphatic in his opinion that he would have no difficulty in turning the enemy. French, who occupied the center, was more doubtful about his prospects of success, and Meade, therefore, took some of his troops and added them to Warren, intending to rely upon the attack made by the two wings, retaining the center merely as a corps of observation.

CHAP. IX.

Nov. 30, 1863.

Meade, Testimony. Report Committee on Conduct of the War, 1865. Part I., p. 345.

Both armies waited in intense excitement through the long wintry night for an attack, which each expected to begin at dawn of the next day. Sedgwick was ready, and his attack was just beginning when there arrived from Warren, instead of the echo of his opening guns for which Meade was waiting, a dispatch, stating that on examining the enemy's lines by daylight they presented so formidable an appearance that he was sure an attack would result in nothing but disaster. He therefore assumed the grave responsibility of suspending his movement, and of requesting General Meade to join him on the ground for a further survey of the situation. Meade rode over to Warren, and on looking at the heights on the farther side of the run, bristling all over with fortifications, which seemed to have sprung up as if by magic as soon as Warren's corps came upon the ground, he concurred in the view of his lieutenant, and countermanded the attack.

Ibid., p. 346.

CHAP. IX.

This opinion of the generals in command received a silent but most significant confirmation in the action of the veteran soldiers of the Second Corps. Wishing to inform themselves in regard to the work expected of them, as soon as the gray light of the wintry dawn rendered surrounding objects visible they crept forward, working their way like serpents through the tangled brushwood, until they could see the murderous-looking fortifications beyond the run. Taking account of these fatal obstacles, they crawled noiselessly back to their ranks, and writing their names on bits of paper, they pinned them to their blouses. There was not a murmur of fear or of mutiny among them, but by this mute and touching demonstration they testified at once to their intelligent appreciation of the hopeless task before them, and their readiness to meet an almost certain death in the discharge of their duty.[1]

It was now out of the question to send Sedgwick in alone upon the right; and to draw a large force, under Warren, from the left, for the purpose of reenforcing him, would have occupied so much time that the enemy, with that amazing facility for intrenching which they had displayed within the last few days, would have made their strong line still stronger before Warren could arrive.

[1] This incident has been treated as a legend by some writers — the Comte de Paris says: "les legendes se font vite" — but it is strictly true. General Webb says, in a letter to one of the writers of this work: "At Mine Run the soldiers of my division did creep to the front and determine their chances to take the rebel line. Upon examination of the works in their front they did pin papers, on which they inscribed their names, to their blouses. Had the order been sent we would have gone in with a rush, but there was very little prospect of our succeeding."

Webb to Hay. MS.

If General Meade had chosen in this situation to throw his army upon the intrenched force of Lee, and if he had carried those works with the loss of half his force, he would have gained a vast access of popularity. If he had attacked and failed and brought back to the north of the river, as he might easily have done, his broken and shattered forces, he still would have had the credit which is always given to unsuccessful valor. He chose the wiser and more difficult course to acknowledge his campaign a failure, and to bring back his army safe and sound from the unfortunate venture. Without a moment's hesitation, after resolving upon this course, he carried it out with the greatest skill and energy; and General Lee rising the next morning, and looking forward with exultation to the victory which he imagined already in his grasp, found that the Army of the Potomac had vanished from before him like an exhalation. So sure had he been of his strength and of his position that, on the night of the 1st of December, when one of his generals asked what course should be pursued in case the enemy should not attack, he at once replied, "They must be attacked." He had, it is said, even arranged a plan for an offensive movement against the Union left flank, but Meade had conducted his retrograde movement so promptly and rapidly that no efficient pursuit was possible.

CHAP. IX.

1863.

Cooke, "Life of General Lee," p. 369.

After Mine Run the army went into winter quarters. A few scattered raids and reconnaissances broke the monotony of the next months, the most important of which was a cavalry expedition moving through Virginia under command of General Kilpatrick. It started on the 28th of February, and

1864.

CHAP. IX. struck the Virginia Central Railroad at Beaver Dam, sending parties out to destroy roads and bridges, and on the 1st of March came in view of the fortifications of Richmond. The bold troopers excited great terror and panic in the Confederate capital, but, as a matter of course, could do nothing against the system of works by which it was surrounded. Some damage was done, but nothing compensating for the cost and loss of the expedition, among which the most grievous was the death of Colonel Ulric Dahlgren, son of the admiral, whose personal gifts and graces of character, no less than his distinguished gallantry and talents as an officer, had greatly endeared him to the President, and promised a most brilliant future. In the course of the raid he became separated from the main body, and was surrounded and killed with most of his men.

No better review of the lost opportunities of this campaign can probably be made than that in which, in few words, General Warren, before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, enumerated the occasions which, in his opinion, had been missed. "I think we should have advanced on the evening
1863. of the 3d of July, after the enemy were repulsed at Gettysburg, with all the force we had on our left. I think we should have attacked the enemy at Williamsport on the morning of the 12th of July; . . . we lost another opportunity at Manassas Gap on the 23d of July, while the enemy was retreating; . . . another when the enemy attacked me, on the 14th of October, at Bristoe; . . . we lost a good opportunity after we recrossed the Rappahannock on the 8th of November; and another . . . was lost in not

making the junction we should have made at Robertson's Tavern [before Mine Run] on the 27th of November"; but, he continued, and in this opinion most impartial critics will agree with him, "nearly all these delays and failures I think are due not so much to General Meade as to his plans and expectations not being carried out"; and in another place he gave as a reason for the failure of the army to carry out promptly and efficiently the plans of its general, the loss at Gettysburg of its three best corps commanders: Reynolds by death, Hancock by wounds, and Meade by promotion.

Warren, Testimony. Report Committee on Conduct of the War, 1865. Part I., p. 387.

CHAPTER X

FOREIGN RELATIONS IN 1863

CHAP. X. THE correspondence between the British and the American governments did not cease with the escape of the *Alabama.* Mr. Seward and Mr. Adams, throughout the year 1863, kept up a vigorous and persistent reclamation upon the English Government, holding them responsible for all the damages consequent upon what they regarded as their neglect to prevent the violation of neutrality involved in the sailing of this corsair from Liverpool. Lord Russell wrote several elaborate dispatches, endeavoring to prove that the British Government had been guilty of no neglect, and was not responsible for any damage committed by the Confederate cruisers; but he never argued the subject at such length as the American statesmen; he usually contented himself with brief notes couched in a tone of constantly increasing resentment and annoyance, disclaiming all responsibility for any acts of the
1863. *Alabama;* and at last, on the 14th of September, saying to Mr. Adams: "When the United States Government assume to hold the Government of Great Britain responsible for the captures made by vessels which may be fitted out as vessels of war in a foreign port, because such vessels were

originally built in a British port, I have to observe that such pretensions are entirely at variance with the principles of international law and with the decisions of American courts of the highest authority, and I have only, in conclusion, to express my hope that you may not be instructed again to put forward claims which her Majesty's Government cannot admit to be founded on any grounds of law or justice." CHAP. X.

To this Mr. Seward answered on the 6th of October, in a dispatch remarkable for its dignity, its force, and its calm and friendly tone. After a terse restatement of the facts in the case, and the law applicable to them, he said that the United States had insisted, and must continue to insist, that the British Government was justly responsible for the damages which the peaceful, law-abiding citizens of the United States sustained by the depredations of the *Alabama*. "I cannot, therefore," he says, "instruct you to refrain from presenting the claims which you have now in your hands of the character indicated"; at the same time he admits the difficulties and embarrassments under which her Majesty's Government are laboring, and confesses that he does not regard the present hour as one that is entirely favorable to calm and candid examination of either the facts or the principles involved in such cases. He looks forward to a future time for a fuller and more satisfactory discussion of these matters, and directs the American envoy to inform Earl Russell that he must continue to give him notice of these claims as they arise, and to furnish him the evidence upon which they rest, in order to guard against ultimate failure of justice. 1863.

Seward to Adams.

CHAP. X.

Lord Russell replied in a similar friendly temper, saying that her Majesty's Government did not contend for the principle of equipping vessels in their ports "to cruise against either of the belligerent parties," but said they "must decline to be responsible for the acts of parties who fit out a seeming merchant-ship, send her to a port, or to waters far from the jurisdiction of British courts, and there commission, equip, and man her as a vessel of war. Her Majesty's Government fear," he continued, "that if an admitted principle were thus made elastic to suit a particular case, the trade of ship-building, in which our people excel, and which is to great numbers of them a source of honest livelihood, would be seriously embarrassed and impeded."

Earl Russell to Mr. Adams, Oct. 26, 1863.

But while this discussion was proceeding the work of fitting out Confederate cruisers in British ports went steadily on. In April, 1863, a steamer called the *Japan*, afterwards known as the *Georgia*, left the Clyde with the intent to depredate on the commerce of the United States, and in the spring of the same year the same firm which had built the *Florida* launched at their yard in Liverpool a new gunboat, to which the name of *Alexandra* was given. It was apparent to the least attentive observer that this was a vessel of war, and the evidence was overwhelming that it was intended for the insurgents of the Southern States. In this case the British Government acted promptly and an information was filed by the Attorney-General on behalf of the Queen against the ship and the builders.

"Papers relating to Treaty of Washington." Vol. I., p. 105.

Ibid.

1863.

The case came on for trial in June and was prosecuted with energy and ability by the Attorney-General. The testimony upon which he relied

went to prove that the vessel was constructed for a ship of war; that gun-carriages and other warlike equipment were being made for her; that her builders had declared she was being built for the Confederate States, and that the persons who contracted for her and supervised her construction were Confederate agents. Yet in spite of this weight of evidence and of the authority of the Government which was doubtless exercised in good faith, the Lord Chief Baron gave this amazing instruction to the jury: "If you think the object really was to build a ship in obedience to orders and in compliance with a contract, leaving it to those who bought it to make what use they thought fit of it, then it appears to me that the Foreign Enlistment Act has not in any degree been broken"; on which the jury, of course, returned a verdict for the defendants. The case was at once appealed, and proceedings followed which were extremely interesting from a legal point of view, but without further practical result which need be noticed, except that the *Alexandra* never passed into the Confederate service. CHAP. X.

Mr. Seward rightly acknowledged the honor and good faith with which the British Government had attempted to prevent the fitting out of this vessel to prey on American commerce and said, pending the appeal, "The President is not prepared to believe that the judiciary of Great Britain will with well-considered judgment render nugatory and void a statute of the realm which, with its counterpart in our own legislation, has hitherto been regarded by both nations as a guarantee of that mutual forbearance which is so essential to

CHAP. X.

the preservation of peace and friendship. If the ruling of the Lord Chief Baron was to stand, the inference would be that there was no law in England to prevent the unlimited employment of British capital, industry, and skill to make war from British ports against the United States."

Undeterred, we might rather say encouraged, by these proceedings, the eminent ship-builder Laird, at Birkenhead, proceeded during this same summer in the construction for the Confederates of two iron-clad rams more formidable than anything hitherto attempted in England. In the middle of July Mr. Adams communicated these facts to Lord Russell, saying, "A war has thus been practically conducted by a portion of her people against a government with which her Majesty is under the most solemn of all national engagements to preserve a lasting and durable peace." A month later Mr. Adams wrote again in a tone of the gravest warning, giving information of the progress of the work upon these vessels, and again, on the 3d of September, he sent to the Secretary for Foreign Affairs further depositions, showing that they were nearing completion and stating that he had been directed to describe the grave nature of the situation in which both countries must be placed, in the event of an aggression committed against the Government and the people of the United States by either of these formidable vessels.

1863.

"Papers relating to the Treaty of Washington." Vol. I., p. 107.

The next day he informed the Foreign Office that one of the rams was preparing to leave the port, and on the same day he received a note from Lord Russell, already three days old, giving the discouraging and alarming answer that "Her

Majesty's Government are advised that they cannot interfere in any way with these vessels." Mr. Adams at once replied, expressing his profound regret at this conclusion, and added in words of solemn warning which are rarely heard except on the eve of actual hostilities, "It would be superfluous in me to point out to your Lordship that this is war." But on the 8th of September he received a note announcing a determination which saved Europe and America from incalculable evils, that instructions had been issued which would prevent the departure of the two iron-clad vessels from Liverpool. The Government finally bought them, and they were taken into the royal navy under the names of the *Scorpion* and the *Wyvern*.

CHAP. X.

Sept. 1, 1863.

Sept. 5.

It is difficult, looking back over the lapse of a score of years, after all these controversies have been peacefully and happily settled, and the two great nations have been united in a friendship stronger and more durable than ever, to appreciate all the causes of such action on the part of the British Government during the summer of 1863. Their disinclination to perform fully and with a cordial spirit their obligations towards the Government of the United States receives some explanation from the utterances of prominent British statesmen in Parliament, and on the hustings during the year. It was not only the consideration alluded to in Lord Russell's dispatch quoted above, that it was to the advantage of British trade and British commerce to observe a strict neutrality, which led them to the course they pursued. The attitude ascribed to the British Government, by Mr. Rolin-Jacquemyns, of the judge in the fable

CHAP. X.

who gives a shell to each of the parties in the suit, reserving the oyster for himself, preserving strict neutrality, but fattening himself at the expense of both parties, does less than justice to the intentions of the statesmen of Great Britain. The one fact which we must keep constantly in view is that they disbelieved in the possibility of the restoration of the Union, and, therefore, however little they may have sympathized with the purposes of a Confederacy founded upon slavery as its corner-stone, they were unwilling to place themselves in an attitude of positive hostility to a Government which they honestly believed themselves bound to recognize sooner or later.

As early as the autumn of 1861 Lord Russell said in a public speech that the "North was fighting for empire and the South for independence"; that if the South came back to the Union the fatal question of slavery would still remain a source of discord, and that if the Federal Government should conquer the South, the national prosperity would in this way be destroyed. A year later, Mr. Gladstone announced from the same platform that Jefferson Davis and the Southern leaders had "made a nation"; that the success of the Southern States, so far as regards their separation from the North, was "as certain as any event yet future and contingent could be"; and in February, 1863, Lord Russell said from his place in the House of Lords that the subjugation of the South by the North would prove a calamity to the United States and to the world, and especially calamitous to the negro race in those countries. On the 30th of June in the same year, only three days before the crowning victories of

"Papers relating to the Treaty of Washington." Vol. I., p. 41.

Speech at Newcastle, Oct. 7, 1862.

1863.

Gettysburg and Vicksburg, Mr. Gladstone said: "We do not believe that the restoration of the American Union by force is attainable," and added that he "did not believe a more fatal error was ever committed than when men of high intelligence . . . came to the conclusion that the emancipation of the negro race was to be sought, although they could only travel to it by a sea of blood." During the same debate Lord Palmerston took John Bright to task for indulging in what he considered an absurd and fantastical idea, "that the Union was still in existence; that there were not in America two belligerent parties, but a legitimate Government and a rebellion against that Government." CHAP. X.

Not until the final catastrophe came did the most intelligent and far-seeing British statesmen, even among those who were at heart friendly to the United States, admit the possibility of the complete triumph of the National arms. Among the leaders of the Conservative party in England there was no concealment of their intense hostility to the National cause. One spoke with exultation of the "bursting of the bubble republic"; another, now Marquis of Salisbury, said "the people of the South were the natural allies of England, as great producers of the articles we needed, and great consumers of the articles we supplied. The North, on the other hand, kept an opposition shop in the same department of trade as ourselves."

After the seizure and sale of the Confederate rams in the British ports it became evident to the Richmond Government that the British Isles could no longer be made the base of naval operations, and the refusal of the English Cabinet to join in the

CHAP. X. 1863. overtures of mediation proposed by Napoleon III. destroyed the last hope entertained by the Confederates of recognition by England. Mr. Davis, in his message of the 7th of December, indulged in a bitter outbreak of resentment against the British Government. "Great Britain," he said, "has . . . entertained with that Government [the United States] the closest and most intimate relations, while refusing, on its demand, ordinary amicable intercourse with us, and has, under arrangements made with the other nations of Europe, not only denied our just claim of admission into the family of nations, but interposed a passive, though effectual, bar to the acknowledgment of our rights by other powers. So soon as it had become apparent," he continued, " . . . that her Majesty's Government was determined to persist indefinitely in a course of policy which, under professions of neutrality, had become subservient to the designs of our enemy, I felt it my duty to recall the commissioners formerly accredited to that court."

Message of Jefferson Davis, 2d Session Confederate Congress, 1863.

A few months later this feeling of resentment was aroused to absolute fury by a letter which Mr. Davis received from the British Legation in Washington conveying a communication from Lord Russell, in which a "formal protest and remonstrance of her Majesty's Government" was made against "the efforts of the authorities of the so-called Confederate States to build war vessels within her Majesty's dominions to be employed against the Government of the United States." "After consulting with the law officers of the crown," said Earl Russell, "her Majesty's Government have come to the decision that agents of the

authorities of the so-called Confederate States have been engaged in building vessels which would be at least partially equipped for war purposes on leaving the ports of this country; that these war vessels would undoubtedly be used against the United States, a country with which this Government is at peace; that this would be a violation of the neutrality laws of the realm, and that the Government of the United States would have just ground for serious complaint against her Majesty's Government should they permit such an infraction of the amicable relations now subsisting between the two countries."

Lord Lyons to Jefferson Davis, April 1, 1864. "Annual Cyclopædia," p. 557.

The rest of the dispatch was couched in courteous and even kindly terms; but this could not compensate for the injurious substance of the communication, and what was to Mr. Davis the intolerable outrage of the phrase, "the so-called Confederate States." He disdained to make any formal reply, but wrote by the hand of his private secretary an angry response, saying: "Were, indeed, her Majesty's Government sincere in a desire and determination to maintain neutrality, the President could not but feel that it would neither be just nor gallant to allow the subjugation of a nation like the Confederate States by such a barbarous, despotic race as are now attempting it." As the three parties concerned belong to precisely the same race, Mr. Davis's furious epithets must have seemed to Lord Russell rather more ludicrous than forcible. The letter goes on to say in an equal confusion of facts and of grammar: "As for the specious arguments on the subject of the rams advanced by Earl Russell, the President desires

Apr. 6, 1864.

CHAP. X.

me to state that he is content to leave the world and history to pronounce judgment upon this attempt to heap injury upon insult by declaring that her Majesty's Government and law officers are satisfied of the questions involved, while those questions are still before the highest legal tribunal of the kingdom, composed of members of the Government and the highest law officers of the crown, for their decision. The President himself will not condescend to notice them."

"Annual Cyclopædia," 1864, p. 557.

Mr. Mason gave up his residence in London with great regret. He had grown accustomed to the official neglect with which he was treated, and greatly enjoyed the hospitality of those whose sympathies, or rather whose animosities, were with the South. But the orders from Richmond were positive; so he shut up his Legation in Seymour street and set out for Paris, unconsoled by the answer to his letter of farewell, in which Lord Russell said: "I regret that circumstances have prevented my cultivating your personal acquaintance which, in a different state of affairs, I should have done with much pleasure and satisfaction." Mr. Mason afterwards called himself "Confederate Commissioner on the Continent," but the title was not satisfying. He kept coming furtively back to London, continually hoping for an invitation to plead his cause in an unofficial manner before some member of the Government.

Mason to Benjamin, July 14, 1864. MS., Confederate Archives.

At last, through the intervention of W. S. Lindsay, M. P., he obtained an interview with Lord Palmerston. This long-desired privilege put him in the highest spirits; he could not have talked with more vigor and enjoyment if he had been in the

smoking-room of the Senate. He talked only too much and too well. Lord Palmerston's proceeding was cruelly Socratic. He confined himself to questions, and the answers came in a flood. Mr. Mason told him the war would end with this campaign; that the North could not replenish its armies; enlistments had ceased, and they dared not draft. In reply to Palmerston's innocent inquiry what they would do with Washington, after they had captured it, he replied that it would be destroyed, not vindictively, but to keep the enemy at a distance. The defeat of Grant and of Sherman, which he assumed as a matter of course, would be followed by anarchy in the North, which would probably prevent any election from being held; if held Lincoln would be defeated. Now, then, was the time for Europe to intervene and insist upon peace; the North itself would look upon such action as a godsend; the Government would be powerless before the masses insisting on a peace. "I thought both he and I," said Mr. Mason, "could form a safe opinion as to the probable effect of such interposition, when we looked at the broken and disintegrated condition of the North, broken into factions, its finances in ruins, and unable to replenish its army." CHAP. X.

Lord Palmerston replied that since Mr. Mason was of the opinion that the crisis was at hand, it might be better to wait until it had arrived. He had to be content with the true humorist's appreciation of his own joke, for Mr. Mason saw no gibe in the grave words, but reported them complacently to Richmond, expressing the hope that "good might come" of the interview.

There was a marked difference in our relations

CHAP. X.

with the powers on either side of the Channel. While an air of recrimination and almost of menace pervaded our correspondence with England, while the public speakers in that country and in this indulged in the bitterest taunts and reproaches, a tone of superficial friendliness characterized all our intercourse with the court of the Tuileries, and hardly an expression except those of commonplace amity can be found in the utterances of the public speakers of the United States and France in regard to each other. But as a matter of fact, the Government of the Emperor was intensely hostile to the Union cause, and his smooth phrases of cordial courtesy to our representative served to mask a series of plots, equally treacherous and nugatory, against the United States.

The Emperor Napoleon, in his address of the 12th of January, 1863, to the expiring Legislature, referred in these words to his efforts at intervention in America: "I have made the attempt to send beyond the Atlantic advices inspired by a sincere sympathy, but the great maritime powers not having thought it advisable as yet to act in concert with me, I have been obliged to postpone to a more suitable opportunity the offer of mediation, the object of which was to stop the effusion of blood, and to prevent the exhaustion of a country the future of which cannot be looked upon with indifference"; and in November of the same year, a new legislative body having been elected, he attempted to defend in one paragraph his much criticized expeditions to the two ends of the world, Mexico and Cochin China. "How," he said, "could

"Annual Cyclopædia," 1863, p. 417.

we develop our foreign commerce, if on the one side, we were to renounce all influence in America, and if on the other, in presence of immense territories occupied by the Spanish and Dutch, France alone remain without possessions in the Asiatic seas." "Let us, then, have faith," he continued, "in our enterprises beyond the sea. Commenced to avenge our honor, they will terminate in the triumph of our interests; and if prejudiced minds do not divine the fruitfulness inclosed in the germs deposited for the future, let us not tarnish the glory thus acquired, so to speak, at the two extremities of the globe — at Pekin and at Mexico." During the entire year all the official utterances of the Emperor were marked with a spirit of constant kindness and friendship towards the Government of the United States; but the correspondence of the Confederate agents in Paris tells a singular story of treachery and double-dealing on his part, lacking as much in sagacity as in candor.

"Annual Cyclopædia," 1863, p. 419.

Mr. Slidell had arrived in France in the early part of the preceding year accompanied by the momentary prestige of his capture and release, and had at once established close relations with the French Ministry and even with the Tuileries. While no official character was ever accorded him, his correspondence is full of reports of the most intimate conversations between him and the successive Ministers of Foreign Affairs and the Emperor himself, in which it is continually intimated to him that a recognition of the Confederacy is only a question of time, and that it may be expected at an early day. These reports faithfully transmitted to Richmond, excited the liveliest hopes, in the minds

CHAP. X.

of the Confederate leaders, of an immediate introduction into the family of European nations; and though this feeling of complacency was troubled from time to time by apprehensions of the Emperor's covetous intentions in the direction of Texas,[1] which were not entirely unfounded, still the cabinet at Richmond built their strongest hopes upon the benevolent intentions of Napoleon III.

Both Mr. Mason, who was alternately basking in the light of social attentions in London and freezing under the studied reserve of the Government, and Mr. Slidell who was enjoying to the utmost the charm of life in Paris as well as the intimate though unofficial converse of its rulers, agree in all their correspondence of this year and the next, that the French Emperor was willing and anxious to recognize the South if he could only induce England to join with him; and there is little doubt that these assertions had sufficient foundation, though the official denials of both Governments were justified by the fact that no formal or written propositions to that effect from France to England were in existence.

In the autumn of 1862 M. Thouvenel resigned. The Emperor intimated to Mr. Slidell that one

[1] One of the most threatening symptoms of the Emperor's greedy intentions on the Southwest frontier is set forth in a letter from Mr. Benjamin to Mr. Slidell, inclosing a note from M. Theron, the French Consul in Texas to the Governor of that State, dated August 18, 1862, asking the Governor confidentially whether the annexation of Texas to the United States was or was not a politic movement, and whether the junction of Texas to the Southern Confederacy was a politic act, and whether the reëstablishment of the old republic of Texas would not be advisable. This stupid though logical suggestion of the right of secession in one of their own States greatly alarmed the Confederate Government at Richmond, and M. Theron was at once ordered out of the Confederacy bag and baggage.

cause of the change in the Foreign Office was M. Thouvenel's lack of zeal on behalf of the South, a reproach which seems hardly just in view of the friendly conversation reported between the outgoing Minister and the rebel emissary. On one occasion he had declared to Mr. Slidell that the English denial of the French overtures in favor of the South was a "*mauvaise plaisanterie*"; that the matter had been seriously discussed between the two nations and had fallen through on account of the unwillingness of the English to act.

The new Minister, M. Drouyn de l'Huys, was found at first more pliant to the Emperor's wishes in this matter. The attempt at a joint mediation of the three powers, and the final overtures of France alone, were discussed between the Emperor and Mr. Slidell before they were carried into effect, and at an interview about this time the Emperor himself suggested to Slidell the building of a Confederate navy in Europe, a suggestion which the rebel envoy said they would gladly avail themselves of if the Emperor would only give him some verbal assurance that the police would not watch too closely the armament of the vessels; to which Mr. Slidell reports the Emperor as making this shameless and almost incredible response: "Why could you not have them built as for the Italian Government? I do not think it would be difficult, but I will consult the Minister of Marine about it."

Slidell to Benjamin, Oct. 28, 1862. MS., Confederate Archives.

The relations thus set on foot between the Confederate Legation and the officers of the French empire continued in a manner which cannot but excite the amazement of any one who reads the letters of Slidell to his Government. It is impos-

CHAP. X. sible to regard all these reports as a mere mystification, certain in the end to be detected; they must therefore be received with the same credit given to the reports of any other minister to his home government. Mr. Slidell says he kept in his pay an official in the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the knowledge and sanction of M. Drouyn de l'Huys, receiving all the information he needed from this person; the Minister, while he talked freely enough with Mr. Slidell, preferred to say that the building of the ships was a matter out of his jurisdiction, belonging rather to that of the Minister of Commerce, or of Marine; that it was better that he should know nothing of it; and that "he was quite willing to close his eyes until some direct appeal was made to him."

Slidell to Benjamin, Feb. 6 and Mar. 4, 1863.

Ibid.

The Minister of Marine, who was less liable to embarrassing inquiries from Mr. Dayton, was therefore less punctilious in his conversation with Mr. Slidell, and unhesitatingly told him that, if the Confederates built ships of war in French ports they should be permitted to arm and equip them and go to sea. Mr. Slidell further says that on the 23d of February he called by appointment on M. Rouher, Minister of State, a man so powerful in the imperial councils that he was usually called the Vice-Emperor, with M. Voruz, deputy from Nantes, the express object of the visit being to receive from M. Rouher the distinct assurance that "if we were to build ships of war in French ports we should be permitted to arm and equip them and proceed to sea." "This assurance," says Slidell, "was given by him, and so soon as the success of the Erlanger loan is established, I shall write to Messrs. Maury

1863.

and Bulloch recommending them to come here for the purpose of ascertaining whether they can make satisfactory contracts." This Erlanger loan, the most successful of all the financial operations of the Confederates in Europe, was directly promoted by the Emperor in France. After the Minister of Foreign Affairs had declined to permit it to be advertised in the Paris papers, his objections were overcome by the direct command of the Emperor.

Slidell to Benjamin, Mar. 4, 1863.

Considering the reputation which the Emperor enjoyed among the public men of Europe for his supposed talent of keeping his own counsels he exhibited a surprising recklessness in this affair. While giving to Mr. Dayton constant assurances of his friendship for the United States, he talked with the utmost freedom of his warm sympathy toward the Southern cause with Confederate envoys, with Members of Parliament, and even with casual British tourists, who all reported his conversation with the utmost promptitude to Mr. Slidell, or directly to Mr. Davis in Richmond. It was not enough for him to intimate to the rebel envoys that the construction of ships in French ports would be winked at, but he took the manufacturers themselves directly into his confidence. M. Arman, the eminent ship-builder of Bordeaux, went directly to the Emperor and received from him the positive assurance, which he was authorized to convey to Mr. Slidell, that no difficulties would be made in the matter. M. Arman suggested that Mr. Slidell would probably not be satisfied with any assurance he did not receive directly from the Emperor, and asked if an audience could not be granted him for this purpose.

Ibid., April 11, 1863. MS., Confederate Archives.

CHAP. X.

April 14.

Mr. Slidell had already received from the Emperor a most gratifying and characteristic proof of his sympathy. He sent him by the hands of M. Mocquard, his private secretary, a copy of a confidential telegraphic dispatch from Adams to Dayton, advising him of the sailing of the Confederate steamer *Japan* from England to France. The dispatch had been stolen from the wires by the French Government, and by the Emperor himself laid before Mr. Slidell, before it was read by Mr. Dayton. He naturally felt after this so sure of his standing at the Tuileries that Captain Bulloch entered at once into provisional contracts for the building of four corvettes and two ironclads.

Slidell to Benjamin, April 20, 1863.

Ibid., June 20, 1863.

Mr. Slidell obtained his promised interview with the Emperor on the 18th of June. In the course of this conversation Mr. Slidell, regarding the matter as arranged, expressed his thanks to the Emperor for his sanction of the contract made for the building of four ships of war at Bordeaux and Nantes, and informed him that they were now prepared to build several iron-clad ships in France, and that he only required his verbal assurance that they should be allowed to proceed to sea under the Confederate flag, to enter into the contracts for that purpose. This language is quoted textually from Mr. Slidell's dispatch to Richmond as well as what follows from the Emperor. The latter said that "we might build the ships, but it would be necessary that their destination should be concealed." His Majesty had evidently taken no offense at the cynicism of the envoy's proposition. The definite contracts were then signed and the work on the ships went rapidly forward.



CAPTAIN JAMES D. BULLOCH.

But it was not only in relation to naval matters that Mr. Slidell kept up his curious intimate relations with the Emperor. In this same interview of the 18th of June the entire subject of the recognition of the Confederacy by France, either jointly or in company with England, was fully discussed between Napoleon and Slidell, the Emperor constantly expressing his fear that England desired to embroil him in war with the United States, and Slidell continually assuring him that with his navy he could conquer a peace in a moment. There seems no limit to the indiscretions of both parties. Mr. Slidell went so far as to ask the Emperor whether he preferred to see the Whigs or Tories in power in England, to which his Majesty replied that he rather preferred the Whigs; "the Tories are very good friends of mine," he said, "when in the minority, but their tone changes very much when they get into power." Mr. Slidell showed him a letter from Messrs. Roebuck and Lindsay, two Members of Parliament who were ardently devoted to the cause of the South, and asked the Emperor if he would receive them, to which he unhesitatingly assented; but after a little reflection added, "I think that I can do something better — make a direct proposition to England for joint recognition. This will effectually prevent Lord Palmerston from misrepresenting my position and wishes on the American question."

CHAP. X. 1863. 1863.

He promised to bring the matter before the Cabinet, and two days later Mr. Slidell received a confidential letter from M. Mocquard, dictated by the Emperor, saying, "M. Drouyn de l'Huys has written to Baron Gros, our ambassador in Lon-

CHAP. X.

Slidell to Benjamin, June 20, 1863.

don, to sound Lord Palmerston on the question of recognition of the South, and is authorized to declare that the Cabinet of the Tuileries is ready to discuss the subject." A few days later, in accordance with the arrangements which Slidell had made, the famous interview of Roebuck and Lindsay with the Emperor took place at Fontainebleau. The Emperor talked with these ardent advocates of the South in a tone of inconceivable indiscretion. Roebuck reported the conversation with equal recklessness to Slidell before leaving Paris, and repeated it soon afterwards from his place in the House of Commons, claiming that he was authorized by Napoleon III. to state publicly that he was ready to recognize the Confederacy, that he had urged the British Government to such action, and that the Emperor was chagrined at the discourteous treatment he had received from the British Cabinet in not only rejecting his overtures, but denying that they had been made, and then communicating them to the Washington Cabinet.

The British Government, of course, gave a categorical denial to all the assertions of Mr. Roebuck's extraordinary speech, and the Emperor, in his turn, coolly joined in giving the lie to the unfortunate amateur diplomatist. He sent, it is true, through M. Mocquard, a note to Mr. Slidell, making an attempt to explain some of the contradictions in this tangled web of falsehood, and expressly stating that the morning after the interview with Roebuck and Lindsay the Minister of Foreign Affairs sent a telegraphic dispatch to Baron Gros to inform Lord Palmerston unofficially that if England was disposed to recognize the South the Emperor was

Slidell to Benjamin, July 6, 1863.

inclined to follow her in that path; a fact which was made public in the "Moniteur." At the same time Mr. Slidell's agent in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs told him that M. Drouyn de l'Huys had read to him a part of a letter from the Emperor, in which, after giving him the instructions above referred to, in regard to Baron Gros, the Emperor added: "I question whether I ought not to say, officially, to Lord Palmerston that I have decided to recognize the Confederate States." But all these thick-woven cobwebs of intrigue and diplomacy were blown to pieces a few days later when the thunder of the guns of Gettysburg and Vicksburg came echoing over the ocean. CHAP. X. July, 1863.

The year went on in alternation of hope and discouragement to Mr. Slidell. He writes on one day with exultation that the Archduke Maximilian is ready to form a treaty of alliance offensive and defensive with the Southern Confederacy; on another, that the Emperor at a court ball has distinguished him and his family with extraordinary marks of favor; on another, that his ironclads are almost ready for sea. But in November his suspicions in regard to the good faith of Napoleon III. became aroused, and he wrote a note directly to the Emperor, expressing his fear that orders might be given without the Emperor's being consulted, which would interfere with the completion and armament of the ships of war in construction at Bordeaux and Nantes for the Government of the Confederate States. "The undersigned," he says, "has the most entire confidence that your Majesty, being made aware of the possibility of such an interference, will take the necessary steps to prevent it;

Slidell to Benjamin, Nov. 15, 1863. MS., Confederate Archives.

CHAP. X. the undersigned has no access to the Minister of Marine, and does not feel authorized to state to the Minister of Foreign Affairs the circumstances under which the construction of these ships was commenced; he relies upon this reason to excuse the liberty which he has ventured to take in addressing himself directly to your Majesty on a subject in which are involved not only vital interests of the Government which he represents, but very grave and delicate personal responsibilities for himself."

The Emperor, who by this time had probably been made to see the indiscretion of his irregular relations with the Confederate envoy, handed this note to M. Drouyn de l'Huys, who at once sent for Mr. Slidell. "He seemed at first," says Mr. Slidell, "to take rather a high tone, saying that what had passed with the Emperor was confidential; that France could not be forced into a war by indirection; that when prepared to act it would be openly; and that peace with the North should not be jeopardized on an accessory and unimportant point, such as the building of one or two vessels; that France was bound by the declaration of neutrality." Mr. Slidell, who was not disposed to rest silently under the imputation of intrusion upon the Emperor, then gave the Minister a detailed history of the affair, showing him that the idea originated with the Emperor, and was carried out not only with his knowledge and approbation but at his invitation; that it was so far confidential that it was to be communicated only to a few necessary persons; but that this could not deprive him of the right of invoking, as he did, an adher-

ence to promises which had been given long after the declaration of neutrality. CHAP. X.

The interview ended more amicably than it had begun; M. Drouyn de l'Huys expressing his sympathy with the South, and his regret that on account of the opposition of England they could not take more efficacious steps to assist the Confederacy. It was not long, however, before the apprehensions of Mr. Slidell and Captain Bulloch, Confederate naval agent in Europe, were shown to have been well-founded. M. Voruz, deputy of Nantes, who had been employed in company with M. Arman to build two corvettes, came hurriedly to Paris in November when the rams were three-fifths finished, and the corvettes almost ready for sea, to inform the Confederate emissaries that one of his confidential clerks had disappeared and had carried off the letters and papers pertaining to this business. They all took it for granted that these compromising documents would soon fall into the hands of the United States Legation, which proved to be the case; and when Mr. Dayton presented this damaging evidence to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs both M. Drouyn de l'Huys and his colleague of the marine were properly shocked and surprised. The Minister of the United States received the most satisfactory assurances, and the work on the ships went steadily on.

Neither Captain Bulloch nor Mr. Slidell imagined that this discovery would put an end to their enterprise. The former wrote to Mr. Mallory: "The French Government has only thus become aware of a transaction it was perfectly well-informed of before. Indeed, I may say that the attempt to Nov. 26, 1863.

CHAP. X.

build ships in France was undertaken at the instigation of the Imperial Government itself"; and it was, of course, impossible at first for Mr. Slidell to believe that the repeated assurances he had received from the most august personage in the empire were to go for nothing, simply because a clerk had run away with some letters. The Minister of Marine had expressly authorized by an official document not only the construction of the four corvettes but their arming with twelve or fourteen guns each *(canons de trente)*. Even when the order was given that the vessels should not leave the ports of France, but must be sold to other parties, Mr. Slidell still imagined that some trick would be devised by which they could go to sea. So late as the 16th of February, 1864, Mr. Slidell, writing to his Government that the Minister of Marine had informed him that the sailing of the vessels would be an act of open hostility to the United States, did not yet believe in the full extent of the disaster which had overtaken him. He admits the necessity of the nominal sale, but still trusts to the chapter of accidents and the friendship of the Emperor, and proposes to go on and complete the ships. He cannot conceive that the Government means unkindly to him. "The contract for the corvettes," he says, "was concluded only after the official consent to their armament and sailing was given by the Minister of Marine, and this was given on the representation that they were intended for commercial purposes, although their real character and destination were fully known to him; he, however reluctantly, signing the order in obedience to superior authority."

Bulloch, "Secret Service of the Confederate States in Europe," Vol. II., p. 67.

Slidell to Benjamin, Feb. 16, 1864.

It was agreed between Arman and Captain Bulloch that the sale of the corvettes should be purely fictitious, and that the negotiations in respect to the rams should be kept in such a state that the Confederates might get possession of them again if there should be any change in the policy of the Emperor's Government. Trusting that this arrangement would be carried out, Captain Bulloch went to Liverpool, where, on the 9th of June, he received a letter from Arman informing him that he had sold both the rams and the corvettes to "Governments of the north of Europe," in obedience to the imperative orders of his Government. He said he could not write particulars, but his messenger gave this verbal explanation: "M. Arman had obtained his promised interview with the Emperor, who rated him severely, threatened imprisonment, ordered him to sell the ships at once, *bona fide*, and said if this was not done he would have them seized and taken to Rochefort. A similar order was sent to M. Voruz at Nantes from the Minister of Marine, written, says Captain Bulloch, "in a style of virtuous indignation, specifying the general arrangements of the ships as proving their warlike character, and dogmatically pronounces the one to which he especially refers '*une véritable corvette de guerre!*'"

Bulloch, "Secret Service, Confederate States in Europe." Vol. II., p. 45.

1864.

Bulloch to Mallory, June 10, 1864.

Even after this wreck of his hopes, after the Minister of Marine, in an interview with Mr. Slidell, had informed him that he had "kept his eyes shut as long as he could, and that he had assisted him in every way possible," but that now he had been ordered to turn over matters connected with the Confederate navy to the

CHAP. X.

Slidell to Benjamin, Dec. 13, 1864.

Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Slidell was still able to believe that the Emperor had been true to him. "I am sure," he said, "that the builders were never forced to sell them to third parties, and that no pressure for that object was ever exercised towards them by the Government. The builder of the Bordeaux ships did, as I was informed, make assertions to that effect, but I am fully convinced that they were pure fictions gotten up to subserve his own views." The other emissaries did not share in this rosy view of the imperial friendship. Mason wrote: "We have been utterly duped by that power, and worse"; Captain Bulloch calls it a case of "simple deception," and gives as the reason why the Government at Richmond always refrained from making these transactions public, that the effect would have been to alienate the sympathies of the Imperial Government which Mr. Slidell was assured were still with the South. It is evident that the Emperor had changed his mind in regard to the comparative desirability of the friendship of the United States and the Confederacy. The steady progress of the Union arms had, at last, caused even Napoleon III. to modify his sanguine hopes of the downfall of the American republic. He had no desire to commit himself further in the path that became every day hedged round with new difficulties, and he availed himself, probably without reluctance, of the opportunity afforded by the energetic action of Mr. Dayton to free himself from the entanglement with Mr. Slidell.

July 8, 1864. MS., Confederate Archives.

Bulloch, "Secret Service of Confederate States in Europe." Vol. II., p. 57.

CHAPTER XI

OLUSTEE AND THE RED RIVER

THE war, during the early part of 1864, brought little of glory or profit to the Union arms. There were numberless marches and countermarches, many insignificant engagements resulting in nothing, but the only events, not otherwise mentioned, which are especially worth recording, were two somewhat serious reverses to the National cause, both of them in the southernmost tier of States, one in Florida, and one in Louisiana.

Early in the winter of 1863–64 General Gillmore, commanding the Department of the South, announced to the Government at Washington his intention of beginning active operations in his department, and was authorized to act according to his own judgment and discretion. He therefore resolved upon an expedition into Florida to take possession of such portions of the Eastern and Northern sections of the State as could be easily held by small garrisons. He hoped by this to accomplish several objects, such as to procure an outlet for cotton, lumber, timber, and to open up the trade of the St. John's River; to cut off a source of commissary supplies to the enemy; to obtain recruits for his colored regiments and

Gillmore to Halleck, Dec. 15, 1863. W. R. Vol. XXVIII., Part II., p. 129.

Halleck to Gillmore, Dec. 22, 1863. Ibid., p. 134.

CHAP. XI. enough white volunteers for at least one regiment. He afterwards added another detail to his plan: to assist in bringing Florida back into the Union, in accordance with the President's Proclamation of December 8, 1863. This came in time to be regarded by the opponents of the Administration as the sole purpose of the expedition, and Mr. Lincoln has received a great deal of unjust censure for having made a useless sacrifice of life for a political end. His only connection with the matter can be briefly given.

When General Gillmore's intention to move into the interior was made known at Washington, one of the President's secretaries, who had formerly served for a few months on General Hunter's staff as a volunteer, and had many acquaintances in that Department, asked leave to accompany the expedition. The President, at the suggestion of the Secretary of War, gave him a commission as Assistant Adjutant-General, and charged him with a special errand which will be best explained by the letter which he carried to General Gillmore:

"I understand an effort is being made by some worthy gentlemen to reconstruct a loyal State government in Florida. Florida is in your department, and it is not unlikely that you may be there in person. I have given Mr. Hay a commission of major, and sent him to you with some blank books and other blanks, to aid in the reconstruction. He will explain as to the manner of using the blanks, and also my general views on the subject. It is desirable for all to coöperate; but if irreconcilable differences of opinion shall arise, you are master. I wish the thing done in the most speedy

way possible, so that when done it lie within the range of the late proclamation on the subject. The detail labor, of course, will have to be done by others, but I shall be greatly obliged if you will give it such general supervision as you can find consistent with your more strictly military duties." CHAP. XI. Lincoln to Gillmore, Jan. 13, 1864. MS.

In accordance with this letter Major Hay was ordered to proceed to Fernandina and other convenient points in Florida for the purpose of extending to the citizens of the State an opportunity of availing themselves of the President's Proclamation, by signing the oath of allegiance contained in it, and of enrolling themselves as loyal citizens for the purposes mentioned in the Proclamation. The special duties assigned him occupied little time; there were few loyal citizens to enroll; the most of his service was as an ordinary staff officer to General Gillmore, and there need be no further mention of him, except to say that the movement to restore a legal State government for Florida at that time failed for lack of material. Jan. 31, 1864.

The expedition to Florida was under the immediate charge of General Truman Seymour, an accomplished and gallant officer of the regular army. He landed at Jacksonville and pushed forward his mounted force twenty miles to Baldwin, the junction of the two railroads to Fernandina and Jacksonville. The march was highly successful, Colonel Guy V. Henry having captured eight of the enemy's guns, and a large amount of stores, wagons, and horses. Gillmore himself arrived at Baldwin on the 9th of February, and after a full conference and, as he thought, understanding with Seymour returned to Jacksonville. From there he tele- 1864.

CHAP. XI. graphed to Seymour on the 11th not to risk a repulse in advancing on Lake City, but to hold Sanderson's, unless there were reasons for falling back. He reiterated his orders to concentrate at Baldwin, and then went back to Hilton Head. On
Feb., 1864. the 18th he was surprised at receiving a letter from Seymour, dated the day before, announcing his intention of moving at once to the Suwanee River without supplies, and asking for a strong demonstration of the army and navy in the Savannah River to assist his movement. This news was all the more amazing to Gillmore because Seymour, who had all along been opposed to the movement and thought that there was no desire on the part of Florida to return to the Union, now thought the Floridians were tired of the war, and if kindly treated would soon come back. Gillmore wrote a peremptory letter, ordering him to restrict himself to holding Baldwin and the south prong of the St. Mary's River and occupying Palatka and Magnolia, and dispatched a staff officer to Florida with it.

He arrived too late. Seymour had made up his mind that there was less risk in going forward than in staying at Baldwin, and like the brave and devoted soldier that he was had resolved to take the responsibility. He marched rapidly out towards Olustee, where the enemy under General Joseph Finegan was supposed to be, but came upon them unexpectedly about two miles east of that place. The forces were equal in numbers, about 5500 on each side; the advantage to the Confederates was that they were in a strong position selected by themselves and ready for the fight. General J. R. Hawley, who commanded a brigade of infantry in

the battle, says, "We rushed in, not waiting for the proper full formation, and were fought in detail." Seymour made a gallant fight of it; the National artillery did good service; but to attack an equally brave enemy in position requires a superiority of force, and Seymour's attack was constantly repulsed with heavy loss, until at nightfall he fell back to a new line. He was not pursued, and retired in good order and unmolested to Jacksonville. The Union loss was 1861; the Confederate, 940.

CHAP. XI. "Battles and Leaders." Vol. IV., p. 80.

Feb. 20, 1864.

This misadventure put an end for the moment to the attempt to occupy Florida. General Gillmore soon afterwards asked that he might be ordered to Virginia to take part in the campaign then opening; an order which General Grant gladly gave. Seymour also went North and was involved in the attack on Meade's right wing in the Wilderness and was thus once more unfortunate; but, whatever his misfortunes, he never lost the respect and esteem of his brother officers as a man of honor, of courage, and of ability. The calumnies, of a political nature and origin, which at one time were rife in the press against him, do not even deserve a refutation.

In the summer of 1863 the situation in Mexico had assumed so threatening an attitude that Mr. Seward thought it a matter of the utmost urgency to restore the United States flag to some point in Texas. In view of the plan of Napoleon III. for the establishment of an empire on our Southwestern border, it was every way desirable that the Archduke Maximilian should not find, on landing

Halleck to Banks, Aug. 10, 1863. W. R. Vol. XXVI., Part I., p. 673.

CHAP. XI.

in his new dominion, the adjoining State entirely void of any vestige of the National authority. General Banks, although anxious to proceed at once to the capture of Mobile, was instructed first to hoist the flag "in some point of Texas with the least possible delay." The point to be selected was nominally left to his own discretion, but General Halleck strongly urged upon him a combined military and naval movement up the Red River to Alexandria or Shreveport and the military occupation of Northern Texas. He said that, by adopting the line of the Red River, Banks would retain his connection with his own base and separate still more the already dissevered sections of the Confederacy, and also cut off the sources of supply from Texas to Northern Louisiana and Arkansas.

Halleck to Banks, Aug. 6, 1863. W. R. Vol. XXVI., Part I., p. 672.

A considerable interchange of views took place between Banks and Halleck. Banks objected to the movement inland by the river on account of low water and other reasons that were afterwards proved to be sound, and preferred a movement upon Texas by way of the coast. He decided to make a descent at Sabine Pass, where the river Sabine, which forms the boundary between Louisiana and Texas, empties into the Gulf. Thence he expected by a rapid march to occupy the town of Houston, the capital of Texas, which was less than a hundred miles from Sabine. It was the 5th

1863.

of September before the preparations for the expedition could be completed; on that day 4000 troops, under General W. B. Franklin, sailed from New Orleans, convoyed by four light-draft vessels; the transports got to the Pass on the morning of the 7th and the gunboats in the

evening. The next day the gunboats engaged the fort unsuccessfully; the *Clifton* and the *Sachem*, after considerable damage had been done to them, hauled down their flags; the army abandoned the expedition and withdrew with the two uninjured gunboats. CHAP. XI.

This expedition having failed, Banks immediately tried to carry out the instructions of the Government by a movement westward from Bayou Teche, but becoming aware of the impracticability of this scheme, before his preparations had made much progress, he gave it up and resolved instead upon the occupation of the country at the mouth of the Rio Grande. He organized a small force, under the command of General N. J. T. Dana, and accompanied by three naval vessels sailed the 26th of October, 1863. On the 2d of November he landed at Brazos Santiago; the next day he drove away a force of the enemy which was stationed there, and on the 6th his advance occupied Brownsville. With very little delay he moved northward along the coast in the direction of Galveston, occupying Point Isabel on the 8th of November and the troops were transported to Mustang Island which lies between Corpus Christi Bay and the Gulf. The Confederate works commanding Aransas Pass were handsomely carried by General T. E. G. Ransom, and the whole force, now under General C. C. Washburn, moved upon Pass Cavallo, commanding the entrance to Matagorda Bay, which was defended by Fort Esperanza, a strong and well-manned fortification. Before the investment of this work was completed, the Confederates on the 30th of No- 1863.

CHAP. XI. 1863.

vember evacuated it, escaping by the long peninsula which leads to the mainland near the Brazos River.

Thus in a month Banks had, by good management and good fortune, brought a large portion of the Texas coast under the Union flag. But the formidable works at Galveston and the mouth of the Brazos still confronted him, and he thought that to attack them successfully it would be necessary to march inland and approach them from the rear. He was not ready for this, but reported progress to Washington and suggested an increase of his forces for further operations. This proposition did not meet with General Halleck's approval. He had never favored the coastwise plan, and he now renewed his suggestion of a movement up the Red River, coupling it with an offer of an additional force from Sherman's army and a coöperating force, under Steele, from Arkansas. Banks says in his report that he did not feel at liberty to decline participation in the campaign thus repeatedly pressed upon him, especially as Halleck informed him that the best military opinions of the generals of the West favored it. He therefore concurred in the scheme and promised cordial coöperation. Previous to undertaking it, however, he required Major D. C. Houston, chief engineer of the department, to prepare a memorandum detailing the difficulties in the way of a campaign on the Red River, and the measures indispensable for meeting them. It was easier to foresee the obstacles than to overcome them, and the expedition started at last, lacking, one may say, all the conditions of success.



GENERAL A. J. SMITH.

CHAP. XI.

As General Banks was occupied at the time with duties connected with the establishment of a State government for Louisiana, the organization of the expedition was left in the hands of General W. B. Franklin, an officer of high reputation and ability. The preparations consumed more time than was expected, and it was not until the early days of March that the final arrangements were made. W. T. Sherman, on his return from his march across Mississippi and back, visited Banks at New Orleans and promised him ten thousand men for the expedition, who were to meet him at Alexandria on the 17th. This force was merely lent to Banks for "thirty days from the time they actually entered Red River," and were in no event to go beyond Shreveport. Over Steele's forces Banks had no control whatever, and received no assistance from them. Through the delay and the ill-luck which marked every step of the enterprise, the troops did not get off at the time appointed, and only reached Alexandria on the 25th of March. Sherman's detachment, under General A. J. Smith, was at the mouth of the river on the 11th, where a powerful fleet, under D. D. Porter, was awaiting him, and the next morning the gunboats started up the river, the troops following in transports. On the 13th Smith's forces landed at Simsport on the Atchafalaya, and the next day assaulted and captured Fort de Russy with 260 prisoners and ten guns. Porter's fleet moved up the river, bursting their way through the obstructions with great energy, and arrived at Alexandria on the 15th and 16th, Smith's force also coming up on the latter day, one day better than their promise. This good fortune

1864.

Sherman to Banks, Mar. 4, 1864. Sherman, "Memoirs." Vol. I., p. 402.

March, 1864.

CHAP. XI. was, however, counterbalanced by the recall by General McPherson of Ellet's Marine Brigade, an excellent organization, the loss of which reduced the strength of the advancing column nearly three thousand men.

Evil omens multiplied at Alexandria. The river, which ordinarily at that season is at a high March, 1864. stage of water, was very low. Some of the transports and gunboats were unable to pass the falls and returned to the Mississippi. It became necessary to establish a depot of supplies at Alexandria and a line of transportation between the vessels below and those above the falls; this further reduced the force of Banks more than he could afford. Steele's force was of no use to him, and with these subtractions from his marching strength there was already no great discrepancy of numbers between him and Kirby Smith, who had the enormous advantage of fighting on the defensive and of being acquainted with every inch of the ground which was an unknown wilderness to Banks. There was, of course, the valuable help of the navy, but when the time of crisis came, the navy was out of reach.

Dated Mar. 15, received Mar. 26th. Banks, Report. Moore, "Rebellion Record," Vol. IX., Documents, p. 741. See U. S. Grant, Report, July 22, 1865. "Personal Memoirs," Part II., p. 559.

While Banks was at Alexandria he received a letter from Grant which would have justified him in an immediate return to New Orleans. It enforced upon him the prompt return of Sherman's detachment at the time specified, even if such a course "should lead to the abandonment of the main object of the expedition." Grant's mind was occupied with the opening of the spring campaign. He said in a subsequent dispatch that he "would much rather that the Red River expedition had never

been begun than that [Banks] should be detained one day beyond the 1st of May in commencing the movement East of the Mississippi." Fettered by such instructions as these, with the days in which he was to be allowed to accomplish his difficult task numbered beforehand, with his not too liberal forces diminishing every hour, without, as it afterwards appeared, the confidence or regard of his subordinate officers, General Banks began his unfortunate march towards Shreveport.

CHAP. XI.

Report Committee on Conduct of the War, 1864–65. Part II., p. 385.

The army reached Natchitoches, eighty miles from Alexandria, on the 2d and 3d of April, the fleet and the transports with Smith's corps and the stores arriving at the same time at Grand Ecore, four miles away. General Banks had remained behind for a few days in Alexandria, where elections were held on the 2d for the Union Convention of Louisiana. He anticipated no serious resistance short of Shreveport. His information led him to believe that the enemy was fortifying the Sabine River; so far from apprehending a battle on the way to Shreveport, he was only anxious lest he should not be able to obtain one there. He wrote in this vein to Washington, and Mr. Lincoln, with that instinct of the approach of bad news which seemed like a sixth sense in him, said, "I am sorry to see this tone of confidence; the next news we shall hear from there will be of a defeat."

1864.

Banks to Hay, April 2, 1864. MS.

J. H., Diary.

General Banks joined the army as soon as the election was over. He was not alone in his feeling of confidence. No such preparations were made as to indicate that the subordinate generals expected any serious interruption in their long march

CHAP. XI. of a hundred miles from Natchitoches to Shreveport, "through a barren, sandy country, with little water and less forage, the greater portion an unbroken pine forest" traversed by a narrow wood road. On the 6th of April the army moved towards Shreveport, General A. L. Lee with the cavalry in advance, followed by the infantry of Banks's army, under the immediate command of General Franklin, under whom were Generals Ransom and W. H. Emory, and Colonel W. H Dickey with a colored brigade. A. J. Smith's detachment followed, a day's journey behind, and a division, under General T. Kilby Smith, accompanied Admiral Porter on the river as a guard for the transports. The order of march was severely criticized after the event. Immediately behind the cavalry came their unwieldy train, blocking up the narrow road and leaving no space free in front of the infantry. The column wound wearily on among the dense woods, on a single execrable road, encumbered by twelve miles of wagons, bearing the provisions and ammunition of the army in the heart of a hostile wilderness. It was inevitable that when the head of this loose-jointed column struck against any serious obstacle disaster should follow.

1864.

Colonel R. B. Irwin, "Battles and Leaders," Vol. IV., p. 352.

The Confederates, under General Richard Taylor, had been falling back before the Union advance all the way up the river. He had received on the 21st of March, at Henderson's Hill, a severe blow from a force under General J. A. Mower who surprised his camp in a storm of rain and captured his only cavalry regiment. Destitute for the moment of horse, he retired still further on the road to Shreveport, until he came to the village of Mansfield,

where he halted and occupied the roads leading to Texas and to Shreveport, from which he received heavy reënforcements, Thomas Green's cavalry being a welcome arrival from the South. Being now strong enough to dispute the narrow road with Banks, he moved out to Sabine Cross Roads and there formed line of battle with the divisions of J. G. Walker, Alfred Mouton, and Green, eleven thousand effectives, by Confederate reports, with five thousand men of Price's army, General Kirby Smith says, within one day's march of him. This army, fully equal to that which was struggling towards it through the dense forest, was drawn up in a position that doubled its effectiveness, in the edge of the woods commanding a rather wide clearing. CHAP. XI.

All day, the 7th of April, General Lee had been skirmishing with Green's cavalry, who made such resistance to the Union advance as was necessary to allow Taylor to make his preparations for battle undisturbed. A little after midday Lee, who had asked for and received two brigades of infantry, under Ransom, from General Franklin, came upon the enemy in position and in force, and at the same time General Banks, who had been riding forward all day through his scattered army, trying to hurry them on, came upon the field. He saw at once the threatening aspect of affairs, told Lee to hold his ground, and sent urgent orders for the rest of the troops to come up. But it was already too late. It was not, indeed, the intention of Kirby Smith that a decisive battle should be fought at that place. He wished merely that a thorough reconnaissance should be made. Taylor himself thought he was confronted only by cavalry at least 1864. Apr. 8, 1864. Kirby Smith, "Battles and Leaders." Vol. IV., p. 371.

CHAP. XI. as late as noon of the day of battle; and, in effect, when the shock came, the resistance made to the Confederate attack amounted to little more. About
Apr. 8, 1864. four o'clock Mouton's division attacked with great energy on the left of the road and Walker on the right, and after a short contest the cavalry of Lee and their slender infantry supports gave way,— General Ransom being wounded,— and fled to the rear, where they were instantly mingled in an inextricable confusion with the cavalry trains. An attempt was made to stay the rout by R. A. Cameron's division of the Thirteenth Corps which came on the field at five o'clock, accompanied by General Franklin, but the effort was ineffectual. The whole force dissolved in disorderly retreat. The infantry and cavalry streamed to the rear as they could, in chaotic confusion, and the Confederates reaped a rich harvest of wagons and guns. A little before nightfall Emory's division of the Nineteenth Corps came up and formed across the road about three miles from where the fight began. The routed mass of men, horses, and wagons poured down the road which was left open for their retreat, and Taylor's successful force, rushing on in hot pursuit, was brought to a stand by Emory, and checked until night came on.

Banks made no mistake in recognizing the full extent of his mishap. He could not, after this check, fight his way to Shreveport within the time allowed by General Grant, and another defeat, on his present ground — which was not improbable, in view of the heavy force of the enemy and the broken condition of his own command — would be an irreparable disaster to both army and navy.

He therefore gave the order to fall back on Pleasant Hill, which was done in the early morning of the 9th of April. A. J. Smith's force was there and what was left of Lee's and Ransom's, now under command of Cameron. These forces, the black brigade under Dickey, and Emory's division, which was in good spirits from the success of the night before, were put in position to await the attack of Taylor. He set out in pursuit, as soon as the morning light showed him that Banks had retreated. The Confederates had been reënforced in the night by T. J. Churchill's and M. M. Parsons's divisions; Mouton had been killed in the onset of the day before, and his division was commanded by C. J. Polignac. Taylor after skirmishing for several hours attacked at five o'clock, his first serious blow falling on the Union left, where Colonel Lewis Benedict was killed and his brigade outflanked and routed. For a moment it looked as if the disaster of Sabine Cross Roads was to be repeated; but Emory and Mower stood firm and checked the advancing enemy, and rallying charged in their turn and drove back the entire Confederate line. General Kirby Smith himself says, "Taylor's troops were repulsed and thrown into confusion," and adds that they were "completely paralyzed" by their repulse.

CHAP. XI.

1864.

"Battles and Leaders." Vol. IV., p. 372.

Inspirited by this decisive success, Banks's first impulse was to move again upon Shreveport in pursuit of Taylor's beaten forces. But the representations of all his generals, with the exception of A. J. Smith, induced him to continue his retrograde movement to Grand Ecore. The reasons given for this determination were: the absence of water; the

CHAP. XI. fact that the provision trains were already far in the rear and could not be reversed promptly in the single forest-road; the impracticability of ascending the river in the low water and the consequent danger of the loss of the fleet; the diminished numbers of the army, and the rigorous orders of Grant against keeping Smith's force a moment beyond the time specified in their loan. He sent word for the fleet to return, and on the 10th the army went back to Grand Ecore.

April, 1863. The fleet had worked its way up the river to Springfield Landing on the 10th and immediately after received news of the disaster of Sabine Cross Roads. They started down the river at once, but were greatly annoyed by constant attacks from Confederates on either shore. They had a severe fight on the 15th, lasting some two hours; a large force of General Thomas Green's cavalry, with field artillery, attacked the fleet from the right bank and tried to capture a transport which had disabled her wheel. This unprecedented battle resulted in a severe defeat for the Confederates; Green was killed and some seven hundred of his force killed and wounded. The admiral and Kilby Smith joined the army at Grand Ecore the next day. The river was now falling rapidly and the condition of the fleet was becoming most critical. Banks received the letter from General Grant already mentioned, expressly forbidding anything which should prevent his return to New Orleans later than the 1st of May. The only business before him therefore was to see to the safety of the fleet and then abandon the expedition.

The fleet was brought to the falls at Alexandria

in safety through the bold and energetic efforts of the admiral and his officers. The *Eastport*, the finest ship in the fleet, was sunk by a torpedo, and although she was raised and kept afloat for fifty miles by tremendous exertions on the part of her gallant commander, S. L. Phelps, she finally grounded on a raft of logs at Montgomery and had to be blown up. Admiral Porter, who after seeing the rest of the fleet safe to Alexandria had gone back with three small gunboats to the rescue of the *Eastport*, had to fight every inch of his way back. His little vessels were riddled with shots from the Confederate artillerymen on the bank, and on the admiral's flagship, in one fight, the pilot was wounded and the engineer killed at the same moment. Few passages of the war called for more courage and skill than were displayed by Admiral Porter and his brave subordinates in that little known but most difficult achievement of the withdrawal of the fleet from Grand Ecore. The army got safely back to Alexandria on the 26th, after a brilliant engagement with a Confederate force under General H. P. Bee at Cane River, in which Bee was quickly and thoroughly defeated.

CHAP. XI.

April, 1864.

Admiral Porter, "The Naval History of the Civil War," p. 522.

April, 1864.

On arriving at Alexandria, Banks found General David Hunter awaiting him with peremptory dispatches ordering him to bring his expedition to an end without delay. General A. J. Smith, whose thirty days had expired, was naturally anxious to return to Sherman, but Banks feeling that the rescue of the fleet was a matter of prime importance, refused to allow him to go. General McClernand arrived on the 29th, bringing reënforcements from Matagorda by order of General Grant. General

Banks, Report, Moore, "Rebellion Record." Vol. IX., Documents, p. 746.

CHAP. XI. April, 1864.

Hunter went away on the 30th, with dispatches giving a full account of the situation, and later Banks received a dispatch from Halleck, dated the same day, countermanding the order for the abandonment of the expedition. But these dispatches had now little value on either side; the water was so low that the gunboats could not ascend the river, which put an advance out of the question; the whole energies of the army were devoted to the one object of saving the fleet which was in a position of the gravest danger.

It was the season of the year when, according to all precedent, the river should have been at high water, but, as if the forces of nature were at league with the enemy to make the National disaster complete, the long line of the falls, about a mile in extent, showed a mass of jagged rocks above the surface, while the water in the channel gave a depth in its shallowest parts of less than four feet. The current was extremely swift, running about ten miles an hour. Most men in the army and navy thought of nothing but to wait where they were in the slender hope of a providential rise of the river, which would allow the vessels to pass the falls and gain the navigable water below Alexandria. But there was one man who knew perfectly well what to do and how to do it. This was Lieutenant-Colonel Joseph Bailey of the Fourth Wisconsin, serving on General Franklin's staff as chief engineer. He had had large experience in building dams in the Northwest, and had floated and saved two Confederate transports which the army found lying in the mud near Port Hudson. During the entire campaign his mind had been preoccupied

with the peril in which the constantly falling water would involve the navy. The ascent of the river had been hard enough and attended with danger at every step; the water had since then fallen six feet, with no signs of a rise. The fleet was inevitably lost if the army should retire; nothing but a dam could save it. Yet the difficulties in the way of a dam seemed almost insuperable. At the point just above the lower chute, which Bailey's intelligent eye had selected, the river was 758 feet wide with a fall of six feet below. He had to effect a rise of about seven feet to save the fleet. CHAP. XI.

He was sure he could do it. He found no difficulty in persuading General Franklin of the feasibility of his plan, but Admiral Porter, General Franklin says, derided the project. Bailey, sure of himself, persisted, and with the aid of Franklin presented his plan to Banks and Hunter. Without any certainty of success, but anxious to avail himself of every possible expedient, Banks gave the necessary orders and details, and the whole army and an efficient detail from the fleet turned in to accomplish the formidable task.[1]

We believe there is no record of a work of equal importance performed in so short a time. The dam was begun on the 30th of April and finished on the 8th of May. On the north side of the river a dam was constructed of trees laid with their tops towards the current, cross-tied with heavy timbers and weighted with all the heavy material available. 1864.

[1] Admiral Porter in his history contradicts this. But Generals Bailey, Banks, and James Grant Wilson agree with Franklin in confirming it. See Report Committee on Conduct of the War, 1865. Vol. II., pp. 34, 41; Banks, Report; Article by J. G. Wilson, in the "Galaxy" for June, 1866.

CHAP. XI. On the south, as timber could not be obtained, heavy cribs were constructed from the proceeds of the demolition of some ruined mills and barns, and filled with brick and stone and all the iron that could be found. Between the cribs and the tree-dam the vacant space, 150 feet, was filled by sinking four large coal-barges across the stream. The men worked with the greatest patience and enthusiasm, standing waist deep in the water, under a broiling sun by day, and in the lurid light of flambeaux and fires by night. Amid the jeers of the disloyal and the doubting, the work went on, and not until a week had passed was there any general belief in its success. But by the 8th of May the results were so evident in the rapidly rising water that no doubt remained. The next day the fleet could have been brought down to the chute; but in the morning the tremendous pressure of the pent-up waters began to force the coal barges out of place. Not an instant was to be lost. Admiral Porter jumped on a horse and galloped at headlong speed to the upper fall and ordered the *Lexington* to go through them and then to run for the dam. She got over the upper fall and rushed with a full head of steam for the opening in the dam. In the midst of breathless silence from the thousands of spectators on the shore, "she entered the gap, . . . pitched down the roaring torrent, made two or three spasmodic rolls, hung for a moment on the rocks below, was then swept into deep water by the current, and rounded-to safely into the bank. Thirty thousand voices rose in one deafening cheer."

Bailey, Report Committee on Conduct of the War, 1864–65. Part II., p. 42 *ut supra.*

1864.

Admiral Porter, Report, May 16, 1864. Ibid., p. 265.

The *Neosho* followed next; her pilot became alarmed and stopped his engine as he approached

the roaring abyss; the ship plunged under the water for a moment, but rose and was swept on by the current little damaged. Two more vessels came through successfully, but by this time the water had fallen so far that no more could make the passage. Bailey, undeterred by this mischance, simply left a gap of fifty-five feet at the lower dam, built a series of wing dams at the upper falls by which all the water of the river was turned into a narrow channel, and in this way a sufficient rise was obtained to bring all the vessels over in safety on the 13th of May. Bailey was made a Brigadier-General and thanked by Congress for this valuable service, and the officers of the Mississippi squadron gave him a sword of honor. He earned new laurels a few days afterwards, when the army and fleet were on their way to New Orleans, by bridging the Atchafalaya at Simsport with boats. CHAP. XI. 1864.

On the 18th of May a sharp engagement took place between A. J. Smith's command and the Confederates under the lead of Polignac and Wharton in which the latter were repulsed. On the 20th, at Simsport, General Banks gave up the command of the troops to General E. R. S. Canby, who had been put in charge of the Military Division of the West Mississippi. General Banks retained command of the Department of the Gulf.

We prefer not to enter into the bitter discussions to which this disastrous campaign gave rise on both sides of the line. A life-long quarrel sprang up between Kirby Smith and Taylor, between Banks and Porter, while Franklin, Charles P. Stone (Banks's chief-of-staff), and Albert L. Lee, all of whom relinquished their commands,


MISSOURI
KENTUCKY
TENNESSEE
MISSISSIPPI
ALABAMA
LOUISIANA
ARKANSAS
INDIAN TERRITORY
Cairo
Columbus
Belmont
Hickman
New Madrid
Obion R.
Tennessee R.
Cumberland
Dover
Fort Donelson
Clarksburg
Parker's Cross Roads
Lexington
Jackson
Trenton
Humboldt
Pittsburg Landing
Shiloh
Corinth
Iuka
Ripley
Tupelo
Pontotoc
Houston
Starkville
Macon
Louisville
Memphis
Holly Springs
Oxford
Grenada
Greenwood
Yazoo R.
Yazoo City
Big Black R.
Tallahatchee R.
Coldwater R.
Hopefield
Osceola
Helena
St. Francis R.
Bear Creek
Bogue Phalia
Bluff
Dorena
Gayoso
Pt. Pemberton
Bunker Hill
Pilot Knob
Pilot
Jacksonport
Augusta
Cache R.
Clarendon
White R.
Columbia
Bayou Bartholomew
Providence
Batesville
Searcy
DesArc
Devalls Bluff
St. Charles
Ft. Hindman
Arkansas Post
Pine Bluff
Monticello
Saline
Washita R.
Little Rock
Hot Springs
Jenkins's Ferry
Marks's Mill
Princeton
Camden
Arkadelphia
Spring Hill
Red River
Springfield
Forsyth
Yellville
Salem
West Plains
Neosho
Pineville
Huntsville
Fayetteville
Prairie Grove
Clarksville
Van Buren
Fort Smith
Arkansas River
White R.
Black R.
Current R.
Spring R.
Eleven Point R.
Osage R.
Pomme de Terre R.
Sac R.
Little Sac R.
Niangua R.
Gasconade R.
Big Piney R.
Roubidoux Spring
Bennett's Spring
Marshfield
Mansfield
Rolla
Waynesville
Lebanon
Linn Creek
Osage Mission
Boonsboro
Illinois R.
Illinois
Ft. Wayne
Indian Territory
Cherokee Nation
Choctaw Nation
Creek Nation
Seminole Nation
Chickasaw Nation

MAP OF THE RED RIVER, AND ARKANSAS AND MISSOURI CAMPAIGNS OF 1864.

CHAP. XI.

added their quota of misunderstanding and resentment. Leaving out all questions of mutual recriminations, it seems that the statement made by General Banks in March, 1865, gives in the fewest possible words the causes of the failure of the expedition: "the difficulties of navigation, the imperfect concentration of forces, the incautious march of the 8th of April, and the limited time allotted to the expedition."

Report Committee on Conduct of the War, 1864–65. Part II., p. 340.

The Committee on the Conduct of the War made an investigation of the matter in the year 1865, at the time when the antagonism between Mr. Lincoln and the Radicals in relation to the subject of reconstruction had assumed an acute form, and they seized upon the occasion to deal a severe blow at the President and Secretary of State, for ordering the expedition, and at Banks — whose obedience to the President's orders in setting on foot the civil administration of Louisiana was regarded by Senators Chandler and Wade, and Representatives Julian and Loan, as an interference with the prerogative of Congress — for his conduct of it. We have shown in another place how important were the intrigues and designs of foreign powers in relation to Texas, which seemed to Lincoln and Seward sufficient reason for wishing the flag set up in that State, even at some sacrifice. The charge was made by the committee against Banks, that what he had in view was to carry out measures for the establishment of a State government in Louisiana, and to afford an egress for cotton and other products of that region, and that the attention directed to the accomplishment of these objects exerted an unfavorable influence on the expedition. The four

BENJAMIN WADE.

members of the committee mentioned above united in this report of censure, and Mr. Gooch presented a minority report wholly dissenting from this opinion. CHAP. XI.

We have fully noticed in another place the measures taken by Banks for the establishment of a State government in Louisiana. These were mainly taken by order of the President, and upon him, and not upon the general, should fall the responsibility of them. The plan, with which the committee charge him, and which has been for twenty years the theme of endless criticism, that of affording an outlet for cotton and other products, was also, within proper limits, in accordance with the policy of the Government. The need for cotton was so great, here and abroad, that every proper means for obtaining it, and therefore relieving the famine with which the world was suffering, was eagerly embraced by the Government. In May, 1863, General Banks had urged upon the Government a plan for the requisition of cotton in Louisiana which, he thought, would have resulted in securing from fifty to one hundred million dollars worth of cotton on the lower Mississippi; this was to purchase cotton from its holders within the rebel lines, through their friends in the Union lines, at the prices current where it was grown, which was only a third or a quarter its value in Liverpool, the Government to receive not only the cash profits on the transaction, but the vastly greater advantage which would come from continuing to the world something like its normal supply of an indispensable product. But this proposition did not receive the approval of the Government, and captured and

CHAP. XI.

abandoned property continued to be turned over to the officers of the War or Treasury Department, according to the regulations promulgated from Washington. Banks gave no permits or privileges to trade. There were many vague charges of improper conduct made by prejudiced persons in the press and before the Committee of Congress, but there was never any proof brought forward to contradict General Banks's unqualified statement: "Every dollar's worth of property that came into the hands of the army during this campaign was either appropriated to its use in kind by the proper officers of the Commissary and Quartermaster's Departments, receipts being given therefor, or transmitted to the chief quartermaster at New Orleans, and by him turned over to the Treasury agents, to be disposed of according to the laws of Congress and the orders of the Government. When cotton or other property interfered with the transportation of any material of the army, or of refugees, negroes, or troops, upon the evacuation of the country, it was thrown from the boats, and abandoned upon the river levee to the enemy."

Banks, Report. Moore, "Rebellion Record." Vol. IX., Documents, p. 748.

A large amount of cotton was seized by the navy and sent to Cairo to be adjudicated under the prize law, and the proceeds distributed among its captors, which was regularly and legally done. A vast quantity of cotton was burnt by the Confederates to prevent it from falling into Union hands.

Reflections more or less severe were cast upon the President because two men appeared at Alexandria bearing passes in his handwriting authorizing them to trade in cotton. The pressure upon him to grant these permits was almost incredible,

and he sometimes, though very seldom, gave way to it. A letter which he wrote in the summer of 1863 to a valued personal and political friend, a man of great prominence in Illinois, shows the pressure he had to contend against. CHAP. XI.

I have received and read your pencil note. I think you do not know how embarrassing your request is. Few things are so troublesome to the Government as the fierceness with which the profits of trading in cotton are sought. The temptation is so great that nearly everybody wishes to be in it; and when in, the question of profit controls all, regardless of whether the cotton-seller is loyal or rebel, or whether he is paid in corn-meal or gunpowder. The officers of the army, in numerous instances, are believed to connive and share the profits, and thus the army itself is diverted from fighting the rebels to speculating in cotton; and steamboats and wagons in the pay of the Government are set to gathering and carrying cotton, and the soldiers to loading cotton-trains and guarding them. The matter deeply affects the Treasury and War Departments, and has been discussed again and again in the Cabinet. What can, and what cannot be done, has for the time been settled, and it seems to me I cannot safely break over it. I know it is thought that one case is not much, but how can I favor one and deny another? One case cannot be kept a secret. The authority given would be utterly ineffectual until it is shown, and when shown everybody knows of it.

The Administration would do for you as much as for any other man; and I personally would do some more than for most others; but really I cannot involve myself and the Government as this would do. Lincoln to Wm. Kellogg, June 29, 1863. MS.

Later, when the war was ending, and the evil consequences of this trade were greatly lessened, the President gave a few of these permits, strictly enjoining, however, upon the officers of the Government, civil and military, that they were in no case to be allowed to interfere with military move-

CHAP. XI. ments or the regular operations of the Treasury. Among others permits were given to his old friend William Butler of Springfield and to Thomas L. Casey.

The appearance of these two favored beings in a camp so full of suspicion and malevolence as that unhappy camp at Alexandria produced a plentiful crop of fantastic fictions. They had bought Kirby Smith; they were scheming to elect Banks, or Governor Yates to the Presidency, with the money they were to coin out of their cotton. The army was to be sacrificed, the navy was to be robbed, that these vampires might fatten on the ruin of the country. Butler and Casey profited little by their permits, and so far from commanding the army and navy in their cotton-quest, they were not allowed to keep the little cotton they collected. Both Porter and Banks agree in saying their cotton was taken away from them by the army, and put to military uses, some of it being worked into the famous dam on the Red River. There was, of course, more or less of the peculation and concussion which attend in the trail of a great war, but in the midst of all the painful controversies that grew out of the Red River mischance it is gratifying to know that no officer of rank in army or navy was shown to be guilty of any act of dishonesty. The honorable poverty in which General Banks has passed his subsequent life is the best answer to the reckless charges of his enemies.

CHAPTER XII

THE POMEROY CIRCULAR

BEFORE the close of the year 1863 the public mind became greatly preoccupied with the subject of the next Presidential election. Though the general drift of opinion was altogether in favor of intrusting to Mr. Lincoln the continuation of the work which he had thus far so well conducted, this feeling was by no means unanimous. It will seem strange to future students of the events of this time that the opposition in the Republican party to Mr. Lincoln, whose name will stand in history as the liberator of the slaves, came almost entirely from the radical antislavery element. The origins of this opposition have been so fully stated, in other portions of this work, that it is not worth while to set them forth at any length in this place. They were principally the action of the President in regard to the administration of affairs in Missouri; the conflict between General Frémont and the Missouri Conservatives, and between General Schofield and the Missouri Radicals; the retention in command of various generals, who, from the radical point of view, had "no heart in the cause"; the deliberation with which the great antislavery acts of the President were performed; and, in general, the dissatis-

CHAP. XII. faction with the slow progress of the war of eager and ardent spirits imperfectly informed as to the processes of the Government and the facts of the situation.

At the end of the year 1863 and the beginning of the following year all these elements of discord were seeking a rallying-point. This it was not easy to find. Every one sufficiently acquainted with practical politics to note the drift of public opinion saw the hopelessness of contending against the popularity of the President. There was not a Republican general in the field, of sufficient prominence to be thought of, who would give the least encouragement for the use of his name against Mr. Lincoln. In neither House of Congress was there a statesman who would enter into such a contest; and in the higher circles of the Administration there was only one man so short-sighted as not to perceive the expediency of the President's renomination and the impossibility of preventing it. Mr. Chase alone had the indiscretion to encourage the overtures of the malcontents, and the folly to imagine that he could lead them to success. Pure and disinterested as he was, and devoted with all his energies and powers to the cause of the country, he was always singularly ignorant of the current public thought and absolutely incapable of judging men in their true relations. He was surrounded by sycophants who constantly assured him of his own strength with the people, and who convinced him at last that all manifestations to the contrary were the result of mystifications set on foot by his enemies. He regarded himself as the friend of Mr. Lincoln; to

him and to others he made strong protestations of friendly feeling, which he undoubtedly thought were sincere; but he held so poor an opinion of the President's intellect and character in comparison with his own, that he could not believe the people so blind as deliberately to prefer the President to himself.

In November, 1863, he wrote to his son-in-law, Governor Sprague: "If I were controlled by merely personal sentiments, I should prefer the reëlection of Mr. Lincoln to that of any other man; but I doubt the expediency of reëlecting anybody, and I think a man of different qualities from those the President has will be needed for the next four years." Of course, he adds, "I am not anxious to be regarded as that man; and I am quite willing to leave that question to the decision of those who agree in thinking that some such man should be chosen." To another he wrote early in December: "I have not the slightest wish to press any claims upon the consideration of friends or the public. There is certainly a purpose, however, to use my name, and I do not feel bound to object to it." He never admitted to himself that he had any personal desire for the place, and in this letter he continued: "Were the post in which these friends desire to place me as low as it is high, I should feel bound to render in it all the service possible to our common country." Yet he always felt that he could render better service in the higher places than in the lower, and when it was once in contemplation to offer him a seat on the Supreme Bench he distinctly intimated he would accept no place there but that of Chief-Justice.

Chase to Sprague, Nov. 26, 1863. Schuckers, "Life of S. P. Chase," p. 494.

Chase to Spencer, Dec. 4, 1863. Ibid., p. 495.

CHAP. XII.

There never was a man who found it so easy to delude himself. He believed that he was indifferent to advancement and anxious only for the public good; yet in the midst of his enormous labors he found time to write letters to every part of the country, all protesting his indifference to the Presidency but indicating his willingness to accept it, and painting pictures so dark of the chaotic state of affairs in the Government that the irresistible inference was that only he could save the country. For instance, he wrote to the editor of a religious newspaper, saying: "Had there been here an Administration in the true sense of the word — a President conferring with his Cabinet and taking their united judgments, and with their aid enforcing activity, economy, and energy in all departments of public service — we could have spoken boldly and defied the world. But our condition here has always been very different. I preside over the funnel; everybody else, and especially the Secretaries of War and the Navy, over the spigots — and keep them well open, too. Mr. Seward conducts the foreign relations with very little let or help from anybody. There is no unity and no system, except so far as it is departmental. There is progress, but it is slow and involuntary; just what is coerced by the irresistible pressure of the vast force of the people. How, under such circumstances, can anybody announce a policy which can only be made respectable by union, wisdom, and courage?"

Chase to the Rev. J. Leavitt, Jan. 24, 1864. Warden, "Life of Salmon P. Chase," p. 562.

A few days later he wrote to another: "The Administration cannot be continued as it is. There is, in fact, no Administration, properly speaking. There are departments and there is a

President. The latter leaves administration substantially to the heads of the former, deciding himself comparatively few questions. These heads act with almost absolute independence of each other."

Chase to Dickson, Jan. 27, 1864. Warden, "Life of Salmon P. Chase," p. 564.

He could not bring himself to feel that the universal demonstrations in favor of the reëlection of Mr. Lincoln were genuine. He regarded himself all the while as the serious candidate, and the opposition to him as knavish and insincere. To one of his adherents he wrote: "It is impossible to reform and investigate without stirring up slanderers and revilers, both among those whose wrong-doings are exposed and unrighteous profits taken away, and among those, too, who think they see a good chance to take advantage of clamor to the injury of a public man, who, they fear, stands too well with the people."

Chase to Gilbert, Jan. 30, 1864. Ibid., p. 567.

To an adherent in Ohio he wrote: "I cannot help being gratified by the preference expressed for me in some quarters, for those who express it are generally men of great weight, and high character, and independent judgment. . . They think there will be a change in the current, which, so far as it is not spontaneous, is chiefly managed by the Blairs." He said that he should be glad to have Ohio decidedly on his side, and that if Ohio should express a preference for any other person he would not allow his name to be used. This was quite an unnecessary engagement, as no candidate could possibly be nominated without the support of his own State.

Chase to Flamen Ball, Feb. 2, 1864. Ibid., p. 570.

Indifferent as he claimed to be in regard to his personal prospects, he yet wrote on the 6th of February promising to try to find a place for a man

CHAP. XII. recommended by the editor of the "Evening Post," and complaining with some bitterness that that paper had not uttered a kind word in reference to him for some months past. There was, in fact, no limit to these overtures of the Secretary in every direction which he thought might be serviceable to him. A few days after the death of Archbishop Hughes, we find him writing to Archbishop Purcell of Cincinnati, reporting the efforts which he is making in every quarter to have the Western prelate appointed the successor of the dead archbishop. On the 18th of January he wrote to a friend of his in Toledo, Ohio, Mr. James C. Hall, formally announcing his candidacy for the Presidency. He told Mr. Hall that a committee of prominent Senators, Representatives and citizens had been organized to promote his election; that a sub-committee had conferred with him, and he had consented to their wishes. He then went on to say: "If I know my own heart, I desire nothing so much as the suppression of this rebellion and the establishment of union, order, and prosperity on sure and safe foundations; and I should despise myself if I felt capable of allowing any personal objects to influence me to any action which would affect, by one jot or tittle, injuriously, the accomplishment of those objects. And it is a source of real gratification to believe that those who desire my nomination desire it on public grounds alone, and will not hesitate in any matter which may concern me, [to act] upon such grounds and such grounds only." He added that he desired the support of Ohio, and that if he did not receive it he would cheerfully acquiesce.

Chase to Bailey. Warden, "Life of Salmon P. Chase," p. 571.

Chase to Purcell, Feb. 1. 1864, Ibid., p. 568.

1864.

Ibid., p. 560.

All through the winter this quasi-candidacy

continued. It seemed of the utmost importance to the Secretary and his few adherents, though it really formed an imperceptible eddy beside the vast current in which the will of the people was sweeping forward to its purpose. Being confined exclusively to politicians, it had, of course, its principal manifestation in Washington. It played its little part in the election of Speaker of the House of Representatives. An attempt was made to identify Mr. Colfax, the most popular candidate for that office, with the adherents of Mr. Chase; but upon hearing of this he at once sought an audience with the President, and positively repudiated any such connection. When Congress had organized, the message of the President was received with an enthusiasm which, for the moment, swept out of sight every trace of opposing opinion. From that moment there was no further question in regard to the Republican nomination. CHAP. XII.

There was at one time an effort on the part of some of the leading spirits in the Union League, a secret Republican organization which had been very zealous and effective in political work throughout the loyal States, to commit it to some measure hostile to Mr. Lincoln. This had alarmed even so experienced and astute an observer as Thurlow Weed, who sent to Mr. Seward in the autumn of 1863 a warning that "loyal leagues, into which Odd Fellows and Know Nothings rush, are fixing to control delegate appointments for Mr. Chase." MS. Mr. Seward accepted this warning somewhat too readily, induced by his inveterate anti-masonic prejudices; these fears had no substantial foundation. Some of the leaders of the League, sym-

CHAP. XII. pathizing strongly with the radicals of Missouri, had indeed from time to time made efforts to commit the order against the President; but such attempts failed there, as elsewhere, on account of the overwhelming tide of contrary opinion, and when the principal chapter of the order met in Washington
1863 on the 10th of December, they elected a list of officers who were almost all either friends of Mr. Lincoln or men of sufficient sagacity not to oppose him.

From the beginning Mr. Lincoln had been fully aware of Mr. Chase's candidacy and of everything that was done for its promotion. It was impossible for him to remain unconscious of it; and although he discouraged all conversation on the subject and refused to read letters relating to it, he could not entirely shut the matter out from his cognizance. He had his own opinion on the taste and judgment displayed by Mr. Chase in his criticisms of the President, and of his colleagues in the Cabinet; but he took no notice of them.

"I have determined," he said, "to shut my eyes, so far as possible, to everything of the sort. Mr. Chase makes a good Secretary, and I shall keep him where he is. If he becomes President, all right. I hope we may never have a worse man. I have observed with regret his plan of strengthening himself. Whenever he sees that an important matter is troubling me, if I am compelled to decide in a way to give offense to a man of some influence, he always ranges himself in opposition to me and persuades the victim that he has been hardly dealt with, and that he would have arranged it very differently. It was so with General Frémont, with

General Hunter when I annulled his hasty proclamation, with General Butler when he was recalled from New Orleans, with these Missouri people when they called the other day. I am entirely indifferent as to his success or failure in these schemes so long as he does his duty at the head of the Treasury Department." CHAP. XII. J. H., Diary, Oct. 16, 1863.

When Rosecrans was removed from the command of the Army of the Cumberland, Mr. Chase pursued the same course. His spiteful comments on that act were reported to the President, who simply laughed at the zealous friend who brought him the news. When told that such tactics might give Mr. Chase the nomination, he said he hoped the country would never do worse. He regretted, however, that the thing had begun, because although it did not annoy him, his friends thought it ought to. He went on appointing by the dozen Mr. Chase's partisans and adherents to places in the Government. He knew perfectly what he was doing, and allowed himself the luxury of a quiet smile as he signed their commissions. He heard more of such gossip than was amusing or agreeable to him. He said on one occasion, "I wish they would stop thrusting that subject of the Presidency into my face. I do not want to hear anything about it."

Of course one reason for the magnanimity with which Mr. Lincoln endured this rivalry of his able and ambitious minister of finance was his consciousness of the inequality of the match between them. Although his renomination was a matter in regard to which he refused to converse much, even with intimate friends, he was perfectly aware of

CHAP. XII.

the drift of things. In capacity of appreciating popular currents and in judgment of individual character Mr. Chase was as a child beside him; and he allowed the opposition to himself in his own Cabinet to continue, without question or remark, with all the more patience and forbearance because he knew how feeble it was.

The movement in favor of Mr. Chase culminated in the month of February in a secret circular signed by Senator Samuel C. Pomeroy of Kansas, and widely circulated through the Union. It is admitted by Mr. Chase's sincerest admirers that the weak point of his character was the incapacity shown in his judgment of men and his choice of intimates; and in no instance was this defect more glaringly exhibited than in the selection of such a man as Senator Pomeroy to conduct his canvass for the Presidency. The two Kansas Senators, Lane and Pomeroy, hated each other intensely, and so long as they were in office together wrangled persistently over the patronage of their State. The President once wrote to Pomeroy, after declining an interview with him: "I wish you and Lane would make a sincere effort to get out of the mood you are in. It does neither of you any good; it gives you the means of tormenting my life out of me, and nothing else."

Lincoln to Pomeroy, May 12, 1864. MS.

Each thought the other got the advantage of him, each abused the President roundly behind his back; but Lane, being the more subtle and adroit politician of the two, never allowed himself to be put in an attitude of open hostility to the Administration. Pomeroy's resentment drove him at last into a mood of sullen animosity towards the Presi-

dent, and it was under his weak leadership that the elements of opposition to Mr. Lincoln at last came together. As the confidential circular issued by the committee of which Pomeroy was the head was the most considerable effort made within the Republican party to defeat the renomination of Mr. Lincoln, we give the document, to show upon how slender a foundation this opposition was based.

The movements recently made throughout the country to secure the renomination of President Lincoln render necessary some counteraction on the part of those unconditional friends of the Union who differ from the policy of his Administration.

So long as no efforts were made to forestall the political action of the people, it was both wise and patriotic for all true friends of the Government to devote their influence to the suppression of the rebellion; but when it becomes evident that party machinery and official influence are being used to secure the perpetuation of the present Administration, those who conscientiously believe that the interests of the country and of freedom demand a change in favor of vigor and purity and nationality, have no choice but to appeal at once to the people, before it shall be too late to secure a fair discussion of principles.

Those in behalf of whom this communication is made have thoughtfully surveyed the political field, and have arrived at the following conclusions: *First*, that even were the reëlection of Mr. Lincoln desirable, it is practically impossible against the union of influences which will oppose him. *Second*, that should he be reëlected, his manifest tendency towards compromises and temporary expedients of policy will become stronger during a second term than it has been in the first, and the cause of human liberty, and the dignity and honor of the nation, suffer proportionately, while the war may continue to languish during his whole Administration, till the public debt shall become a burden too great to be borne. *Third*, that the patronage of the Government through the necessities of the war has been

CHAP. XII.

so rapidly increased, and to such an enormous extent, and so loosely placed, as to render the application of the "one-term principle" absolutely essential to the certain safety of our republican institutions. *Fourth*, that we find united in Hon. Salmon P. Chase more of the qualities needed in a President during the next four years than are combined in any other available candidate; his record, clear and unimpeachable, showing him to be a statesman of rare ability and an administrator of the very highest order, while his private character furnishes the surest obtainable guarantee of economy and purity in the management of public affairs. *Fifth*, that the discussion of the Presidential question, already commenced by the friends of Mr. Lincoln, has developed a popularity and strength in Mr. Chase unexpected even to his warmest admirers; and while we are aware that this strength is at present unorganized, and in no condition to manifest its real magnitude, we are satisfied that it only needs systematic and faithful effort to develop it to an extent sufficient to overcome all opposing obstacles. For these reasons the friends of Mr. Chase have determined on measures which shall present his claims fairly and at once to the country. A central organization has been effected, which already has its connections in all the States, and the object of which is to enable his friends everywhere most effectually to promote his elevation to the Presidency. We wish the hearty co-operation of all those in favor of the speedy restoration of the Union upon the basis of universal freedom, and who desire an administration of the Government during the first period of its new life which shall to the fullest extent develop the capacity of free institutions, enlarge the resources of the country, diminish the burdens of taxation, elevate the standard of public and private morality, vindicate the honor of the Republic before the world, and in all things make our American nationality the fairest example for imitation which human progress has ever achieved. If these objects meet your approval, you can render efficient aid by exerting yourself at once to organize your section of the country, and by corresponding with the chairman of the National Executive Committee for the purpose either of receiving or imparting information.

Corrected by Original Circular.

Of this circular, sent broadcast over the country, many copies of course fell into the hands of the President's friends, and they soon began to come to the Executive Mansion. The President, who was absolutely without curiosity in regard to attacks upon himself, refused to look at them, and they accumulated unread in the desk of his secretary. At last, however, the circular got into print, and it appeared in the "National Intelligencer" of Washington on the morning of the 22d of February. Mr. Chase at once wrote to the President to assure him that he had no knowledge of the existence of the letter before seeing it in print. He gave a brief account of the solicitations of his friends, in compliance with which he had consented to be a candidate for the Presidency, adding: CHAP. XII.

I have never wished that my name should have a moment's thought in comparison with the common cause of enfranchisement and restoration, or be continued before the public a moment after the indication of a preference by the friends of that cause for another. I have thought this explanation due to you as well as to myself. If there is anything in my action or position which in your judgment will prejudice the public interests under my charge, I beg you to say so. I do not wish to administer the Treasury Department one day without your entire confidence. For yourself I cherish sincere respect and esteem, and, permit me to add, affection. Differences of opinion as to administrative action have not changed these sentiments, nor have they been changed by assaults upon me by persons who profess themselves the special representatives of your views and policy. You are not responsible for acts not your own; nor will you hold me responsible, except for what I do or say myself. Great numbers now desire your reëlection. Should their wishes be fulfilled by the suffrages of the people, I hope to carry with me into private life the sentiments I now cherish, whole and unimpaired.

Chase to Lincoln, Feb. 22, 1864. Autograph MS.

CHAP. XII.

Lincoln to Chase, Feb. 23, 1864. MS.

The President next day acknowledged the receipt of this letter, and promised to answer it more fully when he could find time to do so. The next week he wrote at greater length:

I would have taken time to answer yours of the 22d sooner, only that I did not suppose any evil could result from the delay, especially as, by a note, I promptly acknowledged the receipt of yours, and promised a fuller answer. Now, on consideration, I find there is really very little to say. My knowledge of Mr. Pomeroy's letter having been made public came to me only the day you wrote, but I had, in spite of myself, known of its existence several days before. I have not yet read it, and I think I shall not. I was not shocked or surprised by the appearance of the letter, because I had had knowledge of Mr. Pomeroy's committee, and of secret issues which I supposed came from it, and of secret agents who I supposed were sent out by it, for several weeks. I have known just as little of these things as my friends have allowed me to know. They bring the documents to me, but I do not read them; they tell me what they think fit to tell me, but I do not inquire for more. I fully concur with you that neither of us can be justly held responsible for what our respective friends may do without our instigation or countenance; and I assure you, as you have assured me, that no assault has been made upon you by my instigation or with my countenance. Whether you shall remain at the head of the Treasury Department is a question which I will not allow myself to consider from any standpoint other than my judgment of the public service, and, in that view, I do not perceive occasion for a change.[1]

Lincoln to Chase, Feb. 29. 1864. Autograph MS.

Before the President wrote this letter the candidacy of Mr. Chase had already passed completely out of sight. In fact, it never could have been said to

[1] After this correspondence had passed, Mr. Pomeroy, who, whatever his defects of character, did not lack courage, rose in his place in the Senate (March 10), reiterated with added energy his criticisms of the President and his eulogy of Mr. Chase, and claimed that the latter had nothing to do with the circular, but had been "drafted into the service" without his consent.

exist except in the imagination of Mr. Chase and a narrow circle of adherents. He was by no means the choice even of the great body of the radicals who were discontented with Mr. Lincoln. So early as the 17th of December, 1863, Joseph Medill, the editor of the "Chicago Tribune," who represented the most vehement Republican sentiment of the Northwest, wrote: "I presume it is true that Mr. Chase's friends are working for his nomination, but it is all lost labor; Old Abe has the inside track so completely that he will be nominated by acclamation when the convention meets. . . The people will say to Chase, 'You stick to finance, and be content until after 1868'; and to Grant, 'Give the rebels no rest; put them through; your reward will come in due time'; but Uncle Abe must be allowed to boss the reconstruction of the Union."

And from the opening of the year 1864 the feeling in favor of the renomination of Lincoln grew so ardent and so restless that it was almost impossible for the most discreet of the Republican leaders to hold the manifestations of the popular preference in check. An attempt was made by the Treasury officials in Indiana to prevent the State Convention, which met in February, from declaring for Lincoln, but it was all in vain. Wherever any assembly of Republicans came together fresh from the people the only struggle was as to who should get first on the floor to demand the President's renomination. Mr. Chase's principal hope was, of course, founded upon the adhesion of his friends in Ohio; but the result there, as elsewhere, proved how blind he was to the course of politics. The Governor of the State wrote to the President that

CHAP. XII. he was mortified to hear that he had been set down as a Chase man. "The fact that Mr. Chase has been laboring, for the past year at least, with an eye single to promoting his own selfish purposes, totally regardless of the consequences to the Government, as I believe has been the case, is alone sufficient to induce me to oppose him; but aside from this, the policy inaugurated under your lead must be maintained, and it would be suicidal to change leaders in the midst of the contest."

Tod to Lincoln, Feb. 24, 1864. MS.

This is only a specimen of dozens of letters which came from the leading men of the State, who had been relied upon by Mr. Chase to promote his canvass; and finally the feeling grew so strong in Ohio that, although no authorized convention of Republicans was to meet at that time, the Union members of the Legislature took the matter in hand and gave, on the 25th of February, the *coup de grâce* to the Secretary's candidacy. They held a full caucus, and nominated Mr. Lincoln for reëlection, at the demand, as they said, of the people and the soldiers of Ohio. The State of Rhode Island, which Mr. Chase had expected the personal influence of his son-in-law, Governor Sprague, to secure for him, also made haste to range itself with the other States of the North; and as, more than a month before, the great State of Pennsylvania had, by the unanimous expression of the Union members of its Legislature, declared for Lincoln, the Secretary at last concluded that the contest was hopeless, and wrote another letter to Mr. Hall, referring to his former statement that should his friends in Ohio manifest a preference for another he would acquiesce in that decision, and adding:

May 5, 1864.

"The recent action of the Union members of our Legislature indicates such a preference. It becomes my duty, therefore, — and I count it more a privilege than a duty, — to ask that no further consideration be given to my name. It was never more important than now that all our efforts and all our energies should be devoted to the suppression of the rebellion, and to the restoration of order and prosperity, on solid and sure foundations of union, freedom, and impartial justice; and I earnestly urge all with whom my counsels may have weight to allow nothing to divide them while this great work, in comparison with which persons and even parties are nothing, remains unaccomplished."[1]

Schuckers, "Life of S. P. Chase," pp. 502, 503.

In the closing line of this letter occurs the first intimation of that feeling of revolt against the Republican party which afterwards led Mr. Chase to seek the nomination of the Democrats. In numerous letters written during the spring he reiterated his absolute withdrawal from the contest, but indulged in sneers and insinuations against the President which show how deeply he was wounded by his discomfiture.

[1] In an article published in "The Galaxy," July, 1873, by J. M. Winchell, whom Mr. Schuckers in his "Life of Chase" calls the author of the Pomeroy circular (see Schuckers, "Life of Chase," p. 500), occurs this singular passage: "The movement in favor of the Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Chase, had culminated in disaster; that gentleman's chief supporters, including his senatorial son-in-law, having manifested a plentiful lack of nerve or zeal, when the critical question became public, of arraying him against his official chief, and made haste to *take him at his word of declination, diplomatically spoken, in order to rouse their flagging spirits.*"

CHAPTER XIII

GRANT GENERAL-IN-CHIEF

CH. XIII.

THE winter of 1863–64 was unusually cold; and after the exacting work of the autumn both Western armies lay exhausted in their camps about Chattanooga. On the Confederate side the ill-fortune of their army was avenged in the usual manner. Bragg was deprived of his command, although, through the favor and friendship of Mr. Davis, he was afterwards ordered to Richmond in the anomalous capacity of chief-of-staff and military adviser to the Confederate President, who, sorely against his personal wishes, felt himself compelled, by the demands of public opinion, to place General Joseph E. Johnston at the head of the principal Confederate armies of the West. General Polk took the place of Johnston as commander of the Department of Mississippi and East Louisiana; and Johnston proceeded immediately to Dalton, assuming command of the Army of Tennessee on the 27th of December.

Order of Feb. 24, 1864.

His instructions from Richmond were couched in an optimistic tone. Mr. Seddon, the Confederate Secretary of War, said: "The movements of the enemy give no indication of a purpose to attack your army, and it is probable that they may mean to strengthen

themselves in the occupation of the portions of Tennessee they have overrun. It is not desirable they should be allowed to do so with impunity; and as soon as the condition of your forces will allow, it is hoped you will be able to resume the offensive." At the same time it was clearly intimated to him that he must depend exclusively on the resources of his own department or on such help as General Polk might be able to give him. President Davis also addressed the general in terms of exasperating serenity and composure. He quoted to him a letter received from Bragg, in which that beaten commander said: "We can redeem the past. Let us concentrate all our available men, unite them with this little army, still full of zeal and burning to redeem its lost character and prestige,—hurl the whole upon the enemy, and crush him in his power and his glory." Mr. Davis went on to tell General Johnston that his army was, after all, in excellent condition. "You will not need to have it suggested," he said, "that the imperative demand for prompt and vigorous action arises not only from the importance of restoring the prestige of the army and averting the injurious and dispiriting results that must attend a season of inactivity, but from the necessity of reoccupying the country, upon the supplies of which the proper subsistence of our armies materially depends."

Johnston, "Narrative of Military Operations," pp. 263, 264.

Ibid., pp. 267–269.

The Confederate President had a gift of never writing to Johnston without infuriating him; and one of the general's first duties on arriving at Dalton and hurriedly inspecting his new command was to sit down and inform his President of the hard task he had set him, and the insufficient

CH. XIII. means with which he had provided him. He said he had present for duty about 43,000 men, the effective total of infantry and artillery being not quite 36,000, with 2500 cavalry, which he said was not very efficient. He gave Bragg's estimate of Grant's force at 80,000, an estimate which he elsewhere confessed was greatly exaggerated, but he was bent on making out his own case as strong as possible. He acknowledged the importance of recovering the territory lost, but brought forward the serious difficulties that stood in the way. If he should advance through East Tennessee the way to Georgia was left open; if through the middle of the State, the obstacles were Chattanooga, now a fortress, the Tennessee River, the rugged desert of the Cumberland Mountains, and an army outnumbering his own more than two to one. He risked a suggestion which to the ears of the authorities in Richmond had at the time an ominous and sinister sound, though necessity forced it upon them afterwards, the strengthening of the armies of the Confederacy by the substitution of negroes for all the soldiers on detached or daily duty, and in connection with this he made a remark which showed the subtle disorganization even then beginning to be apparent throughout the Confederacy. "My experience in Mississippi was that impressed negroes run away whenever it is possible, and are frequently encouraged by their masters to do so; and I never knew one to be returned by his master."

Johnston, "Narrative of Military Operations," pp. 272, 276.

General Johnston says that he found Dalton had not been selected by Bragg on account of any merit as a strategic position, but simply because the retreat from Missionary Ridge ceased at that town,

the Federal army having abandoned the pursuit. Each division occupied the place it had taken for the encampment of a night, and they afterwards constructed at these points huts for their winter quarters.[1] The army occupied a precipitous ridge called Rocky Face, crossed by the railroad from Dalton to Chattanooga at Mill Creek gap, three and a half miles west of Dalton, but terminating only three miles north of that point, and, therefore, easily flanked by the Ringgold road. This position could also be turned by Snake Creek Gap, traversing the mountains to the south. He says he could have withdrawn to Calhoun, on the Atlanta road, had it not been for the earnestness with which Mr. Davis and Mr. Seddon urged an early resumption of offensive operations, and their apprehensions of the bad effect of a retrograde movement on the spirits of the Southern people. The possession of Kentucky and Tennessee, the vast subsistence depots of the South, was a matter of such vital importance that the Confederate Government at Richmond could not for a moment give up the hope of speedily regaining them.

On the other hand nothing was further from the mind of General Grant than to rest content even with the retention of the vast gains of the autumn. The early part of the winter was necessarily taken up in the strengthening of his position and the subsistence of his army, a matter which on both sides of the line was attended with the greatest labor and difficulty. But the Nashville and Chattanooga

Thomas, Report. Committee on Conduct of the War, 1865–66. Vol. I., Supplement, p. 182.

[1] His army consisted of the two corps of Hardee and Hindman; the former of four divisions, Cheatham's, Breckinridge's, Cleburne's, and Walker's; and the latter of three, his own, Stevenson's, and Stewart's. Wheeler commanded the cavalry corps.

CH. XIII. Railroad was completed on the 14th of January; and trains began running regularly from Nashville to Chattanooga, relieving somewhat the dearth of supplies. Steps were then immediately taken to begin repairing the East Tennessee and Georgia Railroad, which was put in running order as far as Loudon four weeks later. Meanwhile General Sherman, who commanded the Department of the Tennessee, and therefore had especially in his charge the east bank of the Mississippi River from Natchez to the Ohio, asked and received permission from General Grant to go down the Mississippi River to strike a blow at the Confederate forces in the interior of the State of Mississippi and by this means, if possible, put a stop to the annoyance and obstruction which raids on the river occasioned to the traffic of that stream. It was proposed that Banks should at the same time make a similar movement in Louisiana. Sherman, therefore, prepared a picked force of two columns, consisting of two divisions each, McPherson commanding the right and Hurlbut the left, which started east from Vicksburg on the 3d of
1864. February. At the same time a large cavalry force under the command of General W. Sooy Smith was to start south from Memphis, to ride through the country and join General Sherman at Meridian, Mississippi. Sherman marched in the lightest possible order and without deployment straight for Meridian, distant 150 miles. He soon came in contact with the rebel cavalry, but with his compact force brushed them like flies before him, meeting with no substantial opposition. A curious incident befell him at the village of Decatur. Hurlbut's column was several miles in

advance and Sherman halted with his escort at a farm-house, which he entered; he asked for supper, and lying down went to sleep. He was soon awakened by a great noise and confusion in the farm-yard. Some of Hurlbut's wagons which were passing had been attacked by rebel cavalry. Sherman gathered his clerks and orderlies together and was preparing to defend himself in a corn-crib, when the head of McPherson's column appeared on the road and the Confederate troops rode away, unconscious of the rich prize they had had for a moment in their grasp.

"Memoirs of General W. T. Sherman." Vol. I., pp. 390, 391.

Sherman entered Meridian on the 14th, destroying the arsenals and storehouses, and the railroads in every direction for miles around. He sent out a large force of infantry to break up the Mobile and Ohio road to the north and south and the Jackson and Selma road to the east and west. He had succeeded in creating the impression on the minds of the rebel authorities in the State that his objective point was Mobile, an impression which was confirmed by a demonstration made at that point by Farragut; and his march for this reason caused immense excitement which effectively furthered his real purpose. Unfortunately the cavalry force under General Smith did not accomplish their part of the plan. They lost several days in getting started and were finally defeated and driven back by Forrest, near West Point, below Okolona on the Mobile and Ohio road. Sherman, after waiting a week at Meridian for news of Smith, having utterly destroyed the railroads in that region, began to retrace his steps towards Vicksburg. Leaving his troops to follow

Ch. XIII. 1864.

at their leisure he took a small escort and, in advance of his army, rode into Vicksburg on the 29th of February. After a hasty visit to New Orleans, where he arranged to furnish a corps of some ten thousand men to Banks to assist in his operations west of the river, he went up the Mississippi to report to Grant.

The continued presence of Longstreet in East Tennessee had become very irksome to Grant, and on the 10th of February, having accumulated supplies for the support of a considerable force at Knoxville, he ordered Thomas to start for that place on the 13th to coöperate with the Army of the Ohio in driving Longstreet out of the country; but before Thomas moved, Grant had a conversation at Nashville with General J. G. Foster — who had been relieved by General Schofield and was on his way to the North — which convinced him that what might be accomplished by the proposed campaign would not compensate for the hardships which the men would endure and the disadvantage which would result to the coming spring campaign. At the same time he acquired the impression that most of Johnston's force had been withdrawn from Thomas's front. He therefore changed the orders he had given for the march to Knoxville, but as Thomas was all ready for the road, he directed him to move to his immediate front, the object being to gain possession of Dalton and as far south of that as possible.

Thomas, Report. Committee on Conduct of the War. Supplement, Vol. I., p. 183.

This impression of General Grant's proved to be erroneous. The rebel authorities in Richmond as well as in Mississippi had been greatly disturbed by Sherman's move to Meridian; it was

taken for granted that Mobile was in danger. Mr. Davis telegraphed to Johnston either to send Polk reënforcements or to join him in person with what force he could. General Johnston very sensibly replied that it would be impossible for troops from Dalton to meet the Federal army before it reached the Gulf; and, in answer to subsequent solicitations, he said that such an expedition would require two-thirds of his army and involve the abandonment of his present line; upon which Davis directed him peremptorily to send infantry enough to enable "Polk to beat the detachment which the enemy had thrown far into the interior of our country"; and when Johnston replied in his habitual tone that it was too late for such an object, Mr. Davis gave him at last a positive order to send Hardee with his corps to Polk without delay. Johnston obeyed this order with such deliberation that Hardee's advance, which did not start until Sherman was preparing to return, never got farther than the Tombigbee River, and his troops were recalled by Mr. Davis himself on the 23d, so that when General Thomas moved forward, under the impression entertained by Grant that Johnston's army had been withdrawn from Dalton he found the Confederates in full force in their intrenchments and on the ridge of Rocky Face.

CH. XIII.

J. E. Johnston, "Narrative of Military Operations," p. 281.

Ibid.

After a thorough reconnaissance, finding that the supposed conditions under which the movement was made did not exist, Thomas withdrew his army to his former position. Schofield, who had relieved Foster in Tennessee, after a brief demonstration against Longstreet who was retiring from his front, also had to return for lack of supplies and of trans-

CH. XIII. portation. It seems impossible to exaggerate the helpless condition of the armies on both sides in the matter of transportation. Thomas says scarcely any of his artillery could be moved for lack of horses; and Johnston reports that, for a long time after he arrived at Dalton, his artillery horses were so feeble from their hard service and scarcity of forage that it was not only impossible to manœuvre the batteries in action, but also to march with them at the ordinary rate of speed on
1863. ordinary roads; and even so late as February, when the supply of forage had become regular and the face of the country almost dry, the teams of the Napoleon guns were unable to draw them up a trifling hill, over which the roads to their stables passed.

Immediately after the victories at Chattanooga Mr. Washburne of Illinois, the devoted friend and firm supporter of General Grant through good and evil report, introduced a bill in Congress to revive the grade of lieutenant-general in the army. The measure occasioned a good deal of discussion. This high rank had never been conferred on any citizen of the republic except Washington, who held it for a short time before his death. It was discontinued for more than half a century and then conferred by brevet only upon General Scott. There were those who feared, or affected to fear, that so high military rank was threatening to the liberties of the republic. The great majority of Congress, however, considered the liberties of the republic more robust than this fear would indicate, and the bill was finally passed on the 26th of February, and received the approval of the President

on the 29th of February. It provided for the revival of the grade of lieutenant-general, and authorized the President "to appoint, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, a lieutenant-general, to be selected from among those officers in the military service of the United States not below the grade of major-general, most distinguished for courage, skill, and ability, who, being commissioned as lieutenant-general, may be authorized, under the direction and during the pleasure of the President, to command the armies of the United States." Immediately upon signing the bill the President nominated Grant to the Senate for the office created by it.

Appendix, "Globe," Feb. 29, 1864, p. 142.

Although the bill, of course, mentioned the name of no general, there was no pretense from the beginning that any one else was thought of in connection with the place. The Administration exercised no influence in the matter, neither helping nor hindering the progress of the bill through the Houses of Congress. It had already become clearly manifest that General Halleck, although an officer of great learning and ability, was not fitted by character or temperament for the assumption of such weighty responsibilities as the military situation required. The President himself said about this time: "When it appeared that McClellan was incompetent to the work of handling the army and we sent for Halleck to take command, he stipulated that it should be with the full powers and responsibilities of general-in-chief. He kept that attitude until Pope's defeat, but ever since that event he has shrunk from responsibility whenever it was possible." So that in the mind of the President, as well as in the

J. H., Diary.

CH. XIII. intention of Congress and the acquiescence of the public, there was no thought of nominating any one but Grant to the chief command of all the armies. Whether he was or was not the ablest of all our generals is a question which can never be decided; perhaps there were legionaries in the army of Gaul as able as Cæsar if occasion had been given them to show it. The success and fame of generals is the joint result of merit and of opportunity; and Grant was, beyond all comparison, the most fortunate of American soldiers. Whatever criticism might be made on his character, his learning, or his methods, the fact was not to be denied that he had reaped the most substantial successes of the war; he had captured two armies and utterly defeated a third; he was justly entitled, by virtue of the *spolia opima* with which he had presented the republic, to his triumph, to be celebrated with all the pomp and circumstance possible.

1864. The Senate immediately confirmed his nomination, and on the 3d of March the Secretary of War directed him to report in person to the War Department as early as practicable, considering the condition of his command. He started for Washington the next day, but in the midst of his hurried preparations for departure he found time to write a letter of the most warm and generous friendship to Sherman. He had not even yet heard the news of his confirmation, but he took it for granted. He said: "I start in the morning to comply with the order, but I shall say very distinctly on my arrival there that I shall accept no appointment which will require me to make that city [Washington] my headquarters. . . While I have



GENERAL LEONIDAS POLK, BISHOP OF LOUISIANA.

been eminently successful in this war, in at least gaining the confidence of the public, no one feels more than I how much of this success is due to the energy, skill, and the harmonious putting forth of that energy and skill, of those whom it has been my good fortune to have occupying subordinate positions under me. There are many officers to whom these remarks are applicable to a greater or less degree, proportionate to their ability as soldiers, but what I want is to express my thanks to you and McPherson as the men to whom, above all others, I feel indebted for whatever I have had of success. How far your advice and suggestions have been of assistance you know. How far your execution of whatever has been given you to do entitles you to the reward I am receiving you cannot know as well as I do. I feel all the gratitude this letter would express, giving it the most flattering construction. The word YOU I use in the plural, intending it for McPherson also." CH. XIII.

Grant to Sherman, Mar. 4, 1864. "Memoirs of W. T. Sherman." Vol. I., p. 399.

This letter was as unique as it was admirable, for Grant wrote in this strain to no one else in the world. There seemed no room in his heart for more than two such friends. When McPherson died in the flower of his young manhood, Sheridan took the vacant place in the confidence and affection of his great chief where he and Sherman remained ever after without rivals. Sherman, who received the letter on his way up the river from the Meridian raid, answered in a similar strain with even more of ardent and liberal eulogy: "You do yourself injustice and us too much honor in assigning to us so large a share of the merits which have led to your high advancement. . . You

CH. XIII. are now Washington's legitimate successor and occupy a position of almost dangerous elevation; but if you can continue as heretofore to be yourself, simple, honest, and unpretending, you will enjoy through life the respect and love of friends, and the homage of millions of human beings who will award to you a large share for securing to them and their descendants a government of law and stability. I repeat you do General McPherson and myself too much honor. At Belmont, you manifested your traits, neither of us being near; at Donelson also you illustrated your whole character. I was not near, and General McPherson in too subordinate a capacity to influence you. . . I believe you are as brave, patriotic, and just as the great prototype Washington; as unselfish, kindhearted, and honest as a man should be; but the chief characteristic in your nature is the simple faith in success you have always manifested, which I can liken to nothing else than the faith a Christian has in his Saviour. This faith gave you victory at Shiloh and Vicksburg. Also, when you have completed your best preparations, you go into battle without hesitation, as at Chattanooga — no doubts, no reserve; and I tell you that it was this that made us act with confidence. I knew, wherever I was, that you thought of me, and if I got in a tight place you would come, if alive. . . Now as to the future. Do not stay in Washington. Halleck is better qualified than you are to stand the buffets of intrigue and policy. Come out West; take to yourself the whole Mississippi Valley, let us make it dead-sure, and I tell you the Atlantic slope and Pacific shores will follow its destiny, as sure as the limbs of a

tree live or die with the main trunk. We have done much; still much remains to be done. Time and time's influences are all with us; we could almost afford to sit still and let these influences work. Even in the seceded States your word now would go further than a President's proclamation or an act of Congress. For God's sake and for your country's sake, come out of Washington. I foretold to General Halleck before he left Corinth the inevitable result to him, and I now exhort you to come out West. Here lies the seat of the coming empire; and from the West, when our task is done, we will make short work of Charleston and Richmond, and the impoverished coast of the Atlantic." CH. XIII.

Sherman to Grant, March 10, 1864. "Memoirs of W. T. Sherman." Vol. I., pp. 399–400.

In both of these letters there is apparent a not very intelligent dread of Washington and its political influences; something of the feeling which sailors have towards lawyers. Grant assures Sherman beforehand that he shall not accept his new grade if he is compelled to make his headquarters in Washington, and Sherman adjures him by all that is sacred to avoid the Atlantic coast altogether. It evidently did not enter the minds of either that the loftiest honors and no small degree of enjoyment awaited both of them in years to come in the city which they regarded with such superstitious apprehensions.

Grant proceeded on his way to the capital as quietly as possible, but the rumors of his coming went everywhere before him, and his train moved through a continual storm of cheering and enthusiasm from Nashville to Washington. He reached there on the evening of the 8th of March. There 1864.

CH. XIII. was to be a reception at the Executive Mansion and, as Grant's arrival was expected, the throng was very great. At about half-past nine Grant entered, and he and the President met for the first time. A certain movement and rumor in the crowd heralded the approach of the most famous guest of the evening, and when General Grant stood before Mr. Lincoln they recognized each other without formal presentation, and cordially shook hands. The thronging crowd with instinctive deference stood back for a moment, while the President and the general exchanged a few words of conversation. Lincoln then introduced Seward to Grant, and the Secretary of State took him away to present him to Mrs. Lincoln. He then went on to the East Room, where his presence excited a feeling which burst the bonds of etiquette, and cheer after cheer rose from the assembled crowd. Hot and blushing with embarrassment he was forced to mount a sofa from which he could shake hands with the eager admirers who rushed upon him from all sides of the great room.

It was an hour before he could return to the
Mar. 8, 1864. small drawing-room, where, after the departure of the crowd, the President awaited him. The President here made an appointment with him for the formal presentation next day of his commission as lieutenant-general. "I shall make a very short speech to you," said Lincoln, "to which I desire you to reply, for an object; and that you may be properly prepared to do so I have written what I shall say, only four sentences in all, which I will read from my manuscript as an example which you may follow and also read your reply — as you are

perhaps not so much accustomed to public speaking as I am; and I therefore give you what I shall say so that you may consider it. There are two points that I would like to have you make in your answer: First, to say something which shall prevent or obviate any jealousy of you from any of the other generals in the service; and second, something which shall put you on as good terms as possible with the Army of the Potomac. If you see any objection to doing this, be under no restraint whatever in expressing that objection to the Secretary of War."[1] CH. XIII.

General Grant and Mr. Stanton left the room together. The next day, at one o'clock, in presence of the Cabinet, General Halleck, two members of Grant's staff, and the President's private secretary, the commission of lieutenant-general was formally delivered by the President. Mr. Lincoln said: "General Grant, the nation's appreciation of what you have done, and its reliance upon you for what remains to do in the existing great struggle, are now presented, with this commission constituting you Lieutenant-General in the Army of the United States. With this high honor devolves upon you, also, a corresponding responsibility. As the country herein trusts you, so, under God, it will sustain you. I scarcely need to add that with what I here speak for the nation, goes my own hearty personal concurrence." The general had hurriedly and almost illegibly written his speech on half of a sheet of note paper in lead Mar. 9, 1864. Autograph MS.

[1] J. G. N., Personal Memoranda. MS. There were present at this conversation, besides Lincoln and Grant, Mr. Stanton and Mr. Nicolay, the President's private secretary.

CH. XIII. pencil. His embarrassment was evident and extreme;[1] he found his own writing very difficult to read; but what he said could hardly have been improved: "Mr. President, I accept this commission with gratitude for the high honor conferred. With the aid of the noble armies that have fought on so many fields for our common country, it will be my earnest endeavor not to disappoint your expectations. I feel the full weight of the responsibilities now devolving on me; and I know that if they are met, it will be due to those armies, and above all to the favor of that Providence which leads both nations and men." It will be observed that he made no reference whatever to the subject of the President's request the night before. It is not known whether he did this after consultation with Stanton or whether, with his deep distrust of Washington politicians, he thought it wise to begin by disregarding all their suggestions.

Autograph MS.

On the same day General Halleck sent a letter to the Secretary of War, respectfully requesting that since the grade of lieutenant-general, superior to his own, had been created, and the distinguished officer promoted to that rank had received his commission and reported for duty, that orders might

[1] There is a singular parallel in the account given by Senator William Maclay of the manner in which Washington delivered his inaugural address: "This great man was agitated and embarrassed more than ever he was by the leveled cannon or pointed musket. He trembled, and several times could scarce make out to read, though it must be supposed that he had often read before. He made a flourish with his right hand, which left rather an ungainly impression. I sincerely, for my part, wished all set ceremony in the hands of the dancing masters, and that this first of men had read off his address in the plainest manner, without ever taking his eyes from the paper, for I felt hurt that he was not first in everything."

be issued placing him in command of the army and relieving General Halleck from that duty. "In making this request," he says, "I am influenced solely by a desire to conform to the provisions of the law which, in my opinion, impose upon a lieutenant-general the duties and responsibilities of general-in-chief of the army."

Gideon Welles, in "Atlantic Monthly" for March, 1878.

After the presentation of the commission a brief conversation took place. General Grant inquired what special service was expected of him. The President replied that the country wanted him to take Richmond; he said our generals had not been fortunate in their efforts in that direction and asked if the Lieutenant-General could do it. Grant, without hesitation, answered that he could if he had the troops. These the President assured him he should have. There was not one word said as to what route to Richmond should be chosen.[1]

Mar. 9, 1884.

[1] A statement printed by the late General Richard Taylor in regard to this matter needs mention, if only to be peremptorily denied. He pretends that a story had come to him, well authenticated, that in the conference which took place at this time between Lincoln, Stanton, and Grant, Grant said the advance on Richmond should be made by the James River; that it was replied that the Government required the interposition of an army between Lee and Washington, and would not consent, at that late day, to the adoption of a plan that would be taken by the public as a confession of previous error; that Grant observed that he was indifferent as to routes, but if the Government preferred its own to the one he suggested it must be prepared for the additional loss of one hundred thousand men; that the men were promised; that Grant accepted the Governmental plan of campaign, and was supported to the end. Whatever General Taylor's authority for this statement might have been, it is absolutely untrue. Mr. Welles shows that in the conference, if it is to be called such, of the 9th of March the question of the route which Grant was to take was not even mentioned, and there is no record in existence of any other conference of the sort referred to. Grant himself says, "I did not communicate my plans to the President, nor did I to the Secretary of War or to General Halleck."— Grant, "Personal Memoirs." Vol. II., p. 123.

1864.

CH. XIII. The next day Grant visited General Meade at the headquarters of the Army of the Potomac at Brandy Station. He had known General Meade slightly in the Mexican war, but had not met him since. He was a stranger to the Army of the Potomac with the exception of a few officers of the regular army whom he had known in Mexico. Meade received him not only with the courtesy and deference due to his high rank and great services, but with a generosity and magnanimity which impressed Grant most favorably. Meade said that it was possible Grant might want an officer to command the Army of the Potomac who had been with him in the West, and made especial mention of Sherman. He begged him that if that was the case not to hesitate about making the change. "He urged," says Grant, "that the work before us was of such vast importance to the whole nation that the feelings or wishes of no one person should stand in the way of selecting the right men for all positions. For himself, he would serve to the best of his ability wherever placed." Grant assured him that he had no thought of making any change; and that Sherman could not be spared from the West. He returned to Washington on the 11th.

Grant, "Personal Memoirs." Vol. II., p. 117.

Mar. 12, 1864. The next day he was placed in command of all the armies by orders from the War Department; but without waiting for a single day to accept the lavish proffers of hospitality which were showered upon him, he started West again on the evening of the 11th of March. In that short time he had utterly changed his views and plans for the future conduct of the war. He had relin-

quished the purpose he had hitherto firmly held of leading the Western armies on the great campaign to Atlanta and the sea, and had decided to take the field with the Army of the Potomac. "When I got to Washington," he said, "and saw the situation, it was plain that here was the point for the commanding general to be. No one else could probably resist the pressure that would be brought to bear upon him to desist from his own plans and pursue others." He, therefore, hurried back to the West to make preparations for finally severing his relations with those magnificent armies which had gained him so many victories. Sherman at his request was promoted to command the Military Division of the Mississippi, McPherson succeeded to Sherman's command of the Department of the Tennessee, and Logan was promoted to the command of McPherson's corps.

Grant, "Personal Memoirs," Vol. II., p. 116.

CHAPTER XIV

THE WILDERNESS

CHAP. XIV. GENERAL GRANT made but a brief visit to the West. Sherman assumed command of the Military Division of the Mississippi on the 18th
1864. of March, and then accompanied the General-in-Chief as far as Cincinnati on the road to Washington; every hour was now important, and valuable time was saved by this long conference on the rail. Besides the great subject of the coming campaign, the two friends and comrades discussed the disposition which should be made of various officers then out of employment. This was a delicate matter, and seemed both to Grant and the Government more important than it really was. There were few indispensable men, and the political influence of the more conspicuous was far less than was claimed. There was little embarrassment on the score of rank, as a law passed in 1862 had given to the President the power of appointment of generals to special commands without regard to the date of their commissions. When Sherman was promoted over the heads of Thomas and Hooker, and McPherson was put in command over Hurlbut, all of these superseded officers acquiesced with patriotic cheerfulness in what, according to the strict rules of the

Grant, "Personal Memoirs." Vol. II., p. 119.

service, seemed an injustice. Others, it is true, were not so self-sacrificing. General Buell, being offered the command of a corps under Sherman, declined to serve under his junior, and was soon after mustered out of the service. Grant was solicited by the friends of Frémont and McClellan to provide them with commands, but this he declined to do; and both resigned during their political campaigns for the Presidency. CHAP. XIV.

Badeau, "Military History of U. S. Grant," Vol. II., p. 52.

The General-in-Chief established his headquarters at Culpeper Court House near the end of March, and spent a month in preparations for the great campaign which he, in common with the entire North, hoped would end the war. He visited Washington several times, and had occasional conversations with the President. He says in his Memoirs that he was warned, at an early day, by Halleck and Stanton, not to communicate his plan of campaign to Mr. Lincoln; but he found this warning as superfluous as it was impertinent: Mr. Lincoln expressly assured him he preferred not to know his purposes; he desired only to learn what means he needed to carry them out, and promised to furnish these to the full extent of his power. He was, however, especially pleased to learn that the new General-in-Chief intended to employ the full strength of the army in a simultaneous concerted movement all along the line,[1] which should keep the

1864.

[1] General Grant, writing so long after the event, has fallen into an evident error in regard to this matter in his "Personal Memoirs," Vol. II., pp. 142, 143. He says that on his last visit to Washington before taking the field (end of April, 1864), the President had "become acquainted with the fact that a general movement had been ordered all along the line, and seemed to think it a new feature in war." He represented himself as "explaining" the advantages of this course to the President, who, struck by the

CHAP. XIV. enemy everywhere employed, and prevent him from concentrating at threatened points. This was the object which the President had striven for in vain through three years of war; this, the course which he had urged upon successive generals without effect; and which, in despair of seeing the purpose attained in any other way, he had embodied in his general orders of January 27, 1862.

The plan of the Lieutenant-General, as set forth in his report, was extremely simple. So far
1864. as practicable, the armies were to move together, and towards one common center. Banks was to finish his operations in Louisiana, and, leaving a small garrison on the Rio Grande, was to concentrate an army of some 25,000 men, and move

novelty of it, exclaimed: "Oh, yes. I see that! As we say out West, if a man can't skin, he must hold a leg while somebody else does." The general forgot, in writing this, that on the 4th of April, nearly a month before this interview, he had, in a letter to Sherman detailing his plan of campaign, made use of this same expression: "If Sigel can't skin himself, he can hold a leg while some one else skins" ("Personal Memoirs," Vol. II., p. 132). As no one's memory of conversations can be trusted after twenty years, and as it is our habit to rely in such matters only upon memoranda made at the moment, we give a verbatim transcript from the diary of one of Mr. Lincoln's secretaries, written in April, 1864:

"The President has been strongly reminded by General Grant's present plan of his, the President's, old suggestion, so constantly made, and as constantly neglected, to Buell, Halleck, *et al.*, to move at once upon the enemy's whole line, so as to bring into action to our advantage our great superiority of numbers. Otherwise, by use of interior lines, and control of the interior railroad system, the enemy can shift their men rapidly from one position to another as they may be required. In this concerted movement, however, great superiority of numbers must tell, as the enemy, however successful where he concentrates, must necessarily weaken other portions of his line and lose important positions. This idea of his own the President recognized with special pleasure when Grant said it was his intention to make all the line useful, 'those not fighting could help the fighting.' 'Those not skinning can hold a leg,' added the President" (J. H., Diary).

on Mobile. Sherman was to move simultaneously with the other armies, General Johnston's army being his objective, and the heart of Georgia his ultimate aim. Sigel, who was in command in the Shenandoah, was to move to the front in two columns, one to threaten the enemy in the valley, the other to cut the railroads connecting Richmond with the Southwest. Gillmore was to be brought north with his corps, and in company with another corps, under W. F. Smith, was to form an army under General B. F. Butler to operate against Richmond south of the James. Lee's army was to be the objective point of Meade, reënforced by Burnside. CHAP. XIV.

As to the route by which the Army of the Potomac was to advance, Grant reserved his decision until just before he started upon his march. There were advantages and drawbacks to a move by either flank. Moving by the right would have led him through a more open and better cultivated country; would have brought him into immediate collision with the enemy on a terrain more suitable for field operations, and especially better adapted for the use of artillery, than that which he would find on the left; but the disadvantage of that route was that his line of communication would have been constantly exposed; large detachments of troops would have been required to protect the Alexandria Railroad and the depots on it; the army could only carry fifteen days' rations with them, and an enormous covering force would have been required to protect the roads and the trains by which additional supplies would have to be brought. A great number

CHAP. XIV. of wounded would certainly have to be provided for, and this could be much more conveniently managed in a movement to the left, on account of the easy access everywhere afforded to water transportation. Moving by the latter route the line of supply by the railroad could be at once abandoned, and short routes of communication opened from the protected flank to navigable waters connected with Washington. The moral or political advantages and objections to the move by the left flank were also obvious. It was sure to be vehemently criticized by all the partisans of McClellan, who insisted that the only rational approach to Richmond was on the line of the James; and on the other hand the President, although refraining from any suggestion to General Grant, felt that beginning a siege of Richmond with Lee's army wholly intact and free to move in any direction was thoroughly undesirable, and that in a move upon that army overland, the constant access by water to our left flank was an advantage not to be lightly thrown away.

Humphreys, "The Virginia Campaign of '64 and '65," pp. 9, 10.

The main consideration in the mind of Grant, and in this he was sustained by the best minds in the Army of the Potomac, was that the war could not be brought to a close until the power of Lee's army was broken; that without this even the capture of Richmond would not avail; that Lee was too good a general to shut himself up in the defenses of that city and court the fate of Pemberton; that if he were brought to the neighborhood of Richmond without a battle, the extension he would naturally give his lines would render their complete envelopment impracticable; and that if Richmond

1864.

should be captured while the Army of Virginia was still strong enough to keep the field, it might move southward and continue the war indefinitely. A plan of campaign was therefore chosen which should bring the two armies into collision at once, on a field at some distance from Richmond, where troops might be moved in large numbers by either flank, and where there might be at least a chance of success in destroying or greatly diminishing the military power of the Confederacy, before the two antagonists, in their deadly grapple, should come within sight of the works which guarded the rebel capital. No one dreamed of an easy victory. There was no road to Richmond which would not exact its frightful toll of blood. "Move as we might," says General Humphreys, "long-continued, hard fighting under great difficulties was before us." Yet no one imagined how many days of desperate battle, how many months of leaguer and march, they were to see before this terrible campaign was to end in the great and final victory. The Army of the Potomac now had a commander, whose purpose was clear and definite, and whose plan was of archaic simplicity, "to hammer continuously against the armed force of the enemy and his resources until by mere attrition, if in no other way, there should be nothing left to him but an equal submission with the loyal section of our common country to the Constitution and laws of the land."

Humphreys, "The Virginia Campaign of '64 and '65," p. 8.

Ibid., p. 9.

1864.

Grant, Report, Operations from March, 1864, to July, 1865. "Personal Memoirs." Vol. II., p. 556.

The two armies lay in their intrenchments on both sides of the Rapidan. The headquarters of General Grant were at Culpeper Court House, among the main body of his infantry; those of

CHAP. XIV. Lee at Orange Court House; the Army of Northern Virginia guarded the south bank of the river for eighteen or twenty miles, Ewell commanding the right half, A. P. Hill the left. The formidable works on Mine Run secured the Confederate right wing, which was further protected by the tangled and gloomy thickets of the Wilderness. Longstreet had arrived from Tennessee with two fine divisions,

1864. and was held in reserve at Gordonsville. The two armies were not so unequally matched as Confed-

Humphreys, "The Virginia Campaign of '64 and '65," pp. 14–17. erate writers insist. The strength of the Army of the Potomac, present for duty equipped, on the 30th of April, was 122,146; this includes the 22,708 of Burnside's Ninth Corps.[1] The Army of Northern Virginia numbered at the opening of this campaign

Ibid. not less than 61,953. While this seems like a great disparity of strength, it must not be forgotten that the Confederate general had an enormous advantage of position. The dense woods and the thickly timbered swamps in which he was to resist the march of the National army were as well known to him as the lines of his own hand, and were absolutely unknown to his antagonist. Even in a suc-

[1] After a careful collation of all the statements at our command, from both National and Confederate authorities, we have adopted the figures of General A. A. Humphreys, chief-of-staff of the Army of the Potomac, as given in his admirable history of the Virginia Campaign. We take this occasion to express our continual obligations to this able and impartial work. The student is fortunate who can find a guide of such intelligence, such technical learning, and such invincible candor, as General Humphreys. He may be followed with perfect confidence, through the devious maze of groping marches and murderous battles, from the Rapidan to the Appomattox. Compared with him, all other critics of this momentous campaign seem charged with color and prejudice; he alone appears destitute alike of friendships and animosities. He has no favorite but the truth; he is as just to his enemy as to himself; and all this without apparent consciousness of his own magnanimity.



GENERAL J. E. B. STUART.

cessful advance in such a region the lines of the victor become thoroughly broken, and the defeated party, fighting on his own ground, can recover almost as readily as his pursuers. Both armies were of excellent material; the new troops in the National ranks rapidly acquired their education among the seasoned veterans of the Army of the Potomac, and Lee's force was like a well-tempered blade in his practiced hand. On both sides the troops had commanders worthy of them. CHAP. XIV.

The Army of the Potomac had been thoroughly reorganized and reduced to three corps: the Second, commanded by Hancock, who had recovered from his wounds received at Gettysburg, and now came back to complete his record of the most brilliant soldier in action that our army has ever known; the Fifth, which Warren led with eminent ability and devotion; and the Sixth, commanded by the beloved and trusted Sedgwick. Burnside, with the Ninth Corps, had at first an independent command; but this was soon found to be an impracticable arrangement, and it was united late in May with the army of Meade. The cavalry was placed under Sheridan, who had been brought from the West for that service. General Grant had not seen Pleasonton's meritorious service from Chancellorsville to Gettysburg; but he had seen Sheridan in that heroic rush up the slope of Missionary Ridge; and he was much given to trusting the evidence of his own eyes. Under these five commanders were many already famous who were to win still greater renown before the year was gone: Humphreys, Parke, Barlow, Gibbon, Birney, Wright, Crawford, Getty, Gregg, J. H. Wilson, Willcox, Griffin, 1864.

CHAP. XIV. Ricketts; and many for whom, even then, a welcome was preparing in Valhalla, among whom the most honored names were those of Sedgwick and Wadsworth. The officers under Lee were equally able and experienced: Longstreet, who was, taken all round, the best subordinate soldier of the Confederacy; Ewell, who was always active and trustworthy, and A. P. Hill, who possessed the fullest confidence of his superiors, commanded the three infantry corps; the cavalry was under the charge of that gay and gallant trooper, J. E. B. Stuart, so soon to go down to a soldier's grave. Divisions and brigades were led by the men whose courage and conduct had been shown in every field from Charleston to the Susquehanna: Gordon, Edward Johnson, Rodes, Ramseur, Heth, Hampton, and the young Lees. On both sides there was the best manhood, the brightest intelligence, the nation could furnish; both sides were equally ready to shed their blood in fair quarrel; the wearers of the blue and the gray looked with the same eagerness to the fading patches of snow on the summits of the Blue Ridge, which they knew would be the signal of firm roads and marching orders; and few imagined what a flight of warlike ghosts would rise, indignant, from those vernal fields and forests, in the first days of the opening May.

1864. On the last day of April the President sent this letter to General Grant:

"Not expecting to see you again before the spring campaign opens, I wish to express in this way my entire satisfaction with what you have done up to this time, so far as I understand it. The particulars of your plan I neither know nor seek to know.

You are vigilant and self-reliant; and, pleased with this, I wish not to obtrude any constraints or restraints upon you. While I am very anxious that any great disaster or capture of our men in great numbers shall be avoided, I know these points are less likely to escape your attention than they would be mine. If there is anything wanting which is within my power to give, do not fail to let me know it. And now, with a brave army and a just cause, may God sustain you."

Lincoln to Grant, April 30, 1864. MS.

Grant, who in general seems to have cared little for such things, was touched by the generous feeling of the President's letter, and answered the next day with unaccustomed warmth of expression:

"Your very kind letter of yesterday is just received. The confidence you express for the future and satisfaction with the past in my military administration is acknowledged with pride. It will be my earnest endeavor that you and the country shall not be disappointed. From my first entrance into the volunteer service of the country to the present day, I have never had cause of complaint — have never expressed or implied a complaint against the Administration, or the Secretary of War, for throwing any embarrassment in the way of my vigorously prosecuting what appeared to me my duty. Indeed since the promotion which placed me in command of all the armies, and in view of the great responsibility and importance of success, I have been astonished at the readiness with which everything asked for has been yielded, without even an explanation being asked. Should my success be less than I desire and expect, the least I can say is, the fault is not with you."

Grant to Lincoln, May 1, 1864. Autograph MS.



RELATIVE POSITIONS OF FORCES, MORNING AND EVENING, MAY 4, 1864.

CHAP. XIV.

We find in the tone of this letter an augury of ultimate victory, however long it might be delayed. Contrast it for an instant with the spirit of those whimpering epistles which McClellan sent back at every halting-place between the Potomac and the James: his constant complaint that he was not supported; his fantastic exaggeration of the enemy's numbers; his persistent under-statement of his own. He had been treated as well as Grant had been; he outnumbered his adversary more than two to one. He had as good an army as Grant; Johnston had no better than Lee. So far as intellect and knowledge of a soldier's business were

in question, there had been no change for the better on either side. Lee was as able as Johnston; Grant was far from being so accomplished an officer as McClellan. But the incalculable change that had now come to the Army of the Potomac was in the will and temperament of the man who was henceforth to lead it — with whatever errors or imperfections, at least with manly and invincible energy — through unimaginable toil and slaughter to victory and peace. CHAP. XIV.

Promptly at the time appointed, soon after midnight, on the 4th of May, the Army of the Potomac started on its final march to Richmond. Sheridan, with two cavalry divisions, led the two vast columns of infantry, Torbert, with another division, guarding the rear. In the darkness of the night five bridges were thrown across the Rapidan, which was two hundred feet wide. Hancock crossed at Ely's Ford and moved out to the familiar battlefield of Chancellorsville; Warren took the Fifth Corps over at Germanna Ford, and marched out to Wilderness Tavern where his road crossed the turnpike which runs from Orange to Fredericksburg, parallel to the plank road between the same points, a mile or more to the south. The cavalry threw out reconnaissances in every direction: to left and right, to front, and even to the rear. Hancock reached Chancellorsville at ten in the morning, and Warren, who had further to march, established himself at the Tavern at two; both corps had made a good day's march, and it was not thought expedient to push them further until the great trains should come up. 1864.

Grant, like Hooker the year before, had made the

CHAP. XIV. first stage of his momentous journey with perfect success. Another day would bring him through the tangled and gloomy wilderness into the more open ground which lay to the south and west of it. It is idle to conjecture what he would have done if he had made that march unmolested; for neither then nor ever thereafter was he to traverse that ill-famed wood, though rivers of fraternal blood were to flow in the effort to penetrate its eastern selvage. Hancock and Warren were ordered to move forward the next morning, the one to Shady Grove, the other to Parker's Store; Sedgwick to march to Wilderness Tavern, and Burnside, who was already moving with the greatest celerity from Manassas, was ordered to continue by forced marches until he joined the rest of the army.

May 4, 1864.

But, rapidly as Grant was moving, Lee was deciding and acting with equal energy. He has left behind him no statement of the theories or motives which governed his action on this occasion, and General Grant may possibly be right in claiming that his movement was a surprise to the Confederate general. But the moment his signal officers informed him of the movement of the Army of the Potomac to his right, he acted with a decision and swiftness to which we find no parallel in his history. Realizing that the Wilderness was in itself an intrenchment to him, he launched his two army corps—Ewell along the turnpike and Hill on the plank road—with such dispatch that by nightfall on the 4th they were half way through the Wilderness, ready to strike in the morning at the right flank of their moving enemy. A staff officer of General Lee says he was full of buoyant confidence at

Grant, "Personal Memoirs." Vol. II., p. 191. Badeau, Vol. II., p. 101.

General A. L. Long, "Memoirs of R. E. Lee," p. 327.



NOTE: For the most part the troops are indicated by divisions; when a name designates a brigade it is inclosed in parentheses.

CHAP. XIV. May, 1864.

breakfast on the morning of the 5th, expressing his gratification that his new adversary had put himself exactly in Hooker's predicament; he relied upon the friendly aid of the thickets of the Wilderness to repeat and surpass his success at Chancellorsville. His confidence communicated itself to his command, and Ewell moved down the pike in high spirits, taking care not to get too far in advance of Hill on the plank road, and both of them being warned not to bring on a general engagement until Longstreet, who was hurrying up from Gordonsville, should arrive. Ewell's force came into collision with Warren's advance early in the morning; and Meade at once ordered the Fifth Corps to attack, and sent word to Hancock to hold his troops where they were, at Todd's Tavern, until further developments. Sedgwick was directed to go in on Warren's right.

In this manner began the mutual slaughter of the Wilderness, on a scene the strangest ever chosen by man or by destiny for the field of a great battle. The primeval forest had been cut away in former years to serve the needs of mines and furnaces in the neighborhood: those industries had declined and perished; and now the whole region, left to itself, had been covered with a wild and shaggy growth of scrub oak, dwarf pines, and hazel thicket woven together by trailing vines and briers. Into this dense jungle the troops of Warren plunged, and were instantly lost to sight of their commanders and of each other. They fought under terrible disadvantages; deprived of the view of their comrades to the left and right, not knowing what obstacles or dangers would

confront them at every step, they made through the dismal chaparral.

On the other hand, the Confederates, being in position, had every advantage of this strange situation. Unseen and silent, they could await the approach of the Federal troops, whose every movement was betrayed by the noise of their march, and could thus deliver the first and most murderous volley.[1] But, in spite of these disadvantages, Warren's troops, under Griffin, went gallantly forward on the turnpike, and drove parts of Ewell's corps back in confusion; the Confederate general John M. Jones was killed at this point, endeavoring to rally his troops. Early's division was brought forward, however, and the National advance was checked. General Wadsworth, pushing his way forward on Griffin's left, with no guide through the dense brake but a compass, mistook his direction, and, wheeling too far to the right, exposed his left wing to a withering fire from the enemy's front; his veteran troops fell back without orders; Crawford's division, though fighting hard, became isolated and was drawn back; and nearly the whole line was forced to give ground. Neither party, on account of the nature of the country, could follow up these momentary successes. On each side the soldiers hastily intrenched themselves in every position they assumed. There could be no ensemble in such a fight. A series of detached and sanguinary skirmishes took place all day between the forces of Warren and Ewell, and

"Early's Memoir of the Last Year of the War," p. 16.

[1] The participants on both sides agree as to this feature of the fight. See A. L. Long, "Memoirs of R. E. Lee," 326–328; and A. A. Humphreys, "The Virginia Campaign," p. 11.

CHAP. XIV. Sedgwick's (Sixth) corps, coming up in the afternoon, made a lodgment on the extreme right, after a sharp fight, in which the Confederate general Leroy A. Stafford was killed.

On the left General Getty had established himself on the Orange plank road at the crossing of the Brock road; and his skirmishers having become engaged with the advance of Hill's corps, he intrenched and waited for Hancock. Hill, knowing that Longstreet was on the way to his relief, proceeded with great caution. Hancock, riding at full speed, arrived in person at Getty's position about noon, and within two hours some of his troops came up and were put in position, Birney on the right, then Mott and Gibbon. Barlow remained on the left of the line, where, in one of the rare clearings of the forest, the artillery was posted. As Getty had informed Hancock, as soon as he arrived, that an attack from Hill might momentarily be expected, Hancock ordered breastworks to be thrown up all along his line, which, with the marvelous dexterity the troops had acquired, was a matter of minutes. Between four and five o'clock Getty advanced to the attack, under orders from General Meade. Hancock sent Birney in on his right and Mott on his left, and a savage fight instantly ensued. "The musketry," Hancock says, "was continuous and deadly along the entire line." His troops, guided by little more than their own valiant hearts, pushed sturdily through the dismal wood and the treacherous bogs in front of them, and though decimated by the bullets of unseen enemies in the jungle, they made their way inch by inch, driving Hill's troops everywhere before them

until upon the gloom of the Wilderness settled the deeper darkness of night. "An hour more of daylight," says Humphreys, "and he [Hill] would have been driven from the field." Hancock's losses were, of course, severe. General Alexander Hays, one of his best officers, was killed; Getty and Colonel Samuel S. Carroll, though grievously wounded, refused to leave the fight.

Humphreys, "The Virginia Campaign of '64 and '65," p. 33.

Wadsworth was sent to take part in this action, and forced his way as far as he could through the forest — not far enough, however, to connect with Hancock. Wilson, with his cavalry division, was at the same time hotly engaged with a force under Rosser at Todd's Tavern; being reënforced by Gregg, they drove the Confederates over Corbin's Bridge and beyond.

May 5, 1864.

At the close of this laborious but indecisive day, General Grant, feeling the necessity of getting the first blow at the enemy before Longstreet should arrive, ordered Meade to prepare an assault on the left for half-past four in the morning. General Meade, in consideration of the exhaustion of the troops, suggested a later hour, and five o'clock was adopted. Burnside was ordered to be on the road at two o'clock, so as to come to the front and participate in the advance at dawn; his presence was greatly needed in the gap between Warren and Hancock. The fighting began at five o'clock on both wings. Wright, of Sedgwick's corps, attacked the works on Ewell's left with great vigor, but was repulsed; Warren was also unsuccessful in his attempt on the intrenched lines in his front. Better success at first attended Hancock. He could not know by what road Longstreet would approach,

Grant, "Personal Memoirs." Vol. II., p. 195.

CHAP. XIV. and did not think best, therefore, to bring his whole force into action on his front. Barlow's fine division was detained on the extreme left to guard against an approach from that direction, and several times during the day Hancock's attention was directed to his left by false alarms. But in spite of this, his attack along the plank road was made with prodigious energy and skill, and aided by Wadsworth on the right, he came near destroying Lee's right wing. After desperate fighting the Confederate line was broken at all points, and driven more than a mile in confusion through the forest.

General Grant thought afterwards that if the nature of the ground could have permitted Hancock to see the rout of his enemy and to take advantage of it, Lee could not have recovered himself. Confederate accounts do not vary far from this. Colonel Venable, of Lee's staff, says, "The danger was great and General Lee sent his trusted adjutant, Colonel W. H. Taylor, back to Parker's Store to get the trains ready for a movement to the rear." But Hancock's ranks were so torn and disordered by the fierce charge through the chaparral, that they were compelled to halt to adjust their formations, and before this could be accomplished Longstreet arrived — a tower of strength in himself, not to speak of his fresh battalions. The fruit of the morning's work, which had begun so well, could not be gathered.

Grant, "Personal Memoirs." Vol. II., p. 197.

Long. "Memoirs of R. E. Lee," p. 330.

General Burnside's progress through the matted undergrowth of the woods was toilsome and slow; although his corps did good service in the afternoon, he came into position too late to assist in the morning's advance; Hancock's left,

May 6, 1864.



NOTE: For the most part the troops are indicated by divisions, and when a name indicates a brigade it is inclosed in parentheses.

CHAP. XIV. which was waiting for an attack from the left, was of little help to the main body on the turnpike; and when, a little before noon, Longstreet advanced in two columns, which struck Birney's tired troops in front and flank at the same moment, they were unable to hold the ground they had gained. In spite of the conspicuous bravery of Hancock and his utmost efforts to rally his troops; in spite of the devotion of General Wadsworth, who fell in front of his command, his gray hairs crimsoned with his blood, the whole line was forced back to the intrenchments they had left in the morning. Long-

May 6, 1864. street was advancing, intent upon seizing the Brock road, when an accident occurred like that which brought Stonewall Jackson to his death a year before in the same forest. Longstreet was riding with his staff down the plank road, in company with General Micah Jenkins, who commanded the brigade in advance; they were mistaken for Federal cavalry by some of his own men who had come in on Birney's left, and a volley from the bushes killed Jenkins and severely wounded Longstreet. Again, by the same curious fatality, did Lee's right arm fall shattered by his side. The Confederate advance was checked. Hancock, now safe behind his intrenchments, sent a brigade under Colonel Daniel Leasure to sweep along his whole front from left to right, combing the woods for the enemy. He met only a few, who fell back without fighting.

Humphreys, "The Virginia Campaign of '64 and '65," p. 45.

General Grant, not in the least dismayed by his ill fortune, at three o'clock ordered another advance on the enemy at six; but in this he was anticipated by Lee, who directed in person a furious attack on Hancock shortly after four. This was repulsed

after heavy fighting in which the woods and part of the breastworks took fire; the enemy gained no advantage anywhere, except for a moment at a point where some of Jenkins's men, eager to avenge their fallen general, rushing through the flames, seized a part of the burning works, from which, however, they were speedily driven by Colonel Carroll. The day closed with an attack by General John B. Gordon of Early's division upon the Union right, where the brigades of Generals Shaler and Seymour were thrown into some confusion, losing several hundred prisoners, the two generals being among the number. Exaggerated rumors of this mishap soon spread through the army and — it may be said — survived long afterwards. General Wright, however, immediately restored order, withdrawing his lines somewhat; and Early, seeing only the confusion of his own troops, was more anxious to secure himself than to pursue.[1] It was not until the next morning that he discovered the ground he had gained. CHAP. XIV.

On the morning of the 7th a profound silence brooded over the desolate space between the two armies. Neither appeared in the humor to renew the struggle. Each had suffered frightfully. "More desperate fighting," says Grant, "has not been witnessed on this continent than that of the 5th and 6th of May." The National pickets and skirmishers were pushed forward all along the front; they found the enemy everywhere retired behind his trenches; a strong reconnaissance May, 1864.

Grant, "Personal Memoirs." Vol. II., p. 204.

1 "It was fortunate," he says, "that darkness came to close this affair, as the enemy, if he had been able to discover the disorder on our side, might have brought up fresh troops and availed himself of our condition."—"Early, Memoir of the Last Year of the War," p. 20.

CHAP. XIV. ordered by Meade about noon had no effect in bringing him out. An assault by the Union Army on the Confederate works was needless and in-

May 7, 1864. judicious. At half-past six in the morning Grant drew up his orders for the march by the left flank to Spotsylvania. The reasons he gives for this movement are: 1. The apprehension that Lee might hastily retire upon Richmond and crush Butler, who, according to news received that day, had reached City Point. 2. The hope that by a swift movement he might get between Richmond and Lee, and thus secure a battle on more open ground. He was not without hope that Lee might attack again in the afternoon, but each side had apparently experience enough of the other's intrenchments, and the afternoon wore away in quiet. The only serious fighting this day was at Todd's Tavern, where Sheridan attacked the entire cavalry force of Stuart and inflicted upon him a severe defeat, driving him a long distance on the Spotsylvania and Catharpin roads.

Grant, "Personal Memoirs." Vol. II., p. 211.

The trains were set in motion about three o'clock, and the army began its flank movement soon after dark. But General Lee had observed the movement of the trains in the afternoon, and not being certain whether Grant was moving to the left or falling back to Fredericksburg he ordered Longstreet's corps, now under command of R. H. Anderson, to march to Spotsylvania in the morning to operate on the right flank of his enemy. Anderson transcended his orders, with a success due partly to accident and partly to his excess of zeal. Finding the woods in his route on fire, and no suitable place to bivouac, he pushed to Spotsylvania during the night; and thus it came about



GENERAL JAMES S. WADSWORTH.

that Warren's corps arriving, in the neighborhood of the Court House the next morning after a laborious march which had been delayed as much by the difficulties of the road as by the Confederate cavalry, found themselves confronted by Longstreet's veteran corps in position. Both generals were grievously disappointed; for Grant had hoped to pass beyond Spotsylvania in his night march; and Lee, who on the evening before had seen nothing to convince him that Grant was retiring,[1] had changed his mind completely on the morning of the 8th, and telegraphed exultantly to Richmond, "The enemy has abandoned his position and is moving towards Fredericksburg. This army is in motion on his right flank, and our advance is now at Spotsylvania Court House." His delusion was further shown by his ordering Early to pursue by the Brock road, which he imagined entirely clear — a route which Early at once found impossible, and which, he says, would have led him through Grant's entire army. Yet — so strange are the chances of war — this flagrant error inured to Lee's advantage. He had succeeded, favored by his own mistake and a fortunate disobedience of orders in his lieutenant, in placing himself squarely across the path of the Army of the Potomac. The sanguinary work of the Wilderness was all to be done over again. Lee's position at Spotsylvania was even stronger than his former one; the country was more undulating, there were more accidents of terrain to be taken advantage of; and he

CHAP. XIV.

Lee to Cooper. MS., Confederate Archives.

"Early's Memoir of the Last Year of the War," p. 23.

[1] Taylor to Stuart, May 7: "The general thinks there is nothing to indicate an intention (on the part of the enemy) to retire, but rather that appearances would indicate an intention to move towards Spotsylvania Court House."

1864.

CHAP. XIV. employed the precious hours, while the Army of the Potomac was coming up, to turn every hill and knoll about the place into an almost impregnable fortress.

Lee, when he found that Grant was not on the way to the rear, attempted no offensive movement, and during two days Grant occupied himself in bringing his army into position in front of the Confederate works, and preparing for the desperate struggle he saw was before him. To free himself from annoyance from Lee's cavalry, he ordered Sheridan to cut loose from the Army of the Potomac, to go south by the rebel right flank, so as to draw after him the Confederate mounted force, to do all the harm possible to the railroads and stores in Lee's rear, and then to communicate with Butler on the James, replenish his supplies, and rejoin Grant by whatever road should at the time seem

May, 1864. practicable. Early on the morning of the 9th Sheridan rode away on the most formidable and important cavalry expedition of the war. He soon got past the right flank of Lee's infantry, and drew after him, as was intended, the main body of the rebel horse. Custer's brigade went to Beaver Dam Station on the Virginia Central Road, of which he destroyed ten miles, a large amount of rolling stock and supplies, and recaptured some four hundred Union prisoners, who were on the way to Richmond. Sheridan himself crossed the South Anna at Ground Squirrel Bridge on the 10th, and the next day pushed on towards Richmond.

J. E. B. Stuart, by that time seeing the folly of the stern chase, had by desperate riding made a detour, and succeeded in concentrating a great part

of his forces at the Yellow Tavern, on the Brooke pike, six miles due north of the city. Sheridan promptly attacked him, Merritt, Wilson, and Custer leading the assault with equal gallantry and success, while Gregg defeated an attack made by James B. Gordon upon Sheridan's rear. This was one of the fiercest cavalry fights of the war, and one of the most important in results; Stuart and Gordon were killed, and the Confederate horse were so roughly handled that they never again met the National cavalry on equal terms. Sheridan, pursuing Fitz-Hugh Lee's division towards Richmond, passed through the outer line of fortifications, and in his own opinion might have entered the city. But rightly judging that he could not sustain himself there with cavalry alone, he recrossed to the north side of the Chickahominy, and after another brisk engagement with a force which made a sortie from the Confederate works, he made his way to the James, where General Butler supplied his wants. He remained there for three days, and then started on the 17th to rejoin Grant, which he succeeded in doing without further adventures on the 24th of May. CHAP. XIV. 1864.

CHAPTER XV

SPOTSYLVANIA AND COLD HARBOR

BOTH armies had marched during the night of the 7th–8th under misapprehensions which were full of hope and encouragement. Lee, imagining that Grant was repeating the retrograde movement of Hooker, threw forward his right to cut off his enemy's retreat to Fredericksburg; while, on the other hand, when Grant, in the deepening night, rode with his staff in advance of Warren's corps behind Hancock's troops in position, and it was seen the line of march pointed to Richmond instead of Washington, the enthusiasm of the troops burst out in long and vociferous cheering; it was thought that the sanguinary struggle in the Wilderness was over, and that an honest fight on a fair field would soon give them the fruits of a victorious campaign. An equally bitter disillusion greeted both commanders on the morning of the 8th. Lee found that Grant was neither beaten nor retreating; and Grant, who had hoped to pass round the right wing of Lee, so as to force a battle in the open or a race for Richmond, found, before the day ended, the whole Army of Northern Virginia fortressed on the hills of Spotsylvania, directly in his path. He did not indeed recognize

RELATIVE POSITIONS OF THE OPPOSING CORPS AT SPOTSYLVANIA, MAY 8-21, 1864.

CHAP. XV.

this unwelcome fact until afternoon, and had actually directed an order of march southward to be prepared before he was convinced that Lee was concentrated before him. The necessity of battle was not so strong here as at the Wilderness; General Humphreys says, "sufficiently good roads southward lay open to us on either side, . . . by which, if we did not attack in front, we could have moved to turn either flank." But Grant's genius was essentially offensive; if the advantages of fighting or not fighting were evenly balanced, he was sure to fight. He determined to attack Lee in position, and at least twice during the week of battles that followed his furious assaults came so near to overwhelming success that most military critics have been led to justify his resolution.

Humphreys, "The Virginia Campaign of '64 and '65," pp. 66, 67.

Ibid., p. 71.

May, 1864.

It was half-past eight on the morning of the 8th before Warren's advance made its way through the dense woods, impeded at every step by the gallant resistance of Fitz-Hugh Lee's cavalry, to the more open ground of Alsop's, about two and a half miles from the Court House; and from that point there was continuous and heavy fighting for a mile to the forks of the Brock and Old Court House roads, when the Union troops came upon the intrenched division of Kershaw and made no further progress. The Sixth Corps, under Sedgwick, came up later, on Warren's left, and both these able commanders were ordered to attack. It was, however, late in the day; there was no adequate time for preparation, the ground was absolutely new, and the attack failed. Both sides passed the night in strengthening their positions. The next day Hancock went into position on the right. Beyond the

work of intrenching, little was done on the 9th except that there was a hot fire of skirmishers and sharp-shooters, in the course of which General Sedgwick was killed — a soldier of tried valor and merit, as modest and amiable as he was intelligent and brave. General Horatio G. Wright, an officer of the same high character, succeeded him in command of the Sixth Corps. Burnside's corps came up on the extreme left, and for still another day the work of intrenching and observation went on. On the Confederate side the intrenchments defended by the corps of Longstreet (commanded by R. H. Anderson), Ewell, and Hill (commanded by Early) stretched from left to right in an irregular semicircle, from the Block-House Bridge over the Po on the left to Snell's bridge over the same river on the right, with a bold salient jutting out a mile to the north. It was a line of extraordinary strength; the works were almost everywhere concealed by a scrubby growth of brush; lines of access were broken by ragged ravines bristling with artillery; in the judgment of the most dispassionate of critics, "the strength of an army sustaining attack was more than quadrupled, provided they had force enough to man the intrenchments well." Yet against this triple line of tangled thicket, of massive earthworks, and of brave men, Grant resolved to throw his utmost strength, confident that if he could once break it, his summer's task would be virtually accomplished.

Humphreys, "The Virginia Campaign of '64 and '65," pp. 75, 76.

There was a moment, indeed, in which it had seemed possible that the left flank of this formidable position might be turned and Lee driven out

CHAP. XV. of it without the enormous cost which subsequently became necessary. Hancock crossed the Po on the evening of the 9th, and gained a position which constituted, General Early says, "a very threatening danger" to Lee's left, "completely enfilading it," and commanding the line of the Confederate communications to their rear. But on the morning of the 10th Grant concluded to strike in front, and ordered Hancock to withdraw his troops from the south side of the Po, and to arrange a vigorous attack in company with Warren at five o'clock. Gibbon and Birney were therefore withdrawn; and later Barlow, in retiring under orders, was furiously attacked by Heth's division of Hill's corps. Barlow made a gallant fight, repulsing every attack made on him, and recrossing the river in admirable order under a destructive fire. This apparent victory gave great encouragement to the Confederates, who, of course, could not know that Barlow was retiring under imperative orders.

"Early's Memoir of the Last Year of the War," p. 24.

May, 1864.

May 10, 1864. In the afternoon the conditions for assault seemed so favorable that the attack was made a little earlier than had been ordered. Warren, with three divisions, tore through the obstacles in front of him; and his troops, with splendid bravery, although disordered by their struggle through the dense woods, reached the intrenchments, only to be swept away by the murderous fire; some were killed even in the enemy's works; the gallant General James C. Rice fell in this assault. The attack was renewed two hours later, with perfect spirit, two divisions of Hancock joining — but with equal ill-fortune. The Sixth Corps assaulted at the same time and having the advantage of

better ground, was at first brilliantly successful. CHAP. XV.
The storming party, led by Colonel Emory Upton, May 10,1864.
a young officer of the finest education and most daring courage, struck the west side of the McCool salient, the "bloody angle," which jutted out nearly a mile beyond the main Confederate line, with such compactness and energy that it poured over the parapet, unchecked by a terrible fire in front and flank, and after a desperate grapple, hand to hand, broke the Confederate line, capturing many prisoners right and left, and pushing forward seized the second line of intrenchments with its guns. If the supporting column had been on the ground ready to pour through the opening Upton had made, the damage to the Confederates would have been irreparable. But Mott's division had been so roughly handled in its advance that it failed to arrive in time. Upton's men, unwilling to give up their splendid prize, held the salient under heavy assaults from both sides, but retired at last, under orders, about nightfall. Upton was promoted brigadier-general next day; he had most worthily won his stars; Colonel Carroll shared the same honor soon after; they were brought up to receive the personal thanks and compliments of the Lieutenant-General, both of them bandaged and pale from loss of blood.

The day was notable for successes almost achieved. As we have seen, General Hancock turned the Confederate left in the morning, and May 10,1864.
then was ordered to draw off his troops; Upton broke their center, but for lack of support had to be withdrawn; and Burnside, who commanded the Union left wing, completely turned Lee's right while

CHAP. XV.

the assault on the front was going on; but neither he nor Grant being conscious of the advantage acquired, Burnside was ordered to connect with Wright, and the position, so easily gained, was thus lost. The 11th passed by in inactivity; the nature of the ground was so unfavorable for offensive operations that General Lee wisely refrained from them;[1] and Grant was busily preparing for the supreme effort of the campaign — the second assault of the McCool salient. He had not met either at the Wilderness or at Spotsylvania with all the success which he had anticipated. He had been forced to fight upon ground chosen by the enemy, under circumstances so unfavorable to himself as to neutralize all the advantage of his superior numbers; his magnificent artillery had been rendered so useless to him that he at last sent his entire reserve of that formidable arm back to Washington. After six days of slaughter, he could as yet point to no substantial result of so much labor and blood. But these circumstances, incomparably more discouraging than those to which Hooker had so promptly succumbed, did not daunt for an instant the indomitable heart of Grant. His intellect as well as his temperament naturally rejected the gloomy view of things. He wrote to Halleck on the morning of the 11th of May: "We have now ended the sixth day of very hard fighting. The result up to this time is much in our favor." He is frank as to his heavy losses, but thinks those of the enemy must be greater. He

Grant, "Personal Memoirs." Vol. II., p. 225.

1864.

[1] Early says, in his "Memoir of the Last Year of the War," p. 26, accounting for the inactivity of the Confederates, "the ground beween the lines was very rough, being full of rugged ravines, and covered with thick vines and other growth."

ends his first paragraph with the famous phrase: "I . . . propose to fight it out on this line if it takes all summer." There is not a word of boasting, or of complaint; he wants all the reënforcements the Government can send, as they "will be very encouraging to the men"; at the close of his dispatch his peculiar trait asserts itself of looking away from the condition of his own army and surmising the distress of his adversary — a faculty, we have seen, impossible to McClellan and others. "I am satisfied," he says, "the enemy are very shaky, and are only kept up to the mark by the greatest exertions on the part of their officers, and by keeping them intrenched in every position they take." Even if this impression was somewhat exaggerated, it was far more conducive to coolness and activity than McClellan's fault of multiplying the force of an enemy till "the nodding of their plumes fanned him into despair." CHAP. XV. Grant to Halleck, May 11, 1864.

On the afternoon of the 11th Grant made preparations for an assault at the apex of the salient by Hancock's troops at dawn the next morning. Little was even yet known of the enemy's works or of the country between; but there was some open ground north of the salient, and a line drawn on his imperfect map from Brown's farm-house in the Union line to one within the rebel works was the direction for attack. In a drenching rain Hancock concentrated his troops, Barlow on the left, Birney on the right, and waited for the dawn which came slowly, heavy and thick with fog and showers. It was 4:35 before there was light enough to march by; Hancock gave the order to advance, and the men rushed forward up to the earthworks 1864.

CHAP. XV. which loomed portentously through the mist. Shouting and cheering, they tore away the abatis with their hands and poured like a breaking wave
May 12, 1864. over the parapet; Barlow and Birney were over almost at the same instant. There was scant room for firing; a fierce bayonet fight took place, but the hand-to-hand grapple could not last long. Edward Johnson's whole division of Ewell's corps was captured; General Johnson and Brigadier-General George H. Steuart being among the prisoners.

Hancock's victorious troops swept down the reverse of the intrenchments, through the woods, nearly a mile towards Spotsylvania, until they struck a strong line of works, running east and west across the base of the salient, the existence of which had been hitherto unknown. These were heavily manned; their possession was vital to Lee's army; he hurried reënforcements to this point from every hand, and soon checked Hancock's troops, who were somewhat disorganized by their victory and their hot pursuit, and in turn forced them back to the works they had first taken. But here they stood fast. They established themselves on both sides of the apex of the salient, and could not be dislodged. One of the most furious battles of the war raged all day about this "bloody angle." The opposing flags were planted again and again on either side of the breastworks. Men were killed by bayonet thrusts over the logs; prisoners were pulled over on both sides; occasionally a white flag would be shown, and a few rebels would leap the barrier and surrender to get out of the deadly hail of bullets. The thickets were withered by the fire; large trees

were cut down by the missiles; the dead lay piled upon each other; the trenches had to be cleared of them more than once. Wright was ordered to the support of Hancock; he was wounded in his advance, but kept the field all day, and his corps fought side by side with the Second until nightfall. North and South never proved their essential brotherhood more magnificently; there was no especial advantage of position; no skill of tactics brought into play; they both fought to kill, with undaunted spirit, from the first flush of dawn, through the misty morning, the dull, rainy day, to the black night. CHAP. XV. May 12, 1864.

On the right Warren, with the Fifth Corps, pushed forward his skirmish-line and opened with his artillery. He found the works in his front so strongly held by Longstreet's corps, under Anderson, that he thought it imprudent to assault them; he reported this, but his report was taken ill by General Grant, who ordered him at a quarter-past nine to attack with his whole force. He did so, and met with a severe repulse. Humphreys, who saw the attack could not succeed, gave orders for it to cease, and had the troops transferred to the center to assist in operations there. On the left Burnside also attacked with great energy. General Potter's division carried the intrenchments held by the left of Hill's corps, under Early, but could not hold them in face of the fresh troops which were at once hurried up to retake them. In all the corps the casualties were heavy, the total amounting to 6000 killed and wounded; Hancock suffered the greatest loss, over 2000 men; Warren and Wright about 1000 each, and Burnside

Humphreys, "The Virginia Campaign of '64 and '65," p. 101.

CHAP. XV.

more. The Confederate loss is matter of conjecture and estimate, as it was never reported; but General Humphreys puts it at between 9000 and 10,000 killed, wounded, and prisoners, which would make their killed and wounded about the same as those of the National forces. Their loss in general officers was especially severe; E. Johnson and Steuart captured, Junius Daniel and Abner Perrin killed, and James A. Walker, S. D. Ramseur, R. D. Johnston, and Samuel McGowan seriously wounded. On the Union side, Wright, Alexander S. Webb, and Samuel S. Carroll were wounded.

Humphreys, "The Virginia Campaign of '64 and '65," pp. 105, 106.

It is hard to compute upon which side was the advantage of all this toil and carnage; still it would seem that the greater proportionate damage fell to Lee. His material losses were harder for him to make good, and the holding of the salient was to Grant the moral trophy of victory. In the night the Confederates abandoned the attempt to regain the angle of death, and fell back to the inner line, three-quarters of a mile in the rear, where, in turn, they stood defiant of attack. Grant, telegraphing to Halleck in the evening of the 12th an account of his harvest of prisoners on this "eighth day of the battle," said, "The enemy are obstinate and seem to have found the last ditch."

May, 1864.

The next day General Grant was called upon to choose whether he would move by the right or left flank. If he moved by the right Lee would have been forced to abandon his intrenchments and fall back to the North Anna; as this was not desired, the move to the left was decided upon. It was hoped that a blow might be struck at Lee's

Humphreys, "The Virginia Campaign of '64 and '65," p. 106.

right flank before his intrenchments were extended further in that direction; and to this end Warren and Wright were ordered to move during the night of the 13th to Burnside's left; Warren was to attack at daylight of the 14th, and Wright to go in on his left. But, as so often happened in this campaign, more was demanded of the men than was physically possible. The night was dark as pitch; a heavy rain fell, turning the roads to mire, impassable unless corduroyed; in spite of the most intelligent precautions and the most arduous efforts on the part of the commanders, the head of the column could not be brought through the sea of mud to the point where they were to attack before six o'clock, and the command could not be got ready for work that day. There was a sharp skirmish on the Union left for the possession of a hill in Wright's front, which the National forces at last held and fortified. But the day was lost, and the movement, which with ordinary weather should have succeeded, failed. By the morning of the 15th the enemy had shifted his troops from his left to his right and had strongly intrenched himself in front of the new Union lines.

CHAP. XV.

May, 1864.

Grant, "Personal Memoirs," Vol. II., p. 235.

Humphreys, "The Virginia Campaign," p. 107.

The stormy weather prevented active operations for more than a week. Grant on the 16th wrote reporting "five days almost constant rain without any prospect yet of it clearing up"; roads impassable; "all offensive operations necessarily cease until we can have twenty-four hours of dry weather." But he says the army is in the best of spirits, that hostilities are suspended only by the weather, and not through exhaustion or weakness of the National army.

May, 1864.

CHAP. XV.

During these days of delay some reënforcements arrived, but they were not so numerous as has sometimes been pretended. The estimated force sent to the Army of the Potomac, between the 4th of May and the 12th of June, was not equal to the casualties in battle; and during this time some thirty-six regiments were mustered out and discharged, by expiration of their term of service.[1] General Lee also received very considerable reënforcements, during his retrograde movement from the Rapidan to the James. Beauregard having driven Butler back from before Richmond, R. F. Hoke not being needed in North Carolina, and the force with which Breckinridge had defeated Sigel in the Valley being set free to join Lee, the Army of Northern Virginia received the valuable addition of some fifteen thousand veteran troops, thoroughly inured to war and with the prestige and morale of recent victory.

Humphreys, "The Virginia Campaign of '64 and '65," p. 110. Badeau. Vol. II., pp. 198, 328, 329.

General Grant, before continuing his movement by the left towards Richmond, made one final assault, on the morning of the 18th, upon the works at the base of the salient which had now become Lee's left flank. Though made with vigor and energy by the veterans of the Second and Sixth Corps, and assisted by a strong demonstration on Burnside's front, it was unsuccessful; the works had been so strengthened and were so

May, 1864.

[1] General Humphreys (p. 110) thinks the effectives sent to the Army of the Potomac between May 4 and June 12 amounted to about 12,000. We have General Augur's MS. statement of troops, forwarded from the Department of Washington between the 4th and the 27th of May, showing a total of 40,062 men; but this, as Humphreys observes, merely gives the nominal strength of regiments and other organizations, and includes the absent and the extra-duty men. Humphreys's 12,000 seems an understatement.



GENERAL JOHN SEDGWICK.

well defended that the Union forces lost heavily[1] and inflicted little damage on the other side. The 18th was altogether a gloomy day for Grant. From every quarter came news of reverses: Butler had been defeated at Drewry's Bluff; Sigel had been badly whipped in the valley; Banks had met with disaster in Louisiana. His plan of concerted movement along the line was not resulting as favorably as he had hoped. But he wasted not a moment in regrets; as soon as the attack on Lee's left had failed, he issued orders for a movement by the left flank to be begun the next night. But before this movement commenced Lee, with singular intuition, suspected it, and in order to make sure, he sent Ewell with a force of 6000 men to make an attack on Grant's right. He struck Tyler's division of raw recruits about half-past five on the Fredericksburg road; a sharp fight ensued; Hancock and Warren sent over some of their troops, and Ewell was severely repulsed, losing nearly a thousand men. Early's corps had been held ready to coöperate in case Ewell's attack should be successful; but the latter having been compelled to retire, Early's movement was given up.

CHAP. XV.

Grant, "Personal Memoirs." Vol. II., p. 238.

May 19, 1864.

Early, "Memoir of the Last Year of the War," p. 27.

This action, lasting until nine o'clock, delayed the movement to the left which had been ordered for that night, but the orders were repeated the next day, and on the night of the 20th Hancock moved out with the Second Corps, and pushed by daybreak as far as Guiney Station; his cavalry under General A. T. A. Torbert cleared the way before him, fighting, and capturing some prisoners on the way, to Milford Bridge across the Mat-

[1] 2000 killed and wounded — principally in the Second Corps.

CHAP. XV. May 21, 1864.

tapony. Barlow's division was across the river and strongly intrenched by midday. The rest of the army swiftly followed, but nothing escaped the vigilance of Lee. Early in the morning he telegraphed to Richmond that the enemy was apparently changing his base, and that he was himself extending on the Telegraph road.

It was General Grant's hope that Lee, on discovering Hancock's isolated position, might leave his intrenchments to attack him; in that case Grant would follow closely with the other three corps and try to get a battle out of Lee in the open field. But Lee did nothing of the kind, and General Grant in his "Memoirs" rather inconsistently criticizes him for not having done what he avowedly wished him to do.[1] Considering that Lee had lost almost as heavily as Grant in the last terrible fortnight, and that while the Union loss amounted to a third of the army with which the campaign opened — 37,335 is the dreadful total of losses, according to General Humphreys, at the Wilderness and Spotsylvania — that of the Confederates, if it approached the same total, deprived them of half their force, General Lee cannot justly be reproached for a lack of enterprise in declining a battle in the open field on any conditions he was likely to be offered. It must be said he acted wisely in availing himself of the interior line open to him, and in proceeding with the utmost celerity by the Tele-

[1] "Lee had now a superb opportunity to take the initiative, either by attacking Wright and Burnside alone, or by following by the Telegraph road and striking Hancock's and Warren's corps, or even Hancock's alone, before reënforcements could come up. But he did not avail himself of either opportunity. . . He never again had such an opportunity of dealing a heavy blow." — Grant, "Personal Memoirs." Vol. II., p. 244.

graph road, to plant himself on a position where he could once more, with all his skill as an engineer and a topographer, bar the way to Richmond in the face of his formidable adversary. On the other hand, Humphreys admits with his usual candor that the circuitous route pursued by the Union army, several miles longer than that which was left to Lee, was an error. If Hancock had moved by the Telegraph road, a collision in open ground might have been brought about before Lee could intrench in new ground. CHAP. XV. Humphreys, "The Virginia Campaign of '64 and '65," pp. 126, 127.

So late as the morning of the 22d General Lee, who had then arrived at Hanover Junction, does not seem to have ascertained the purpose or the whereabouts of Grant. He thought him at that time east of the Mattapony; but later in the same day his cavalry brought him news that the whole Army of the Potomac was west of that river, and he immediately disposed his force to meet Grant on the banks of the North Anna. Although no great battle was fought there, it will probably be considered by military students that both the opposing generals made exhibition on the banks of that little river of their most characteristic qualities. The story can be briefly told. Warren, commanding the Union right, crossed at Jericho Mills on the 23d and was furiously attacked by A. P. Hill, who had recovered his health and resumed command of his corps; Warren, in a sharp fight, repulsed the enemy and took up a strong position which he soon made impregnable. Hancock carried the works on the north side of the stream which covered the railroad and telegraph bridges, and the next morning crossed over and established himself May, 1864.



NOTE: Ox Ford is otherwise known as Anderson Bridge and Ford. Anderson's Station is Verdon, and the Ch. Cady house is J. Anderson's.

firmly on the other side. Burnside, who was to cross at Oxford, in the center, found Lee's army in force on the south side, and could do nothing there. His force was divided, a portion joining Warren above, and another portion Hancock below. The situation was one of the gravest peril to Grant. His two wings, both south of the river, were separated by Lee's army, which occupied a formidable position on the river bank, with its flanks perfectly protected by marsh and thicket. If Lee had chosen to attack either detachment of his enemy, he might have thrown his whole force upon a given point in one third of the time which it would have taken Grant to reënforce one wing by the other — there was not only the distance of six miles between them, but a river to be twice crossed. But the result of a defeat would have been to Lee so disastrous that he will not perhaps be blamed for excessive caution in this instance — especially in view of the defeat which Warren had inflicted upon Hill. Grant was, however, completely checkmated. Lee's position was too strong to assault; so he coolly resolved to recross the river and continue his flank march to the left. CHAP. XV.

Grant accomplished the difficult and delicate task of recrossing the river under the very eyes of the enemy with extraordinary ability and success, and set off upon his usual flank march to the left, without the slightest apparent feeling of chagrin or disappointment. He announced his intention in a dispatch of the 26th of May, which is full of character. After describing the relative positions of the two armies, he said, "To make a direct attack from either wing would cause a slaughter of our 1864.

CHAP. XV. men that even success would not justify. To turn the enemy by his right between the two Annas is impossible on account of the swamp upon which his right rests." On his left there were three difficult streams to be crossed; he therefore determined to cross at Hanover Town; he wished his base of supplies changed from Port Royal to the White House. The tone of his dispatch was something to which the Government had never been accustomed from that region. "Lee's army," he said, "is really whipped. The prisoners we now take show it, and the action of his army shows it unmistakably. A battle with them outside of intrenchments cannot be had. Our men feel that they have gained the *morale* over the enemy, and attack him with confidence. I may be mistaken, but I feel that our success over Lee's army is already assured. The promptness and rapidity with which you have forwarded reënforcements has contributed largely to the feeling of confidence inspired in our men, and to break down that of the enemy." Nothing like this had ever before been received from a commander of the Army of the Potomac; a man was now in charge of affairs who respected the Government behind him more than the enemy in front.

Grant, "Personal Memoirs," Vol. II., p. 253.

Grant hardly hoped at this time to interpose his army between Lee and Richmond, but he did expect to hold him so far to the West as "to reach the James River high up." He put his army in motion on the night of the 26th of May, and the next day his advance under Sheridan crossed the Pamunkey River, at Hanover Town, some thirty-two miles by the shortest route from his camp on the

Ibid., p. 252.

1864.

North Anna; the rest of the army got over the next day; but it was only to find the army of Lee awaiting them on the banks of the Totopotomoy, a creek which flows into the Pamunkey below Hanover Town. It is claimed in behalf of Lee that he had no desire to detain Grant on the Pamunkey, as that would have enabled him to reënforce Butler and take Richmond from the South. He therefore preferred to hold Grant on the Totopotomoy, so that, being nearer to Richmond, Lee might observe the whole field more intelligently and secure a readier coöperation of all his forces.

CHAP. XV.

A. L. Long, "Memoirs of R. E. Lee," p. 346.

Heavy skirmishing on the 29th and 30th showed that the two armies were once more face to face. Lee with his three corps, A. P. Hill's, Longstreet's, (commanded by Anderson), and Ewell's (for the moment commanded by Early), lay intrenched on a line from Atlee's on the Central road, almost to Cold Harbor; Warren held the Union left on the Shady Grove road, then came Burnside, Hancock, and Wright, who was about six miles southeast of Hanover Court House. Sheridan, with two divisions of cavalry, observed the left front towards Cold Harbor; J. H. Wilson, with one cavalry division, was operating on the Union right. The first fight was to be for the possession of Cold Harbor; in this W. F. Smith's force, which had been ordered north of the James, was to join. As a great part of General Butler's force was now to unite with the Army of the Potomac, this is the most convenient place to survey briefly what his work had been in the eventful three weeks, during which the long and terrible battle had been drifting from the Rapidan to the Chickahominy.

May, 1864.

CHAP. XV. It was not General Grant's desire that the force which was to coöperate with him by an advance upon Richmond from Fort Monroe should be commanded by General Butler in person. He would have preferred that Butler should remain in command of the Department and that General Wm. F. Smith, who had won his favor by his admirable services at Chattanooga, should have direction of this important column. But as Butler naturally insisted upon his claim to the immediate command of his own troops, Grant yielded his preference in the matter. His orders were general, though extremely clear: Butler was informed that Richmond was his objective; he was to move on City
May, 1864. Point on the 5th, intrench and concentrate, and operate on Richmond from the south side of the river; if Lee should fall back before Richmond, Butler was to unite with Grant; if he were able to invest Richmond from the south, so that his left could rest on the James, the junction of the two armies was to take place there; and in case the Army of the Potomac should approach from that quarter, Butler was to attack vigorously, and either carry the city or assist Grant by detaining a large force of the enemy on that side. He had a fine army under his orders — the Tenth Corps, commanded by General Gillmore, who at his own request had been ordered up from South Carolina; and the Eighteenth under W. F. Smith; in all, six excellent divisions, numbering in the aggregate some 32,000 men under able generals; and 3000 cavalry under A. V. Kautz. Grant had, with his usual indifference to personal considerations, given Butler, of whom he was not fond, the oppor-

tunity of striking the great coup of the war, while he himself was engaged in a desperate struggle with Lee's army on the Rapidan. CHAP. XV.

Butler made his landing at Bermuda Hundred without opposition, and his troops on the 6th of May intrenched themselves on a line three miles long, stretching from Port Walthall on the Appomattox to Trent's Reach on the James; Smith held the right, Gillmore the left. Richmond and Petersburg were at this time very feebly garrisoned. Beauregard had been put in charge of the defense and was straining every nerve to bring troops to the rescue; but when Butler moved, and for a week thereafter, there was no adequate force either in Richmond or Petersburg, if those places had been vigorously attacked. Butler acted with unaccountable slowness; from the 7th to the 9th nothing of importance was accomplished, except that on the last of these days six miles of the Richmond and Petersburg Railroad immediately in front of his lines was destroyed, and Kautz with his cavalry did considerable damage to the Weldon road. General Butler was so well satisfied with this that when on the evening of the 9th Gillmore and Smith proposed to him to cross the Appomattox and capture Petersburg, he refused his consent to the movement. Day by day Beauregard strengthened himself and posted his reënforcements at the points where they were most needed, so that when at last, on the 14th, Butler moved out against the enemy at Drewry's Bluff, he found him in powerful intrenchments, heavily manned, in force nearly equal to his own.[1] 1864.

[1] Robert Ransom, Jr.'s, division, 5400; R. F. Hoke's, 7000; A. H. Colquitt's, 4900; W. H. C. Whiting's, 4600.


MALVERN HILL
Harrison's
JAMES RIVER
CURL'S NECK
JONES NECK
HANOVER
Aug. 16-18
Aug. 16-18
Aug. 16-18


1864
MAP OF OPERATIONS AT
DREWRY'S BLUFF, BERMUDA HUNDRED
AND DEEP BOTTOM.
UNION WORKS
CONFEDERATE WORKS
UNION TROOPS
CONFEDERATE TROOPS
SCALE OF 3 MILES
Bermuda Hundred
City Point
Point of Rocks
Port Walthall Junction
Swift Creek
Fort Clifton
Fort Gregg
Fort Wadsworth
Fort Converse
Fort Graves
Fort Morris
Fort Lewis
Fort Porter
Fort Gould
Fort Abbot
Fort Craig
Fort McKeen
Fort Haskell
Fort Gilmer
Fort Johnson
Fort Clarke
Fort Harrison
Fort Brady
Fort Fisher
Fort Burnham
Fort Dunlop
Fort Stevens
Fort Sumner
Fort Alexander
Fort Mahone
Fort Davis
Fort Gregg
Fort Wadsworth
Fort Converse
Fort Graves
Fort Morris
Fort Lewis
Fort Porter
Fort Gould
Fort Abbot
Fort Craig
Fort McKeen
Fort Haskell
Fort Gilmer
Fort Johnson
Fort Clarke
Fort Harrison
Fort Brady
Fort Fisher
Fort Burnham
Fort Dunlop
Fort Stevens
Fort Sumner
Fort Alexander
Fort Mahone
Fort Davis
Petersburg
Richmond
Appomattox River
James River
Petersburg Railroad
Richmond & Petersburg Railroad
May 16
J. WELLS

CHAP. XV. A great and justifiable anxiety had prevailed in Richmond for nine days. When Butler landed
May, 1864. at City Point both Petersburg and the Confederate capital were almost defenseless; not more than six thousand men could be found to man the works. The dispatches between the rebel war office and Pickett, and afterwards Beauregard, are full of panic. So late as the 10th Seddon says: "This city is in hot danger. It should be defended with all our resources, to the sacrifice of minor considerations." The situation was in fact of the gravest character. With Lee grappling in a life and death struggle on the Spotsylvania hills; with Sheridan breaking to pieces the renowned Confederate cavalry; with Butler at their gates at the head of an army which Grant thought should have taken Richmond with a single rush, it was a time for supreme exertions. But General Beauregard would have been untrue to himself if he had let pass so fine an opportunity for controversy with his superiors. In the midst of this imperative crisis he laid before General Bragg, his commanding general, an elaborate plan, the main features of which were, that Lee should fall back before Grant to the Chickahominy; that he should then send Beauregard fifteen thousand men, with which reënforcement Beauregard would destroy Butler and then take his whole army to Lee and destroy Grant. They must concentrate or starve, he urged; this plan would but anticipate what must ultimately be done.

There is a direct contradiction between Bragg and Beauregard as to the manner in which these suggestions were received. Beauregard insists that Davis and Bragg both received them favor-

ably, and although they could not venture to withdraw troops from Lee at such a time, they reënforced Beauregard with five thousand men and enabled him to attack Butler; while Bragg in a memoradum, dated the 19th, severely condemns the whole plan on the ground that it would involve such delay as to exhaust their subsistence; that it would allow the enemy to strengthen himself by intrenching; that it would involve the fall of Petersburg; that a retreat of sixty miles by General Lee might destroy his army; that it would abandon a territory rich in stores; that it would lose the Valley of Virginia and the Central Railroad; and finally, that it was unnecessary, as Beauregard had already a force of twenty-three thousand men, enough to whip Butler, if properly handled. Beauregard was therefore sharply enjoined to attack. Delay, Mr. Seddon urged, would be fatal. "By Wednesday our fate will in all probability be settled." The Confederate authorities had used the most strenuous exertions to bring troops to Richmond. The answers of some of their generals to their appeals show the strain to which they were subjecting their resources. General Samuel Jones, having been ordered to send a brigade from Florida, says he will obey, but adds, with a simplicity which is full of ominous meaning, "I greatly doubt if one-half of the men ordered will leave Florida, and my order will cause desertions and disorganizations."

CHAP. XV.

"Battles and Leaders." Vol. IV., pp. 197, 199.

MS. War Records.

Ibid.

General Beauregard, having refreshed himself with his customary dispute with the Richmond officials, prepared to attack Butler energetically on the morning of the 16th. Butler's forward

May, 1864.

CHAP. XV. movement had not only been brought to impotence by the heavy force and the strong intrenchments he had given his adversary the leisure to accumulate across his path at Drewry's Bluff; he had also made a faulty disposition of his line, leaving his right unguarded and open to easy approach from the River road. Beauregard's object was, attacking by that side to cut him off from Bermuda Hundred and capture or destroy him. Ransom was to turn his right, Hoke to attack in the center, Colquitt being held in reserve; while Whiting was to come up from Petersburg and strike the rear or left flank. This plan, well combined as it was, had only a partial success. A dense fog confused the movements of both sides. It gave Ransom the opportunity to strike Smith's right by surprise and to capture General C. A. Heckman and a portion of his brigade; but his front with-
May 16, 1864. stood successfully all the assaults made upon it, and Gillmore was able not only to repulse Hoke's attack upon him but also to send help to Smith.

The morning wore on in a blundering series of movements and orders made and countermanded as the fog lifted and fell. Beauregard did not pursue with any effectiveness his early advantage on the right; yet Butler was so impressed by the menace to his rear, that he at last ordered Smith to fall back and Gillmore to keep in connection with him, until about noon they both established themselves firmly across the turnpike and the roads east of it, and kept that position the rest of the day. Whiting took no part in the battle. He was checked by Ames's division at the Walthall Junction, six miles to the south, and as often happened in the course of the

war, from atmospheric conditions and the direction of the wind, hearing no sound of the fight, and receiving erroneous news of an advance from City Point, he fell back to Swift Creek. It was night before he received Beauregard's order to aid in the advance, dated at 4 : 15, and he replied that the hour was too late for him to act. A furious rainstorm came on in the afternoon, and during the night Butler fell back to Bermuda Hundred. Beauregard reported a loss in this engagement of 2184; that of Butler was 3500, of which 1400 were prisoners, the killed and wounded being almost exactly equal. But the substantial victory was, of course, with Beauregard, though he did not accomplish all he had hoped. He had saved Richmond for the time and had shut up Butler in his intrenchments between the two rivers "as in a bottle strongly corked."[1]

May 16, 1864.

The news of the fruitless ending of the campaign south of the James came to Grant on the 22d of May, while he was moving south from Spotsylvania; and, accepting the situation with his usual decision, he ordered Butler to keep only enough of his army to hold his works, and to send the rest under Smith to join the Army of the Potomac. They began to arrive at the White House about noon of the 30th of May. Beauregard had already received similar orders from Richmond, and Pickett joined Lee at Hanover Junction, while Hoke's division came up in time for Cold Harbor.

[1] This phrase in General Grant's report had a great success, which caused him considerable annoyance; first, because he afterwards became very friendly with General Butler in political relations; and second, because it was not original with him, but was the invention of General J. G. Barnard.—Grant, "Personal Memoirs." Vol. II., p. 152.

CHAP. XV. May, 1864. There was a sharp collision on the 31st between Sheridan and Fitzhugh Lee on the Union extreme left for the possession of Cold Harbor, an important point, as it was the center of a network of roads leading to the bridges of the Chickahominy. The enemy received an infantry reënforcement late in the day, but Sheridan held fast, and in the night turned the breastworks he had captured against the Confederates, and in the morning was relieved by Smith's command. Wright also got up in the afternoon of the 1st of June, and at six o'clock he and Smith advanced upon the enemy's works, which crossed the road between Cold Harbor and New Cold Harbor. The first line was carried in fine style, though with severe loss in men, and especially in valuable officers, and both corps at once intrenched the positions they had gained. During this attack there was heavy skirmishing between the corps not engaged and the enemy opposite them. The next day was spent in getting the troops into position for an assault of the enemy's works in force. Lee, observing the movement to the left, sent Early to strike the Union right flank, which effort met with a severe repulse, in which the Confederate general George Doles was killed.

1864. The attempt to break through the enemy's intrenchments on the 3d of June failed so disastrously, it has been so unsparingly condemned by military critics, and so candidly acknowledged to be an error by General Grant himself, that we are apt to lose sight of the motive which prompted it. The right and left wings of Lee were unassailable from the nature of the ground; the front only appeared possible to attack. Grant was unwilling to go to

GENERAL RICHARD H. ANDERSON.

the south side of the James without one more attempt to accomplish the purpose with which he had opened the campaign, to destroy Lee's army north of Richmond. If he had succeeded at Cold Harbor he might have achieved that great result. He knew the task was difficult — it proved to be impossible. He inflicted upon the heroic Army of the Potomac one of its most terrible defeats, as he says himself, "without compensation." CHAP. XV.

There was no lack of energy or soldiership in the assault. The army never rushed to battle with more splendid ardor than in the early dawn of the 3d of June. Hancock, Wright, and Smith sent their veterans forward at the hour named with an impulse which would have been irresistible if the work assigned them had been possible. In the Second Corps, Barlow, advancing under a withering fire, actually seized a portion of the works, capturing a color, some guns, and prisoners; but it was not possible to stay under the rain of musketry and the enfilading fire of artillery concentrated on them by Breckinridge and Hill. They were forced out again, though they retired less than seventy-five yards, and intrenched themselves under a destructive fire. Gibbon's force was cut in two by an impassable swamp, which widened as it approached the enemy; his severed division advanced gallantly, however, young Colonel James P. MacMahon mounting the breastworks with a few of his men, and falling dead in the enemy's hands beside his colors. Wright's corps went forward with equal spirit, carrying the enemy's rifle-pits and assaulting the main line unsuccessfully and with heavy loss, but retiring only a few yards and intrenching them- 1864.

Allens Mill
Allens Mill Pond
Butler
Bowles
Globon
Via
Armstrong
Bethesda Church
Bowles
Curry
Tucker
Sydnor's Saw mill
Hundley
Mason
Old Church Road
Grove Church
Beulah Church
Mrs Matthews
Mrs Bowles
Stewart
Old Court Harbor
G. Williams
T. J. Wade
Dr. Wood
Dr. Curtis
W. Chris.



On the forenoon of June 1 Wright occupied an intrenched line close to Old Cold Harbor. At that time Hoke's division formed the Confederate right, near New Cold Harbor, and Anderson's corps (Longstreet's) extended the line to a point opposite Beulah Church. During the afternoon W. F. Smith's corps arrived on the right of Wright, extending the Union line to Beulah Church. At 6 o'clock Smith and Wright drove the enemy through the woods along the road to New Cold Harbor and intrenched a new line. Warren was north of Smith. On June 2 Hancock formed on the left of Wright. Hill's corps and Breckinridge's division took position opposite, extending the Confederate line to the Chickahominy. Burnside, May 30 to June 1, occupied lines facing south and west, above Sydnor's sawmill: June 2 he withdrew to Warren's right. Ewell's position throughout was on the Confederate left.

CHAP. XV. selves. Smith, with the Eighteenth Corps, also did all that brave men could do; his divisions were torn to rags in their assault. Several times the attack, repulsed by a fire which may fitly be called infernal, was renewed; until General Grant, learning from all his corps commanders that they were not sanguine of success, ordered the attack to cease. Burnside and Warren meanwhile had been demonstrating on the right; Burnside captured some of the enemy's rifle-pits, and Warren repulsed a vigorous attack of John B. Gordon; but the nature of the ground in front of them prevented any advance. At night the two armies lay so close together that their pickets were continually coming into collision, and the officers on both sides reported themselves attacked by the enemy.

June 3, 1864. The day's loss on the Union side was frightful, considering the short time the troops were actually engaged — between 5000 and 6000.[1] And even these appalling figures do not give an adequate idea of the damage done; the men destroyed were of the flower of the Army of the Potomac, inured to the service by years of march and battle. The valor with which they were led was proved by the list of brigade and regimental commanders who fell in the desperate charge. In Barlow's division Colonels Richard Byrnes and Orlando H. Morris were killed, and John R. Brooke wounded; in Gibbon's, General Robert O. Tyler was severely wounded, Henry B. McKeen, another brigade commander, was killed, his place was taken by

[1] Humphreys's estimate ("The Virginia Campaign of '64 and '65," p. 191) is 1100 killed, 4517 wounded on the 3d of June; on the 1st, 500 killed and 2125 wounded. The total of casualties from the crossing of the Pamunkey to the 3d, inclusive, was 12,970.

Colonel Frank A. Haskell, who was killed a few minutes later; MacMahon's heroic death has been already mentioned, and Colonel Peter A. Porter, a gentleman of the finest strain, in breeding and in character, was another among the sixty-five officers lost in this single division. The Eighteenth Corps lost on the 1st and 3d four regimental commanders, Fred. F. Wead, Edgar Perry, Hiram Anderson, Jr., and Marshall. The loss on the Confederate side was small; standing safely within their impregnable intrenchments, they slaughtered their assailants at their leisure.[1] It was the useless carnage of Marye's Hill repeated in the same way. General Grant had followed the example of some of his predecessors and given General Lee a victory gratis. In his "Memoirs," written with the candor and conscience of a man in the presence of death, he deals himself this just and severe sentence: "I have always regretted that the last assault at Cold Harbor was ever made. . . No advantage whatever was gained to compensate for the heavy loss we sustained. Indeed, the advantages, other than those of relative losses, were on the Confederate side. Before that the Army of Northern Virginia seemed to have acquired a wholesome regard for the courage, endurance, and soldierly qualities generally of the Army of the Potomac. . . They seemed to have given up any idea of gaining any advantage of their antagonist in the open field.

CHAP. XV.

June, 1864.

1 "When General Lee sent a messenger to A. P. Hill, asking the result of the assault on his part of the line, Hill took the officer with him in front of his works, and pointing to the dead bodies which were literally lying upon each other, said: 'Tell General Lee it is the same all along my front.'"—"Life of R. E. Lee," by John Esten Cooke, p. 406.

CHAP. XV. They had come to much prefer breastworks in their front to the Army of the Potomac. This charge seemed to revive their hopes temporarily, but it was of short duration. The effect upon the Army of the Potomac was the reverse. When we reached the James River, however, all effects of the battle of Cold Harbor seemed to have disappeared."

Grant, "Personal Memoirs." Vol. II., pp. 276, 277.

There was perhaps a compensation for this disaster, which General Grant does not mention; it made him always thereafter careful and economical of his soldiers' blood. From the 3d of June to the end of the war he never wasted a life. By the 5th of June he had thought out the problem before him, and was ready to act, and his action was in the highest degree characteristic. He did not, like his predecessor in defeat on that same ground, turn and rail at the Government for his disaster, and ask for impossible reënforcements. He accepted with manly fortitude the partial failure of his plan of campaign. He had hoped to disable Lee north of Richmond; finding this impracticable, he now determined to assail that city and its communications from the south. He made known his intentions to General Halleck in a dispatch of remarkable clearness and strength. "A full survey of all the ground satisfies me that it would be impracticable to hold a line northeast of Richmond that would protect the Fredericksburg Railroad to enable us to use that road for supplying the army. . . My idea from the start has been to beat Lee's army, if possible, north of Richmond; then, after destroying his lines of communication on the north side of the James River, to transfer the army to the south side and besiege Lee in Richmond, or

1864.

June 5, 1864.

follow him South if he should retreat. I now find, after over thirty days of trial, the enemy deems it of the first importance to run no risks with the armies they now have. They act purely on the defensive behind breastworks, or feebly on the offensive immediately in front of them, and where in case of repulse they can instantly retire behind them. Without a greater sacrifice of human life than I am willing to make, all cannot be accomplished that I had designed outside of the city." He then sets forth the plan he has adopted: to destroy the Central road some twenty-five miles west of Beaver Dam; then to move to the south side of the James; to operate on the enemy's lines of supply. He concludes with these words: "The feeling of the two armies now seems to be that the rebels can protect themselves only by strong intrenchments, whilst our army is not only confident of protecting itself without intrenchments, but that it can beat and drive the enemy wherever and whenever he can be found without this protection."

CHAP. XV.

June 5, 1864.

Grant, "Personal Memoirs." Vol. II., Note, pp. 279–281.

These words are the key to his whole subsequent campaign. He threw away no more advantages from a spirit of hurry or of pugnacity. Realizing the full value of his enemy's works, he opposed his own to them henceforward, and in his constant effort to force his enemy to a point where he could fight him in the field, he stretched his line always to the left, till that of his adversary, in the attempt to follow, broke, and the Confederacy crumbled in instantaneous ruin.

CHAPTER XVI

ARKANSAS FREE

WE have related elsewhere how, in those portions of insurrectionary States which came under the control of the Union armies, a beginning was made to supply the subverted Federal authority in civil administration by appointing military governors, whose function was to restore the displaced civil authority and administration, so far as it could be done under military supervision, and consistently with the necessities of military operations. Under the protection and with the aid of this restored civil order, there grew up in several States a very important political reorganization, bringing about within the Federal military lines a practical reconstruction of loyal State governments in harmony with the national Federal Government, and which resulted in an amendment of the Constitutions of the States of Arkansas, Louisiana, and Tennessee to abolish slavery. Contemporaneously with this movement in the States named, similar action was begun and carried to completion in the States of Maryland and Missouri, where no reconstruction was needed; and in its larger relations these political phenomena form a great popular movement of loyalty and emancipation in the South, which

it will be instructive to group together and trace out as a whole. CHAP. XVI.

The State of Arkansas went into rebellion with great reluctance. The secession ordinance was voted down at the first and regular session of the Convention called to decide the question; and its final adoption was only effected after some months' delay, at a special session hastily called in the excitement and military frenzy created by the bombardment and capture of Fort Sumter. The Union feeling, thus silenced by revolutionary terrorism, was never destroyed, but only held in repression under the military thraldom which attended the organization of rebel armies. Had it been possible for the Union armies to give Arkansas the same moral and military support they gave West Virginia, Kentucky, and Missouri, she would probably have remained as loyal as they did; but, unaided, she could not free herself from rebel domination. Her subjection to the Confederate States remained uncertain; in the spring of 1862 her Governor openly threatened to secede from secession, and the despotic military rule instituted by General Hindman served to increase popular discontent with the administration of Jefferson Davis.

But while Arkansas, during the early stages of the war, thus offered an easy and inviting conquest to Union occupation and rule, the course of military affairs thwarted its realization. After the victory of Pea Ridge, General Curtis, the Union commander, felt compelled to forego the opportunity of an immediate advance on Little Rock, and instead moved down the White River and established himself at Helena on the Mississippi,

CHAP. XVI. where he might aid either in the siege of Corinth, the capture of Vicksburg, or resume his contemplated march on Little Rock. But Halleck's faulty generalship postponed the opening of the great river a whole year, and it was not until after Grant's masterly campaign and the capitulation of Pemberton on July 4, 1863, that an expedition to recover the State of Arkansas to Union control became feasible, though the hope and plan had long been nourished both at Washington and in the West.

July 4, 1863. Vicksburg had no sooner fallen than Union manifestations began to come from leading citizens of Arkansas. Mr. E. W. Gantt, one of the last Representatives elected to the Federal Congress from that State, came as a prisoner of war to Washington, and in a frank letter to President Lincoln announced his determination to abandon secession in which he had taken an active part. "My only object," he wrote, "is to induce the withdrawal of my State from its allies in rebellion and its reentry into the Federal Union." Similar intimations came from other influential sources, and in response President Lincoln on July 31, 1863, wrote as follows to General Hurlbut, then in command at Memphis, Tennessee:

Gantt to Lincoln, July 15, 1863. MS.

> . . . I understand that Senator Sebastian of Arkansas thinks of offering to resume his place in the Senate. Of course the Senate, and not I, would decide whether to admit or reject him. Still I should feel great interest in the question. It may be so presented as to be one of the very greatest National importance; and it may be otherwise so presented as to be of no more than temporary personal consequence to him. The emancipation proclamation applies to Arkansas. I think it is valid in law

and will be so held by the courts. I think I shall not retract or repudiate it. Those who shall have taken actual freedom I believe can never be slaves, or quasi slaves, again. For the rest, I believe some plan, substantially being gradual emancipation, would be better for both white and black. The Missouri plan, recently adopted, I do not object to on account of the time for ending the institution; but I am sorry the beginning should have been postponed for seven years, leaving all that time to agitate for the repeal of the whole thing. It should begin at once, giving at least the new-born a vested interest in freedom, which could not be taken away. If Senator Sebastian could come with something of this sort from Arkansas, I at least should take great interest in his case; and I believe a single individual will have scarcely done the world so great a service. See him if you can, and read this to him; but charge him to not make it public for the present. CHAP. XVI. Lincoln to Hurlbut, July 31, 1863. MS.

Sebastian, Gantt, and others were probably aware of the President's friendly disposition, because the latter had in the previous autumn sent to the Western commanders a duplicate of his letter to General Butler (of October 14, 1862), advising the encouragement and protection of repentant secession communities in electing State officers or Congressmen, wherever they might desire it.

The long contemplated Union expedition into Arkansas was finally organized under command of General Frederick Steele, who with a column of about 13,000 troops marched from Helena to Little Rock, which was surrendered to him on the evening of September 10, after a brisk cavalry engagement, and from which, as his principal military station, he was soon able to gain substantial control of a large part of the State. A strong Union movement almost immediately set in. Meetings were held and resolutions of Fed- Aug., 1863. Schofield, Report, Dec. 10, 1863. W. R. Vol. XXII., Part I., p. 14.

CHAP. XVI. eral allegiance adopted. By December, eight regiments of Arkansas citizens had been formed for service in the Federal army; and under the conditions and promises of the President's amnesty and reconstruction proclamation of December 8, 1863, a notable political reaction and organization began. Specific and full details of this movement did not at once reach the Washington authorities, but in anticipation that it would occur, or could be stimulated to action, the President, on January 5, 1864, wrote General Steele:

> I wish to afford the people of Arkansas an opportunity of taking the oath prescribed in the proclamation of December 8, 1863, preparatory to reorganizing a State government there. Accordingly I send you by General Kimball some blank books and other blanks, the manner of using which will, in the main, be suggested by an inspection of them, and General Kimball will add some verbal explanations. Please make a trial of the matter immediately at such points as you may think likely to give success. I suppose Helena and Little Rock are two of these. Detail any officer you may see fit to take charge of the subject at each point; and which officer, it may be assumed, will have authority to administer the oath. These books, of course, are intended to be permanent records. Report to me on the subject.

Lincoln to Steele, Jan. 5, 1864. MS.

The documents which the President forwarded were simply directions for administering the amnesty oath, and blank books in which to keep a record of them. But it was about this time that Mr. Lincoln also formally approved the details of General Banks's plan for reorganizing the State government of Louisiana; and seeing no reason why a similar process should not be going on simultaneously in the adjoining State of Arkansas, he again wrote to General Steele, on January 20, re-

peating in detail the instructions to Banks. General Steele was directed, in virtue of his military authority, to order an election to take place on March 28, 1864; "that it be assumed at that election, and thenceforward, that the constitution and laws of the State, as before the Rebellion, are in full force, except that the constitution is so modified as to declare that there shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except in the punishment of crime, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted; that the General Assembly may make such provisions for their freed people as shall recognize and declare their permanent freedom, and provide for their education, and which may yet be construed as a temporary arrangement, suitable to their present condition as a laboring, landless, and homeless class." General Steele was further directed to make regulations and receive returns, and generally to cause the election to be conducted "according to said modified constitution and laws"; and when 5406 votes should have been cast, to ascertain and announce the result, to administer the oath (to the persons appearing to have been elected) to support the Constitution of the United States, and modified constitution of the State of Arkansas; and declare them "qualified and empowered to immediately enter upon the duties of the offices to which they shall have been respectively elected."

CHAP. XVI. Jan. 20, 1864.

Before these last instructions reached General Steele, information came to Mr. Lincoln that they were likely to conflict with a popular movement of reconstruction already in progress in Arkansas. It appeared that since the occupation of Little Rock by the Union army in the previous September,

CHAP. XVI. Union speeches, meetings, and resolutions, in the several parts of the State held by Federal arms, had culminated in a formal delegate Convention, which met at Little Rock on January 8, 1864. It was composed of forty-four delegates who claimed to represent twenty-two out of the fifty-four counties of the State. It was objected, at the time, that these delegates were elected at mass meetings by very meager votes, and that about half the counties they represented lay beyond the Federal lines; while, on the other hand, it was admitted that neither were these counties occupied by Confederate forces, and that all the delegates were of respectable character and moved by an earnest patriotism. The Convention frankly said in its published address: "We found after remaining at Little Rock about a week, under a temporary organization, that delegates were present from twenty-two counties, elected by the people, and that six other counties had held elections, and that their representatives were looked for daily. We then organized the Convention permanently, and determined that while we could not properly claim to be the people of Arkansas in Convention assembled, with full and final authority to adopt a constitution, yet, being the representatives, by election, of a considerable portion of the State, and understanding, as we believed, the sentiment of nearly all our citizens who desire the immediate benefits of a government under the authority of the United States, we also determined to present a constitution and plan of organization, which, if adopted by them, becomes at once their act as effectually as if every county in the State had been represented in the Convention."

Address from the Convention to the voters of Arkansas, "The Unconditional Union," Jan. 23, 1864.

On the 22d of January the Convention adopted an amended constitution which changed the former one in only a few but important particulars. It declared the act of secession null and void; it abolished slavery immediately and unconditionally; and it wholly repudiated the Confederate debt. The Convention ordained a provisional State government and appointed and inaugurated Isaac Murphy provisional governor, and adopted a schedule providing for an election to be held on March 14, 1864, to adopt or reject the constitution and to elect a full list of State and county officers, a State legislature, and Members of Congress.[1]

Very soon after the Convention had finished its work, a registration of voters who had taken the amnesty oath was begun under orders of General Steele (February 2, 1864). About this time it became known in Arkansas that the President's order for an election differed in date from the Convention schedule; and that confusion and delay were likely to result. There was indeed some difference of sentiment, and with the telegrams to the President asking him to conform to the Convention plan a few leading citizens desired its postponement even to a later date than that fixed in the President's order. All these Mr. Lincoln answered by a request that the Convention plan be followed.

"My order to General Steele," he telegraphed, "about an election, was made in ignorance of the

[1] The exact text of that part of the schedule is: "The officers to be voted for in this election are . . . Members to Congress in districts Nos. 1 and 2, according to the act approved January 19, 1861 (no election being ordered in district No. 3, this Convention recognizing the election of Col. James M. Johnson as the Representative from that district)."—Report Joint Committee on Reconstruction, 1866. Part III., p. 95.

CHAP. XVI.

Lincoln to Murphy, Feb. 6, 1864.

action your Convention had taken or would take. A subsequent letter directs General Steele to aid you on your own plan, and not to thwart or hinder you. Show this to him." And again: "When I fixed a plan for an election in Arkansas, I did it in ignorance that your Convention was doing the same work. Since I learned the latter fact, I have been constantly trying to yield my plan to them. I have sent two letters to General Steele, and three or four dispatches to you and others, saying that he — General Steele — must be master, but that it will probably be best for him to merely help the Convention on its own plan. Some single mind must be master, else there will be no agreement in anything; and General Steele, commanding the military and being on the ground, is the best man to be that master. Even now citizens are telegraphing me to postpone the election to a later day than either that fixed by the Convention or by me. This discord must be silenced."

Lincoln to Fishback, Feb. 17, 1864. MS.

Steele to Lincoln, Feb. 21, 1864. MS.

Steele, Proclamation, Feb. 29, 1864. Senate Miscellaneous Documents, 1863–64. Document No. 124, p. 2.

These differences were soon happily reconciled by General Steele, who called together prominent citizens of conflicting views, and who, after consultation, came to the unanimous agreement to adhere to the Convention plan and date. The General therefore issued his proclamation announcing that "The election will be held and the returns made in accordance with the schedule adopted by the Convention, and no interference from any quarter will be allowed to prevent the free expression of the loyal men of the State on that day." Accordingly the election was held beginning on March 14, 1864, the polls being kept open during three days. A total vote of 12,179 was cast for the Constitution

GENERAL FREDERICK STEELE.

and only 226 against it. For governor, Isaac Murphy, against whom there was no opposition candidate, received 12,430 votes, cast by people in more than forty counties. When we consider the condition of civil war amid which the people acted and the radical change of policy proposed for their acceptance, the vote was not only a gratifying evidence of returning loyalty and national spirit, but a manifestation of political vigor and courage far beyond what could have been looked for. The vote was unexpectedly large, more than double what the President had required; but the enthusiasm, the faith in the national promise of protection, and the spirit of progress and unanimity manifested gave a value and significance far in excess of its mere numerical proportion. It might without undue exaggeration be called the new political birth of Arkansas.

Murphy to Lincoln, April 15, 1864. MS.

The whole movement was carried out in the same manner to its full logical sequence. On April 11 the new State government was inaugurated at Little Rock with imposing civic and military ceremonies. Four days afterwards (April 15) both Houses of the newly elected Legislature met and organized. Members were present from more than forty out of the fifty-five counties, each House having a quorum. The session was prolonged until the 1st of June. Among other business transacted by them, they enacted a law requiring that at succeeding elections each voter should take an oath of allegiance, and further swear that he had not voluntarily borne arms in aid of the Rebellion after the day the new State government was inaugurated.

Kimball to the President, April 11, 1864. MS.

CHAP. XVI. 1864.

At the same session the Legislature elected William M. Fishback and Elisha Baxter United States Senators, to fill the vacancies of the previous incumbents, who went into the Rebellion. At the March election three Members of Congress had been chosen: T. M. Jacks in the first district, by a vote of about 3000; A. A. C. Rogers in the second district, by what appeared to be a respectable vote, though its extent could not be definitely ascertained; and J. M. Johnson in the third district, by a vote of over 4000. The Senators and Representatives elect went to Washington and presented their credentials; but by this time a contention had arisen in Congress over the question of reconstructing the States occupied by the Federal forces, and the action of both Houses was in substance a postponement of decision and a refusal for the present to admit them to seats. We shall treat elsewhere the issue thus raised between Congress and the Executive; meanwhile, in order to define his own action, the President wrote as follows to General Steele, under date of June 29, 1864: "I understand that Congress declines to admit to seats the persons sent as Senators and Representatives from Arkansas. These persons apprehend that in consequence you may not support the new State government there as you otherwise would. My wish is that you give that government and the people there the same support and protection that you would if the Members had been admitted, because in no event, nor in any view of the case, can this do any harm, while it will be the best you can do towards suppressing the rebellion."

McPherson, "History of the Rebellion," p. 587. Bartlett, "Contested Election Cases," p. 600.

Lincoln to Steele, June 29, 1864. MS.

CHAPTER XVII

LOUISIANA FREE

THE admission of Michael Hahn and Benjamin F. Flanders, who were elected in December, 1862, to seats in Congress, at once gave life to the political reorganization of Louisiana; and, as usual, also soon developed a divergence of views and action, at the bottom of which lay the inevitable question of slavery, the point at issue being the retention or abolishment of the institution in those parishes which had been excepted from the operation of the President's proclamation of emancipation. Citizens of anti-slavery views, or those willing to accept the emancipation measures, began the organization of Union associations in the city of New Orleans and adjoining territory within Federal military lines, and then, by the selection of five delegates from each association, constituted what they denominated a Free State General Committee, of which they elected Thomas J. Durant president. Upon the theory that the old constitution of Louisiana had been destroyed by rebellion, they proposed to elect a delegate State Convention to frame a new State Constitution which should prohibit slavery. This plan was approved by Governor Shepley, who, on June 12, 1863, appointed Mr. Durant attorney-general for the State, with power to act as com-

CH. XVII.

missioner of registration. The Governor, under the same date, ordered a registration to be made of all free white male citizens of the United States having resided six months in the State and one month in the parish, who should take the oath of allegiance and register "as a voter freely and voluntarily for the purpose of organizing a State government, in Louisiana, loyal to the Government of the United States."

General Orders, No. 24, State of Louisiana Executive Department.

Meanwhile the conservative citizens, though not engaging in so active an organization, sent a committee to Washington to consult the President. They wrote him a letter representing that they had "been delegated to seek of the General Government a full recognition of all the rights of the State as they existed previous to the passage of an act of secession," and further requesting him to direct the military Governor of Louisiana to order an election the following November for all State and Federal officers. The President replied adversely to their request. On June 19, he wrote:

1863.

> Since receiving the letter reliable information has reached me that a respectable portion of the Louisiana people desire to amend their State constitution, and contemplate holding a Convention for that object. This fact alone, as it seems to me, is a sufficient reason why the General Government should not give the committal you seek to the existing State Constitution. I may add, that while I do not perceive how such committal could facilitate our military operations in Louisiana, I really apprehend it might be so used as to embarrass them. As to an election to be held next November, there is abundant time without any order or proclamation from me just now. The people of Louisiana shall not lack an opportunity of a fair election for both Federal and State officers by want of anything within my power to give them."

Lincoln to Committee, June 19, 1863. MS.

The reorganization of Louisiana thus begun was at this point interrupted to a certain extent by the course of military affairs. General Banks, with all the forces he could gather, was engaged in his campaign against Port Hudson, and that having been brought to a successful termination his attention was immediately absorbed by preparations for an expedition to Texas, which the War Department had ordered. Nevertheless, the President, amid his multifarious cares, did not lose sight of the subject of reconstruction, and on August 5 wrote the general explaining his wishes somewhat in detail. CH. XVII. 1863.

Governor Boutwell read me to-day that part of your letter to him which relates to Louisiana affairs. While I very well know what I would be glad for Louisiana to do, it is quite a different thing for me to assume direction of the matter. I would be glad for her to make a new Constitution recognizing the emancipation proclamation, and adopting emancipation in those parts of the State to which the proclamation does not apply. And while she is at it, I think it would not be objectionable for her to adopt some practical system by which the two races could gradually live themselves out of their old relation to each other, and both come out better prepared for the new. Education for young blacks should be included in the plan. After all, the power or element of "contract" may be sufficient for this probationary period; and by its simplicity and flexibility may be the better.

As an antislavery man, I have a motive to desire emancipation which pro-slavery men do not have; but even they have strong enough reason to thus place themselves again under the shield of the Union, and to thus perpetually hedge against the recurrence of the scenes through which we are now passing.

Governor Shepley has informed me that Mr. Durant is now taking a registry, with a view to the election of a Constitutional Convention in Louisiana. This to me

CH. XVII.

appears proper. If such Convention were to ask my views, I could present little else than what I now say to you. I think the thing should be pushed forward so that, if possible, its mature work may reach here by the meeting of Congress.

For my own part, I think I shall not, in any event, retract the Emancipation Proclamation; nor, as Executive, ever return to slavery any person who is freed by the terms of that proclamation, or by any of the acts of Congress. If Louisiana shall send members to Congress, their admission to seats will depend, as you know, upon the respective Houses and not upon the President.

If these views can be of any advantage in giving shape and impetus to action there, I shall be glad for you to use them prudently for that object. Of course you will confer with intelligent and trusty citizens of the State, among whom I would suggest Messrs. Flanders, Hahn, and Durant; and to each of whom I now think I may send copies of this letter.

Lincoln to Banks, Aug. 5, 1863. MS.

The difficulty in carrying out the President's plan was of course that of enlisting the active co-operation of voters to an extent which should make it a real and popular movement instead of merely the perfunctory action of military officials. There was more than ordinary party indifference and torpor, resulting from war, to be overcome. The territory held by Federal arms, twelve out of forty-eight parishes, contained more than one-fourth of all the slaves in the State, and their owners, whose property rights were yet undisturbed by military decree, could hardly be expected to join enthusiastically in the free State movement. They not only hoped for the preservation of slavery in the excepted parishes, but that the chances of war might bring about some retraction or modification of the Proclamation, so as to maintain or restore the institution throughout the entire State. The

Shepley to Stanton, Oct. 29, 1863. MS. Durant to Lincoln, Oct. 1, 1863. MS.

absence of Governor Shepley, during a part of the summer, on a visit to Washington, also contributed to the general inaction. Under these and other influences the registration which had been ordered came to a practical standstill from which it required other letters of the President to rouse it into efficient action. The first of these was to General Banks: CH. XVII.

Three months ago to-day I wrote you about Louisiana affairs, stating on the word of Governor Shepley, as I understood him, that Mr. Durant was taking a registry of citizens preparatory to the election of a Constitutional Convention for that State. I sent a copy of the letter to Mr. Durant, and I now have his letter, written two months after, acknowledging receipt, and saying he is not taking such registry; and he does not let me know that he personally is expecting to do so. Mr. Flanders, to whom I also sent a copy, is now here, and he says nothing has yet been done. This disappoints me bitterly; yet I do not throw blame on you or on them.

I do, however, urge both you and them to lose no more time. Governor Shepley has special instructions from the War Department. I wish him, — these gentlemen and others coöperating,— without waiting for more territory, to go to work and give me a tangible nucleus which the remainder of the State may rally around as fast as it can, and which I can at once recognize and sustain as the true State government. And in that work I wish you and all under your command to give them a hearty sympathy and support.

The instruction to Governor Shepley bases the movement (and rightfully, too) upon the loyal element. Time is important. There is danger, even now, that the adverse element seeks insidiously to preoccupy the ground. If a few professedly loyal men shall draw the disloyal about them, and colorably set up a State government, repudiating the emancipation proclamation and reëstablishing slavery, I cannot recognize or sustain their work. I should fall powerless in the attempt. This Government,

CH. XVII.

in such an attitude, would be a house divided against itself.

I have said, and say again, that if a new State government, acting in harmony with this Government and consistently with general freedom, shall think best to adopt a reasonable temporary arrangement in relation to the landless and houseless freed people, I do not object; but my word is out to be for and not against them on the question of their permanent freedom. I do not insist upon such temporary arrangement, but only say such would not be objectionable to me.

Lincoln to Banks, Nov. 5, 1863. MS.

So, also, to show his willingness to consent to any reasonable course which might bring different Union elements in Louisiana into harmonious and prompt action, Mr. Lincoln, a few days later, wrote the following letter to Flanders, then in Washington: "In a conversation with General Butler he made a suggestion which impressed me a good deal at the time. It was that, as a preliminary step, a vote be taken, yea or nay, whether there shall be a State Convention to repeal the ordinance of secession and remodel the State constitution. I send it merely as a suggestion for your consideration, not having considered it maturely myself. The point which impressed me was not so much the questions to be voted on, as the effect of crystalizing, so to speak, in taking such popular vote on any proper question. In fact, I have always thought the act of secession is legally nothing, and needs no repealing. Turn the thought over in your mind, and see if in your own judgment you can make anything of it."

Lincoln to Flanders, Nov. 9, 1863. MS.

In reality matters were not quite so dormant as had been represented to Mr. Lincoln. Governor Shepley, on October 9, had renewed his order of

1863.

registration, modifying the former one so far as to admit "all loyal citizens." General interest was further quickened by the announcement from certain conservative leaders of a plan to hold a voluntary election for Congressmen, members of the Legislature, and State officers in conformity with the old Constitution and laws of Louisiana. "On the second day of November, then," said their published address, "go to the polls and cast your votes as usual; your chosen Congressmen will take their seats on the first Monday of December; your chosen Legislators will meet on the third Monday of January and organize; your State officers will on the same day be inaugurated; and thus the wheels of civil government will be once more set in motion in our State." CH. XVII.

The Free State Committee met this project with resolutions denouncing it as illegal and dangerous. It turned out that the conservative movement was so weak as to be easily suppressed by military orders from Governor Shepley; the change of opinion from old things to new had been deep and strong even under the seeming calm and inaction. Meanwhile the general subject had received a new impetus by an extended discussion in the President's annual message of December 8, 1863, and the amnesty and reconstruction proclamation which accompanied it, announcing that the President would recognize State governments reconstructed under its provisions by one tenth the voters of insurgent States who had taken the prescribed oaths. One of the Louisiana conservatives who was beginning to appreciate the progress of events happened in Washington about this time,

CH. XVII. 1863.

and to him Mr. Lincoln, in a letter dated December 15, elaborated his views yet more specifically.

You were so kind as to say this morning that you desire to return to Louisiana, and to be guided by my wishes, to some extent, in the part you may take in bringing that State to resume her rightful relation to the General Government; my wishes are in a general way expressed as well as I can express them in the proclamation issued on the eighth of the present month, and in that part of the annual message which relates to that proclamation. It there appears that I deem the sustaining of the Emancipation Proclamation, where it applies, as indispensable; and I add here that I would esteem it fortunate if the people of Louisiana should themselves place the remainder of the State upon the same footing, and then, if in their discretion it should appear best, make some temporary provision for the whole of the freed people, substantially as suggested in the last Proclamation. I have not put forth the plan in that Proclamation as a procrustean bed, to which exact conformity is to be indispensable; and in Louisiana, particularly, I wish that labor already done, which varies from that plan in no important particular, may not be thrown away.

The strongest wish I have, not already publicly expressed, is that in Louisiana and elsewhere all sincere Union men would stoutly eschew cliquism, and, each yielding something in minor matters, all work together. Nothing is likely to be so baleful in the great work before us, as stepping aside of the main object to consider who will get the offices, if a small matter shall go thus, and who else will get them if it shall go otherwise. It is a time now for real patriots to rise above all this. As to the particulars of what I may think best to be done in any State, I have publicly stated certain points, which I have thought indispensable to the reëstablishment and maintenance of the National authority; and I go no further than this because I wish to avoid both the substance and the appearance of dictation.

Lincoln to Cottman, Dec. 15, 1863. MS.

The President doubtless supposed that the various orders and letters from himself and the

War Department to Louisiana officials and citizens had covered every point of necessary instruction. But at this juncture he received letters from General Banks, dated on December 6 and 16, answering his own of November 5, in which the general set forth at length that Governor Shepley, Mr. Durant, and others had given him to understand that they were exclusively charged with the work of reconstruction in Louisiana, and hence he had not felt authorized to interfere. In addition he explained that there existed certain other officers in that department who had set up claims to jurisdiction conflicting and interfering with his own powers of military administration. The President at length becoming annoyed that misunderstanding and contention were delaying a work which he had so plainly marked out and so persistently urged for a whole year, replied, under date of December 24, in a letter which left no doubt on the questions of authority and responsibility.

Yours of the sixth instant has been received and fully considered. I deeply regret to have said or done anything which could give you pain or uneasiness. I have all the while intended you to be master, as well in regard to reorganizing a State government for Louisiana as in regard to the military matters of the Department, and hence my letters on reconstruction have nearly, if not quite, all been addressed to you. My error has been that it did not occur to me that Governor Shepley or any one else would set up a claim to act independently of you; and hence I said nothing expressly upon the point.

Language has not been guarded at a point where no danger was thought of. I now tell you that in every dispute, with whomsoever, you are master. Governor Shepley was appointed to assist the Commander of the Department and not to thwart him or act independently

CH. XVII.

of him. Instructions have been given directly to him merely to spare you detail labor, and not to supersede your authority. This, in its liability to be misconstrued, it now seems was an error in us. But it is past. I now distinctly tell you that you are master of all, and that I wish you to take the case as you find it, and give us a free State reorganization of Louisiana in the shortest possible time. What I say here is to have a reasonable construction. I do not mean that you are to withdraw from Texas, or abandon any other military measure which you may deem important. Nor do I mean that you are to throw away available work already done for reconstruction; nor that war is to be made upon Governor Shepley, or upon any one else, unless it be found that they will not coöperate with you, in which case, and in all cases, you are master while you remain in command of the Department.

Lincoln to Banks, Dec. 24, 1863. MS.

My thanks for your successful and valuable operations in Texas.

Before this letter of full authority reached General Banks, the latter had formulated a plan of action based upon the President's Proclamation of December 8: "I would suggest," he wrote, "as the only speedy and certain method of accomplishing your object, that an election be ordered, of a State government, under the constitution and laws of Louisiana, except so much thereof as recognizes and relates to slavery, which should be declared by the authority calling the election, and in the order authorizing it, inoperative and void. The registration of voters to be made in conformity with your Proclamation, and all measures hitherto taken with reference to State organization, not inconsistent with the Proclamation, may be made available. A Convention of the people for the revision of the constitution may be ordered as soon as the government is organized, and the election of members

1863.

might take place on the same or a subsequent day with the general election. The people of Louisiana will accept such a proposition with favor. They will prefer it to any arrangement which leaves the subject to them for an affirmative or negative vote. Strange as this may appear, it is the fact. Of course a government organized upon the basis of immediate and universal freedom, with the general consent of the people, followed by the adaptation of commercial and industrial interests to this order of things, and supported by the army and navy, the influence of the civil officers of the Government, and the Administration at Washington, could not fail by any possible chance to obtain an absolute and permanent recognition of the principle of freedom upon which it would be based. Any other result would be impossible. The same influence would secure with the same certainty the selection of proper men in the election of officers. CH. XVII.

"Let me assure you that this course will be far more acceptable to the citizens of Louisiana than the submission of the question of slavery to the chances of an election. Their self-respect, their *amour propre* will be appeased if they are not required to vote for or against it. Offer them a government without slavery and they will gladly accept it as a necessity resulting from the war. On all other points, sufficient guarantees of right results can be secured; but the great question, that of immediate emancipation, will be covered, *ab initio*, by a conceded and absolute prohibition of slavery.

"Upon this plan a government can be established whenever you wish — in thirty or sixty days: a government that will be satisfactory to the South

CH. XVII. and the North; to the South, because it relieves them from any action in regard to an institution which cannot be restored, and which they cannot condemn; and to the North, because it places the interests of liberty beyond all possible accident or chance of failure. The result is certain."

Banks to Lincoln, Dec. 30, 1863. MS.

The President, in his various private letters to commanders and military governors as well as in his recent Message and Proclamation, had uniformly said that he would not insist upon any specific plan of reconstruction as to details, provided only it conformed to a few essential conditions. He, therefore, immediately sent General Banks his full approval, under date of January 13, 1864.

1863. I have received two letters from you which are duplicates each of the other, except that one bears date the 27th and the other the 30th of December. Your confidence in the practicability of constructing a free State government speedily for Louisiana, and your zeal to accomplish it, are very gratifying. It is a connection, than in which the words "*can*" and "*will*" were never more precious. I am much in hope that on the authority of my letter of December 24 you have already begun the work. Whether you shall have done so or not, please, on receiving this, proceed with all possible dispatch using your own absolute discretion in all matters which may not carry you away from the conditions stated in your letters, to me nor from those of the Message and Proclamation of December 8. Frame orders, and fix times and places for this and that, according to your own judgment. I am much gratified to know that Mr. Dennison, the collector at New Orleans, and who bears you this, understands your views and will give you his full and zealous coöperation. It is my wish and purpose that all others holding authority from me shall do the like; and to spare me writing I will thank you to make this known to them.

Lincoln to Banks, Jan. 13, 1864. MS.

General Banks, in the mean time, acting upon the President's letter which made him "master" of the situation, had published, on January 11, 1864, a proclamation, announcing an election for State officers to be held on February 22, "who shall, when elected, for the time being, and until others are appointed by competent authority, constitute the civil government of the State, under the constitution and laws of Louisiana, except so much of the said constitution and laws as recognize, regulate, or relate to slavery; which, being inconsistent with the present condition of public affairs, and plainly inapplicable to any class of persons now existing within its limits, must be suspended, and they are therefore and hereby declared to be inoperative and void." He further announced that "an election of delegates to a Convention for the revision of the constitution will be held on the first Monday of April, 1864," the details to be announced in subsequent orders, and that further arrangements would be made for an early election of Members of Congress. The general's justification of his act appears in the following language: "The fundamental law of the State is martial law. It is competent and just for the Government to surrender to the people, at the earliest possible moment, so much of military power as may be consistent with the success of military operation; to prepare the way, by prompt and wise measures, for the full restoration of the State to the Union and its power to the people."

1864.

Proclamation, Department of the Gulf, Jan. 11, 1864.

As the general's theory did not conform entirely to either the claim of the conservatives that the constitution and laws of Louisiana existing before

CH. XVII. rebellion were completely preserved, or to the claim of the Free State Committee that they were completely destroyed, there arose some protest from both against his proceeding. But it was of such limited extent as not to reach the proportions of even a troublesome, much less a serious, obstacle. Before the day of election all the parties determined to participate in it, and three different tickets, representing the various views, were nominated. A general order of February 13 prescribed that "Every free white male, twenty-one years of age, who has been a resident of the State twelve months, and six months in the parish in which he offers to vote, who is a citizen of the United States, and who shall have taken the oath prescribed by the President in his proclamation of the 8th December, 1863, shall have the right to vote in the election of State officers on the 22d day of February, 1864."

General Orders, No. 24, Department of the Gulf, Feb. 13, 1864.

When the day arrived the election was held, with the usual formalities, in seventeen parishes. An aggregate of 11,411 votes was cast, of which Michael Hahn, the candidate for governor of those who approved the measures of General Banks, received 6183; J. Q. A. Fellows, the candidate for governor of the pro-slavery conservatives, received 2996; and B. F. Flanders, the candidate for governor of the protesting Free State Committee and its adherents, received 2232, the votes for the other six State officers varying somewhat from these figures. "The election of the 22d February," wrote the commanding general, "was conducted with great spirit and propriety. No complaint is heard from any quarter, so far as I know, of unfairness or un-

Official Table of Returns. MS.

1864.

due influence on the part of the officers of the Government. At some of the strictly military posts, the entire vote of the Louisiana men was for Mr. Flanders, at others for Mr. Hahn, according to the inclination of the voters. Every voter accepted the oath prescribed by your proclamation of the 8th December. . . The ordinary vote of the State has been less than forty thousand. The proportion given on the 22d of February is nearly equal to the territory covered by our arms."

1863. Banks to Lincoln, Feb. 25, 1864. MS.

The election was consummated by a public inauguration of Mr. Hahn as governor on March 4, with imposing civic and military ceremonies, "in the presence," the general wrote, "of more than fifty thousand people. Eight thousand pupils of the public schools participated in the ceremonies, which were intended to celebrate in this manner the return of Louisiana to the Union of States. It is impossible adequately to describe this demonstration of the people. I have witnessed many popular movements in this country, but nothing that approached this in magnitude, in enthusiasm, or popular interest. All the arrangements were by committees of citizens, in which all classes were represented, without the intervention of the military authorities in any manner whatever. They were magnificent, and beyond all description." In further elaboration of his conception of the legal theory under which he was proceeding, General Banks explained: "It is understood by the people that Mr. Hahn represents a popular power entirely subordinate to the armed occupation of the State for the suppression of the rebellion and the full restoration of the authority of the Government. This is expressed in his oath of

CH. XVII.

office. The power asked for him is that exercised heretofore by the military governor."

Banks to Lincoln, Mar. 6, 1864. MS.

As suggested by General Banks, the President soon after invested Governor Hahn "with the powers exercised hitherto by the military governor of Louisiana." Meanwhile he had written him a

1864.

letter, under date of March 13th, in which he said: "I congratulate you on having fixed your name in history as the first free State governor of Louisiana. Now you are about to have a Convention, which, among other things, will probably define the elective franchise. I barely suggest, for your private consideration, whether some of the colored people may not be let in, as, for instance, the very intelligent, and especially those who have fought gallantly in our ranks. They will probably help in some trying time to come, to keep the jewel of liberty in the family of freedom. But this is only a suggestion, not to the public, but to you alone."

Lincoln to Hahn. Raymond, "Life of Abraham Lincoln," p. 489.

It could scarcely be expected of human nature that these important proceedings should pass without some show of factious opposition. The party organized by the Free State Committee had, by formal resolution, held a convention, nominated candidates, and taken part in the election; but since their candidate for governor, Mr. Flanders, received the smallest number of votes, their ill-success only increased their indignation that the management of reconstruction had, with the President's sanction, been so summarily taken out of their hands by General Banks. They now took the ground that it was an election without validity and without moral force, and that Congress ought to declare it null and void; and their defeated candidate for governor, who was

also a prominent official of the Treasury Department, used his efforts, which, to say the least, were not rebuked by Secretary Chase, to create a sentiment in Congress adverse to the recognition of the President's plan.

1864.

Meanwhile, on March 11, General Banks ordered an election of "delegates to a Convention to be held for the revision and amendment of the constitution of Louisiana"; and Governor Hahn, on March 16, gave notice to the qualified voters of the election so ordered by the commanding general. The election was held on March 28, when, out of 150 delegates to which the whole State was entitled, ninety-eight were elected and served in the Convention. The total vote cast does not appear to have been published. A letter from Governor Hahn explains that the Conservatives, owing to their late defeat, made no formal nominations, and this, with the fact of a heavy rain on election day, was the cause of a smaller vote than before.

Hahn to Lincoln, April 2, 1864. MS.

1864.

The Convention met on April 6, and continued in session until July 25. On May 11, the Governor notified the President that "the ordinance of emancipation without compensation was finally adopted to-day by a vote of seventy to sixteen, and is now the law of the State." The perfected constitution was adopted in Convention July 22, 1864. A letter of General Banks to the President contained the following comments on the document as a whole: "The constitution . . . is one of the best ever penned. The Convention, reviewing the circumstances under which it has labored, is entitled to the highest respect and the warmest support of the Government. It was composed entirely of men of

Ibid., May 11, 1864. MS.

CH. XVII. the people. There were few or none of the old leaders of opinion in public affairs. They represented, therefore, the heart of the people, and the Constitution will be generously and triumphantly sustained by them. It abolishes slavery in the State and forbids the Legislature to enact any law recognizing property in man. The emancipation is instantaneous and absolute, without condition or compensation, and nearly unanimous.

"It confers upon the Legislature the power to grant the right of suffrage to negroes. It provides for the compulsory enrollment of all able-bodied men in the militia, without distinction of race or color. It requires the Legislature to provide means for the education of all children without restriction as to color. Twelve months since every court in this State recognized the validity of the slave code. To-day there is not a court in Louisiana that does not place every negro upon an equal footing with the whites before the law. And the Convention has wisely provided for the ultimate recognition of every right, and given them the means for qualifying themselves for every enjoyment and duty. In this progress there is marvelous success. At the beginning of the session negro suffrage was scarcely mentioned. To-day it may be regarded as secure."

Banks to Lincoln, July 25, 1864. MS.

A popular vote upon the constitution was taken on the 5th of September following, when 6836 votes were cast for its adoption and 1566 for its rejection, being a majority of 5270 in its favor; and the Governor proclaimed (September 19), "That from this date and henceforth said constitution shall be and is ordained and established as the constitution of the State of Louisiana." Members of Congress

1864.

Official Proclamation.

and a State Legislature were also chosen at the election of September 5; and the latter, about a month afterwards, elected United States Senators to fill existing vacancies.[1]

[1] The Members of Congress chosen, were: First District, M. F. Bonzano; Second District, A. P. Field; Third District, W. D. Mann; Fourth District, T. M. Welles; Fifth District, R. W. Taliaferro.— MS.

The United States Senators elected by the Legislature on October 10 were: R. King Cutler, for the unexpired term ending on the 4th of March, 1867; and Charles Smith, for the vacancy created by the resignation of J. P. Benjamin, and ending on the 4th of March, 1865.

CHAPTER XVIII

TENNESSEE FREE

CH. XVIII. THE appointment of Andrew Johnson as military governor of Tennessee, and his assumption of active duty, at Nashville, in the spring of 1862, have been mentioned. The successive Union victories at Fort Donelson, Shiloh, Corinth, and Memphis seemed to have completely paralyzed rebellion in the middle and western portions of the State. Various Union manifestations in the shape of public meetings and conventions, occurring at Nashville, Columbia, Murfreesboro, Shelbyville, and perhaps other places, indicated that popular thought was turning towards a restoration of civil government under Federal authority. This tendency, however, was arrested when in the autumn Bragg conceived and executed his daring invasion of Kentucky. Even after his forced retreat and the severe losses which the Union Army inflicted on him in the battles of Perryville in October, and of Murfreesboro on December 31, 1862, it was apparent that Federal military control in Tennessee was not yet permanently assured; and this uncertainty blighted such official efforts at reconstruction as were set on foot. President Lincoln had hoped for more favorable results in this direction.

He had written to Governor Johnson and to General Grant, on October 21, a letter which was in substance a copy of that which on October 14 he sent to the military Governor of Louisiana, requesting that an opportunity be given to the people of Tennessee to hold a popular election for Members of Congress, State officers, and a Legislature; his primary object being to awaken and crystallize dormant Union sentiment, with a view as much as possible to detach captured localities and generally insurrectionary States from their military support to the Rebellion. Both Governor Johnson and General Grant complied with the President's request so far as to publish orders for holding an election on December 29 to fill vacancies in the Thirty-seventh Congress for the ninth and tenth Congressional Districts of Tennessee. But though the Union voters were alert, and made an effort to choose Representatives, the rebel General Forrest planned and executed an extensive raid on that day, which prevented the election being held.

CH. XVIII. 1862. 1862.

Dawes, Report, Bartlett, "Contested Election Cases," p. 466.

Neither was there any early improvement in the political situation. For six months after the battle of Murfreesboro General Rosecrans made no forward movement. This left the strong rebel army of Bragg planted near the center of the State, where its mere presence was sufficient to deter Unionists from openly declaring their loyalty, except such of the bolder leaders as had been outspoken against secession and rebellion through all the incidents and fluctuations of the war. From time to time they encouraged each other and kept alive what there was of latent loyalty by meetings, speeches, and resolutions.

Dec., 1862, and Jan., 1863.

CH. XVIII. On the 1st of July, 1863, a Union Convention met at Nashville, which had been called by a committee consisting of W. G. Brownlow, Horace Maynard, and thirteen others; forty counties were represented, though only partially by regularly chosen delegates, many of them simply enrolling their names as citizens. They took an oath of allegiance to the United States; and in their resolutions pronounced void the various secession laws and ordinances. They further declared it to be vitally important to elect a Legislature and invited Governor Johnson to issue writs of election as soon as expedient. But it was clear to all prudent observers that the time was not yet ripe for such a step. General Hurlbut, writing from Memphis, 1863. under date of August 11, in answer to the President's letter of July 31, about reconstruction in Arkansas, said: "As to Tennessee, I am satisfied that this State is ready, by overwhelming majorities, to repeal the act of secession, establish a fair system of gradual emancipation, and tender herself back to the Union. I have discouraged any action on this subject here until East Tennessee is delivered. When that is done, so that her powerful voice may be heard, let Governor Johnson call an election for members of the Legislature, and that Hurlbut to Lincoln, Aug. 11, 1863. MS. Legislature call a Convention, and in sixty days the work will be done."

It was not long before the favorable conjuncture thus outlined seemed to have arrived. Rosecrans at length moved forward, forced Bragg by slow degrees southward to the State line, and on Sep- 1863. tember 9 marched, unopposed, into Chattanooga. Coincident with this advance, Burnside, at the head

of the Army of the Ohio, moved forward from Kentucky into East Tennessee, entering Knoxville on September 4. Hard fighting was still to be done to hold these points, but this also was successfully accomplished when Burnside, on November 29, repulsed Longstreet; and when, by the battle of Chattanooga on November 24, the army of Bragg at length suffered disastrous defeat. Meanwhile President Lincoln, not losing a moment of time after hearing of the occupation of Chattanooga, and studying his moves on the political chess-board as unremittingly as those on the military, wrote to Governor Johnson, under date of September 11:

All Tennessee is now clear of armed insurrectionists. You need not to be reminded that it is the nick of time for reinaugurating a loyal State government. Not a moment should be lost. You and the coöperating friends there can better judge of the ways and means than can be judged by any here. I only offer a few suggestions. The reinauguration must not be such as to give control of the State, and its representation in Congress, to the enemies of the Union, driving its friends there into political exile. The whole struggle for Tennessee will have been profitless to both State and Nation if it so ends that Governor Johnson is put down and Governor Harris is put up. It must not be so. You must have it otherwise. Let the reconstruction be the work of such men only as can be trusted for the Union. Exclude all others; and trust that your government so organized will be recognized here as being the one of republican form to be guaranteed to the State, and to be protected against invasion and domestic violence. It is something on the question of time to remember that it cannot be known who is next to occupy the position I now hold nor what he will do. I see that you have declared in favor of emancipation in Tennessee, for which may God bless you. Get emancipation into your new State government — constitution — and there will be no such word as fail for your case. The

Lincoln to Johnson, Sept. 11, 1863. MS.

CH. XVIII. raising of colored troops, I think, will greatly help every way.

Sept. 19, 1863. The foregoing letter of general advice the President followed up a week later by sending the Governor these additional documents, investing him with full powers to execute the work he was requested to do: "Herewith I send you a paper, substantially the same as the one drawn by yourself and mentioned in your dispatch, but slightly changed in two particulars. First, yours was so drawn as that I authorized you to carry into effect the fourth section, etc.; whereas I so modify it as to authorize you to so act as to require the United States to carry into effect that section. Secondly, you had a clause committing me in some sort to the State constitution of Tennessee, which I feared might embarrass you in making a new constitution if you desire — so I dropped that clause." This letter contained an inclosure which further said: "In addition to the matters contained in the orders and instructions given you by the Secretary of War you are hereby authorized to exercise such powers as may be necessary and proper to enable the loyal people of Tennessee to present such a republican form of State government as will entitle the State to the guaranty of the United States therefor, and to be protected under such State government by the United States against invasion and domestic violence, all according to the fourth Section of the fourth Article of the Constitution of the United States."

Lincoln to Johnson, Sept. 19, 1863. MS.

For a month or more after these letters were sent military operations about Chattanooga created anxious suspense; and before it was entirely re-

lieved by the full news following the battle of Lookout Mountain the President had issued his Amnesty and Reconstruction Proclamation of December 8, 1863. The great pressure of business both at Washington and Nashville and the mid-winter weather created still further delay. About the middle of January, however, the President sent to Tennessee, as he had done to Louisiana, Arkansas, and elsewhere, an agent with blank books and instructions to begin and push forward the work of enrolling citizens willing to take the oath prescribed in the Amnesty and Reconstruction Proclamation. CH. XVIII.

Governor Johnson, on his part, was by this time also ready to begin reconstruction proceedings. A large public meeting was held at Nashville, January 21, at which he made a stirring speech, using his afterwards famous phrase that "treason must be made odious, traitors must be punished and impoverished"; declaring slavery dead, and that political reorganization must leave it altogether out of view. The meeting passed resolutions recommending a Constitutional Convention and pledging their influence to elect "only such men, as delegates to said Convention, as shall be in favor of immediate and universal emancipation." The Governor, however, was resolved to build the new political structure with the greatest caution. To this end, on January 26, 1864, he issued a proclamation ordering an election on the first Saturday in March, only for county officers, "justices of the peace, sheriffs, constables, trustees, circuit and county court clerks, registers and tax collectors." 1864. Pamphlet. Ibid.

It was not easy immediately to restore the good-

CH. XVIII. will which theoretically goes hand in hand with peace. The passions of civil war were made doubly bitter by rebel persecutions of Union men in East Tennessee. Excited loyalists found fault with the Amnesty Proclamation because of its excessive liberality to repentant rebels, and its placing them in the same category with men always loyal. "It is galling in the extreme," wrote Horace Maynard, "to many of our best Union men, officers, and soldiers in the army, and others, to be transmitted to posterity, as they express it, on the same record with men reeking with treason." The Governor, therefore, framed the oath of allegiance in his own proclamation a little more stringently than that in the President's, and this variance naturally produced discussion and delay, and brought new protests and appeals to the President. In reply he telegraphed to Maynard: "Of course Governor Johnson will proceed with reorganization as the exigencies of the case appear to him to require. I do not apprehend he will think it necessary to deviate from my views to any ruinous extent. On one hasty reading I see no such deviation in his programme, which you send." And also to Warren Jordan: "In county elections you had better stand by Governor Johnson's plan; otherwise you will have conflict and confusion. I have seen his plan." Still farther explanation was given in another letter a week later: "Your telegram of the 26th instant, asking for a copy of my dispatch to Warren Jordan, Esq., at 'Nashville Press' office, has just been referred to me by Governor Johnson. In my reply to Mr. Jordan, which was brief and hurried, I intended to say that in the county and State elec-

Maynard to Lincoln, Feb. 2, 1864. MS.

Lincoln to Maynard, Feb. 13, 1864. MS. Feb. 20, 1864. Raymond, "Life of Abraham Lincoln," p. 596.

tions of Tennessee, the oath prescribed in the proclamation of Governor Johnson, on the 26th of January, 1864, ordering an election in Tennessee on the first Saturday in March next, is entirely satisfactory to me as a test of loyalty of all persons proposing, or offering, to vote in said elections; and coming from him would better be observed and followed. There is no conflict between the oath of amnesty in my Proclamation of 8th December, 1863, and that prescribed by Governor Johnson in his proclamation of the 26th ultimo. No person who has taken the oath of amnesty of 8th December, 1863, and obtained a pardon thereby, and who intends to observe the same in good faith, should have any objection to taking that prescribed by Governor Johnson as a test of loyalty. I have seen and examined Governor Johnson's proclamation, and am entirely satisfied with his plan, which is to restore the State government and place it under the control of citizens truly loyal to the Government of the United States."

CH. XVIII. 1864.

Lincoln to E. H. East (Sec. of State of Tenn.), Feb. 27, 1864. MS.

The proposed election was duly held. Such returns of this election of March 5 as have become public and accessible are so meager that they afford no sufficient data for general historical conclusions. Doubtless the event was influential in confirming and renewing the faith of loyalists; but probably its larger result was in drawing the attention of repentant rebels to the chances it offered to rehabilitate themselves in their political rights through the President's proclamation of amnesty. We may infer that the incident created much comment and inquiry in this particular; for on the 26th of March President Lincoln issued a supple- 1864.

CH. XVIII. mentary proclamation explaining and defining that of the previous 8th of December to the extent of excluding from its provisions prisoners of war in confinement or on parole, or prisoners held for other offenses.

1864. It is evident that the success of the county elections in March was not such as to prompt an immediate popular movement towards full State reconstruction as had been hoped by Governor Johnson and the President. The question sank into abeyance until again prompted by the irrepressible Union leaders of East Tennessee. The conventions held in that region in the early part of 1861, which protested so energetically against secession, seem to have kept their organization alive, to a certain extent, by a sort of permanent committee. This committee appears to have assembled a Convention at Knoxville in April or May, 1864, to discuss reconstruction. It would seem that the meeting was divided in sentiment over the slavery question, and made two reports; one favoring the Crittenden resolution, the other demanding emancipation; and this antagonism probably prevented further action, for we next find a call signed by Brownlow and others for a new Convention, which was held in Nashville on September 5, 1864. Some forty or fifty counties were again represented, but, as before, many of them by irregular or volunteer delegates. Nevertheless, they held a spirited meeting, and outlined a comprehensive programme. They recommended the election of a Constitutional Convention and the abolition of slavery in the State, and also made provision for taking part in the approaching Presidential election. This pro-

"Annual Cyclopædia," 1864, p. 764; also "Nashville Dispatch" of Mar. 27, copied from "Chattanooga Gazette" of Mar. 24, 1864.

gramme was, however, only partially carried out. On September 30 Governor Johnson issued his proclamation for holding the Presidential election, and the Union voters cast their ballots for electors of President and Vice-President, so far as the unsettled condition of military operations permitted.

1864.

"Annual Cyclopædia," 1864, p. 465.

It does not appear that at the election of November, 1864, any attempt was made to choose a governor, or legislature, or constitutional convention for Tennessee. But the Convention which met in July constituted an executive committee, consisting of five members for each division of the State. This executive committee, after the Presidential election was over, issued calls for a State Convention to meet in Nashville on December 19, 1864. "The people meet," said the call, "to take such steps as wisdom may direct to restore the State of Tennessee to its once honored status in the great National Union. . . If you cannot meet in your counties, come upon your own personal responsibility. It is the assembling of Union men for the restoration of their own Commonwealth to life and a career of success."

1864.

Report Joint Committee on Reconstruction, First Sess. 39th Congress.

It turned out that the contemplated meeting could not take place on the day designated because of the advance of the rebel army under Hood upon Nashville, and the meeting was therefore postponed to January 9, 1865. By that time the battle of Nashville had once more freed Tennessee from hostile occupation, and the appointed State Convention assembled. Fifty-eight counties and some regiments were represented by about 467 delegates, who deliberated six days. The main act of the Convention was in the following words:

CH. XVIII. 1865. We, the people of the State of Tennessee and of the United States of America, in Convention assembled, do propound the following alterations and amendments to the constitution; which, when ratified by the sovereign loyal people, shall be and constitute a part of the permanent constitution of the State of Tennessee:

ARTICLE I.

SECTION I. That slavery and involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, are hereby forever abolished and prohibited throughout the State.

SECTION II. The Legislature shall make no law recognizing the right of property in man.

The schedule then went on to provide that, "The convention, agreement, and military league entered into by the Commissioners of the State of Tennessee and the Commissioners of the so-called Confederate States of America, made May 7, 1861, and on the same day ratified and confirmed by the Legislature, was an act of treason and usurpation, unconstitutional, null, and void." The schedule also repudiated the rebel debt and declared void all laws, ordinances, resolutions, and acts under the usurped secession government of Tennessee; and provided further: "That the proposed amendments to the constitution, and the schedule thereto, be submitted to the people at the ballot-box, on the 1865. 22d day of February next, and that upon the adoption thereof, by the people, an election shall be held on the 4th day of March next, for governor and members of the Legislature, the latter to be voted for by general ticket, upon the basis prescribed in the act apportioning representation in the State, passed on the 19th of February, 1852, to assemble at the Capitol on the first Monday in April next,



ANDREW JOHNSON.

said officers to continue in office until their successors shall be elected and qualified under the regular biennial election of 1867."

Report Joint Committee on Reconstruction, First Sess. 39th Congress. 1865.

It is needless to describe in detail the further progress of reconstruction proceedings in Tennessee. On February 25, Governor Johnson proclaimed that the election had been held and the amendments to the constitution adopted on February 22. The election of William G. Brownlow as governor, and of a Union Legislature, followed on the 4th of March. On the 3d of April the Legislature met at Nashville and in a few days thereafter the Governor was inaugurated, and general civil government formally begun. Among the early acts of the Legislature was one to ratify the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States; and in due time United States Senators were elected, and provisions made for choosing Members of Congress, who were regularly elected by the people in the following August.

Report Joint Committee on Reconstruction.

CHAPTER XIX

MARYLAND FREE

CHAP. XIX.

THE notable military events which occurred in the State of Maryland during the last three years of the war connect themselves more with the general history of the Union than with the local history of the State; and in reviewing the latter, political results become the dominant feature. The power of rebellion in Maryland was effectually broken during the year 1861. The Union party formed and maintained a solid organization, and on November 6, in that year, elected Augustus W. Bradford governor, by a majority of 31,412, for a term of four years, to succeed Governor Hicks. At the same election a Legislature was chosen, with an overwhelming majority of Union members. Governor Bradford was inaugurated on the 8th of January, 1862, and his inaugural message declared in the most outspoken terms against secession and for maintaining the Union by a vigorous prosecution of the war.

"Tribune Almanac," 1862.

Next to the question between union and secession, the question of emancipation was brought to popular attention in Maryland at a very early period. We have seen how President Lincoln hoped to induce voluntary action on this subject

by his plan of compensated abolishment, first suggested to her leading politicians, and afterwards officially recommended to Congress; and it was this policy which directly brought about the formation of new party divisions in the State.

By the census of 1860 the population of Maryland was: white, 515,918; free colored, 83,942; slave, 87,189. It was therefore slavery traditions rather than money value in slaves which created the strength of pro-slavery sentiment and the political influence of the institution. The fact also needs to be noted that the numbers of slaves and free colored persons were nearly equal; a condition producing special influences of peculiar power in the antislavery movement which the war called into action. Under such conditions the whole colored population was more intelligent, more active, and more self-reliant than in dense slave communities, and both the desire and the opportunities for escape from bondage were greatly increased amid the confusion of war and the presence of armies. It has been elsewhere stated that the President and the local military commanders for a while discouraged or forbade the presence of negro runaways in military camps; but this was only a temporary check, and was practically discontinued after the first year of the war, the army finding more serious work to do than returning fugitive slaves to their masters; and it was at length formally prohibited by the act of Congress of March 13, 1862.

When, therefore, President Lincoln announced his policy of compensated emancipation in the spring of 1862, Maryland Unionists who belonged

CHAP. XIX. to the conservative or slaveholding class were moved to oppose it, not alone by their lifelong hatred of "abolition," but also by the constant irritation of the escape of their slaves; their prejudices blinded them too much to see that this was the exact reason which should have induced them heartily to accept and second it.

At Mr. Lincoln's first interview with the border State delegations on March 10, 1862, to propose his policy, only two of the Maryland Representatives were present, Cornelius L. L. Leary and J. W. Crisfield, and they gave him little encouragement. The reluctance they expressed seemed based more upon pride than economical expediency. "Mr. Crisfield said he did not think the people of Maryland looked upon slavery as a permanent institution, and he did not know that they would be very reluctant to give it up if provision was made to meet the loss, and they could be rid of the race; but they did not like to be coerced into emancipation either by the direct action of the Government, or by indirection, as through the emancipation of slaves in this District [of Columbia] or the confiscation of Southern property as now threatened." And when assured by the President that no coercive action was contemplated, that he had no present design beyond his patriotic appeal to them, Mr. Crisfield further said: "Mr. President, if what you now say could be heard by the people of Maryland, they would consider your proposition with a much better feeling than I fear without it they will be inclined to do."

McPherson, "History of the Rebellion," p. 211.

It would appear, however, that little could be expected from the Maryland Union Representa-

tives at that time in behalf of the President's policy. They had been elected on June 13, 1861, by the party organization which still reflected the conservatism existing before the war, and whose single bond of party affiliation was opposition to secession and disunion — a condition of political sentiment at that time common to all the border slave States, and which was formulated by the Crittenden Resolution. None of the Maryland Representatives had yet become infused with the spirit and independence of the new antislavery drift in politics. Throughout the regular session of Congress from December, 1861, to the middle of July, 1862, they were either silent or their votes were recorded against the great antislavery measures of that session. When, after the lapse of four months, the President called them to a second interview, to hear his renewed appeal in behalf of compensated emancipation, they joined the bulk of other border State conservatives in refusing to entertain his policy. They pledged themselves anew to the Union and the prosecution of the war, but urged various reasons why they should have nothing to do with emancipation. CHAP. XIX.

It was quite natural that the bolder politicians of Maryland should seize an opportunity so favorable to begin the organization of a new and more radical party, and endeavor to supplant them in popular leadership. The question had been brought to the attention of the people of Maryland with especial force, by the bill pending in Congress to emancipate slaves in the District of Columbia, which was introduced on December 16, 1861, though active discussion of it did not begin till February 24. The

CHAP. XIX. 1862. bill passed the Senate on April 3, and the House on April 11, and was signed by the President on April 16. Meanwhile the President had also, by his special message of March 6, recommended his plan of compensated abolishment, which Congress promptly indorsed. Public sentiment had at once taken up the question in Maryland, the first declarations being from conservative opponents of both propositions. On the 2d of January, 1862, the Legislature, in a series of resolutions expressing confidence in the Administration generally and in Mr. Lincoln personally, declared that they, nevertheless, protested against "all attempts, from whatever quarter, to make the present war for the restoration of the Union the means of interfering with the domestic institutions of the States." Again on February 22 the Legislature, by another resolution, appealed to the Northern States to "rebuke, in an unmistakable manner, those of their Representatives in Congress who are wasting their time in devising schemes for the abolition of slavery in the rebellious States." And once more, early in March, the Legislature reaffirmed and commended to Congress the language and spirit of the Crittenden resolution, and declared its apprehension at indications "of an interference with the institution of slavery in the slaveholding States"; though at the same time it reaffirmed its confidence in the wisdom and moderation of the President.

"Annual Cyclopædia," 1862, p. 560.

1862.

Scharf, "History of Maryland." Vol. III., p. 463.

Ibid., p. 461.

The popular voice was more specific than these legislative generalities. A large meeting was held about the 1st of April, in Montgomery county, which lies contiguous to the District of Columbia, and which was therefore peculiarly annoyed by the

escape of slaves. The resolutions denounced the act to emancipate the slaves in the District of Columbia as unwise, ill-timed, and unconstitutional, and as the entering wedge of a general scheme of abolition — the latter being evidently regarded as the most serious point of the indictment.

But conservative views like these did not comprise the whole public sentiment of Maryland. A Convention met in the city of Baltimore on May 28, 1862, composed of delegates from Union meetings in the various wards, which passed a series of resolutions approving President Lincoln's policy of compensated abolishment, declaring it to the interest of the people of the State, especially its slaveholders, to accept the pecuniary aid tendered, and favoring the inauguration of "such a plan of emancipation and colonization as will be equitable to those interested." A more practical and local reform was broached in the long preamble and resolution which closed the series, setting forth the inequality and injustice of the existing State apportionment, through which the southern counties, where the slave population was centered,[1] "containing one-fourth of the population and wealth, and paying less than one-fourth of the taxes, possess the virtual control of the whole State, sending thirty-four out of the seventy-four delegates, and fourteen out of twenty-two senators to the Legislature"; alleging further, that under this appor-

McPherson, "History of the Rebellion," p. 226.

Ibid.

[1] "... the number of slaves in the city [Baltimore] is less than one per cent. of the whole population, and that the proportion of slaves to the whites throughout the northern part of the State is less than four of the former to one hundred of the latter; whilst the proportion in the favored counties is fifty-six slaves to one hundred white people."— Extract from preamble adopted by the Convention.—McPherson, "History of the Rebellion," p. 227.

CHAP. XIX. tionment the slave-owners of the State, constituting fewer than 16,000 individuals, virtually wielded its political power; and that they demanded a change of the State constitution to correct this unequal representation.

This was certainly a strong argument in favor of holding a State Constitutional Convention, and doubtless played no unimportant part in stimulating the action of liberal and progressive voters among the class of non-slaveholding whites, and particularly among the white laboring population of Baltimore. During the remainder of the year the party reorganization thus begun was powerfully aided, first, by the Union victory at the battle of Antietam and the quick expulsion of the Confederate invasion; second, by President Lincoln's preliminary proclamation of emancipation, which was issued almost immediately thereafter. When in due course the final emancipation proclamation of January 1, 1863, appeared, the policy of the Administration on this subject had become so pronounced and unalterable that it was by mere force of circumstances an unavoidable issue in the politics of every State. Hitherto conservatives already began to show the influence of the profound movement of public opinion which had taken place; and Francis Thomas, one of the Maryland Representatives in Congress, so far changed his attitude that on January 12, 1863, he introduced a resolution, which was agreed to, "that the Committee on Emancipation and Colonization be instructed to inquire into the expediency of making an appropriation to aid the State of Maryland in a system of emancipation and colonization of persons of color, inhabitants of

"Globe," Jan. 12, 1863, p. 283.

said State." A bill was introduced on the 19th, by Mr. Bingham of Ohio, for the same purpose, which was referred to a select committee. The committee, on February 25, reported a bill appropriating ten millions to aid Maryland emancipation, but parliamentary objection was immediately interposed, and Representative Crisfield said that the measure was not asked for by the State of Maryland. The bill was recommitted and not again reported, probably for the reason that the session was almost ended. Maryland not being ready to accept such a boon, Congress would not force it upon her.

"Globe," Jan. 19, 1863, p. 381.

"Globe," Feb. 25, 1863, pp. 1293, 1294.

As no important election was held in Maryland during the year 1862 political sentiment was not further defined than by the resolutions of the Convention which have been mentioned; and there being little or no party wreckage to clear away an unusually thorough and radical party reorganization took place in 1863. There was only one of the Union State offices to be filled by general election; but the contest over the choice of Representatives in Congress, which usually creates a spirited political activity, was in this case supplemented by the deeper struggle over the election of a Legislature, in which the question of State emancipation was the dominant and far-reaching issue, and for which public opinion had been fully ripened by the events of 1862.

The party machinery was still in the hands of the State Central Committee, appointed by the Union State Convention of May 23, 1861, which reflected the conservative Unionism of the earlier stages of the war. But a vehicle for the expression of more

CHAP. XIX. advanced and radical thought of Maryland voters was found in the organization of the Union Leagues within the State; and by this instrumentality a Convention met in Baltimore on June 16, 1863, the call for which had addressed itself to "all persons who support the whole policy of the Government in suppressing the Rebellion." Contemporaneously with this movement the old party organization, headed by the State Central Committee, also called a State Convention to meet on June 23, the two bodies being designated respectively the "Union League Convention" and the "State Central Committee Convention." The former being a new organization, and not yet possessing full confidence in its own strength, had, after resolving "that the policy of emancipation ought to be inaugurated in Maryland," adjourned its meeting, and reconvened also on the 23d. The rival conventions being now both in session a proposition was submitted by the Union League Convention that they should bring about harmony of action by joining in a call for a third convention, to be held at a future day. But there was too much difference in the underlying thought and purpose of each to permit such a fusion. The Union League Convention had declared for emancipation; the State Central Committee Convention resolved "that this Convention ignores all issues, local or national, but those of war, until treason shall succumb before an offended people." It therefore declined the tendered overture, and the Union voters of Maryland thus became separated into rival factions, one of which was designated "Union Men," and the other "Unconditional Union Men." Both parties admitted

"Baltimore American," June 17, 1863.

"Baltimore American," June 24, 1863.

the imminence of the slavery question; but the former sought refuge in delay, while the latter urged the policy of boldly grappling with and ending it.

The convention of the Union Men so far yielded to the drift of public sentiment as to pass a resolution declaring "that the Legislature at its next session should make provision for submitting to the people the question of the call for a Constitutional Convention"; while, in an address which the State Central Committee issued on September 11, though they deprecated the present agitation of the emancipation issue, they said the immediate emancipationists must be unreasonable indeed if they "desire a more rapid change than that which is now going on, and has left the institution of slavery within our limits already scarcely worth the trouble of contending for." On their part, the Unconditional Union Men answered by an address, issued on September 16, disavowing all measures for the violent abrogation of slavery, but asserting that the institution should be abolished legally and constitutionally at the earliest moment, and retorting that since only the skeleton was left it ought to be removed.

"Baltimore American," June 24, 1863.

Ibid., Sept. 11, 1863.

Ibid., Sept. 16, 1863.

Pending this discussion of local policy by the voters of the State, two important questions of military administration arose between the State authorities and the General Government. One grew out of the system of enlisting negro soldiers for the army, which had begun in Maryland as in other States; and Governor Bradford wrote the President a long letter, complaining that recruiting officers encouraged slaves to abscond and enlist, and that owners were not only thus deprived of their

CHAP. XIX. labor, but that they were in some instances refused access to them to identify their property for the mere purpose of formulating a claim to future indemnity. After much discussion the President to some extent relieved this grievance by directing the Secretary of War to issue a general order, dated October 3, 1863, regulating enlistment of colored troops in the States of Maryland, Missouri, and Tennessee, and which was subsequently extended to Delaware. The order provided: That persons so enlisted in the military service should forever thereafter be free; that free persons, and slaves with the written consent of their owners, and slaves belonging to rebels, might then be enlisted; but if a sufficient number to meet the exigencies of the service were not obtained, within thirty days, enlistment might be made of slaves without requiring consent of their owners. Loyal owners were compensated, whether they had given their consent or not, upon filing deeds of manumission and release, and a board was appointed to audit such claims. This order gave satisfaction in many directions; it helped to fill the army, gave slaves an avenue to freedom, aided and stimulated State emancipation, compensated slave-owners, and lightened the burden of the draft upon white citizens.

The other question was more difficult of solution. Though the State of Maryland had given continuous and conclusive proof of her dominant loyalty, there was no disguising the presence within her limits of a very considerable minority of malignant secessionists, who neglected no opportunity to propagate and practice treason, and obstruct loyal administration. Major-General Schenck, who had

been placed in military command in Maryland on December 17, 1862, found much of his time and vigilance required in ferreting out and repressing secret secession combinations, or such open manifestations as evil-doers ventured upon. While disloyal combinations and plots were prevented by military precautions, the secessionists lost no occasion to make a loud outcry and complaint of military oppression, and in no particular did their wounded susceptibilities find so convenient a theme for energetic protest as in the charge of apprehended military interference at elections. CHAP. XIX.

On October 26, 1863, Thomas Swann, Chairman of the State Central Committee of the Union men, wrote a letter to the President stating that many Union voters of Maryland had a suspicion that the coming election, on the 4th of November, would "be attended with undue interference on the part of persons claiming to represent the wishes of the Government," and asking the President's views on the subject. To this Mr. Lincoln replied, on October 27, as follows: 1863. Swann to Lincoln. MS.

"Your letter, a copy of which is on the other half of this sheet, is received. I trust there is no just ground for the suspicion you mention; and I am somewhat mortified that there could be any doubt of my views upon the point of your inquiry. I wish all loyal qualified voters in Maryland and elsewhere to have the undisturbed privilege of voting at elections; and neither my authority nor my name can be properly used to the contrary." Lincoln to Swann, Oct. 27, 1863. MS.

But the conservative party was disposed to magnify every pretext for complaint, and would not rest satisfied with the general declarations the

CHAP. XIX. President had laid down in his answer. Four days later Governor Bradford wrote to him reporting rumors that "detachments of soldiers are to be dispatched on Monday next to several of the counties of the State with a view of being present at their polls, on Wednesday next, the day of our State election"; and his apprehension "that these military detachments, if sent, are expected to exert some control or influence in that election. I am also informed," continued the Governor, "that orders are to be issued from this military department, on Monday, presenting certain restrictions, or qualifications in the right of suffrage,— of what precise character I am not apprised,— which the judges of election will be expected to observe."

Bradford to Lincoln, Oct. 31, 1863. MS.

It is unnecessary to quote in full the military order of General Schenck to which the Governor alluded. In substance it gave the following directions: 1. That provost-marshals and other military officers should arrest disloyal persons "found at, or hanging about, or approaching any poll or place of election." 2. That provost-marshals and military officers should support judges of election "in requiring an oath of allegiance to the United States as the test of citizenship of any one whose vote may be challenged on the ground that he is not loyal." 3. That provost-marshals and military officers should report judges of election refusing to require such an oath. After an interview with General Schenck on the subject the President made the following reply to Governor Bradford, in which the reciprocal rights and obligations of individual voters on the one hand, and the Government authorities on the other, are set forth with

General Orders, No. 53. MS.

that specific minuteness and clearness of analysis and definition which never failed him in this class of controversies: CHAP. XIX.

Yours of the 31st ult. was received yesterday about noon, and since then I have been giving most earnest attention to the subject-matter of it. At my call General Schenck has attended, and he assures me it is almost certain that violence will be used at some of the voting places on election day unless prevented by his provost guards. He says that at some of those places Union voters will not attend at all, or run a ticket, unless they have some assurance of protection. This makes the Missouri case, of my action in regard to which you express your approval.

The remaining point of your letter is a protest against any person, offering to vote, being put to any test not found in the laws of Maryland. This brings us to a difference between Missouri and Maryland. With the same reason in both States, Missouri has, by law, provided a test for the voter with reference to the present Rebellion, while Maryland has not. For example, General Trimble, captured fighting us at Gettysburg, is, without recanting his treason, a legal voter by the laws of Maryland. Even General Schenck's order admits him to vote, if he recants upon oath. I think that is cheap enough. My order in Missouri, which you approve, and General Schenck's order here, reach precisely the same end. Each assures the right of voting to all loyal men, and whether a man is loyal, each allows that man to fix by his own oath. Your suggestion that nearly all the candidates are loyal I do not think quite meets the case. In this struggle for the nation's life, I cannot so confidently rely on those whose elections may have depended upon disloyal votes. Such men, when elected, may prove true; but such votes are given them in the expectation that they will prove false. Nor do I think that to keep the peace at the polls, and to prevent the persistently disloyal from voting, constitutes just cause of offense to Maryland. I think she has her own example for it. If I mistake not, it is precisely what General Dix did when

CHAP. XIX.

your Excellency was elected governor. I revoke the first of the three propositions in General Schenck's General Order, No. 53; not that it is wrong in principle, but because the military, being of necessity exclusive judges as to who shall be arrested, the provision is too liable to abuse. For the revoked part I substitute the following:

"That all provost-marshals and other military officers do prevent all disturbance and violence at or about the polls, whether offered by such persons as above described, or by any other person or persons whomsoever."

The other two propositions of the order I allow to stand. General Schenck is fully determined, and has my strict orders besides, that all loyal men may vote, and vote for whom they please.

Lincoln to Bradford, Nov. 2, 1863. MS.

Before receiving the President's letter, Governor Bradford had issued a proclamation stating his criticism of General Schenck's order, and admonishing judges of election that their own judgment "must determine the right to vote of any person offering himself for that purpose . . . undeterred by any orders to provost-marshals to report them to headquarters"; which he supplemented by a letter citing and acknowledging the revocation made by the President, but expressing his regret that he could "perceive no such change in the general principles of the order as to induce me to change the foregoing proclamation." To this General Schenck retorted with a supplementary order, repeating his directions to his provost guards to carry out his own and the President's instructions. It was natural that such a war of words should ensue to relieve the irritated tempers of the Governor and the General; but it evidently had little effect, except to confirm the adherents of each in the political views to which prior causes had brought them.

Scharf, "History of Maryland." Vol. III., pp. 565, 566.

GENERAL LEW WALLACE.

The Governor and his friends may be pardoned for having continued to nurse and utter their unnecessary and ill-timed complaints, for at the election, which was held November 4, their party suffered a decisive defeat. The Conservative Union candidate for comptroller received a vote of 15,984; the Unconditional Union, or Emancipation candidate, 36,360. Out of the five Congressmen chosen, four were Unconditional Unionists; and of the Legislature which was elected, the Emancipationists had a decided majority in the House and a practical majority in the Senate. The new Legislature met at Annapolis on January 6, 1864, and during the ensuing month, amid the usual party and parliamentary strategy and debate upon collateral points, perfected and passed a bill which provided for holding an election on April 6, 1864, submitting to the voters of Maryland the question of "Convention" or "No Convention," and also providing for electing delegates to a State Convention to amend the constitution.

"Tribune Almanac."

Mr. Lincoln followed with unabated interest the growth of liberal sentiment in Maryland which promised to put an end to slavery, giving it his constant personal encouragement. On March 17 he wrote to Mr. Creswell, one of the newly chosen members of Congress, "It needs not to be a secret that I wish success to emancipation in Maryland. It would aid much to end the Rebellion. Hence it is a matter of national consequence, in which every national man may rightfully feel a deep interest. I sincerely hope the friends of the measure will allow no minor considerations to divide and distract them."

Lincoln to Creswell, March 17, 1864. MS.

CHAP. XIX. As the election came on the usual controversy between secessionists and the military authorities, about permission to become candidates and to vote, was renewed; but the correspondence on the subject between Governor Bradford and General Lew. Wallace, who had succeeded General Schenck, was in better temper, owing to the evident drift of public opinion, and especially to the additional duties and powers which the Convention Act of the Legislature imposed on judges of election. When the popular vote was taken, the question of emancipation gained another signal success. There was a majority of more than twelve thousand in favor of holding the Convention; and of the delegates elected, sixty-one were emancipationists, and only thirty-five opposed. Accordingly, the Convention met at Annapolis on April 27, 1864, and its sessions were prolonged by animated debate until the 6th of September. Long before this, however, the main question which had called it into existence was de-

1864. cided, the Convention having, on June 24, by a vote of yeas fifty-three, nays twenty-seven, adopted an article declaring "that hereafter in this State there shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except in punishment of crime, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted; and all persons

"Baltimore American," June 25, 1864. held to service or labor as slaves are hereby declared free." This vote of the Convention in favor of abolishing the institution was so decisive that though the body remained in session more than two months longer no effort seems to have been made by the minority to reverse or rescind its action. The Constitution, as a whole, was adopted on September 6, 1864, fifty-three to twenty-five; though

thirty-five of the delegates afterwards joined in a protest against it. The new instrument thereupon went to the people at large, and during the ensuing month was vigorously discussed in public by the strong parties which arrayed themselves for and against it. The influence of President Lincoln being invoked to aid in this popular contest, he wrote the following letter to Henry W. Hoffman, on October 10, two days before the vote was taken : CHAP. XIX. 1864.

A Convention of Maryland has framed a new constitution for the State; a public meeting is called for this evening at Baltimore to aid in securing its ratification by the people; and you ask a word from me for the occasion. I presume the only feature of the instrument about which there is serious controversy is that which provides for the extinction of slavery. It needs not to be a secret, and I presume it is no secret, that I wish success to this provision. I desire it on every consideration. I wish all men to be free. I wish the material prosperity of the already free, which I feel sure the extinction of slavery would bring. I wish to see in process of disappearing that only thing which ever could bring this nation to civil war. I attempt no argument. Argument upon the question is already exhausted by the abler, better informed, and more immediately interested sons of Maryland herself. I only add that I shall be gratified exceedingly if the good people of the State shall, by their votes, ratify the new constitution. Lincoln to Hoffman, Oct. 10, 1864. MS.

In accordance with the schedule adopted by the Convention the popular vote for and against the new constitution was taken on October 12 and 13, 1864, and proved one of the most closely contested elections held in Maryland during the war. Rigid provisions had been adopted to prevent disloyal persons from voting, and liberal provisions for taking the vote of Maryland soldiers on the question at whatever camp or station they might be

CHAP. XIX. serving. The result was a vote of 30,174 for and 29,799 against the new constitution. Though the majority of only 375 votes out of a total of nearly 60,000 was a very narrow victory for emancipation, the result seems to have been accepted by the defeated party without serious opposition. A case was taken to the Court of Appeals on the question of the Governor's discretion in ascertaining the result, the object being to throw out the soldiers' vote and thus defeat the constitution; but the de-
1864. cision sustained the vote; and, on October 29, Governor Bradford issued his proclamation, definitely announcing that the new constitution had been legally adopted and would go into effect on the 1st of November.

In accordance with this announcement the new constitution became operative, and slavery ceased to exist in Maryland. However small was the majority by which the result was attained, it was in entire harmony with the manifest popular will
NOV. 8, 1864. of the State, for within the succeeding month occurred the Presidential election of 1864, at which Maryland cast 40,153 votes for Lincoln, and 32,739 for McClellan; giving the President, who had prompted and aided State emancipation, a popular majority of 7414, and electing a Republican governor, and three Republican members of Congress out of five, and a new Legislature, with a majority of twenty-two Republicans on joint ballot.

The remarkable transformation of Maryland by the war can be realized by recalling that, at the Presidential election of 1860, only 2294 ballots had been cast for Lincoln, the total then being less than one-third of his majority in 1864.

CHAPTER XX

MISSOURI FREE

THE temporary quiet which had been reached in Missouri between the Radicals and General Schofield, about the time of the November election in 1863, soon suffered a new interruption. The Legislature of the State met at Jefferson City on November 10, and the two principal questions before that body were, the election of United States Senators and the passage of an act to call a State Convention to deal with the subject of emancipation. The Legislature was composed of members chosen a year before, excepting that some vacancies had occurred which were filled at the recent election. But several circumstances probably served to change its temper. At the session of the previous winter, neither faction having a controlling majority, an effort to elect United States Senators for the two existing vacancies and the following term had only partially succeeded.[1] The Radicals

[1] On January 10, 1862, Waldo P. Johnson and Trusten Polk, members of the United States Senate from the State of Missouri, were expelled from that body for secession and disloyalty. Lieutenant-Governor Hall, of the Provisional Government, on the 17th day of January appointed Robert Wilson to succeed Johnson, and John B. Henderson to succeed Polk, who took their seats, the former on January 24, and the latter on January 29, 1862. These appointments, however, being made during the recess, only ran until the next meet-

CHAP. XX.

claimed that their candidate for Supreme Judge of Missouri had received a majority in the State of about seventeen hundred votes, though the official count, through technical informalities of certain ballots, awarded the certificate of election to the Conservative candidate. With the chances of success thus evenly divided, and vibrating between the two, both parties were put on their good behavior; a balance, however, that was soon destroyed by the death of Governor Gamble, which occurred on the 31st of January, 1864. Through this the Conservative party lost its most conspicuous leader, and from that time forward rapidly declined in prestige and numerical strength.

The first of these legislative contests was disposed of on the fourth day of the session by the election of B. Gratz Brown the leading Radical, for the vacancy, to succeed Wilson, and of John B. Henderson, a Conservative, but also a hearty Emancipationist, for the coming full term, to succeed himself, to the United States Senate. President Lincoln was greatly pleased at this result, which appeared to him the forerunner of such coöperation in Missouri as would secure an earlier and more substantial measure of emancipation than that adopted by the old State Convention on the 1st of July previous. In this he was not disappointed. The Radicals could not command a working majority of the members, but a sufficient number of them had become convinced that slavery was doomed, and were agreed that a Convention should

"New York Tribune," Feb. 27, 1864.

ing. The Legislature, on the 6th day of January, 1863, elected John B. Henderson for the remaining two months of Polk's term; but no choice could at that session be agreed upon for the remaining three years of Johnson's term.

be held. A parliamentary struggle, however, occurred over the time when it ought to be elected. The Radicals desired that the Convention should be chosen and an emancipation ordinance adopted without delay, but in this they failed; and an act was passed, which became a law on the 13th of February, 1864, for submitting the question of Convention or no Convention to a popular vote in the following November, and for the election at the same time of delegates, with authority to act upon this and other enumerated subjects. Violent as had been the attacks of the Radicals upon General Schofield, it was perhaps more than one could expect of human nature that with his vast and varied powers of administration he would remain entirely neutral in these new political contests; and complaints of his interference began to reach the President. Mr. Lincoln's intimate friend, Washburne of Illinois, reported to him that he had held a conversation with the general, advising him to use his influence to harmonize the conflicting elements so as to elect one Senator from each wing, Gratz Brown and Henderson. Schofield's reported reply was that he would not consent to the election of Gratz Brown. Again, when Gratz Brown, after his election, was about coming to Washington, he sent a friend to Schofield to say that he would not oppose his confirmation as major-general, if he, Schofield, would, so far as his influence extended, agree to a Convention of Missouri to make necessary alterations in her State constitution. Schofield's reply, as reported by Brown to the President, was that he would not consent to a State Convention. "These things," the President said, "are

CHAP. XX. J. H., Diary, Dec. 13, 1863.

obviously transcendent of his instructions and must not be permitted"; and he sent for Schofield to come to Washington and explain the facts.

But the President also saw that Schofield's mere interference was not the most troublesome point. The reports brought to him by Washburne and by Gratz Brown, as of their personal knowledge, would either be admitted or denied by the general. If admitted, he could not escape blame; if denied, the truthfulness of the President's trusted friend and that of the newly elected Senator would be impugned. The culmination of this difficulty and Mr. Lincoln's tact in dealing with it, are fully set forth in his letter to the Secretary of War, of December 18, 1863.[1]

I believe General Schofield must be relieved from command of the Department of Missouri; otherwise a question of veracity, in relation to his declarations as to his interfering, or not, with the Missouri Legislature, will be made with him, which will create an additional amount of trouble, not to be overcome by even a correct decision of the question. The question itself must be avoided. Now for the mode. Senator Henderson, his friend, thinks he can be induced to ask to be relieved, if he shall understand he will be generously treated; and, on this latter point, Gratz Brown will help his nomination, as a major-general, through the Senate. In no other way can he be confirmed; and upon his rejection alone, it would be difficult for me to sustain him as commander of the department. Besides, his being relieved from command of the department, and at the same time confirmed as a major-general, will be the means of Henderson and Brown leading off

[1] Mr. Lincoln's letter of December 18, 1863, to the Secretary of War, was written after he had seen General Schofield and heard his denial of the allegations made by Washburne and Brown, and his statement of the facts, to which the President replied: "I believe you, Schofield." It was evidently a controversy arising out of mere personal misunderstanding.

together as friends, and will go far to heal the Missouri difficulty. Another point. I find it is scarcely less than indispensable for me to do something for General Rosecrans; and I find Henderson and Brown will agree to him for the commander of their department.

Again, I have received such evidence and explanations, in regard to the supposed cotton transactions of General Curtis, as fully restores in my mind the fair presumption of his innocence; and, as he is my friend, and, what is more, as I think, the country's friend, I would be glad to relieve him from the impression that I think him dishonest, by giving him a command. Most of the Iowa and Kansas delegations, a large part of that of Missouri, and the delegates from Nebraska and Colorado, ask this in behalf of General C., and suggest Kansas and other contiguous territory west of Missouri as a department for him. In a purely military point of view it may be that none of these things are indispensable, or perhaps advantageous; but in another aspect, scarcely less important, they would give great relief; while, at the worst, I think they could not injure the military service much. I therefore shall be greatly obliged if yourself and General Halleck can give me your hearty coöperation in making the arrangement. Perhaps the first thing would be to send General Schofield's nomination to me. Let me hear from you before you take any actual step in the matter.

Lincoln to Stanton, Dec. 18, 1863. MS.

It would seem that Stanton and Halleck were not quite agreed to the changes proposed by the President; for three days later, December 21, Mr. Lincoln again wrote to the Secretary of War, "In regard to the Western matter I believe the programme will have to stand substantially as I first put it. Henderson, and especially Brown, believe that the social influence of St. Louis would inevitably tell injuriously upon General Pope in the particular difficulty existing there, and I think there is some force in that view. As to retaining General S. [Schofield] temporarily, if this should be done, I

1863.

CHAP. XX.

believe I should scarcely be able to get his nomination through the Senate. Send me over his nomination; which, however, I am not yet quite ready to send to the Senate." The remaining obstacle appears to have been removed, and Stanton and Halleck evidently yielded to the President's wish, for two days later General Schofield was duly nominated to the Senate to be a major-general.

W. R. Vol. XXII., Part II., p. 745.

But Mr. Lincoln's difficulties were not at an end. In his various interviews with Gratz Brown he had understood him to fully agree to the proposed transfer, and he was much surprised to learn that that Senator, though perhaps keeping his technical promise not to personally oppose the confirmation, was secretly encouraging others in opposition. Schofield's confirmation was secured only after some weeks of delay, and upon Mr. Lincoln's further solicitation. He explained to Senators Wilkinson and Chandler that Grant and Sherman, for reasons which he did not understand, disliked Rosecrans; but that, on the contrary, they had a high opinion of Schofield, and wished him to command a corps in their army. That also while Schofield displeased the Radicals in Missouri they would be satisfied with Rosecrans, and that the transfer would thus not only set matters at ease in both these places, but would gratify the friends of Schofield by his promotion and the friends of Rosecrans by the important command he would thus receive. "It is needless to say," writes Wilkinson, "that when the Senate fully grasped the plan of the President in this regard there was no longer any opposition to the confirmation of Schofield."

Wilkinson in "N. Y. Tribune," 1885.

Ibid.

The military administration of General Rosecrans

in Missouri was thus begun in January, 1864, under favoring conditions. With the senatorial election completed and a new State Convention provided, the violent controversies of the previous year abated somewhat by a natural reaction. But there existed so many latent elements of dissension and provocation that new difficulties were continually springing up. For the better control of certain disloyal influences the General had deemed it necessary to issue an order through his provost marshal general that the members of the larger representative organizations of the various churches, such as conventions, synods, and councils, should, before transacting their business, take and subscribe an oath of allegiance to the United States. This was resented by some of them as imposing a qualification not of a political but of a religious character. The President deprecated every such restraint which was not seriously demanded; and, upon complaint, he wrote the general the following mild admonition on the subject: CHAP. XX.

This is rather more social than official; containing suggestions rather than orders. I somewhat dread the effect of your Special Order, No. 61, dated March 7, 1864. I have found that men who have not even been suspected of disloyalty are very averse to taking an oath of any sort as a condition to exercising an ordinary right of citizenship. The point will probably be made, that while men may, without an oath, assemble in a noisy political meeting, they must take the oath, to assemble in a religious meeting. It is said, I know not whether truly, that in some parts of Missouri assassinations are systematically committed upon returned rebels who wish to ground arms and behave themselves. This should not be. Of course, I have not heard that you give countenance to, or wink at, such assassinations. Again, it is

CHAP. XX.

complained that the enlistment of negroes is not conducted in as orderly a manner and with as little collateral provocation, as it might be. So far you have got along in the Department of the Missouri rather better than I dared to hope; and I congratulate you and myself upon it.

Lincoln to Rosecrans, April 4, 1864. MS.

Military conditions, like those in the political world, were more favorable at this time in Missouri; as indeed they had become throughout the whole Union. The strength of the Rebellion was everywhere declining. East of the Alleghanies General Grant was beginning his great campaign against Richmond. In Tennessee Sherman was starting on his famous campaign through the heart of the South. West of the Mississippi the Union forces had, at the chief point, such preponderant strength as left them free to take the initiative, and a combined movement to ascend the Red River and occupy Eastern Texas was in progress. No Confederate force was therefore free to threaten or invade Missouri during the early months of the year 1864, although by the disasters which befell the Red River Expedition this came about later in the year. The attention of General Rosecrans was thus mainly taken up with local military administration, in which the criticisms of the Missouri factions upon him never became so extreme as they had been upon his predecessors. For the moment, the Radicals declared themselves satisfied with him, while the Conservatives merely accused him of inefficiency and not of political bias. This branch of the quarrel between the factions expended itself mainly on the party movements preliminary to the Presidential nomi-

Sherman, "Memoirs." Vol. II., pp. 5–7.

nations. Both the Radicals and Conservatives held their State Conventions about the same time to appoint delegates to the Republican National Convention at Baltimore; each, however, accusing the other of designs adverse to Mr. Lincoln's renomination. It was alleged that the Radical delegates would go to Baltimore and demand as a condition of their adhesion that Mr. Lincoln must reorganize his Cabinet by dismissing Bates, Blair, and Seward; and that, in addition, a portion of them had sent a delegation, with Senator B. Gratz Brown as active manager, to the Cleveland National Convention to control the Frémonters of that body in the interest of Mr. Chase's candidacy. On their part, one of the principal leaders of the Radicals wrote to the President, in connection with a protest against the removal of General Rosecrans from command, "Though I do not think you have in times past treated the Missouri Radicals as kindly as you ought, yet I desire, and so do they (except the German Frémonters), that the vote of this State should be cast for you. I am one of the candidates for elector in the State-at-large, and expect to do my part towards securing that result. But all effort will be hopeless, if it should appear that you yield in so important a matter to the solicitations of our adversaries, almost every one of whom will in due time be found ranged under the standard of the Chicago nominee. You cannot afford thus to throw away the vote of Missouri; nor can the loyal men of Missouri bear for a moment the thought of being trampled under the feet of the disloyal."

Glover to Blair, May 27, 1864. MS.

Drake to Lincoln, June 22, 1864. MS.

It turned out in the end that these factional movements and intrigues depended more upon

CHAP. XX.

drifts and currents of party feeling among the masses of their followers than upon the designs of individual leaders, and that none of the several predictions were wholly verified. Senator B. Gratz Brown and the more influential Missouri delegates appointed to the Cleveland Convention neglected to attend; the labors of that meeting turned to barrenness, and its nominee withdrew from the canvass. The Conservative delegation to Baltimore was excluded from, and the Radical delegation admitted to, the Republican National Convention; and the latter was the only delegation which cast its vote against Mr. Lincoln's renomination. Under instructions they voted for Ulysses S. Grant; but immediately, on the whole vote being declared, they moved to make Mr. Lincoln's nomination unanimous; and it was done. The bulk of the Missouri Conservatives, with all their loud professions of support to the Administration, voted the McClellan ticket; while the Missouri Radicals, as a party refusing till the last moment to acknowledge Lincoln as their candidate, nevertheless gave him the electoral vote of the State.

"New York Tribune," June 9, 1864.

The summer thus passed away, and the Presidential canvass went on in Missouri with no very marked incidents, except the repetition of the annual rebel invasion; this time again under the leadership of General Price, who clung with pertinacity to his hallucination that Missouri was rebel in sentiment and he her chosen deliverer. After the Union defeats in Louisiana and the return of the Red River expedition, Price gathered a force of ten or twelve thousand rebel cavalry in Arkansas and moving rapidly northward entered Southeast

Missouri, thus changing his point of attack; driving the Union garrison out of Pilot Knob, about September 26, which delayed him by a determined resistance, he next showed an intention of capturing St. Louis, advancing a part of his forces to within a few miles of the city. In this project, however, he failed by a hasty arming of the citizens as well as by the presence of an infantry division under General A. J. Smith, sent from Cairo. Turning north and westward the rebels next threatened Jefferson City; but finding this also guarded they continued their course along the Missouri River, capturing Boonville, Glasgow, Lexington, and Independence. Their march was greatly aided by the rising of guerrillas and bushwhackers along their route. One band of these, under a notorious outlaw called Bill Anderson, atrociously massacred two parties of Union prisoners they had captured and disarmed; but they were followed, and the leader killed a few days later.

1864. Grant, Report. Moore, "Rebellion Record." Vol. XI., p. 342.

Rosecrans, Report. Ibid., p. 511.

Meanwhile the various Union detachments were being so rapidly concentrated against Price that he began a retreat southward along the Kansas border, which was soon changed to precipitate flight. A column of Union cavalry under Pleasonton fought the enemy in several sharp engagements, and in one of them captured Price's artillery — eight guns — and the rebel generals Marmaduke and Cabell, with a thousand prisoners, while the pursuit of the invaders was continued into Arkansas. The large accessions which Price's invading column temporarily gained from rebel sympathizers were more than counterbalanced by the fidelity and vigor with which the Union citizens, either as

Ibid., p. 514.

CHAP. XX.

enrolled militia or in other organizations, assisted and reënforced the military detachments. General Grant afterwards rather harshly criticized General Rosecrans for "the impunity with which Price was enabled to roam over the State of Missouri for a long time"; but the history of the war had shown that heavy columns of veteran cavalry were not easily prevented from making raids of this character, especially when, as in this case, they were willing to encounter the risk of gradual depletion and dispersion. There seems little doubt that the raid was as much political as military. All the summer General Rosecrans had been receiving information of a movement of conspiracy in the State nursed by the order of "American Knights." It was doubtless a part of that more general political conspiracy of secret associations, extending through several Northwestern States, by members of this and similarly affiliated societies, whose mischievous plottings and attempts, inspired by the rebel authorities at Richmond through their agents in Canada, are elsewhere related.

Moore, "Rebellion Record." Vol. XI., p. 342.

Rosecrans, Report, Dec. 7, 1864. Ibid., p. 510.

Upon one point General Rosecrans gave the Radical party of Missouri unfeigned satisfaction; and as his action was in strict accordance with the instructions of the President, and doubtless of his own judgment as well, we may here quote Mr. Lincoln's letter on the subject:

Sept. 26, 1864.

> One cannot always safely disregard a report, even which one may not believe. I have a report that you incline to deny the soldiers the right of attending the election in Missouri, on the assumed ground that they will get drunk and make disturbance. Last year I sent General Schofield a letter of instruction, dated October 1, 1863, which I suppose you will find on the files of the Department, and

GENERAL ALFRED PLEASONTON.

which contains among other things the following: "At elections see that those, and only those, are allowed to vote who are entitled to do so by the laws of Missouri, including as of those laws the restrictions laid by the Missouri Convention upon those who may have participated in the rebellion." This I thought right then, and think right now; and, I may add, I do not remember that either party complained after the election of General Schofield's action under it. Wherever the law allows soldiers to vote, their officers must also allow it. Please write me on this subject.

Lincoln to Rosecrans, Sept. 26, 1864. MS.

The orders of General Schofield in the previous year simply used the phraseology "qualified voters" and forbade their intimidation or exclusion. The order which General Rosecrans issued to govern the election of 1864 went a step further, and, interpreting existing laws, explained that, "This excludes from the right of voting all who since that date [December 17, 1861] have been in the rebel army or navy anywhere, and all who, since that date, have been anywhere engaged in guerrilla marauding or bushwhacking." Reciting that the civil power was too weak to execute laws and punish offenders, he declared that violations of the election laws would be punished as military offenses, and that he would punish election officers as severely for willful neglect of their duty as for its violation. On the subject of soldiers' voting, the general's response to the President was earnest and satisfactory. "I should be untrue," wrote he, "to the instincts, convictions, and professions of my life if I did not sacredly respect the right of franchise which lies at the foundation of our free government. I should be doubly so were I to prevent or even neglect to facilitate voting by the noble and

"Annual Cyclopædia," 1864, p. 551.

CHAP. XX.

Rosecrans to Lincoln, Oct. 3, 1864. MS.

patriotic citizens who, for the sacred cause of the Union, law, and justice, have become soldiers under my command, whenever and wherever the laws of the State permit it." It is sufficient to add that the careful provisions of the general's election order amply fulfilled his promise to publish one which would "give satisfaction to all honest Union men."

Better, however, than the general's stringent military order was the great tide of antislavery conversion, which, sweeping over the North, nowhere rose to a more surprising height than in this guerrilla-haunted and war-smitten State. The Presidential nominations almost wholly changed the attitude of the factions towards each other. The Conservative party, as such, practically disappeared. Its voters of Democratic antecedents returned to the Democratic party and supported McClellan; its voters of Whig and Republican origin, little by little, fused with the Radicals. The political conditions and prospects became every way satisfactory to the President and his friends, except upon a single point. Such important gains of Republican members of the House of Representatives had been made in the October elections in Indiana, Ohio, and Pennsylvania as to afford reasonable promise that, with continued success, a two-thirds vote might perhaps be secured which would have power to propose to the States an amendment of the national Constitution, abolishing slavery throughout the Union. At this critical juncture a personal controversy about the nomination of candidates in the first congressional district of Missouri had most unseasonably put two candidates in the field, which would inevitably insure the election

of a Democrat, who would as certainly vote against such a constitutional amendment. In this aspect of affairs, Mr. Lincoln deemed it his duty to interfere, and sent one of his secretaries to St. Louis with a confidential message to the Federal office-holders belonging to the Conservative faction, that they must not labor and vote to defeat the emancipation candidates, even though these called themselves Radicals and were opposing his reëlection to the Presidency.

It turned out that the controversy about the nomination for Congressman in the first district could not be composed, and the Democrat was elected as had been foreseen; but in all other respects the election simplified the confusion of the Missouri factions in a most refreshing manner. In the previous November, when the issue had been between Radicals and Conservatives without further definition of party creed, the vote had been nearly equal. But in the new issue between Lincoln and McClellan, between the Baltimore platform and the Chicago surrender, between prosecuting the war to success and declaring it a failure, the result was an overwhelming triumph for the former. Lincoln received 72,750 votes, McClellan 31,678, giving the President a majority of 41,072, or of more than one-third. The Radical candidate for governor was elected by about the same majority. Of the Congressmen elected, eight out of the nine were Radicals, the solitary exception being in the first district, where the foolish personal quarrel had thrown away victory. A large majority of the Legislature was Radical. The Radical ticket was successful in eighty out of the one hundred and fourteen coun-

"Tribune Almanac," 1865.

CHAP. XX.

ties in the State; and finally, there was a majority vote of 37,793 for the Convention, and three-fourths of the delegates elected to form it were also of the Radical party. The political revolution in the State of Missouri was complete and irrevocable, and it is only necessary to record the official embodiment of the popular decision.

"Annual Cyclopædia," 1864, p. 552.

The new Constitutional Convention met according to law at the city of St. Louis on the 6th of January, 1865, and on the sixth day of its session, January 11, it formally adopted an ordinance, "That hereafter in this State there shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except in punishment of crime, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted; and all persons held to service or labor as slaves are hereby declared free." A telegraphic announcement of the event was sent to the Legislature at Jefferson City; and in jubilation over the news the lower house of that body, by a formal resolution, turned from weightier business to greet with immense applause the singing of the famous war song, "John Brown's Body." We can best measure the change which had been wrought in public opinion, when we remember that this took place in the hall where, less than four years before, Governor Jackson and his rebel Legislature, belted with bowie knives and pistols, and with rifles leaning on their desks, concocted their treasonable enactments, through a long night, in a mockery of parliamentary forms. Also, that this constitutional ordinance of immediate and unrecompensed emancipation was now the mandatory will of two-thirds of the voters of Missouri, a State whose public opinion had tolerated, if not

Ibid., p. 553.

justified, the violation of law in almost every form, by a portion of its citizens, less than ten years before, in order to compel the neighboring Territory of Kansas to adopt the institution of slavery. Yet, it must not be hastily inferred that the passage of this ordinance of emancipation immediately restored peace and prosperity. About a month later we find President Lincoln writing the following letter to the new Governor, who had been elected and inaugurated to replace the provisional government: CHAP. XX. Feb. 20, 1865.

> It seems that there is now no organized military force of the enemy in Missouri, and yet that destruction of property and life is rampant everywhere. Is not the cure for this within easy reach of the people themselves? It cannot but be that every man, not naturally a robber or cutthroat, would gladly put an end to this state of things. A large majority in every locality must feel alike upon this subject; and if so, they only need to reach an understanding one with another. Each leaving all others alone solves the problem; and surely each would do this but for his apprehension that others will not leave him alone. Cannot this mischievous distrust be removed? Let neighborhood meetings be everywhere called and held of all entertaining a sincere purpose for mutual security in the future, whatever they may heretofore have thought, said, or done about the war or about anything else. Let all such meet, and, waiving all else, pledge each to cease harassing others, and to make common cause against whoever persists in making, aiding, or encouraging further disturbance. The practical means they will best know how to adopt and apply. At such meetings old friendships will cross the memory, and honor and Christian charity will come in to help. Please consider whether it may not be well to suggest this to the now afflicted people of Missouri.

McPherson, "History of the Rebellion," p. 606.

The action of the new Governor in response to this appeal was not all that might have been de-

CHAP. XX. sired. He did not call the neighborhood meetings suggested by the President's letter, but, in his proclamation of March 7, 1865, merely invited "all men who have not made themselves infamous by crime to unite together for the support of the officers of the law," and admonished courts and officers to greater vigilance and activity. How long the fires of these chronic neighborhood feuds might have blazed or smouldered cannot even be surmised, for new events, mightier than any mere local efforts, were destined to bring them to a sudden termination.

END OF VOL. VIII

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